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Abstract
The thesis provides a systematic analysis of social inequalities in Hungary during economic 
transition, using nationally representative samples from 1992 and 1998. Beyond the 
traditional economic measure of income inequality it uses a range of measures, including 
‘objective well-being7 (such as employment status, housing quality, social relations) and 
‘subjective well-being7 (such as individuals7 self-reported satisfaction).
The analysis shows that the highly educated are well-being rich, since they have higher 
incomes, higher chances of labour market participation, and they are more contented. The 
Romany ethnic group are well-being poor, with particularly low levels of labour market 
participation, which cannot be explained entirely by their educational disadvantage. 
However, in general a ‘patchwork inequality7 prevails. Inhabitants of the capital prosper 
better and fewer experience social isolation, but they tend to be more dissatisfied with their 
neighbourhood. Age plays a varying, but at times major, role. Other things being equal, age 
has an inverted U-shaped pattern for income and for labour market participation, 
indicating the relative advantage of middle-aged groups. In contrast, for life satisfaction age 
has a pronounced U-shaped pattern.
The determinants of happiness are largely unaffected even by a major societal landslide. 
For example unemployment or disability pensioner status is a major source of unhappiness, 
even after controlling for income, both in 1992 and 1998. Religiosity, measured as church- 
going, is a positive and stable correlate of happiness. One exception is the self-employed, 
who may be called major winners of the transition process, as indicated by their growing 
life satisfaction.
The empirical results show that objective well-being does matter over and above income, in the sense 
that its specific measures contribute significandy and consistendy to life satisfaction 
(‘experienced utility7). This suggests that a minimum level o f‘well-being or that of ‘functionings7 
is not just normatively good, as suggested by Sen7s capabilities theory, but also desired by 
people.
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The primary goal of the thesis is to investigate one of die main social dimensions of 
economic transition in Hungary, namely how well-being of various social groups has 
changed. The ultimate justification of such a transition process (if we disregard historical 
‘inevitability* as the exclusive reasoning), can only be improvement in the lives of people. 
Two questions arise, however: improvement for whom, and when. The latter issue is 
widely discussed in the literature of transition, identifying a Valley of tears’ followed by 
prosperity (e.g. Przeworski 1991). Most of the countries of Central-Europe have already 
managed to restructure their polity, the legal foundations of their economies, and stabilise 
their new economic systems. Transition seems to be over. Why does well-being during 
transition matter then? One reason is that current and future prosperity of the people 
gready depends on the distributional processes during that period. The other is that better 
understanding of social changes would contribute to our knowledge of the patterns of 
social stratification. Our focus is die distribution of well-being among various social 
groups, thus legal or macro-economic issues, however important they may be, are 
considered indirecdy, only through their effects.
The thesis will investigate two dimensions of social inequalities during transition: objective 
well-being and subjective well-being. It will aim to describe and analyse how specific social 
groups have gained or lost during the process, using a set of indicators. Objective well­
being will incorporate income, housing quality, employment status and social relations. 
Subjective measures will include specific and general indicators, such as individuals’ 
satisfaction with various aspects of their lives, including their incomes, housing conditions 
and family relations, and their satisfaction widi their lives as a whole. This will enable us to 
get a rather complete picture of social inequalities, and also, to assess the relative merits of 
diese analytical approaches.
Empirical research inevitably involves value judgements of some sort, even if this is 
concealed or not made explicit. These judgements, if hidden, may limit the interpretation 
of the implications of such results. Therefore I intend to establish the theoretical 
background of my research first of all, discussing the role of value judgements in 
philosophies of distributive justice, followed by a brief account of value choices in the 
empirical literature. Finally I will outline the starting position of my research, the 
operationalisation of a theoretical concept.
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1.1 VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE
The theoretical basis of the thesis is Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, which is regarded 
to be a distinctive contribution to normative economics by many. The reason for this 
choice, however, is not primarily this, but the normative and deeply humanistic nature of 
Sen’s work. For Sen, the foundations of a consistent theory of the social good lie in a 
conception of what makes a good life for a human being (Sugden 1993). Starting from an 
extended critique of the orthodox position in economics, which may be called ‘revealed 
preference welfarism’ he offers an alternative theory of the social good. This approach also 
seems to provide a major theoretical solution for the problem of interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being. Sen’s theory has strong conceptual connections with Aristotle’s 
view of the human good (Nussbaum 1993; Sen 1993). Both of these theories are based on 
a single objective account of the human good, or in ethical terminology, human 
flourishing1. This account is
*objective in the sense that it isjustifiable by preference to reasons that do not derive merely 
from bcal traditions and practices, but ratherfrom feature of humanness that lie beneath 
all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not thy are in fact recognised in 
the local traditions* (Nussbaum 1993, p. 243).
Capabilities and human flourishing
The objective roots of Sen’s theory seem to be strongly associated with neo-Aristotelian 
accounts of human flourishing. Both capabilities and human flourishing are objective, 
because they identify objects of desire and choice (capabilities and human flourishing, 
respectively), which are desirable and choiceworthy, not simply because they are desired or 
chosen. ‘It is desired because of what it is. Its constitution is what makes it good. Thus, a 
human goodness is something ontological. It is a state of being, not a mere feeling or 
experience.’ (Rasmussen 1999, p. 3). One of Sen’s major criticisms against utilitarianism lies 
in its disregard of personal adaptation to circumstances, for example by diminished 
expectations. A person with disadvantaged circumstances may not aspire to certain things,
1 ‘ "Human flourishing” is a relatively recent term in ethics. It seems to have developed in the last two decades 
because the traditional translation of the Greek term eudaimonia as “happiness” failed to communicate clearly 
that eudaimonia was an objective good, not merely a subjective good’ (Rasmussen 1999, pp. 1-2).
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may not choose them, but this should not prevent us from acknowledging these potential 
choices as objects of value. In his theory, Sen claims that having capabilities, which means a 
person's ability to achieve and choose from various states of being, is good per se.
Human flourishing and capabilities offer a view of the human good that is objective, 
individualised and diverse, self-directed and social. Both are individualised and diverse, 
because they depend on the individual and his characteristics. In the notion of human 
flourishing the realisation of a person’s potentialities is not the same as someone else’s, they 
are not interchangeable. Sen does not daim that equal states of capabilities cannot occur by 
definition. His account is individualised in the way that he acknowledges personal 
diversities, differing abilities in converting resources into states of being. The self-directed 
nature of human flourishing emphasises the role of a person’s own effort, the necessity of 
him taking charge of his own life, beyond the mere possession and use of needed goods. 
Sen’s theory also attaches intrinsic value to the active choice of individuals in attaining their 
current state of being. Choice, and the ability to choose are valuable, and the value attached 
to them distinguishes the capabilities framework from other theories of justice based on 
the possession of goods. Social interactions, ‘philia’ (friendship) are in the core of both 
accounts, our maturation or ‘full life’ requires a life with others.
Sen however emphasises the differences between his and the Aristotelian approach. He 
maintains that the capabilities approach is incomplete, and deliberately so. ‘This (the 
Aristotelian) view of human nature (with a unique list of functionings for a good human 
life) may be tremendously overspecified’ (Sen 1993, p. 47). He rejects urges to be more 
radical and specific, ‘by introducing an objective normative account of human functioning 
and by describing a procedure of objective evaluation by which functionings can be 
assessed for their contribution to the good human life’ (Nussbaum, quoted by Sen 1993, p. 
108). Sen sees his capability approach primarily as an identification of the ‘space’ of value- 
objects, and does not intend to reach conclusions on how the valuational exercise is to be 
completed. Thus, Sen avoids being non-liberal (by not acknowledging that there are 
various possible accounts of what “good” is) or paternalistic (believing to be able to set the 
standard of evaluation entirely himself).
Sen’s way of describing what a good life is, thus, rather indirect, through the identification 
of the space of value objects. His intention is to redirect our attention from resources to
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‘states of beings’, from means to ends, from utility to functionings and capabilities. 
Functionings, ‘beings and doings’, and capabilities, a set of functionings a person can achieve, 
constitute this evaluative space. ‘Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 
“functionings” ’ (1992, p. 30). ‘Being adequately nourished’, ‘avoiding premature mortality’, 
‘taking part in the life of the community’, and ‘being happy* are all examples of 
functionings. Capabilities, in comparison, ‘are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: 
what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead’ (1987, p. 36). Capabilities 
thus come close to the notion of positive freedom. This definition of capabilities also 
implies that they include opportunities, which may not be valued or chosen by the person. 
For example, having the capability of being adequately nourished, someone can choose to 
fast. In this case the lack of the functioning of being fed is a result of the individual’s 
choice, and not due to external constraints.
Capabilities and other objects of value
In establishing his theory, Sen draws a conceptual map, relating his position to major 
political philosophies. He criticises rights and entitlements, utility, resources and primary 
goods as bases of theories of distributive justice. Rights are inadequate, because they ignore 
consequences of actions (Sen 1984c), referring to especially Nozick (1974). Utility, 
interpreted either as an object of value in itself (referring to a certain mental state), or as a 
valuational device (used to evaluate other objects of value, for example goods possessed) 
ignores freedom and concentrates only on achievements (Sen 1992). Equality of resources, 
as presented by Dworkin (1981), ‘overlooks the interpersonal differences in the mapping 
from resources to capabilities’ (Sen 1984c). Primary goods, in Sen’s view, lack concern for 
what goods do to people, thus represent only means, not ends (1982; 1984b). Sen, 
however, stresses how much he has been inspired by John Rawls, and identifies basic 
capabilities ‘as natural extension of Rawls’s concern with primary goods’ (Sen 1982, p. 368). 
Sen even asserts that ‘there are good reasons to think that Rawls himself — contrary to the 
theory is really after something like capabilities. He motivates the focus on primary goods 
by discussing what the primary goods enable people to do”2 (1984c, p. 320).
2 According to Sen the main reason for their divergence is Rawls’ ‘untenable assumption underpinning his 
framework. He asserts that the, often implicit, assumption of Rawls is that ‘the same mapping of primary 
goods to capabilities holds for all* (Sen 1984c, p. 320). This means that Sen challenges Rawls for his disregard 
o f interpersonal differences in converting goods into capabilities.
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Sen’s capabilities are equal to neither goods nor the utility enjoyed by the individual at their 
consumption. They stand in between, as the map portrays (Figure 1). Sen makes clear 
distinction between goods (e.g. rice), their material characteristics (giving calories and 
nutrition), the functioning of a person (living without calorie deficiency) and utility (e.g. the 
pleasure from consumption) (Sen 1984c). A person’s well-being, the quality of living, is 
characterised by his functionings. The freedom to pursue well-being, the real opportunities 
the person has, are reflected in his set of capabilities. Capabilities are thus may be called 
Svell-being freedom’, ‘reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another’ 
(Sen 1992, p. 40).
Figure 1.1. Utility, functionings, capabilities and their sources
Utility ^I Goods
Psychic state
Material
characteristicsFunctionings
Personal
characteristics
Capabilities o f a 
person to function
Environment
physical,
social,
political
Source: (Muellbauer 1987, p. 40)
As mentioned before, Sen emphasises the connection between capabilities and primary 
goods, for both provide a basis for assessment of real opportunities. Primary goods are 
‘things that every rational man is presumed to want.’ (Rawls 1971, p. 54). Rawls makes a 
distinction between social primary goods and natural goods. Social primary goods are 
rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth. Natural goods are for example 
health and vigour, intelligence and imagination. Thus liberties and opportunities seem to be 
intrinsic part of both Sen’s and Rawls’ theory. Rawls explains liberty by reference to three 
items: ‘the agents who are free, the restrictions or limitations which they are free from, and 
what it is that they are free to do or not to do.’ (p. 177) He discusses liberty mosdy in 
connection to constitutional and legal restrictions. Sen’s focus is freedom as positive 
freedom, as freedom of individuals to do something. For him, the institutional and political 
structure of a society is relevant only in an indirect way, in its effects of promoting or 
inhibiting individual’s capabilities.
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As Sugden notes, however, Sen underestimates the difference between his theory and that 
of Rawls’ (Sugden 1993). The fundamental difference lies in their ways of thinking about 
justice. While Sen aims to develop a substantive account of the good of the individual, 
Rawls aspires to evaluate rules, using procedural values. Rawls’ justice as fairness is 
political, not metaphysical (Rawls 1985). It avoids ‘claims to universal truth, or claims about 
the essential nature and identity of persons’ (p. 223). It does not intend to apply any general 
moral conception to the structure of society. According to Rawls, the ‘basic structure’ of a 
modem democracy is realised by means of social co-operation, one unified system of social 
co-operation. A basis of such social unity is consensus between individuals who may well 
have different values and beliefs. Justice as fairness is ‘supported by what we may call an 
“overlapping consensus”, that is, by a consensus that includes all the opposing 
philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less 
just constitutional democratic society.’ (pp. 225-226) This theory is based on liberalism as a 
political doctrine, which ‘assumes that it is a characteristic feature of a free democratic 
culture that a plurality of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good are 
affirmed by its citizens.’ (p. 248) In contrast, classical utilitarianism, and other conceptions 
of justice, for example Plato, Aristode and the Christian tradition as represented by 
Augustine and Aquinas all hold that there is but one conception of the good which is to be 
recognised by all persons, so far as they are fully rational.
Criticism of the foundations of utilitarianism has played a major role in Sen’s work, and 
even a brief account of his contribution to the debate on welfarism would go beyond the 
limits of the thesis. Some major concerns, however, are particularly relevant for the 
approach of this analysis. Sen emphasises that die utilitarian approach is problematic 
because of its focus on a single maximand, utility, disregarding its distribution among 
people. Utility itself is problematic, because it does not distinguish between different 
sources of pleasures or pain. Actions, rules, and institutions matter only to the extent they 
promote individuals’ happiness.
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‘Utilitarianism is not really interested in persons as such, and that a person is viewed by 
a utilitarian as nothing other than the place in which that valuable thing called 
happiness takes place. It does not ultimately matter how this happiness happens, what 
causes it, what goes with it, and whether it is shared by many or grabbed by a few. A ll 
that really matters is the total amount of this 'marvellous’ thing, happiness or desire- 
fulfilment. ’ (Sen 1984c, p. 308)
Interestingly, in much of his work Sen focuses mostly on utility as happiness or desire 
fulfilment. As Sugden notes in his review of Inequality Reexamined, Sen ‘says very little about 
revealed preference welfarism, effectively treating it as a nonstarter’ (1993, p .1949).
Sen’s attack on utility may sound controversial: while he acknowledges the value of 
happiness as an element of well-being, at the same time he also condems it, being a 
measure of utility. The criticism, however, does not refer to happiness per se, rather its use 
as a single object of value.
I t is quite eay to be persuaded that being happy is an achievement that is valuable, and 
that in evaluating the standard of living happiness is an object of value. [ ...]  The 
interesting question regarding this approach is not the legjtimaty of taking happiness to be 
valuable, which is convincing enough, but its exclusive legttimaty. ’ (Sen 1987, p. 8)
One major fault of using happiness as a unique measure of well-being may be called the 
problem of the ‘adaptive preferences’. A person, who lives in thorough deprivation, may 
not aspire for things, which are not attainable for her. Jon Elster (1983), using die tale of 
sour grapes, describes the adaptation process in the following way: aldiough desiring die 
grapes, the fox, seeing that he cannot reach them, judges that they are sour. Nussbaum 
(2001) criticises the narrow focus of Elster’s argument and says that changes in preferences 
can often be a good thing, for example when people adjust to reality rather than sustaining 
unrealistic aspirations (she cites her own personal desire to be the world’s best opera 
singer). She argues that a substantive theory of justice and central human capabilities is 
essential in order to identify desires (and unrealisable desires). In addition, discrimination 
and abuse are violations of personal liberty even if people adjust to them.
In sum, Sen’s theory of capabilities is distinct from other theories of justice, both in terms 
of the identification of the object of value and also in terms of its justification. For 
utilitarians, it is utility that matters, for libertarians, it is rights, and for egalitarians resources 
are the basis of evaluation. Rawls’ theory of justice uses the concept of primary goods.
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Sen’s metric is based on capabilities. Sen’s theory of the social good may be called an end- 
state theory, which is distinct from procedural criterion of fairness, concerned with the 
evaluation of rules. Capabilities, and especially functionings seem to provide a suitable base 
for empirical comparisons of inter-personal well-being. The main value of this conceptual 
framework lies in its focus on positive freedom, the realisation of this freedom, its concern 
with ends, not means, the acknowledgement of interpersonal differences in converting 
resources into states of being, and the provision of an absolutist core for interpersonal 
comparisons.
1.2 MAKING SEN(SE) IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Although Sen’s work received wide acclamation for advancing normative theory, many 
scholars expressed their scepticism on the empirical applicability of his theory of 
capabilities. Sen refrains from ‘completing* his framework, by providing a comprehensive 
list of capabilities, or even that of basic capabilities. He does not give a clear guidance on 
empirical application either (see discussion later). Despite the numerous attempts at 
empirical conceptualisation, it seems that there is limited success in a comprehensive and 
direct application of his theory. Nolan and Whelan find that ‘the approach has had litde or 
no impact on empirical studies which seek to measure and understand poverty* (1996, p. 
85). Piachaud argues that ‘Sen’s absolute goals, save that of physical survival, are too vague 
to be of any theoretical or practical use’ (1987, p. 148). How has Sen influenced the 
empirical literature? And how can the existing literature be evaluated in terms of Sen’s 
discussion on the normative basis of social research?
Existing operationalisation of the capabilities approach predominandy uses functionings as an 
approximation of capabilities. Capability has not yet gained scope as a major currency of 
interpersonal comparisons. Empirical literature based on functionings can identify its roots 
in existing ‘social indicators’ research and the ‘basic needs approach’. What Sen seems to 
have provided, is a theoretical depth to the ‘not deeply founded approach’ (1987, p. 25). 
Although these approaches, according to Sen, have the merit of redirecting attention from 
income, from GDP and economic growth to other aspects of social achievements, they 
mosdy remain preoccupied with commodity possession instead of examining what lives
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people actually lead or can lead. Based on this, primarily two major objects of value can be 
distinguished in empirical research: income, and well-being or functionings.
Place of functionings in the field
My main concern related to the extensive literature on quality of life and living standards is 
how it actually relates to Sen’s approach. For this, first I try to draw a map of the major 
empirical concepts and applications based on their choice of the evaluative space and the 
methodology of evaluation (Table 1), and then discuss briefly a few selected major works. 
Literature on both objective and subjective measures of well-being will be discussed in 
more depth in later chapters of the thesis.
Choices in empirical studies involve firsdy a choice of the object of value, whether it is 
income, or functionings, secondly a choice on the general concern, whether it is a specific 
basic standard or overall inequality, and finally, a choice on methodology, whether 
aggregate or distributional measures are used, and if any, what weighting method is to be 
employed. This classificatory exercise, however, at times proved to be difficult. Studies 
often use various measurement units, combining measures of income, material resources 
and functionings, e.g. Swedish Level of Living Research (Erikson and Aberg 1987), the 
Living Standards Measurement Survey of the World Bank (e.g. Chander, Grootaert and 
Pyatt 1980; Grosh and Glewwe 1995). In these ambiguous cases the criterion for 
classification was whether there was a detectable intention in the projects to measure 
functionings or not. Studies which are based on income often use a commodity-based 
standard to define die desirable income level. For example, the so called "budget standard 
approach’ in poverty research defines minimum consumption requirements, then after 
pricing the goods, translates it to the metric of income. Such cases are classified as studies 
of income, since they do not focus on the possession of certain commodities, but only on 
levels of income.
The Breadline Britain Survey was first systematic attempt in Britain to define what 
constitutes the minimum standard of living in the public’s view, and also to assess in what 
ways people fail to meet these standards (Mack and Lansley 1985). The specific virtue of
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this approach is that the authors try to measure enforced deprivation3. Mack and Lansky’s 
way of identifying social consensus thus includes subjective standards, because households 
are asked whether their lack of a specific item is due to their choice or they cannot afford 
it. This approach thus measures resources, not direcdy states of individuals. The motivation 
of the authors, including their effort to go beyond the single measure of income, suggests, 
however, that this approach may be regarded as an attempt to measure functionings4.
Table 1.1 Classification of major empirical concepts and applications
General concern
Minimum standard Overall inequality
Summary measures Distributional measures
Objective approaches
In
co
me
Headcount 
Poverty gap 
Relative poverty lines 
Absolute poverty lines (e.g. 
budget standard’ approach) 
Sen index5
Townsend’s deprivation 
index6
Lorenz curve; 
Gini coefficient 
Atkinson index
Analyses o f income distribution or income 
mobility
Subjective approaches
Leyden poverty Hne | |
Objective approaches
i '
1 &
- S
%
s*
fe
>
Human Poverty Index-2 
Breadline Britain Survey 
Studies on deprivation7 
Studies on social exclusion8 
EU indicators on social 
inclusion9
Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Swedish Level of living Research;
Living Standards Measurement Study 
(World Bank)
Comparative Scandinavian Welfare Study 
Norbalt Living Condition Project10 
Research on well-being in the European 
Union and Eastern Europe 11
Subjective approaches
£ Comparative Scandinavian Welfare Study 
Sociological and psychological literature 
on subjective well-being 
‘Economics o f happiness’12
Nolan and Whelan start from the hypodiesis that income poverty is inadequate as a 
measure of the extent and nature of poverty, if poverty is conceptualised in term of
3 This systematic attempt seems valuable in my view, although there are some methodological doubts on the 
measurement o f involuntary deprivation. As Piachaud notes, a major problem is their treatment o f those 
households which cannot afford necessities but afford non-necessities (1987, pp. 149-152).
4 Sen regards Mack and Lansky’s work to be related to his approach, but does not specify how (1992, p. 39).
5 For definition, see (Sen and Foster 1997)
6 (Townsend 1979)
7 e.g. (Nolan and Whelan 1996; Layte, Maitre, Nolan and Whelan 2001)
8 e.g. (Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud 2002)
9 (Atkinson, Cantillon, Marker and Nolan 2002)
10 (Aasland 1996; Grogaard 1996; Knudsen 1996)
11 (Comia 1994; Micklewright 1999; Micklewright and Stewart 1999; 2000; Micklewright and Ismail 2001; Stewart 2002)
12 e.g. (Di Telia, MacCulloch and Oswald 2001)
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exclusion from the life of society because of a lack of resources (1996). Instead, they 
propose a poverty measure, which takes into account both income and deprivation. 
Deprivation is measured by various indicators of life-style, including household amenities, 
housing conditions, nutrition, clothing, and leisure. To account for differences in tastes 
across people the authors distinguish ‘enforced lack of resources’, those items which the 
household lacked and said that it was because could not afford them. Their finding is that the 
overlap between income poverty and deprivation is weak. ‘About half the households 
below income poverty lines were experiencing enforced basic deprivation, while substantial 
numbers above those lines reported such deprivation’ (p. 149)13. Thus income is not an 
adequate ‘short cut* if someone wants to measure multi-dimensional deprivation. A 
possible main explanation is that current income is an inadequate proxy for actual financial 
resources. Using both savings and income as an alternative poverty criterion, however, the 
authors still find that the explanatory power of this criterion is weaker than measures of 
deprivation, e.g. for explaining people’s experience of financial strain. The reason for this is 
that differences in individuals’ backgrounds, needs and other ‘social assets’ also contribute 
to variations in life-styles. According to Nolan and Whelan, this provides a strong case for 
die use of multiple measures of deprivation. Later the authors applied a similar approach 
for cross-country comparison, using the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(Layte et al. 2001; Whelan, Layte, Maitre and Nolan 2001).
The Comparative Scandinavian Welfare Study also uses resources, but its primary focus is 
much broader, It incorporates measures of education, health, employment, social relations, 
political activities and opportunities to live in harmony with nature (Allardt 1993). 
Subjective measures gained equal emphasis to objective ones in the design of the survey. 
The subjective indicators include dissatisfaction/satisfaction widi living conditions, 
unhappiness/happiness about social relations and about personal growth.
Subjective approaches measure well-being on the basis of people’s self-reported states. 
They usually investigate individuals’ happiness in general or their satisfaction with particular 
aspects of their lives, such as income, living standards, health or other functionings. 
‘Subjective well-being’ has an extensive literature, including economics, sociology and
13 Basic life-style deprivation indicates lack of food, clothes and basic necessities. This is distinguished from 
secondary life-style deprivation, which includes items such as leisure activities, and from housing deprivation.
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psychology (for a review of the relevant literature, see chapter 5). The empirical literature 
on the ‘economics of happiness* uses survey measures of happiness as proxies for utility 
(see e.g. Di Telia et al. 2001). Although these studies use this measure of happiness 
exclusively, they could also be interpreted as essential analyses of a particular, and very 
important element of well-being. The related literature will be discussed in detail in chapter 
7.
An early application of this subjective approach in economics is the so-called Leyden 
approach. This has been derived by a research group, which worked at the University of 
Leyden in the seventies and eighties (see e.g. Van Praag, Spit and Van de Stadt 1981). The 
basic question module is the so-called Income Evaluation Question, which follows: ‘What 
monthly income (net of taxes) would you consider for your household as: very bad, bad, 
not bad not good, good and very good?’ The respondent is then supposed to give exact 
amounts of these in the local currency. This information is used for the compilation of an 
overall subjective poverty line, and also of a welfare function.
Sen himself has contributed to die empirical literature in the field of quality of life research, 
and has applied his capability approach, with paying special attention to the developing 
world, especially India. His contribution to quality o f life research included analysis of 
mortality as an indicator of economic success and failure (Sen 1998), studies of sex bias in 
health conditions, undemutrition and poverty (Kynch and Sen 1983; Sen 1984a; 1985). Sen 
in his 1998 study presents a major argument for the use of measures other than income in 
comparative research (1998). He found that Harlem men are overtaken in terms of survival 
even by the Bangladeshis, meanwhile they are many times richer measured as income per 
head than the latter group. He does not argue that income should be abandoned in 
economic analysis, rather that it should be supplemented by other measures. Sen asserts 
that ‘personal income is certainly a basic determinant even of survival and death, and more 
generally of the quality of life of a person* (p. 23).
A major, and maybe the most influential explicit application of Sen*s theory is the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (with Amartya Sen’s contribution as a consultant), published 
yearly in the Human Development Report by the UNDP starting from 1990, as the now 
widely accepted alternative to GDP for comparing human well-being between countries. 
The report interprets human development both as ‘the process of widening people’s
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choices and the level of their achieved well-being’ (UNDP 1990, p. 10). The measurement 
of human development focuses on three essential elements of human life: longevity, 
knowledge and decent living standards. These elements are described by means of life 
expectancy at birth, illiteracy and school enrolment, and GDP per capita. (HDI is a 
composite index based upon the weighted average of these indicators.) The HDI rankings 
of countries may differ significandy from their ranking based upon GDP per capita.
The HDI index is a simplified approach to tackle and measure the selected three elements 
of well-being, and represents a compromise for the sake of ensuring comparability and 
accessibility of data. Life expectancy, illiteracy and school enrolment may be called 
measures of ‘basic capabilities’. GDP per capita, however is a rather indirect approximation 
of capabilities. Thus, similarly to the classic psychological approach of Maslow (1970), the 
conceptual choices of the HDI imply a hierarchy of needs, where the satisfaction of 
physical needs is essential prior to the appearance of social, emotional and other higher- 
ranked needs. These elements of well-being, nevertheless, do not provide a full description 
o f human development, as also acknowledged by the report. ‘Additional choices, highly 
valued by many people, range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities 
for being creative and productive, and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed 
human rights.’ (UNDP 1990, p.10) Another shortfall of this measurement is the lack of 
concern of a society’s human freedom, first of all of the fact if individuals live in a 
democratic or an authoritarian polity. This is also revealed in the first report, indicating that 
the exploration of links between human freedom and human development is indeed 
necessary in the future.
Most criticism of die construction of the HDI has targeted the income component. 
Ravallion, for example, challenges the implicit trade-offs built into the HDI between 
income and longevity (1997). The calculation of the income index in the formula is based 
upon the assumption of decreasing utility of income and the diminishing returns to 
transforming income into human capabilities. Therefore a world average income ($5,990, $ 
based on PPP, purchasing power parity) is taken as a threshold level and any income above 
this level is discounted. In response to these, the UNDP has revised its methodology for
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discounting income. The new formula14 does not discount income as severely as the one 
earlier, and it discounts all income, not just the income above a certain level (UNDP 1999a, 
p. 159). As a result, rising income gets recognition as a potential means for further human 
development. The new methodology, however, brought some problems of comparability 
with indices of previous years15.
The definition of human well-being used in the HDI does not seem to be adequate for the 
characterisation and comparison of industrial countries. Probably as a response to this 
problem a special index was introduced in 1998, the human poverty index for industrial 
countries (HPI-2). The dimensions of deprivation defined as the basis of this index are 
quite similar to those reflected in the HDI — longevity, knowledge, a decent standard of 
living, plus social exclusion. The standards of measurement are adjusted to these countries, 
for example deprivation in knowledge is measured by the percentage of people who are 
functionally illiterate, which is more adequate measure than simple illiteracy in these 
countries. The incorporation of social exclusion, measured simply as the rate of long-term 
unemployment, also reflects social norms of industrial countries, where participation in the 
labour market is increasingly perceived as a criterion of social inclusion (e.g. Atkinson et al. 
2002).
Since 1990, the launch of the first Human Development Report, the concept of HDI as a 
measurement of human development has been significandy extended. By 1999 the United 
Nations Development Programme published various indicators beyond the human 
development index; a gender-related development index and a gender empowerment 
measure, and two types of human poverty index, for developing and for industrial 
countries, as mentioned above (UNDP 1999a). The incorporation of die gender 
perspective is the first step within this comparative framework to actually indicate the 
distribution of capabilities widiin societies. These gender indices confirm the existing 
results of previous empirical research on relative deprivation of women in most societies. 
Economic historians have expanded the use of the HDI as well, by applying it as an 
indicator of development in a historic perspective. For example Crafts has compiled the
14 W(y)= (logj -  logjmin)/(logj^-logjO, where y is a specific country’s actual per capita income in PPP$
15 The UNDP made some effort for recalculating previous indices on the basis o f the new formula, but is was 
partial. For many countries, including Hungary, they did not manage to compute the HDI of the previous 
year, thus the HDI has lost its potential for time-series analysis in these countries.
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HDI for 16 advanced economies since 1870 and argues that conventional measures of 
economic growth seriously understate the rate of improvement in living standards (Crafts 
1997).
Although starting from a different basis, the recommendations of the United Nations (UN 
and ILO 1954; Drewnowski and Scott 1966), the Swedish Level of Living Research16 
represents one potential implementation of Sen’s capability concept (Erikson and Aberg 
1987; Erikson 1993). The research is based on a one-country longitudinal survey especially 
designed for its purposes and describes the changes in living conditions between 1968 and 
1981. These inequalities are outlined in distributional terms as well, between different social 
groups, thus providing a detailed analysis of relative well-being based upon various group 
characteristics like gender, age, occupational group and region. The study has used 
descriptive indicators, thus was based on actual situation of individuals, irrespective of their 
satisfaction with their current situation. The indicators incorporated both economic 
resources (income and wealth), and other components such as health, employment, 
education, housing, social integration and political resources.
A few studies have used non-monetary dimension of well-being for evaluating transition 
countries, but it is far from becoming a widely used exercise. A major international 
comparative study was implemented through the NORBALT Living Condition Project, 
which comprises national reports from five different regions in the three Baltic states of 
Estonia (Grogaard 1996), Latvia (Aasland 1996), and Lithuania and two Russian areas 
(Knudsen 1996). The surveys were conducted on a standardised methodological base, thus 
allowing comparisons between the areas. There is a limited dynamic analysis included in the 
project, in case of Lithuania, where a rather similar survey was conducted in 1991 and 
1994. In another international comparative study, for Central-Asia, Falkingham uses 
capability-based indicators for measuring well-being (Falkingham 1999). Her research is 
based on existing data, first of all the national Human Development Reports and UNICEF 
data. The recent study by Micklewright and Stewart focuses on a population subgroup,
16 Level o f living’ is a specific term used in the Swedish Level o f Living Research. The designers o f the 
research wanted to emphasise its difference from standard of living, because level o f living’ uses not only 
resources, but also states and achievements of individuals. Standard of living is however, fir from being a 
well-defined concept, and various ‘divergent and rival views’ co-exist within it In Sen’s terminology, 
capabilities can be actually used for the assessment of living standards, thus there seems to be no 
contradiction between the standard of living and capabilities (Sen 1987).
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children, and compares their level of well-being in the European Union to that of the 
applicant countries (2000). They use measures of economic welfare, health and education. 
None of these studies, however, seems to share the main concern of the Swedish Level of 
Living Research, namely the comparison of well-being between various socio-economic 
groups.
Analysis of what? Specification of the object of value
The use of capabilities seems to be especially relevant for die analysis of the countries of 
Central-Eastern Europe for various reasons. First of all, capabilities are valuable per se. It is 
the human condition and the choices people have which are the final test of the social 
consequences of transition. Secondly, income is an inadequate indicator of well-being 
during a major dislocation. Crucially change in economic system could produce a step 
change in the relationship between income and well-being. So before and after change, 
difference in income correlates with well-being, but not over transition itself. In addition, 
income may not be able to explain individual differences in well-being, such as health state 
or nutrition. Income analysis faces serious difficulties related to the intra-household 
allocation of resources. Individual level indicators of well-being avoid external judgements 
on this matter, and may be particularly useful in countries with intense cultural diversities. 
Income may only partially reflect the effects of substantial economic changes, like the 
restructuring of the labour market, the redistribution of wealth and privatisation of state 
assets, the reorganisation of social services or changes in the relative prices of goods (e.g. 
due to cutbacks in price subsidies). Point-in-time income data inevitably show transient 
shocks as well, disregarding households’ ability to pool over time and their ability to adjust 
their consumption patterns (Comia, Fajtli, Motivans, Panicda and Sborgi 1996). Income 
indicators may be deficient for describing resources themselves, due to measurement 
failures. Problems relating to hidden income, resulting for example from black market 
activities or own production, or tax evasion may substantially distort available data in 
certain countries.
Capabilities thus seem to have great potential to evaluate Eastem-European changes. The 
question of how to do this immediately arises. Sen proposes three alternative approaches 
for the evaluation of capability sets (Sen and Foster 1997; Sen 1999b). The first is the 
“direct approach”, which examines and compares vectors of functionings or capabilities.
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Sen calls this ‘the most immediate and full-blooded way* (1999b, p. 81). The second, the 
“supplementary approach” uses both traditional procedures of income comparisons, but 
supplements them by capability considerations, ‘often in rather informal ways’ (p. 82). This 
means either the direct comparison of functionings, or that of variables other than income, 
which are expected to influence capabilities. Lastly, the “indirect approach” remains 
focused on incomes, appropriately adjusted. It uses various equivalence scales to equalise 
family incomes in terms of capability achievement. For example, ‘family income may be 
adjusted downward by illiteracy or upward by high levels of education’ (p. 83). Sex bias 
within the family could also be assessed.
The “indirect approach” has the advantage of using income, which, beyond being familiar, 
allows more articulation and easier interpretation. The difficulties, however, are not 
negligible. In order to define die equivalence scale, we need to identify the relevant 
capabilities, and their influence on income, the conversion rate. This and die definition of 
the relative weights on how various capabilities influence incomes necessitates certain 
judgements. In this sense this approach is not different from the direct comparison of 
capabilities or functionings.
Sen also emphasises that the primary object of evaluation should be capabilities, not 
functionings. The valuable informational content of capabilities, as representatives of 
positive freedom, is acknowledged by most scholars in the field, however the complexity 
seems to be a major barrier of its widespread empirical application. Discussions of the 
freedom of choice are rather formalised and theoretical (e.g. Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Arrow 
1995). A full empirical application would need to investigate all potential choices o f people, 
including those they are not aware of due to their diminished expectations. Who could 
detect such capabilities? It seems doubtful than any external viewer can make a judgement 
on this, being able to identify those options which are not known but realistically attainable 
by an individual. Also, how could such an exercise avoid paternalism, and arbitrary 
discretion? A more limited exercise, the mapping of the well-known options by individuals 
would avoid such problems, but it would inherently bring biased outcome due to individual 
variations of consciousness and rationality. Also, the information content of such 
investigation would increase to great complexity. This would also raise issues like whether 
realised capabilities are to be given specific weight and if yes, how.
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Sen, as discussed before, does not provide a specific account of what capabilities or 
functionings are to be assessed, thus their identification seems to be the prior step of any 
evaluative exercise. All what Sen defines are some examples, e.g. of basic capabilities (1982, 
p. 367). Nussbaum derives her list of ‘basic human functional capabilities’ from an 
Aristotelian account of a good life (Nussbaum and Glover 1995). Although she calls her 
list ‘basic’, it incorporates a wide range of items, including personal intellectual and 
psychological factors, for example ‘being able to laugh, to play5 (p.84), and also social and 
political elements. Similarly, expert judgement is the basis of Desai’s list of basic capabilities 
(1995, p. 193). Another way of defining the valuable set is by social consensus. This approach 
aims to define contemporary standards, the commonly accepted values in the society. Such 
consensus is the basis of defining primary goods in Rawls’ theory of justice. In their 
empirical work, Mack and Lansley base their analysis of poverty on an investigation on 
social standards regarding the need for particular commodities and the related functionings 
(1985).
Sen acknowledges that the use of functionings (‘the option actually chosen3) can be a way 
of assessing capability sets. (1994, pp. 339-40). Functionings are used as the basis of most 
empirical applications. Erik Schokkaert and Luc Van Ootegem apply Sen’s concept to the 
Belgian unemployed (1990). Their identification of functionings is rather pragmatic; a result 
o f factor analysis of 57 survey questions (elements of functionings). Their investigation 
includes extensive survey of psychological characteristics of the unemployed as well. This is 
a particularly interesting aspect of their application, not only because they recognise that 
psychological difficulties are often a consequence of being without a job, but also because 
such functionings may be particularly relevant in the context of richer countries. 
Schokkaert and Ootegem refer to Sen17, implying that Sen acknowledges the importance of 
‘psychological’ functionings in richer countries compared to ‘material functionings’, which 
may show little variation (1990, p. 432)18.
17 (Sen 1985, p. 46)
18 This is, unfortunately, a misrepresentation of Sen’s argument, since he does not mention psychological 
functionings at all (Sen 1985, p. 46; or in a different edition: Sen 1999a, p. 30). Sen refers to only social, 
cultural and intellectual functionings (all o f them being objective, not subjective or self-evaluation), such as the 
ability to have friends, to participate in the life of the community, to travel, etc. The ‘psychological’ 
functionings, however, do seem to be a useful addition to this list Moreover, they are consistent with Sen’s 
interpretation of well-being, as noted before, which includes happiness as well
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In his “supplementary approach”, as mentioned earlier, Sen acknowledges the use of 
income together with functionings or capabilities (Sen 1999b). Such hybrid techniques may 
be particularly useful, when ‘data limitations are rather pervasive and apply to resources as 
well as functionings’ (1994, p. 338). The supplementary approach has been used by 
numerous empirical studies, like the Swedish Level of Living Survey (Erikson and Aberg 
1987), and the Comparative Scandinavian Welfare Survey (Allardt 1993). Chiappero 
Martinetti (1996) argues that resources as well as functionings and capabilities should be all 
included into the assessment of the standard of living. She proposes the use of ‘fu22y  set 
theory’, which provides various alternative aggregation procedures for all elements of well­
being into a ‘membership function’ 19. She produces a good visual presentation of the 
problem by her analogy of an “expert system”, but overall provides a rather partial picture. 
Her proposal for the distinction between choice and constraint as a cause for low levels of 
functionings does not seem to be convincing. It is not clear how she can account for ‘taste’, 
and distinguish it from unobservable factors. With this, the core of her argument, the 
inclusion of freedom as a component of well-being remains unconvincing. This problem 
however leads us already to the issue of evaluation methods.
Methodology of evaluation
The chosen object of value gready determines what kind of problems we face at the 
selection of the applied methodology. If someone uses the direct approach, trying to 
compare functionings or capabilities themselves, he can opt for
“ \total comparison ’ involving the ranking of all such vectors vis-a-vis each other in 
terms of poverty or inequality (or whatever the subject matter is); 
partial ranking\ involving the ranking of some vectors vis-a-vis others, but not 
demanding completeness of the evaluative ranking;
19 Fuzzy set theory is a theoretical concept introduced in the mid-1960s, which has been extensively used in 
decision-making support models, and in science, including artificial intelligence and expert systems. Recently it 
drew attention in inequality and well-being analysis as well The brief, non-formal definition is the following: 
‘Fuzzy set theory substitutes the characteristic function of a crisp set that assigns a value of either 1 or 0 to 
each element in the universal set (discriminating between members and nonmembers of the crisp set), with a 
generalized characteristic function (called a membership function) which varies uniformly between 0 and 1. 
Larger values denote higher degrees of membership’ (Chiappero Martinetti 1996, p. 44). This enables the 
inclusion of both qualitative variables measured on an ordinal scale, such as health condition or subjective 
opinions, but also dichotomic variables with values of 0 and 1.
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‘dintinguished capability comparison \ involving the comparison of some particular 
capability chosen as the focus, without looking for completeness of coverage” (Sen 1999b, 
p. 82).
Sen expresses his doubts in several cases of the use of total ranking, and reveals his 
preference for partial ranking20. Gaertner’s attempt to compare vectors of basic 
functionings for 130 countries confirms this (Gaertner 1993). He finds for example that 
simple vector dominance held only in 16% of binary comparisons among Eastem- 
European countries (p. 44). Similarly, Chakraborty, comparing 10 countries with low HDI 
ranks does not find a single case of vector dominance (Chakraborty 1996). Both of them 
conclude that the consequence of this is that a certain weighting is necessary for 
comparisons.
Various weighting mechanisms have been proposed in the literature. Dasgupta uses the so- 
called Borda method for ranking poor countries based on certain major social indicators 
(1993, p 108-116). Chakraborty proposes a consensual approach, where the aggregation of 
individual’s functionings is based on weights defined by all members of the society (1996). 
Chiappero Martinetti’s fuzzy approach provides another potential method, although its full 
empirical application is still lacking (1995; 1996). Deutsch, Ramos and Silber uses notions 
of production economics (the input quantity index and the output quantity index) to derive 
single measures of quality of life and standard of living, which is then applied to the British 
Household Panel Study data (Deutsch, Ramos and Silber 2000).
The necessity of weighting is, however, can be challenged on various grounds. Firsdy, Sen 
himself emphasises that the components of the standard of living are valuable per se.
Tf it turns out that there has been an improvement in, say, the standard of nourishment 
but a decline in the standard of being sheltered, that itsef may be an interesting enough 
assessment, even when we are unable to decide whether \altogether’ this indicates an 
improvement ora deterioration. ’ (Sen 1987, p. 33)
Elsewhere he goes on to say that the simultaneous assessment o f different objects of value 
can actually capture the ‘constitutive plurality’ of the standard of living (p. 36).
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The second major reason for scrutinising components of well-being is policy oriented. 
Individual indicators may be used as ‘output’ measures of past and existing government 
policies and can provide useful information for policy-making. The third argument can be 
made from a social research point of view. Aggregation implies information loss per se, 
which may not be desirable especially if the focus of the research is distributional, 
concerned with relative well-being of various social groups compared to each other. An 
interesting research question may well be for example to test whether there are different 
social groups which have health problems and low levels of education or it is one specific 
group which scores low on these measures of standard of living. The use of a single 
indicator has the implicit assumption that there is a specific social group which is well­
being poor and another which is well-being rich. In addition, Micklewright emphasises that 
the results of a single index are sensitive to the arbitrary choices made at the index’s 
construction (2001, p. 48). In conclusion, all this provides a strong case for a multi­
dimensional way of measuring well-being
1.3 AIM AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE THESIS
As argued before, the capabilities approach seems to provide an adequate basis for 
analysing the impact of transition in Eastem-Europe. During such a substantial social 
restructuring income indicators may provide only a partial picture, and they do not seem to 
explain suffidendy individual differences in well-being (Comia et al. 1996). Hungary 
appears to provide an excellent example for die application of diis approadi. It has gone 
through a major economic and sodal restructuring, and the process seems to be by and 
large over. The available datasets, national representative household samples are rich and 
reliable, and seem to provide a suitable basis for the analysis of well-being. The coexistence 
of these factors make it a useful test case for modelling the sodal consequences of 
transition.
20 The formal definition is the following: I f  x  has more of some object of value and no less of any than 
then xhas a higher standard of living. I shall call this the ‘dominance partial ordering’ (Sen 1987, p. 4).
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Inequality in transition: research questions and hypotheses
The window of opportunity to change positions in social paces, to counteract effects of 
inequality, is a narrow one. It is limited to the time of transformations. A s a new social 
order settles, it is likely that those who are on the top ’will find themselves able to 
maintain that position, and those at the bottom m il end up staying there as well Change 
is the excption and n'production the rule of social orders, be thty communist or 
capitalist. * (S^elenyi and Kostelh 1996, p. 1095).
This passage explains the motivation of the analysis of transition. ‘Positions’, as explained 
before, in this analysis are interpreted as level of well-being, the object of value used here. 
Social divisions of well-being may help to understand the main features of future inequality. 
Changes in die relative position, on the other hand, shows how this window of opportunity 
has opened and for whom.
The thesis seeks to answer die following questions:
1. What were the differences in the well-being of various socioeconomic groups in 
Hungary at an early point of the transition, 1991-1992 and at a later phase, 1997- 
1998?
2. How did these differences evolve during the period 1992-1998?
3. What is the added value of the analysis of inequalities of various indicators of well­
being compared to using current income measures?
4. How is satisfaction related to objective well-being, human capital and other 
personal characteristics?
5. Which social groups have become more satisfied, and which less satisfied during 
transition? In other words, who are the ’winners’ and ’losers’ of transition in terms 
of happiness?
I am concerned with inequality, rather than poverty or social exclusion. The focus is thus 
on the overall distribution of well-being, not just on the bottom of the scale, which would 
imply the use of a certain minimum standard This broader approach thus avoids the use of 
simple dichotomies, and also the problems of justifying a single cut-off line. Erikson, in his 
own argument for inequality rather than poverty, refers to underlying ideological 
differences (1993). He suggests that ’poverty is the main welfare problem for social 
liberalism, while inequality is the main problem for social democracy’ (p. 80). He explains 
that the Swedish institutionalised welfare model functions ’on a par’ with the market, and is
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concerned with diminishing disparities between population groups. This also explains the 
values of Swedish social research. In contrast, die residual welfare model aims for the 
correction of market deficiencies and focuses on people in the greatest need. In accordance 
with Erikson’s view, I agree that there is an obvious value choice in choosing inequality as 
the subject of inquiry. I would like to clarify that this concern, however, is not exclusively 
related to the role of the welfare state, but rather it is a way of assessing the overall 
functioning of the market, the welfare state and the family as well. All of these are inherent 
parts of the ’welfare regime’, as also argued by Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999).
The meritocracy thesis
For the field of sociology the Eastern European transition is of major interest, not only for 
the magnitude of social changes, but also because it provides an opportunity for testing 
general theories of social stratification and mobility. One major issue, which may be called 
the issue of meritocracy, is whether the social positions of individuals are primarily 
determined by their social origins or by their own efforts. In the terminology of social 
mobility research, the question refers to the strength of association between class of origin 
and the class of destination. The ‘industrialisation and modernisation thesis’ claims diat 
increasing industrialisation and modernisation leads to declining inequalities by individuals’ 
origin, and status attainment is increasingly determined by their investment in schooling. 
How does this relate to economic transition in Eastern Europe? Robert argues that 
transition brought economic crisis, which is expected to result in an opposite trend, a rise 
in inequality by origin and a weakening relationship between higher levels of education and 
high social status (Robert 2001, p. 124). The alternative argument, however, appears more 
appealing; the increased role of the market as a coordination mechanism should strengthen 
the relationship between individual effort and reward. Human capital, skills and knowledge, 
and social capital, personal relations21, are expected to matter increasingly. It seems, 
however, that these two indicators are strongly related to each other, and also to an 
individual’s origin. The systematic test of these hypotheses is not aimed at in this current 
research. The main reason is that these theories describe achievement mostly as a single
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indicator, e.g. that of class position. A multidimensional test of causality in individual’s life 
history would go beyond the scope of this work, and is altogether a different research 
question. What is a more relevant hypothesis from our point of view?
Human capital, although seems to be influenced by both ‘luck’, e.g. inherited abilities, and 
also by effort, may be used as a proxy for ‘merit* in this sense (although not necessarily in 
the moral one). Such an approach is pursued in much of the economic literature, 
measuring e.g. returns to skills. Skills, however, are only partly measurable, and 
unobservable factors may become increasingly important over time, as US data for 1963- 
1989 (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993) and Russian data for 1991-1994 suggest (Brainerd 
1998). A sociological explanation is that ‘social skills* may play an increasing role (Jackson, 
Goldthorpe and Mills 2002).
Increasing returns to human capital may have other reasons as well. In their theoretical 
discussion on the consequences of transition, Flemming and Micklewright note that in a 
new economic system with liberalised prices ‘abnormal quasi-rents will accrue [...] to the 
owners of certain types of human capital’ (2000, p. 879). The returns to human capital (and 
thus overall earnings inequality) depend on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of labour, on 
labour mobility between enterprises and locations, and also on capital/labour 
substitutability (ibid., p. 878, Table 4). The latter means that if profits increase and as a 
result investments rise, they will be concentrated in those areas, which bring the highest 
return. Investment in human capital will depend on the capital market, and on the level of 
earnings. It may happen that low earnings would limit investment in the education of 
worker’s children, which may sustain positions which yield high quasi-rents for a long 
period and thus would contribute to a cumulative deterioration in the distribution of 
earnings.
As the consequence of a move away from a ‘bureaucratic coordination’ mechanism toward 
greater ‘market coordination’22 we can expect that instead of ideological definitions of
21 Social capital refers to the ‘resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization 
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person’ (Coleman 1990, p. 
300). Coleman, in his outstanding work on social theory, analyses relations of authority and of trust, and also 
norms as various forms of social capital. Social capital is a major focus of the French sociologist, Bourdieu as 
well
22 Komai’s terminology (1992b, pp 91-109). See also discussion in the introduction of chapter 2.
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‘merit’, rewards are more attached to performance, defined as economic performance. This 
implies that those individual characteristics, which do not influence a person’s productive 
capacity, should not be factors of inequality. So while educational attainment and labour 
market status are expected to be determinants of well-being, gender and ethnicity in 
themselves should not be. Some existing evidence, however, suggests that this may not the 
case. Income poverty is increasingly associated with ethnicity and gender. Emigh, Fodor 
and Szelenyi speak about the ‘radalization and feminization of poverty’ (2001). Ladanyi 
goes further, speaking about a ‘Roma underclass’, primarily referring to the spatial 
concentration of the Gypsy population (2001). These studies, however, use only bivariate 
analysis for measuring the relationship between ethnicity and income, or ethnicity and 
other indicators of well-being. Despite recent efforts to understand the situation of women 
(Levai and Toth 1999; Pongracz and Toth 1999), it seems that overall there is still limited 
evidence on the ethnic and gender dimensions of well-being in Hungary, beyond the 
traditional measures of income and labour market participation What are these divisions? 
Can the differences be explained by educational and demographic differences?
Possible losers,; the Romany population
There are various accounts of the social marginalisation of the Gypsy population23, or the 
Romany as they prefer to call themselves24, and also of a prevailing discrimination against 
them. As the Helsinki Human Rights Watch notes ‘they are almost entirely absent from the 
visible political, academic, commercial and social life of the country’ (Guglielmo and 
Waters 1996, p. 1), although diey comprise around 5-6 percent of the total population25. 
Their major educational disadvantage [only about half of Romany children finish primary 
school, and only 5 in 1000 complete secondary school (Kertesi 1995)] is one of the major 
reasons why they were particularly hit by lay-offs during the economic restructuring. The
23 The Gypsy population is not a single community, but consists o f a number of distinct groups. These groups 
have unique historical, cultural and linguistic traditions. The surveys used here, similar to most other 
household surveys, cannot make distinctions beyond the generalised ‘Gypsy* identifier. Thus I will use a single 
category of Gypsy ethnicity. Nevertheless, we have to be aware of their heterogeneity. About three fourths of  
Gypsy population are Hungarian speakers, and characterised by the most advanced degree of assimilation. 
One fifth of the is Olah, or Romany-speaking, and about 50,000 speak Beash, a dialect o f Romanian 
(Guglielmo and Waters 1996, p. 7).
24 Roma means ‘man/men* in their language.
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other major reason, as some powerful empirical analyses show (Kertesi 1994; Abraham and 
Kertesi 1996), is the regional concentration of the Romany population: they tend to live in 
areas and small settlements particularly hit by unemployment. Standard economic theory 
and compositional differences, including educational and demographic differences, can 
only partly explain the significandy higher unemployment and inactivity of the Gypsy 
ethnic group. The large remaining residuals (V2 — Vi) suggest that there are strong signs of 
possible discrimination. A striking finding of Kertesi’s study is that the willingness to work 
of the non-employed Romany is much greater that of the non-Romany: the occurrence of 
those who are actively seeking work is one and a half times as high among the first group 
than in the latter. This contradicts public opinion, which often blames the specific 
‘attitudes’ of the Gypsy population for their low rates of activity.
The case studies of the Human Rights Watch group confirm the assumption that there is 
systematic discrimination against the Romany in various public services, including public 
housing and education (Feher, Cartner and Whitman 1993; Guglielmo and Waters 1996). 
In addition, they are subject to a widespread racism and are frequently victims of violence 
(Guglielmo and Waters 1996). These disadvantages are expected to result in a prevailing 
overall pattern of relatively low well-being for the Romany population, including income, 
labour market situation and housing conditions. Has the Gypsy population experienced 
lower levels of well-being in both years, or have they also suffered increasingly from the 
consequences of economic transition? In other words, can they be called losers’?
Winners: human capital seems to dominate over past politicalparticipation
Another major issue of social mobility is that of elites: to what extent the former political 
elite managed to convert their old privileges into new ones. Evidence for the success of 
former cadres seems to be mixed. Rona-Tas finds that communist cadres were successful 
in converting their past political power to economic one, and did particularly well in the 
corporate segments of the private sector (1994). The very reason for this, he argues, was
25 A promising sign of increasing ethnic autonomy was the establishment of minority self-governments for 
thirteen minorities, including the Romany in late 1994. The fimctioning o f these bodies, however, had to face 
numerous difficulties. One of the main problems is that the minorities law did not include any substantive 
financial guarantee. As a result, actual funding had been ‘minimal’ (Guglielmo and Waters 1996, p. 115). 
Beyond this, the Human Rights Watch noted signs of government interference in the elections for the 
national Romany self-government and also in the operations o f the minority governments (ibid, p. 115-136).
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their human capital (p. 40). As Robert points out, however, discussing these results, the 
effect of party membership disappears once educational level is controlled for in the model 
(2001, p. 177). Similarly, his analysis on the entry into self-employment shows that the 
impact of former party membership is not significant, using a multivariate model (Robert 
and Bukodi 2001). Party membership, however, may be a rather crude proxy for past 
political power. In a more differentiated fashion, Szelenyi argues that there are both 
winners and losers among the old elite. The Trig winners’ are the members of the former 
‘technocratic elite’, while the ‘big losers* are the ‘bureaucratic fraction of the cadre elite’ 
(Szelenyi and Kostello 1996, pp. 1093-94). Komai emphasises that the change in the 
economic system brings new behaviour patterns as well. Old elites act differendy in the 
new environment. Even a former party secretary will have to desire to earn profit and 
increase the value of the firm. ‘Old friendships may gain the former cadre member a job 
for a time, but if he fails to meet the requirements, he will not have a successful second 
career and will probably be weeded out sooner or later’ (Komai 2000, p. 34). In sum, it 
seems plausible to assume that political power was not a sole source of advantage during 
transition to capitalism. Radier, human capital and individual achievement played a major 
role.
Labour marketposition: a key role in success
Existing evidence suggests that educational attainment and labour market position play a 
major role in success during transition. Habich and Speder find diat people widi higher 
education degrees are die major winners, and also those who live in Budapest (1998). The 
authors also show that labour market position, first of all labour market participation or the 
lack of it, is a major determinant of die ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ position. In their analysis the 
winner and loser positions are defined in terms of income, using a panel dataset 
overlapping with the dataset used here26. These results also imply that neither social 
transfers nor inter-family support could compensate for die disadvantaged labour market 
position.
26 Winners and losers are identified by the authors both on the basis o f their income levels and that of  
changes in the income levels. Winners are those (1) who had an income which was one and a half times or 
more that the average in four years out of five, (2) who had this income level in the last two years of the 
period, (3) whose income dynamics was more than 30% of the average. Similar categories define the losers.
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The ‘window of opportunity’ opened for those with high education levels in general, but 
also for those endowed with entrepreneurial spirit. The increasing dominance of capitalism 
brought increasing opportunities for entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurship, although 
existed in some restricted ways before 1990, gained more legal support, and possibly moral 
one, too. On the other hand, they had to face increasing competition. Widening 
opportunity thus went together with growing constraints. What was the total outcome of 
these forces in terms of well-being? Measures of life satisfaction seem to provide a useful 
analytical tool to answer this question. Can entrepreneurs be called ‘winners’ of the 
transition? Have they become happier over time?
Income and mil-being
The advancing of transformation into capitalism, the increasing dominance of market and 
the decline of state redistribution supposedly affected not just the social divisions of well­
being, but also the relationship between various aspects of well-being. Increasing self- 
reliance of individual’s made them increasingly liable for the promotion of their own well­
being. Also, people may have been able to ‘cushion’ themselves during the early shock of 
transition against the negative impact of the decline of their incomes, by using past saving 
or changing their consumption patterns. This may have been less so over time. All this 
suggests that we can expect that the role of income as a determinant of well-being has 
strengthened over time.
Altogether, the thesis tries to describe the patterns of well-being and their changes over 
time. Due to the existing complexity of these issues, I do not aim for a causal explanation. 
How will these questions be answered? What are the methodological choices made?
Unit of evaluation
The thesis will use functionings as a unit of evaluation. Thus, we will concentrate on the ‘focal 
point of the set*, the capability option actually chosen. This has been called ‘elementary 
evaluation’; the value of the set is equated with the value of the ‘best’ element (Sen 1999a, 
p. 39). Although theoretically this ‘best’ can be interpreted both as the actually chosen 
element or the maximally valued option from the capability set (1994, p. 340), if there is 
maximising behaviour these two options will coincide. For example, if individual A prefers 
spending her money on recreation, and individual B chooses to renovate her home, then,
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although the capability set of both included the possibility of recreation and good quality 
housing, I will measure the value of their capabilities by the element chosen, thus by 
recreation for person A and housing quality for person B. In this approach the real issue is 
the lack of adequate housing for A, which shows up as a functioning failure for him, even 
though that functioning was in A’s capability set This seems to be of major policy 
relevance as well, given that the focus here is on basic measures of functionings. A more 
pragmatic reason in favour of using functionings is that there is no data available on 
capabilities. The informational requirement of capabilities is immensely larger than 
functionings, thus choosing capabilities would exclude the use of existing datasets designed 
for other purposes.
The elementary evaluation approach may be challenged by critiques of rationality (cognitive 
imperfections, time-inconsistent behaviour, or loss aversion, e.g. see the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky, discussed in chapter 7). People, they would say, may well not 
choose the options which are the best for them, thus evaluating capability sets based on the 
options chosen would be a poor proxy of the most valuable set In defence, one can argue 
that choices are relevant per se, especially from a polity perspective, because thy reveal how people actually 
live. In my view the issue of how they could live better if they were more rational is a useful 
complementary, but not fully adequate basis for analysis.
One essential element of capabilities, however, seem to disappear when using functionings 
as approximation for capabilities: freedom. Sen argues that it is more valuable to be able to 
choose one option out of several ones compared to having one single option, even if 
ultimately the choice of the individual is the same. For example, if an individual chooses to 
spend on food, he is better off if he had the alternative to spend on housing compared to 
not having it. I think that this problem is relevant first of all in the specific case of 
constrained choice. By this I refer to a specific situation in which an individual is limited in 
his choices due to external circumstances, e.g. the legal system or labour market 
opportunities. For example, let as assume a situation where an individual has a set of 
options consisting of spending on food or on a car, but not that of buying a house, due to 
the existence of a bureaucratic allocation system. If the individual ends up spending on a 
car instead of his preferred option of buying a house, he will experience constrained 
choice. These issues will be discussed in more details when I interpret the findings of the 
empirical investigation. One approximation of freedom may be based on the analysis of
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material resources, because they greatly influence the capabilities a specific individual can 
achieve.
For the measurement of well-being various alternative indicators will be used, including 
income. Although resources themselves are valuable only in an indirect way in the 
capability framework, they seem to provide an important complementary information, 
which make them useful in empirical studies (e.g. Swedish Level of Living Surveys). 
Income indicates a potential range of choice in consumption and express possibilities for 
future functionings. Income will also provide a base for comparison of traditional income- 
based measures of inequality and capability based inequality.
Methodology of evaluation
The analysis will incorporate both objective and subjective well-being, or in Sen’s 
terminology “standard-evaluation” and “self-evaluation” (Sen 1987). In the first case I try 
to identify and scrutinise those indicators which constitute contemporary standards. In the 
second case, the analysis is based on the individual’s self-assessment This will, to more or 
less extent, involve a comparison of his or her situation with that of others. The 
identification of people’s reference groups is a rather difficult empirical exercise. On the 
other hand, these groups play a major role in people’s expectations or their sense o f 
fairness. Indicators of subjective well-being include this relative aspect of well-being as well. 
Subjective indicators, however, may be problematic, because people probably adapt to 
situations. Possible paradoxes include the satisfied poor with diminished expectations, or 
the luxury tastes of the rich. It is not clear how strong these phenomena are in the context 
of transition, where changes of circumstances are substantial, so adaptation to specific 
levels of well-being may occur to a less extent than in countries which experienced long 
periods of continuous development. Nevertheless, the use of both objective and subjective 
standards seems to be a appealing approach, as shown by existing empirical literature 
(Kolosi 1987; Allardt 1993; Andorka 1995) This approach may help with the problem of 
whether we should incorporate people’s expectations as measures of policy outcomes, 
given that protection of accustomed living standards is taken as an aim of social insurance 
(Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven 1999).
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The classificatory framework chosen here has roots in classical sociology as well. Max 
Weber defines ‘class situation’ as ‘the typical probability that a given state of a) provision 
with goods, b) external conditions of life, and c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be 
possessed by an individual or a group’ (1947, pp. 424). These attributes may be called 
indicators of well-being in contemporary language, which indude a) resources, b) objective 
measures and c) subjective measures. This is exactly the approach chosen in this work.
The analysis will focus on the following set of capabilities:
•  Being able to maintain an autonomous life, to have financial security
• Being able to live in a healthy and pleasant physical environment
• Being able to have employment, to have a fulfilling job or to do a socially valued 
activity outside the labour market
• Being able to live for others
•  Being able to lead a happy life
These capabilities will be approximated by functionings or well-being indicators of individuals, in 
other words, realised capabilities. This inevitably means that I will attach normative values to 
these measures of functionings, and attach more value to higher levels of possessions. For 
example, housing of a good quality is regarded to be valuable per se. For certain variables, 
individual’s states have to be compared and ranked. Unemployment is regarded to be 
undesirable compared to employment. Such judgements are more difficult referring to
absence from the labour market. Inactivity may occur as a dioice, for example for die
purpose of child care, or it may be a necessity, e.g. an escape from unemployment in the 
form of early retirement. During the analysis I will try to separate these two forms of 
inactivity, first of all by identifying such ‘forced’ inactive states27.
In the case of certain possible indicators of well-being, it is not appropriate to rank states of 
individuals, because ‘choice’ and ‘enforced lack’ cannot be distinguished. Marital status, or 
voting behaviour are such measures, of which the second may need more explanation. 
Identifying voting in national elections as an indicator of well-being seems to be 
problematic. In my view it is an essential part of individual’s freedom to be able to refrain
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from voting, thus I do not want to attach normative value to voting as such. The possibility 
of voting in a democratic election may have value for an individual, but not the act of 
voting itself if it is a result of a free personal choice. This argument seems to be particularly 
relevant in the specific context of Hungary, where in the pre-transition era many people felt 
that they were expected to vote and now they may appreciate the freedom of being able to 
abstain from voting if they want to.
These measures of functionings show significant overlaps with the United Nations* notion 
of level of living (Drewnowski and Scott 1966), the Swedish welfare concept (Erikson and 
Aberg 1987) and the Hungarian quality of life survey conducted by the Central Statistical 
Office in 1981/82. Due to shortfalls of the currently used dataset, it is not possible in this 
work to address issues of security of life and property and that of working conditions. A 
major constraint of the current research is the simplicity of health indicators in the available 
survey data, which do not provide comparability over time.
Table 1.2 Capabilities and their operationalisation in the thesis: indicators of well-being
Capabilities | Indicators \ Measurement
OBJECTIVE MEASURES
Being able to maintain an 
autonomous life, to have 
financial security
Income Net total annual income fin most cases: equivalised 
household income)
Being able to live in a healthy 
and pleasant physical 
environment
Housing quality Housing quality problems 
Housing ownership
Being able to have 
employment, to participate in a 
socially valued activity
Employment
status
Employment status
Being able to live for others Contacts with 
friends and 
relatives
Contact with friends or relatives
Number of friends with whom problems can be
discussed (1998)
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES
Being able to maintain an 
autonomous life, to have 
financial security
self-reported
satisfaction
Satisfaction with income 
Satisfaction with living standards
Being able to live in a healthy 
and pleasant physical 
environment
self-reported
satisfaction
Satisfaction with housing 
Satisfaction with neighbourhood
Being able to live for others self-reported
satisfaction
Satisfaction with family life
Being able to lead a happy life self-reported
satisfaction
Satisfaction with life so fax 
Satisfaction with future perspectives
27 Two main particular exit strategies characterised the Hungarian labour market during transition: early
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Each of these capabilities or measures of well-being will be examined individually, thus not 
as a component of an overall measure. The population as a whole is the subject of the 
investigation, including children. Due to the nature of certain indicators, like employment, 
at times the analysis has to be narrowed down to the working age population. Wherever 
possible, household level variables will be attributed to all members of the household 
individually (e.g. housing conditions, social contacts with relatives). In the case of 
household income, which needs to be somehow attributed to the members of the 
household the analysis will apply various measures of equalisation.
Figure 1.2. Assumed relationship of variousfunctionings and income
Income HappinessEducation Occupation
Housing
Social integration
The explanatory variables will include sex, age, educational level, ethnicity and region or 
type of setdement. The independent variables all refer to personal characteristics of 
individuals, which are either permanent (like age, sex and ethnicity) or relatively long-term 
characteristics (like education and region). These indicators, togedier with labour market 
status and household size have been identified as major risk factors of income poverty in 
Hungary (Toth 1999). The inclusion of education needs some explanation. Knowledge, 
participation in education, and the ability to lead a life with adequate educational 
background are one of the most common indicators of social development and human 
well-being. Educational attainment is no doubt an essential functioning. At the same time it 
is not just an end in itself, but a means to achieve other valuable things in life, such as 
having a satisfactory job, or being able to lead a certain lifestyle. In this analysis I focus on 
education as a determinant of well-being, rather than an end in itself. This choice, however, 
is more of a pragmatic nature, due to space and data constraints, rather than an expression
retirement and disability pension scheme. These have been widely used as alternatives to unemployment
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of a value judgement Figure 1.2 illustrates the assumed relationship of various functionings 
and income.
Ethnicity in the analysis is defined as those who were considered Gypsy by the non-Gypsy 
community. ‘This definition certainly does not discount those, who self-consciously claim 
dieir Gypsy origin, but it also includes those, who have already became strongly assimilated 
into other communities. Every experience indicates, that the non-gypsy communities are 
aware of the origins of even of the successfully assimilated gypsies’ (Kemeny, Havas and 
Kertesi 1996, p. 3). This comprehensive survey, conducted between Oct 1993 and Feb 
1994 finds that 5% of the population is Gypsy, which equates to approximately half a 
million. This is similar to the proportion identified in the surveys used in this thesis.
Finally, I would like to briefly mention a few major terminological choices of the thesis. 
Well-being is used as a synonym for specific measures of functionings, so it refers to a 
particular labour market status (objective well-being) or a specific level of self-reported 
satisfaction (subjective well-being). For the sake of clarity, it does not refer to die whole set 
of functionings, in odier words the overall quality of life of a person. Self-reported satisfaction 
with life as a whole so fa r is a specific measure of subjective well-being, used in the second part 
of the thesis. This measure of satisfaction is used interchangeably with *happiness*, in line 
with the terminological conventions of the recent economics of happiness (e.g. Frey and 
Stutzer 2000), which uses similar survey measures (for a detailed discussion see chapter 5). 
Gypsy and Romany will be used interchangeably as identifiers of the major ethnic group in 
Hungary. Finally, the text aims to use ‘gender sensitive’ language, which means that Tie’ and 
‘she’ are used interchangeably, referring to lie  or she’.
1.4 MAIN HYPOTHESIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
In sum, the main hypothesis of die diesis are the following
1) The overview of various major empirical works measuring people’s well-being in 
section 1.2 suggested diat there are certain important aspects of the quality of life, 
which are not adequately addressed by a sole income measure. Thus it is expected 
that there will be social inequalities in well-being which cannot be explained by 
differences in income.
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2) Increasing ‘meritocracy5, in other words increasing returns to human capital is expected to 
be a major consequence of transition to capitalism. Human capital may increasingly 
influence earnings and also labour market participation. It may also happen that 
‘abnormal quasi rents’ will accrue to specific types of human capital, since labour 
supply adjusts to changing demand with some delay (Flemming and Micklewright 
2000).
3) Existing literature reports a prevailing disadvantage of the major minority ethnic 
population, the 'Romany: This includes their particularly low labour market 
participation, their very low average level of educational attainment and also spatial 
concentration most hit by economic recession (Kertesi 1994; 1995; Ladanyi 2001). 
There are various accounts of systematic discrimination against Gypsy people, 
including social services (Guglielmo and Waters 1996). Based on this, it is expected 
that die analysis will find signs of disadvantage in terms of various measures of 
well-being of the Gypsy ethnic group. Beyond this, there might be a worsening in 
the relative position of the Gypsy population, thus diey may be potential group of 
losers of the transition process.
4) Existing empirical research on Hungary showed that beyond educational 
attainment labour market position plays a major role in ‘success’, measured in terms of 
income (Habich and Speder 1998). Did labour market participation contribute 
positively to other elements of well-being over and above income? More 
specifically, the ‘window of opportunity’ opened for those endowed with 
entrepreneurial spirit. Did entrepreneurs gain from die increased economic freedom 
during transition? Have they become happier over time?
5) Finally, it is expected that the advancing of transformation into capitalism has 
affected the relationship between various aspects of well-being Increasing self-reliance of 
individuals made them increasingly liable for the promotion of their own well­
being. Also, people may have been able to ‘cushion’ themselves during the early 
shock of transition against the negative impact of the decline of their incomes, by 
using past saving or changing their consumption patterns. This may have been less
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so over time. AH this suggests that we can expect that the role o f income as a 
determinant of well-being has strengthened over time.
How will the thesis address these particular issues? It has two main parts, on objective well­
being and on subjective well-being. This reflects the complementary nature of these 
approaches in assessment of the quality o f life. The relative weigjht of subjective well-being 
is also due to the fact that similar systematic assessment of people’s satisfaction in Hungary 
is very scarce.
In the following section, in chapter 2 ,1 will discuss the context of the analysis, by providing 
an overview of well-being in Hungary during the 1990s, together with an international 
comparison. The main features of the welfare system, and its changes will be also 
described, including the welfare state and enterprises as providers of welfare. Later chapters 
will present my own data analysis, including its methodology, its results and their 
interpretation. The structure will follow particular elements of well-being. Income 
inequality is discussed in chapter 3, with a great emphasis on methodological choices, and a 
sensitivity analysis of the results. Three further measures of well-being are analysed in 
chapter 4, including labour market participation, housing and social relations.
The second part of the thesis, the analysis of subjective well-being, starts with the 
discussion of satisfaction with specific domains of life. Chapter 5 analyses the relationship 
between objective conditions and their subjective assessment, focusing on three measures 
of satisfaction: satisfaction with income, satisfaction with housing and neighbourhood and 
satisfaction with family relations. I will also scrutinize the relationship between personal 
characteristics and subjective well-being, in other words social inequalities in subjective 
terms. Then, in chapter 6 I will examine the relationship between measures of satisfaction 
with particular domains of life and general life satisfaction. In other words, how much 
individuals’ sentiments toward specific aspects of their lives explain their overall 
‘happiness’, and whether this ‘internal structure’ of ‘happiness’ differs for specific 
population groups. In the final phase of the empirical analysis, I will look at social patterns 
of ‘happiness’, and its changes over time. This latter question may be also interpreted as an 
analysis of winners and losers during economic transition in terms of personal happiness. 
This survey measure of general life satisfaction may be also interpreted as a proxy for 
‘experienced utility’. Thus, this chapter will present evidence on the relationship between
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income and utility, and also between odier personal attributes, including labour market 
status, and utility.
While happiness can be interpreted as an inherent element of a person’s well-being, as 
mentioned before, it is also used as a single measure of individuals’ welfare. Due to this 
dualistic nature of this measure, I can also say the thesis will finally be able to draw together 
various different aspects of measuring individuals’ quality of life, including resources, 
functionings and utility, each of them representing different objects of value, stemming 
from a rather different theoretical background. This unintended consequence of the 
plurality of the operationalisation of Sen’s concept of well-being may prove to be insightful 
in its own right.
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2.1 OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF WELL-BEING AND TRANSITION: AN
INTRODUCTION
The coming three chapters analyse objective well-being in transition. What is objective 
well-being and what do we mean by transition? I start die discussion with clarification of 
these terms.
Objective well-being refers to states of individuals, which are observable, and measurable 
based on explicit criteria of success. As discussed before, these criteria of success may be 
based on ‘expert judgement’ or on a sort of ‘social consensus’. The former approach is 
pursued recendy by the European Union, and will be used in this analysis as well. ‘Expert 
judgement’ seems to be more suitable for choosing indicators, which ‘have a clear and 
accepted normative interpretation’, are ‘robust and statistically validated’, are ‘responsive to 
effective policy interventions’, and their ‘measurement should not impose too large a 
burden’ on states. These criteria are suggested by Atkinson et al as desirable properties of 
social indicators in die EU (Atkinson et al. 2002, pp. 21-23). Such ‘expert judgement*, 
however, in order to be socially accepted and transparent, has to take account of 
contemporary social standards. Due to this, the indicators should be remain ‘timely*, and be 
subject to revision if necessary 28. The indicators o f objective well-being thus need to 
measure elements of the quality of life, which are desirable and measurable. Desirability, 
however, is not the sole criterion of value, as discussed in depdi in die previous chapter.
Social indicators as performance indicators seem increasingly to play a political role in the 
development of the social agenda of die EU. Atkinson et al. in their recommendations on 
the principles of indicator construction emphasise diat an indicator should ‘have a clear 
and accepted normative interpretation’ (2002, p. 21). In this analysis I focus on elements of 
individuals’ lives, which are inherendy valuable. In most cases, goodness can be simply 
quantified in terms of ‘the more is better*. In others, however, such as certain labour 
market positions, or family status and fertility, the normatively desirable states are less
28 Certain indicators of poverty already include an automatic updating mechanism, for example when a 
poverty threshold is defined relative to the mean or median income.
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clear-cut and gready depend on individuals’ choices. These aspects of well-being will be 
discussed later on in the relevant sections of the analysis.
What are the main features of the measures of well-being used here? Drawing on the 
discussion in the previous chapter, the properties of the indicators used here can be briefly 
summarised as follows.
•  They measure inequality within the total population., rather than social exclusion or poverty. 
The main concern here is the total range of distribution of the elements of the quality 
of life.
•  The measurement of well-being will include income as well as other indicators. The 
normative value of ‘functionings’ other than income seems to be indisputable, as 
discussed in greater depth before. Income expresses a command over resources, which 
determines well-being to a great extent. It also reveals a person’s consumption which is 
not covered by other indicators of well-being. Also, income captures a certain aspect of 
individual freedom in providing people autonomy and a range of choice in their 
decision-making. Its additional informational value seems to be useful from a 
pragmatic, methodological point of view.
•  The well-being of individuals is my main concern, rather than that of households or 
families. From this point of view, households or families matter only to the extent as 
they contribute to their members’ well-being.
•  A. multidimensional set of indicators will be used, without aggregating them into a single 
score.
The meaning of the expression ‘transition’ needs some clarification as well. Theoretical 
models of the socialist and the capitalist system identify pure and distinct types of 
economic structures [e.g. the work of Komai on the socialist system (1992b)]. Existing 
economic systems, however, appear to be impure cases. A self-evident example is that of 
the countries which undergo transition from socialism to capitalism. Beyond this, none of 
the stages of the process appear pure cases either. As Komai notes, in mainstream 
economics the term ‘mixed system’ applies to practically all modem capitalist economies, 
indicating that the state plays a certain role in monetary and fiscal policy (2000, pp. 34-35).. 
He also emphasises, that even those countries, which have a relatively high proportion of 
state ownership (Austria) or high redistribution (Sweden), are capitalist, because they 
remain to have the principal attributes of a capitalist system (These attributes are presented
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in Figure 2.1.) The economic system where transition economies are heading can be called 
capitalist only when they show the same basic features.
Figure 2.1 Model of the socialist and capitalist systems 
Model of the socialist system
Model of the capitalist system
Dominant position 
of private property
Preponderance 
of market 
coordination
Preponderance 
of bureaucratic 
coordinaton
Undivided power 
of the Marxist- 
Leninist party
Dominant position 
of state and quasi­
state ownership
Political power 
friendly to private 
property and the 
market
Hard budget 
constraint, strong 
responsiveness to 
prices
Soft budget 
constraint, weak 
responsiveness to 
prices; plan 
bargaining; 
quantity drive
No chronic 
shortage; buyers’ 
market, chronic 
unemployment; 
fluctuations in the 
business cycle
Chronic shortage 
economy; sellers’ 
market; labour 
shortage;
unemployment on 
the job
Source: (Komai 2000, Figure 1)
Socialism prior to transition did not exist in its pure form either. From the mid 1980s a 
‘reformed state’ or a ‘socialist mixed economy’ existed in Hungary. The main feature of this 
was that it enabled the evolution of a significant private sector. Certain forms of private 
entrepreneurship were legalised, and state control, ‘bureaucratic coordination’, declined. 
Komai argues that the journey from socialism to capitalism is primarily a spontaneous 
development after the legal barriers are abolished (2000, pp. 29-33)29. This process, 
however, speeds up significandy if the state is an ‘active assistant’. In his view, the changes 
started in an economic sphere, but could be completed only after a fundamental change in 
the political regime. When has this process of transition started?
In political transformation, the major landmark is 1990, the year of the first democratic 
multiparty elections. In the economic sphere there was more gradualism. A possible marker 
of a new and distinct phase in economic development was the introduction of a series of 
new laws between 1988 and 1991, which were clearly laying the foundations of a market
29 H e contrasts this with the transition to socialism a few decades ago, which was not the result o f  a 
spontaneous development The socialist system, argues Kom ai, was imposed on society by the communist 
party V ith brutal force’ (Komai 2000, p. 31).
economy. As Annex 2 shows, there was major liberalisation in foreign trade, price control 
was abolished, and a bankruptcy law was introduced. The new income tax system 
introduced the value-added tax and the personal income tax, and marked the launch of a 
new fiscal policy.
The term transition refers to the phase of development, when the principal attributes of 
the economic and political system changed, including the metamorphosis of the state as a 
regulator and redistributor. Beyond these institutional changes, however, there was a major, 
although less tangible change, a transformation in people’s norms as well. In this sense 
‘transition’ may be still happening. It takes a long time for the democratic culture or a 
flourishing civil society to be firmly rooted. In a narrow economic sense, however, now it 
seems to be appropriate to speak of transition in Hungary as a period of the past. As 
shown later on, total output in Hungary had returned to its 1989 level by the late 1990s. 
Also, at large institutional changes have been complete, and as a result the private sector is 
dominant. Market coordination prevails in the economy, and the economy is characterised 
by chronic unemployment.
The time period studied here thus seems to capture most of the impact of the transition 
process itself. The earlier survey year, measuring the period between April 1991 and March 
1992, is clearly not a pre-transition year, rather a point in time in early transition. Also, as I 
will discuss later on, income inequality rose significandy already before 1990. Supposedly 
there were growing disparities in other indicators of well-being as well. The period 
examined in the data analysis in later chapters, from 1991 to 1998, however, seems to 
capture the major changes in the welfare system. As shown Annex 2, the transformation of 
the welfare state only followed die economic restructuring with a delay of a few years. It is 
expected that the consequences of this in terms of people’s well-being appeared with some 
delay as well. Similarly, rising inequality and falling average real incomes are expected to 
affect people’s quality of life with some time lag. Thus, the years studied here seem to be 
adequate for the analysis of the social consequences of economic transition and that of the 
transformation of the welfare system.
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2.2 WELL-BEING AND ITS CHANGE: HOW DOES HUNGARY COMPARE?
Hungary, with its 10 million inhabitants, is about the same size as Portugal, Belgium, 
Greece or the Czech Republic. Although geographically it has always been part of Europe, 
throughout its intellectual history there has been an intense debate whether the country 
should look at the West as a reference point or emphasise its distinct nature. Hungary’s 
specific feature first of all is its unique language, ‘magyar’, which is a member of the Finno- 
Ugrian language family, and practically the only representative of the Ugrian languages30. 
This linguistic divide identifies the country as distinct from all nations with Indo-European 
origin, including all its neighbours, with Slavic (Slovak, Ukrainian, the Rusyn dialects, 
Serbo-Croatian, Slovene), Romance (Romanian) and Germanic languages (German - in 
Austria). How different Hungary is from the rest of the world from an economic and social 
point of view? Is there a distinct ‘Ugrian’ path of development, especially after the socialist 
era?
Macro indicators of development
The level of human development in Hungary is similar to other Central European 
countries according to the United Nations (UNDP 1999a). The country’s HDI rank was 47 
among 174 nations in 1997 (see Table 2.1). There is an apparent division among Western-, 
Central- and Eastern Europe, bodi in the level of the HDI and that of the GDP per capita. 
In the league table of nations, all European Union countries stand in the front, followed by 
countries of Central Europe, then by Eastern Europe, including countries of the former 
Soviet Union. The HDI ranks of die Central- and Eastern European countries consistendy 
exceed their GDP ranks, which suggests that the non-income components of their HDIs 
are favourable compared to many odier nations. The main explanation is their outstanding 
adult literacy rate, which equals the level of the most developed countries. In other 
dimensions of the index, including life expectancy and school enrolment, Eastern Europe 
actually does not perform particularly well, it significandy lags behind the leaders of the 
table.
30 Other Ugrian languages, such as Mansi (cVogulJ) and Khanty (‘Ostyak7) are either endangered or extinct 
Some estimations show that there are a few thousand Khanty speakers in Siberia, but these numbers are 
admittedly not reliable (Salminen 1998)
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Table 2.1 Human Development Index and its components in selected countries
HDI rank Country
Life expectany 
at birth 
(years) 
1997
Adult 
literacy rate
(%)
1997
Enrolment 
ratioa
(Z.)
1997
Real GDP 
per capita
(PPPS)
1997
Real GDP 
per capita 
rank minus 
HDI rank
1 Canada 79.0 99.0 99 22,480 12
2 Norway 78.1 99.0 95 24,450 5
3 United States 76.7 99.0 94 29,010 0
10 United Kingdom 77.2 99.0 100 20,730 9
11 France 78.1 99.0 92 22,030 4
14 Germany 77.2 99.0 88 21,260 2
16 Austria 77.0 99.0 86 22,070 -2
19 Italy 78.2 98.3 82 20,290 2
33 Slovenia 74.4 99.0 76 11,800 5
36 Czech Republic 73.9 99.0 74 10,510 3
42 Slovakia 73.0 99.0 75 7,910 9
44 Poland 725 99.0 77 6,520 18
47 Hungary 70.9 99.0 74 7,200 8
54 Estonia 68.7 99.0 81 5,240 15
55 Croatia 726 97.7 67 4,895 18
62 Lithuania 69.9 99.0 75 4,220 22
63 Bulgaria 71.1 98.2 70 4,010 23
68 Romania 69.9 97.8 68 4,310 13
71 Russian Federation 66.6 99.0 77 4,370 8
74 Latvia 68.4 99.0 71 3,940 15
91 Ukraine 68.8 99.0 77 2,190 27
Source. (UNDP 1999a)
■ Comined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (the number o f children enrolled in each 
level o f schooling divided by the number of children in the age group corresponding to that level)31
Gross Domestic Product per capita, a major component of the HDI, shows great 
disparities across European Countries. The GDP of Central European countries varied 
between 6,000 and 12,000 US dollars in PPP32 in 1997, with Hungary situated towards the 
lower end of this range with $7,200 (UNDP 1999a). This region has somewhat more 
income than Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and most of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, which generated $2,000-5,000 per capita33. A major gap in terms of national income, 
however, appears to be between Westem-Europe and Central-Eastern Europe as a whole. 
GDP per capita in most countries of the European Union is about three times as much as 
in Hungary.
31 The UNDP admits that this is a rather crude measure, because such factors such as grade repetition, or 
differences between the duration of education programmes lead to distortions in the data. The alternative, 
however, the net enrolment ratio, is apparently available only for too few countries.
32 Purchasing Power Parity, which provides a much better basis for comparison than simple US dollar 
equivalents, since specific exchange rate systems may distort relative incomes.
33 Exeptions are Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, which have only 1,000-1,500$ GDP per capita.
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Economic transition brought a substantial fall in aggregate income. The extent of this fall 
and the trajectory of later economic development seem to distinguish Central Europe from 
the rest of Eastern Europe. In Central Europe, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, the fall remained no greater than 25% at its deepest point, 
and we may observe an overall trend of recovery (see Figure 2.2 a). Here, transition appears 
to be a shock, a temporary stage of development. Hungary, for example, almost regained 
the level of its 1989 GDP by 1998. The rest of Eastern Europe constitutes a rather 
heterogeneous group of countries, consisting of the nations of the ex-Soviet Union, the 
Baltic States, the East European laggard Bulgaria and Romania, and the war-struck ex- 
Yugoslavian countries. In certain countries (Ukraine or Tajikistan) the decline of the output 
has reached even 60% of the GDP compared to its 1989 level (Figure 2.2 b). Russian GDP 
nearly halved in ten years time, and there are no signs of major recovery yet. The Baltic 
states, although suffering a significant loss of output, seem to show a dear trend of growth 
since 1996.
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Figure 2.2 Real GDP in transition economies, 1989-1998 
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(b) Continued decline
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Note: T o t a l  o f  a l l  t r a n s i t i o n  c o u n t r i e s :  i n c l u d e s  C e n t r a l  a n d  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e ,  t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s  a n d  t h e  C I S
Neither die GDP, nor the HDI can be a sole standard of international comparison. GDP, 
as widely claimed, is inadequate for measuring human development or well-being. The 
HDI has a few drawbacks as well. Without repeating die arguments of the previous 
chapter, I would like to highlight a few main problems. Firsdy, due to its nature HDI is a
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composite index, tackling various different components of well-being together. For a 
deeper analysis, it is necessary to look at relative changes of these parts. Secondly, HDI 
does not address the issue of distribution within countries, and uses purely aggregate 
measures. Thirdly, these simple indicators of development may not offer the best basis of 
comparison between various, relatively developed, European nations. For similar reasons 
the index in itself may not be adequate for the assessment of the transition process either. 
Therefore the following discussion will include the distribution of incomes, the labour 
market situation, and also demographic indicators, and health.
Household income
The incomes of households have changed in two major ways during economic transition: 
there was a major decline in average incomes and also inequality between households rose. 
Lower income levels are partly due to the ‘transformational recession’ (Komai 1994) and 
partly to die shifting role of markets and the state in the economy. As mentioned earlier, 
the output level fell significandy during the transition process in Hungary. Between 1989 
and 1993 GDP decreased by 20%. As a consequence, incomes and consumption declined 
as well, although as we can see in Figure 2.3 they followed a different, smoodier pattern. 
The 1994 parliamentary elections brought a halt to die declining trend, and resulted in a 
temporary rise in living standards due to government policies. This rise was reversed by the 
1995 economic stabilisation programme, which brought a major drop in both income and 
consumption levels. Probably partly as a result of this programme, from 1996 GDP, 
income and consumption show a clear trend of recovery and growth.
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Figure 2.3 Changes of household consumption, income and GDP in Hungary, 1989-1998
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Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Hungary (KSH 1993; 1994; 1995; 1997; 1999b; 2000)
Notes: Income: real income per capita (‘total income’, not defined by the Statistical Office);
Consumption: households’ final consumption expenditure
Income disparities increased in the 90s. There is some ambiguity in the literature on the 
actual degree of inequality, but there is consensus on die rising trend (see chapter 3 for 
more details). The extent of diis rise, however, was moderate. Kolosi reports an increase of 
die ratio of die average income of die top and bottom decile groups from 7.06 to 7.23 
between 1992 and 1998 (2000, p. 109)34. The main explanation for this increase is diat 
while the top decile group could successfully benefit, the bottom two decile groups 
gradually accumulated a disadvantage compared to all odier income groups. The Gini 
coefficient of income, widi its value of 30.8 is higher dian in the Czech Republic (25.4), but 
below die value for Poland (32.9)35 (World Bank 2000, Table 5). Inequality in Hungary has 
not reached such extent as it did in Russia (with a Gini of consumption of 48.7). In 
comparison to Western Europe Hungarian inequality already exceeds several more 
egalitarian countries including Austria, Belgium, and Sweden, but is has not reached die 
inequality measured in die most unequal group of the United Kingdom, Portugal and 
Ireland36 (ibid.)37. The income structure of Hungarian households has changed in two main
34 Net household income per capita is used as a measure of income. Deciles are based on household 
distribution.
35 The data refer to inequality of income in 1996, equally for Hungary, the Czech Republic and for Poland. In 
contrast, the Russian indicator is based on per capita consumption in 1998.There is no information on 
whether the income measure used is gross or net income.
36 All the data refer to inequality of income, but are based on different years between 1987 and 1995.
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ways during the transition; the share of labour market incomes has decreased, and that of 
social security incomes has grown. This is due to the changes in the labour market, first of 
all to decreasing labour market participation. At the same time inequality of market 
incomes has gready increased, as earnings became more concentrated38. This was not 
balanced out by social security benefits, because during the whole period their ‘targeting’ 
has deteriorated, increasingly benefiting the better-off99.
Relative poverty has increased in Hungary, from 12.8% in 1992 to 17.8% in 1997, 
measured by individuals below 50% of the average income (Forster, Szivos and Toth 
1998, p. 288). This increase was smaller if we apply a lower poverty line, namely 50% of 
the median income; from 10.2% to 12.4%. The difference between these two trends 
reveals a tendency of widening dispersion of incomes. During the years of transition the 
curve showing the frequency distribution of income shifted to the left as the average level 
of real income decreased and the concentration of income in the hands of the top decile 
group grew, thus the difference between the median and the average income has increased. 
As shown, the increase in poverty was smaller when a lower poverty threshold was used. 
This reveals anodier peculiar phenomenon among the poor. It seems that die bottom of 
the income distribution was relatively less affected. As Forster et al. note, there was a 
decline in inequality among the poor over time, despite the rising inequality in the total 
population. The reasons for this are not analysed yet.
Poverty particularly affected children. Relative poverty has doubled for children below 14 
years between 1992 and 1997, and reached a particularly high value for children up to 2years, 
of whom 35% lived in poverty in 1997, measured as 50% of average equivalent income 
(Speder 1998, Table 1.3.2.). Child poverty in Hungary in 1994 was not particularly 
outstanding in international comparison (10.3%), using 50% of the national median as a 
poverty criterion, and was about same as the degree of child poverty in Germany, half of 
that in the worst performing countries of the EU, the UK and Italy, where child poverty
37 The data refer to various years: 1996 for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, 1991 for the UK, 1987 
for Ireland, 1994/95 for Portugal, 1987 for Austria, 1992 for Belgium and Sweden.
38 The Gini coefficient of market incomes has increased from 46.6% in 1992 to 51.6% in 1997 (UNDP 1998).
39 The inequality of social security benefits measured by the Gini coefficient has increased from 31.8% to 
36.7% in the same period (UNDP 1998). In Hungary, thus, social security benefits are in general more ‘pro- 
rich’, due to the feet that the major benefit type, pensions, is eamings-related to a great extent, thus provides 
more to those who are better off.
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readies 20% (UNICEF 2000, Figure l)40. This measure, however looks at the whole 
group of children below the age of 18, and uses data for Hungary from an early point of 
transition. In the years following 1994, the situation of children, particularly that of those 
below 6 years has radically deteriorated. Hungary thus would perform much worse in an 
updated league table of child poverty.
In contrast, the relative income situation of the elderly seems to have improved. Poverty 
among people between 60 and 69 years has fallen from 11% to 3% between 1992 and 1997 
and it has declined from 11% to 5% among those above 70 years (Speder 1998, Table 
1.3.2.). In these age groups, poverty remains below 5%. Poverty has a strong regional 
aspect as well. The proportion of the population living in poverty was twice as much in 
villages and small towns as in Budapest (Medgyesi, Szivos and Toth 1999). Another 
major sodal determinant of poverty is education level. Those who have low level of 
education are the most struck by poverty, primarily due to their weakening labour market 
position.
Labour market
Labour market participation is an essential element of the analysis of well-being for two 
major reasons. Firsdy, labour market status is a major determinant of income differences. 
Thus, labour market trends are expected to greatly explain growing income disparities. 
Secondly, characteristics of the labour market reveal the existence or lack of important 
human capabilities: first of all who can participate in the labour market and who cannot. 
Another capability is whether an individual can opt for not having a paid job, for example 
in order to be able to do home-care. These activities together may be called the 
participation in a ‘production activity*, which means to be engaged in an ‘economically or 
socially valued activity* and as Burchardt et al note, these are essential in order to be able to 
participate in the ‘normal activities* of citizens in the society (Burchardt, LeGrand and 
Piachaud 1999, pp 230-1).
40 The percentage of children living in households with income below 50 per cent of the national median in 
1995 in Italy and the UK. The UNICEF report cited above contains data for Hungary from 1994.
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Declining opportunities for the majority
The Hungarian labour market situation is peculiar: a low level of participation is coupled 
with relatively low level of unemployment. This idiosyncrasy is a consequence of a country- 
specific feature of economic transition. In Hungary the decline in the level of employment 
approached 30%, which is twice as much as the average of the whole region (Figure 2.4). 
Decline in employment, and the appearance of unemployment seems to be an inherent 
part of the transition process and is widely discussed in the academic literature (Boeri 1994; 
Komai 1994; Standing 1997). One may argue that it did not actually appear from nowhere, 
rather it came out of the ‘factory walls’: the so-called ‘unemployment on the job’41 was 
replaced by ‘unemployment without job’. The outstanding decline in Hungarian 
employment is predominandy due to the comparatively radical economy policy, containing 
a rigorous bankruptcy law at an early point of the transition, and also to the permissive 
social security benefit system, which allowed ‘exit’ from the labour market. Pension 
schemes, first of all early retirement and disability pensions, have offered a good option for 
leaving the labour market for many. These have resulted in a particular labour market 
situation, characterised by low levels of participation, particularly among the elderly.
41 As shown in Figure 2.1 the labour market, alike the whole economy during the socialist eta, was not based 
on market principles. Demand for labour was not determined by efficiency on a micro level, but with a fuzzy 
constellation of political and economic considerations in a planned economy. A typical characteristic of this 
socialist economic system was a ‘soft budget constraint’ combined with shortage. This resulted in a 
phenomenon where many factories employed more workers than they actually needed, accumulating internal 
surplus for possible future needs. It resulted in ‘hidden unemployment’, or in Komai’s terminology 
‘unemployment on the job’ (Komai 1992b, p. 223).
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Figure 2.4 Change in the level of employment in transition economies, 1989-1998 (1989=100%)
Total of
Czech transition
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Source: (Economic Commission for Europe 2000)
The labour force participation rate in Hungary, 56%, is 11% points below die European 
Union average, and much less than the similar rate of die other two new OECD states, 
Poland and die Czech Republic (see Figure 2.5). The employment rate among die 55-64 
years age group is particularly low by international comparison, 19%, which is about half 
die EU average (Table A l.l, OECD 2001b). As we can see on the graph, all diis is not due 
to high unemployment, since the Hungarian rate is below the EU average and much 
beneadi the unemployment level of a country widi similarly low labour market 
participation, Italy. The key to die peculiar Hungarian labour market situation seems to lie 
in die small labour market itself, dius high inactivity42.
42 The age structure of the population is not characteristically different from that of most other OECD 
countries, thus the population in working age is not different either. This difference in overall inactivity, 
therefore, cannot be explained by demographic factors.
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Figure 2.5 Labourforce participation and unemployment rate in selected OECD countries, 1998
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Labour force participation rate Unemployment rate
Source. (OECD 1999)
Unemployment sharply increased in the early 1990s, then gradually decreased. As Figure
2.6 shows die registered unemployment rate is in most years significandy higher dian the 
ILO rate, calculated from die Labour Force Surveys (LFS). This 2-3% difference is most 
likely attributable to die rather strict criteria of die ILO definition, as die Human 
Development Report for Hungary notes (UNDP 1998, p. 46). The first condition of 
joblessness, diat of not working at all, may be problematic, since many unemployed take on 
smaller occasional jobs, which provide far from enough for a living. A further reason for 
taking on such jobs is die radier low benefit level and inadequacies in coverage. The 
second criteria, that of actively searching for jobs, may not be met by many of those who 
are registered as unemployed. These are typically diose who have given up hopes for 
finding a job, and are called discouraged. The number of this discouraged group is very 
high in Hungary, according to the LFS. The diird criteria, that of being available for work 
within two weeks is probably a major difficulty for a substantial proportion of the 
unemployed. The most likely problem is the major regional mismatch between labour 
demand and supply, and the relatively low mobility of die labour force.
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Figure 2.6 Registered unemployment and unemployment based on the ILO definition in Hungary
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Source: (KSH 1993; 1999b); ILO rate is based on the Labour Force survey
Miclewright and Nagy also challenge die adequacy of die ILO definition for Hungary 
(1998). Using LFS data on Hungary over 1993-1997, die audiors show diat search 
behaviour is not related to actual job finding for men. Interestingly, among women the 
speed of return to work was the same for the ‘discouraged’ and for those wanting work. 
According to die audiors, diis implies diat ‘the emphasis often placed in discussion of 
labour market status on die former group is misplaced’ (p. 13). They also find 
counterintuitive evidence for the change of search behaviour over time. The probability of 
giving up search seems to fa ll with the length of time out of work.
The employment situation in Hungary has also some peculiar characteristics by international 
comparison. First, diere is a very low share of part-time jobs. Part-time employment is only 
2.1 % as a proportion of employment for men, and more strikingly, only 5.1% for women. 
In contrast, diis latter figure is 30.3% in the EU on average. This is particularly striking, 
widi respect to die low participation rate in Hungary. This may suggest a lack of flexibility 
in the labour market. Secondly, there is a high proportion of low-paid jobs, reaching 22%, 
which is above die level of all European OECD countries (OECD 2001c, Table B3)43. The 
incidence of low pay in Hungary has dramatically risen since the late 1980s. The third
43 Low-paid employment is defined as the proportion of employees working full-time who earn less than two- 
thirds of median earnings for all full-time employees. The data refer to various years, between 1994 and 1999. 
Hungarian data are from 1998 (OECD 2001c, Table B3).
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interesting feature is that the gender wage gap is low by international comparison44. This is 
most likely a phenomenon ‘inherited’ from the socialist era.
Finally, a main feature of joblessness needs to be highlighted: that of the high prevalence of 
long-term unemployment. The long term unemployed, people with unemployment spells 
of 12 months or more, make up 50% of the unemployed in total (Table A2.1, OECD 
2001b). Why is this indicator important? In recent discussions on social exclusion long­
term unemployment has received particular attention as a possible measure (Atkinson et al. 
2002). Long-term unemployment is distinct for various reasons. As empirical studies show 
the chance for labour market entry decreases by the length of die unemployment spell (e.g. 
Bemardi, Layte, Schizzerotto and Jacobs 2000). Unemployment, especially longer spells of 
unemployment, were also shown to have a ‘scarring effect’ in the US and in Britain 
through lower future earnings in employment and the increased future incidence of 
unemployment (Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory 2001). Also, there is a greater risk of 
poverty due to the fall in income and also because during the extended period of 
joblessness the individuals’ ability to pool resources over time, for example to use savings, 
becomes limited.
In sum, there was a closing window of opportunity for a large number of people in 
Hungary. Primarily for those who could not participate in the labour market any more, and 
lost their jobs or became discouraged from job search being registered as ‘inactive’. Half of 
the unemployed are long-term unemployed, indicating the difficulties with re-entry into the 
labour market. The relatively high prevalence of low paid jobs and the low proportion of 
part time employment may imply that die opportunities offered for those who are actually 
in the labour market may not be desirable for many eidier.
Opening window of opportunity: entrepreneurship
Economic transition brought insecurity, but also increasing freedom. Transforming labour 
markets in Central Europe provided increasing returns to skills and more opportunities for 
entrepreneurship (Brainerd 1998). Entrepreneurship brings higher job satisfaction, and a
44 Gender wage gap is measured as the difference between male and female median full-time earnings 
expressed as a percentage o f male median full-time earning (OECD 2001b, Chart B4.1).
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large number of people would prefer to be self-employed, both in Eastern and Western 
Europe (Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer 2001). Survey data show that half of 
Hungarians would prefer to be self-employed. This is a much higher ratio than in the 
Czech Republic or in Russia. The entrepreneurial spirit among Hungarians, however, 
seems to be still below that of the Poles, who have both stronger preferences for 
entrepreneurship, and also choose to become an entrepreneur in greater numbers.
Entrepreneurship existed during socialism as well. Similar to other countries of Eastern 
Europe, the rural population in Hungary ‘lived in two worlds’, combining Svork for wages 
and salaries for the government with part-time family agricultural production’ (Szelenyi and 
Manchin 1988, p.5). Beyond this, the Hungarian state was particularly liberal and enabled 
the evolution of a significant private sector from the mid 1980s, including small family 
businesses, and self-employed, freelance individuals (Komai 1988). The transition from 
socialism to capitalism brought profound change in property relations and state regulation. 
As a result, not only did the private sector expand, but also individual entrepreneurship as 
well Entry to self-employment and successful survival was strongly linked to pre-transition 
entrepreneurial experience, and also to human capital (Robert 2001, p. 161). In contrast 
those who benefited from greater opportunities, many others, who lost their jobs e.g. as a 
result of shrinking employment in the state sector, were ‘pushed* into self-employment. 
Many of these, however, soon exited. In sum, the process was highly selective, with 
gradually increasing stratification between the losers and the winners among entrepreneurs.
Existing data confirm that that self-employment existed in socialism, but the real expansion 
in terms of numbers only followed the large-scale liberalisation during economic transition. 
The ratio of self-employed in Hungary was 4.6% in 1985, which rose moderately by 1998, 
to 5.4%, then nearly doubled, reaching 11.2% by 1993 (Robert 2001, p 163). This 
expansion was predominandy concentrated in the non-agticultural sectors. Other Eastem- 
European countries experienced a similar boom as well, including Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria (ibid.). We do not know to what extent this is attributable 
to ‘push’ and to ‘pull’ factors. Nevertheless, entrepreneurship in itself provided opportunity 
for people, and is a possible measure of increasing freedom, even if many chose it as a 
result of growing constraints in other spheres of the labour market. Overall, it seems that a 
large and increasing proportion of people chose self-employment as a way of labour 
market participation.
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Demography and family structure
Divorce rates rose substantially in Hungary during the 1990s, as Figure 2.7 shows. There 
was a similar increase in die Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent, in die OECD countries 
on average. The level of diese rates in Hungary has been substantially above the average of 
die countries of bodi the European Union and die OECD for decades. As a result of die 
recent increase, in 1998 divorce rates in Hungary were one of die highest of all OECD 
countries, exceeded only by die Czech Republic, Belgium and Sweden (OECD 2001c, 
Table G6).
Figure 2.7 Trends in divorce rate in selected Central European countries, 1970-1998
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A major explanation for die increase of divorces in Western countries is that there is high 
and growing labour market participation, which leads to financial independence of women. 
Another reason may be that divorce is becoming socially more acceptable. Do diese 
arguments account for die changes in Hungary? The latter, cultural explanation seems 
plausible for the difference between Poland on one hand and Hungary and die Czech 
Republic on the other. Cadiolicism has remained a major social force in Poland during
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socialism and after its collapse, while only a minority participates in religious activities in 
the other two countries45. This however, does not explain the rising trend in divorce rates 
within Hungary, to the contrary: divorce seems to become less socially acceptable to the 
majority in Hungary over time46. The former explanation does not seem to lead very far 
either. Labour market participation was high in socialist countries, including Hungary. This 
and the resulting financial independence cannot be a reason for higher divorce rates during 
transition, a period of declining labour market participation and probably declining 
financial independence. What is a more plausible explanation then?
A closer look at the components of the indicator reveals that the increase of the divorce 
ratio is, interestingly, driven primarily by the decrease in the denominator, the number of 
marriages. Between 1990 and 1998 the number of marriages in a year fell by 30%. The 
number of divorces seems to remain at the same level with some fluctuation (KSH 1998, 
Tables 3.21, 3.25). The fall in the number of marriages (compared to the total population) 
is not a phenomenon of the 1990s, but seems to be a continuous trend since 1970. The 
extent of the fall in die last decade, however, seems to supersede any previous one, which 
seems to imply an accelerated process. With respect to divorces, there seems to be a 
structural change: it seems that the break-up of long-term marriages (over twenty years) 
makes up an increasing proportion (KSH 1998, Table 3.28). In contrast, the termination of 
short-term marriages comprises less of the total, which probably implies that young people 
tend to choose co-habitation instead of marriage. Co-habitation appears to be a more and 
more preferred option by many, which is well reflected in the number of extramarital 
births. While in 1990 13% of live births were extramarital, by 1997 this ratio has nearly 
doubled: one in every four children was bom out of wedlock (KSH 1998).
The probably most characteristic indicator of the demographic situation in Hungary is that 
of low birth rates. Decreasing birth rates reflect a long term process, starting already in the
45 In 1991 85% of the Polish said they attended a religious service at least once a month, while the equivalent 
ratio was 21% for the Czech and 23% for Hungarians. For comparison, in 12 Western* European countries, 
including Ireland, Italy and Scandinavia, the average ratio was 34%. (Source: World Values Survey, 1990-91, 
own calculations.)
46 One way of testing social acceptance of divorce is looking at the extreme, those who completely reject it In 
1981, 19% of Hungarian respondents said that divorce was ‘never justified*. In contrast, this ratio was 22% 
for 12 Westem-European countries. In 1991, it rose to 22% in Hungary, while decreased to 15% in the same 
group of Western countries. In contrast, 31% of the Polish said that divorce is never justified (Own 
calculations, based on the World Values Survey, 1981,1990-91.)
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1950s. The total fertility rate47 has decreased from 2.5 in 1949 to 1.9 by 1980, and has fallen 
to 1.4 by 1997 (KSH 1998, Table 1.1). A woman on average thus gives birth to one child 
less in Hungary than forty years ago. This trend is prevalent in the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe, including even the strongly Catholic Poland. Currendy, total fertility rates 
range between 1.2 and 1.5 in most countries of the region (World Bank 2000). This is 
below the European Union average, and reaches the level of the countries with the lowest 
fertility, Italy, Spain, Greece and Austria. The extent of the decline in birth rates is thus 
rather sharp in Central and Eastern Europe in comparison with developed countries, and is 
exceeded only by the extreme cases of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Italy, countries with 
traditionally high fertility rates in the 1970s. In most of the ‘developed world’, however, 
either the extent of such falls were milder (as in the UK, in Austria, and Sweden), or there 
was no such trend at all (in the United States birth rates have even increased during this 
period) (UN 1998; UNDP 1999b; World Bank 2000).
Health, mental health
One major measure of social cohesion, or the lack of it, is the number of suicides in a 
society. Hungary has had a high position in die international league table for many years. 
For some, it indicated that the society was deeply unsatisfied and suffered from the lack of 
social norms (Andorka 1994a). Is the recent level of Hungarian suicides still high? Has it 
changed during transition? How does this measure relate to other indicators of health?
The suicide rate in Hungary in 1999 had indeed gready exceeded that of all developed 
Western nations (Figure 2.7). Hungarians committed suicide more dian twice as frequendy 
as people on average in the European Union, and nearly five times more than the British. 
This figure, however, is less outstanding compared to Eastern European countries, many 
of which have similarly high rates. Notably, though, Hungarian figures are more similar to 
those of Russia and the Baltic states, and rather higher than those of most Central 
European countries. There is no simple causal relationship between the level of national 
income and suicide rates, neither within Western nor within Eastern Europe.
47 The ratio expresses how many children would be delivered by a woman during her lifetime, generalising 
from the number of child births in the current year.
68
Figure 2.8 Suicide rates of males in selected European countries (per 100,000), latest available data 1997-
1999
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Are these high suicide figures in Eastern Europe related to the ‘shock’ of transition? 
Indeed, suicide rates rose sharply in die early 1990s in a series of countries, including 
Russia, die Baltic states, Romania, Ukraine and odiers (WHO 2001). In Hungary, however, 
there is no sign of a similar phenomenon. In contrast, as Figure 2.9 shows, during die 
1990s suicide rates for both men and women declined. Similarly, there has been no rise in 
suicide rates in Slovenia and die Czech Republic. This may imply that social consequences 
o f the transition may gready differ in countries, which experienced ‘smoodT transition 
from those where die transformation was more traumatic. Most likely, diis is partly due to 
die fall of income, and die degree of social stability, including the functioning of the 
welfare state.
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Figure 2.9 Suicide rates in Hungary (per 100,000), by gender, 1955-1999
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Comparative statistics of suicide rates may however have major deficiencies related to 
underreporting48. Is there any other measure of healdi, which would confirm the relatively 
negative situation of Hungarians?
Mortality in Hungary is also high in European standards. This is not a recent phenomenon, 
die negative trend had already started in the 1960s49. During the past ten years one 
particular group was negatively affected, that of men between 40-49 years (KSH 1999b), 
for whom mortality figures have worsened severely, to die level o f the 1920s and 1930s 
(UNDP 1998). As a result o f high mortality, life expectancy at birth was only 66 years for 
men, and 75 for women in 1998 (KSH 2000). This is less dian in any odier OECD country 
(including odier Central-European countries50), except for females in Turkey (OECD 
2001a, pp. 66-67). Reaching die age of 65, Hungarian women and men are expected to live 
3.3-3.5 years less than an average person in die OECD. The potential years of life lost for 
men are by far die highest for Hungary (p. 72)51. These figures, however, do not seem
48 Official Hungarian estimates for suicides (KSH 1998) are substantially lower than those of the WHO. The 
available methodological information is insufficient to know whether the discrepancy is due to 
methodological differences or not.
While in all OECD countries there have been a major improvement in life expectancy in the past four 
decades, there has been practically no change for Hungarian men, and only a moderate increase for women 
(OECD 2001b, p. 66-67).
50 For example in the Czech Republic the relevant figures are 70 and 77 years.
51 Briefly, this is a measure of premature mortality, defined as death before the age of 70 (OECD 2001b, p. 
84).
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particularly bad compared to Eastern Europe. The division line between Central and 
Eastern Europe exists in this respect as well. The relatively low Hungarian figures for life 
expectancy still significantly exceed those of Ukraine, Russia, and even that of the 
neighbour Romania. Finally, there is one further striking character of this indicator for 
Hungary: its regional dimension, especially for men. In Budapest, life expectancy for men is
2.7 years longer than in the Northern Hungarian region52.
Other measures of health do not contradict the previously described grave picture for the 
Hungarian population either (OECD 2001b, pp. 88-90). The proportion of daily smokers 
is somewhat higher than the OECD average, especially for men. In alcohol consumption 
Hungarians also exceed most nations. Hungarians drink more alcohol in a year than the 
British, about the same as the Germans and less than the French. Overweight is also a 
relatively grave problem for Hungarians: the obese population makes up 20% of women 
and 18% of men. With these figures (together with the United Kingdom and the United 
States) Hungarians ‘qualify’ as one of the leading nations in the OECD league. These 
measures all express non-medical determinants of health, and from our point of view their 
particular relevance is that they are results of individuals’ choices.
2.3 THE WELFARE SYSTEM DURING TRANSITION
The socialist state, including the welfare state, had a ‘Leviathan’ nature, characterised by a 
highly centralised administration and a large scale redistribution of resources. Benefit 
entidements in the social security system (for pensions, family support and for a long time 
for health care) were conditioned on employment. Since there was a strong commitment to 
full employment in the socialist economic system, and the overall majority of the working 
age population was employed, this condition in reality meant a universal coverage, based 
on a ‘citizenship’ basis.
As Toth notes, social policy was practically a state monopoly, without any significant non­
state funders or service providers, e.g. NGOs. Financing was predominandy based on taxes
52 The Northern region is defined as six counties, where 28% of the total population lives. The data refer to
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levied on enterprises. This state monopoly, in his view, strongly restricted individuals* 
freedom and their choice as customers (Toth 1994, p. 328). State provision — due to 
chronic shortages and the resulting rationing, and also the uneven quality of services in- 
kind — paradoxically was the source of unequal access. According to Toth, ‘some people 
were equal, and and some others were even more equal’ (p. 328). There were high quality 
elite services in health care and education with limited access, just as access to public 
housing was used as ‘carrot or stick’. As Szelenyi, a major sociologist of social stratification 
in Eastern European societies, claims, under socialism state redistribution created 
inequalities, which were mitigated by the market, while under capitalism the market creates 
inequalities, which are then smoothed by state redistribution (1996).
The Hungarian welfare state, according to Komai, was bom ‘prematurely* (1992a, p.15). 
The principles of government commitment were not realistic with respect to the level of 
economic development. It was for this, for the lack of resources, Komai explains, that the 
state has failed to keep its commitments that it would satisfy a number of basic needs free 
or for minimal fee. The result is chronic excess demand and often poor quality.
lAdded to the unkept promises of the classical system were the new concessions introduced 
during the process of reform that began in 1968. It was one of the characteristics o f the 
Hungarian reform, sometimes referred to as (tgoulash communism”, that it tried to turn 
its back on the previous policy of forced industrialisation and devote greater attention to 
the needs ofthe generalpublic. (Komai 1992a, p .16)*.
The great concern for the provision of adequate living standards for the majority, has lead 
the state to overspending and indebtedness. In result, this actually meant a transfer of 
wealdi between generations, benefiting those who lived during socialism on die expense of 
later generations, those living in post-socialist Hungary (Komai 1996a)53.
The welfare system during socialism thus does not seem to fit into any of the major 
typologies. Probably the approximation is Titmuss’s institutional redistributive model’ because 
public social welfare was a vital institution in society, and it provided universalist services 
outside the market (1974, p.31). The organising principle, however, was not clearly ‘need’
1998 (KSH 2000).
53 There is one additional condition for why diis debt lead to a transfer within generation, namely that the 
debt has not been repaid primarily on the expense of the elderly, e.g. in the form of reduced pensions.
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as Titmuss characterises this model, but an arbitrary and rather ad hoc coexistence of 
different principles. In sum, the Hungarian welfare system was predominandy universalist, 
and based on state monopoly in financing and provision, with a massive involvement of 
state enterprises.
The welfare system could not function properly during the transition any longer for various 
reasons. Firsdy, it seems to have increasingly failed in providing a social security net for the 
most needy (Andorka, Kondratas and Toth 1995). Income inequality and poverty already 
started to increase in the 1980s. This tendency continued during transition, with a 
particularly deteriorating situation of the poorest. The welfare system, however, could not 
provide protection for them. Secondly, it did not foster social integration adequately. The 
relative disadvantage of the Gypsy population remained, and may have been even 
aggravated by the welfare system. Although their formal educational rights have 
substantially changed, and e.g. they have granted the right to educational facilities that teach 
the minority language and culture, educational practice has changed little. There were no 
adequate policies to raise their poor level of educational attainment, and thus increase their 
chances for labour market participation (Kertesi 1995). Educational segregation, which 
meant that the Gypsy children were often separated into special classes, sustained 
(Guglielmo and Waters 1996). The regional segregation of the Romany has also largely 
prevails, partly attributable to direct discrimination in sale, and allocation of housing by 
local governments (ibid.). Finally, the welfare system failed to operate efficiently. The high 
level of total social spending, financed from high level of taxes dampened the functioning 
of the new market economy.
The reform of the welfare system proved to be more difficult and much slower than many 
social scientists had hoped (e.g. Toth 1994). In the early phase of transition the welfare 
state tried to smooth the negative impacts of transition, following its long-term ‘paternalist* 
tradition (Komai 1995). This traditional focus on raising people’s welfare was the main 
reason why the Hungarian situation was labelled as ‘Goulash communism*. According to 
Komai, the first phase of the 1990s can be called ‘goulash post-communism* (p. 1098). 
Despite this, however, the economic transition has resulted in a major shift in the relative 
responsibilities of institutions in the provision of welfare (for a presentation of the major 
changes in the welfare system, see Annex 2). The state, aiming to delegate some of its 
commitments, increased the responsibilities of individuals, enterprises, and passed on some
73
of its powers to local governments. Why was the reform process difficult? What has 
actually happened? The coming sections will search for answers to these questions.
The welfare state and individuals
Several Hungarian scholars tried to describe the welfare system of the 1990s as increasingly 
liberal, or as liberal with conservative-corporatist elements (Deacon 1992; Ferge 1992; Toth 
1994), referring to the three-fold typology of welfare regimes by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
These views, however, seem rather loosely related to the original typology. Furthermore, 
this typology does not seem to be adequate to describe a welfare system in fundamental 
transition (Lelkes 2000). It focuses for example on current spending levels and does not 
consider changes in rights, entitlement and future spending commitments. In this way, it 
would disregard a major pension privatisation programme if current spending remained 
still dominantly public. The normative content of one of the main criteria used by Esping- 
Andersen, that of ‘de-commodification, is also problematic in die context of transition 
from socialism. In the author’s terminology, de-commodification means that ‘citizens can 
freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when 
they themselves consider it necessary’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 23). Beyond the arising 
incentive problems and possible ‘unemployment trap’, the use of this as a normative 
criterion for the assessment of a post-socialist welfare system seems inadequate. Instead of 
sweeping generalisations, a more fruitful way of characterising the welfare system seems to 
be the analysis of its specific segments54.
The welfare system has changed in two major ways during the 1990s. Firsdy, diere was a 
major general decline of social spending both in real terms and as a share of the GDP. 
Total public social expenditure55 fell by 30% in real terms between 1991 and 1998 [own 
calculations based on (IMF 2001)]. Using a different measure, it has declined from 46% of 
the GDP to 30% (ibid.). This reveals that there was a general decline of government 
welfare spending. In order to provide a fuller picture of the overall welfare system, diis
54 My own analysis has tried to test the liberal’ hypothesis by discussing the role of the welfare state three 
specific aspects of income maintenance: family support, social assistance and pensions. I found that these 
different programs do not add up to constitute any specific type of welfare regime. ‘Rather, the emerging, and 
still transitory welfare system appears “faceless”’ (Lelkes 2000, p. 92).
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spending data should be complemented widi tax expenditures, in odier words tax credits 
and allowances provided for social policy purposes. Unfortunately no such data are 
available, which makes this element of the welfare system, which is also called ‘fiscal 
welfare’, invisible.
Figure 2.10 Social expenditure of the general government in Hungary, % of GDP, 1991-1998
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Source: Own calculations based on social expenditure data (IMF 2001), and GDP and CPI (KSH 1994;
1997; 1999b)
Notes: The published data are produced by the Hungarian Ministry of Finance following a standardised 
methodology of the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook of the IMF. This specific methodology e.g. 
uses ‘consolidated government expenditure’, which means that intergovernmental transfers are excluded. 
The data presented above include expenditure of the whole general government, including local 
governments as well. The categories of classification are specified in great details by the IMF and are 
intended to provide full comparability with countries as well56.
The second major change of die welfare system refers to its structure. As Figure 2.10 
shows, in the early 1990s spending on social security increased as a share of GDP at the
55 Total social spending includes spending on health, education, ‘social security and welfare’, and housing and 
community amenities’. For a detailed methodological description on these categories, see the Government 
Finance Statistics Manual of the IMF.
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time of GDP decline. This meant that social security and welfare spending, including 
pensions as the greatest spending item, preserved its value in real terms despite the decline 
of the GDP. The year 1995 marks a turning point, with gradually declining social security 
spending afterwards. The related issues, including the pension reform steps, will be 
discussed in detail in the coming section. In contrast, the early 1990s already brought a 
major fall in government spending on housing and community amenities, which dropped 
altogether from 6.8% of GDP in 1991 to 2.2% in 1998. In real terms, this meant a drop of 
62% in the same period. Government spending on health and education also suffered 
significantly during transition, with losses of 13% and 17% in real terms, respectively. 
Altogether, the extent of resizing the welfare system is probably unprecedented in the 
recent history of Western Europe. The Hungarian state, however, managed to implement 
such cut-back without major public outcry. What were the major policy tools which 
enabled such a drastic change? What were the main features of the social policy during 
transition? I will primarily focus on those aspects, which are most likely to affect people’s 
quality of life.
Changes in entitlements: pendulum politics
In the early phase of transition the state tried to smooth the negative consequences of 
growing unemployment. The government decided to cover the additional costs of pre­
retirement, which made possible to remove older workers from the labour market five 
years prior to normal retirement age, which was itself very low by international standards, 
55 years for women and 60 years for men. Disability pensioner status was another exit 
route from the labour market, enabled by liberal law enforcement of eligibility criteria. The 
result was a ‘great abnormal pensioner boom’, in the terminology of Vanhuysse (2001). In 
his view, this was a rational and conscious government policy for pacifying people and 
buying patience during socially cosdy reform periods, rather than the result of the lack of 
action, e.g. due to the underestimation of costs (p. 860).
56 An important sign of democratisation of Hungary is the increasing transparency of government policies. In 
the past, there was no officially published, internationally comparable data on social spending. Earlier efforts, 
including that of the author (Lelkes 1997), tried to prepare such data manually from budget documents. In 
recent years, however, the Ministry of Finance regularly provides data for the annual publications of the IMF 
on social spending (Government Finance Statistics Yearbook), and also for the OECD on tax revenues 
(Revenue Statistics of OECD member countries).
76
This government policy was substantially revised in 1996-98, when the state opted for 
delegating some of its responsibilities to citizens. The previously mentioned growth in the 
number of beneficiaries, due to early retirement, together with the decline of contributors, 
due to unemployment and inactivity, and due to the growth of the informal sector, brought 
major problems regarding the financial sustainability of the pension system. The 1992 
pension reform setded institutional issues and set an indexation principle in the law (which 
did not exist before), but did not touch the basis of the system. Only the 1996 reform 
touched entitlements, and raised retirement age for men and women equally to 62 years. 
Due to increasing domestic fiscal pressure and the support of the World Bank, the 
government opted for a more fundamental change of the whole pension system 
(Simonovits 1998). The new scheme was first regarded a variant of the Chilean reform, but 
later all such reference to Latin American reforms were avoided57 (Muller 2001). The new 
pension system is based on three pillars: a basic state pension, a compulsory private 
pension and an optional voluntary pension. The system is thus altogether a mixed type, still 
containing a predominant public pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e. a system where pension 
payments are funded by the current contributions of the working age population.
The change of government in 1998 brought a halt to the gradual implementation of the 
reform. The new government decided not to implement the gradual increase of 
contributions to the private pillar decided in the reform law, and thus reduced the future 
private element of the system. Also, they have abolished the compulsory entry to the new 
pension system for new labour market entrants, therefore preserving the fully pay-as-you- 
go scheme alongside the mixed scheme as part of the future pension system. This was 
probably a response to the unexpectedly high numbers of new entrants to the ‘mixed’, new 
system. According to Augusztinovics (1999), this highlights the main problem of the 
pension reform as well, that a proper estimation of future costs and the open public debate 
on these issues were lacking. From the individuals’ point of view, the series of ad hoc 
measures, both in the old pay-as-you-go system (on indexation rules, for example), and on 
the implementation of the pension reform, undermine trust in both the public and the 
private pension system.
57 *It turned out that Chile was particularly ill-suited as an example in public discourse, as the connotations of 
the ‘Chilean model’ extended to the dictatorial political rule under which the well-known pension reform was
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Another area of the welfare system, affected by substantial changes in the 1990s is family 
support. There is no clear trend for entitlement restriction here, since many of such 
limitations implemented mosdy in 1995, proved to be temporary and universality was 
reinstalled in 1998. As a result, the universal family allowance seems to function as an 
extensive ‘social wage* for mothers caring for their children. However, this benefit is 
‘extensive’ only in terms of its coverage, rather than its level. One further element o f family 
support is that of maternity benefits, offering an earnings related benefit until the age of 2 
of the child, complemented by a flat rate benefit until the age of 3. In addition, mothers 
with three or more children are entided for a flat rate benefit if they stay at home, in 
addition to the universal family allowance. In contrast to these, a major policy choice of the 
Conservative government, which came to power in 1998, was to increase the real value of 
tax support at the expense of these universal flat rate benefits. This tax credit benefited 
only working families, moreover penalised those with low earnings, because they could not 
receive its full amount. This reinforced a normative element in family support, a certain 
criteria of ‘merit’ attached to employment, and also to higher earnings, rather than simply 
contributing to the costs of children primarily on the basis of need.
In the meantime, there have been numerous new benefits introduced in response to new 
social needs, primarily as social assistance and as unemployment support (see Annex 2). 
Notably, though, there is a clear trend of withdrawal of the government in unemployment 
provision following the original generosity: the entidement period and the replacement 
rates have been repeatedly reduced, for die first time already in 1992.
The gradual restrictions in the duration of benefits and low outflow rates, resulted in a 
major decline of die proportion of unemployed people receiving unemployment insurance. 
By 1997 only 30% of the registered unemployed was covered by such benefit (KSH 1997). 
A particular feature of the Hungarian situation is that ‘exhausting entidement is the most 
common way of leaving the UI register’ (Micklewright and Nagy 1999, p. 317). The authors 
find that about a half of all exhausters received means-tested social assistance in 1995. Thus 
means-tested social assistance is a major benefit type for the unemployed, and more of 
them are actual benefidents (over 40% in 1997) than that of unemployment insurance
carried through’ (Muller 2001, p. 63).
78
(KSH 1997, Table 4.3). Notably, a significant proportion, nearly 30%, of the registered 
unemployed received no benefits at all.
This situation is problematic on various grounds. Firsdy, not receiving unemployment 
assistance results a major drop in income (Micklewright and Nagy 1999). A smaller, but still 
significant decline awaits those who do receive such benefit after the exhaustion of UI. 
Secondly, the authors find that there is significant variation in the claiming and the award 
of benefits, for example by education level and by regions, unrelated to the income level of 
the claimant. This raises worries about the equity of the unemployment support system, 
although a positive sign is that Micklewright and Nagy found no evidence that benefit 
awards vary by the actual resources of the local governments.
The system of housing subsidies has also been radically cut back, primarily with the 
elimination of the highly subsidised housing loan system in the early 1990s. In sum, 
however, the transformation of the benefit system in terms of the eligibility criteria seems 
to imply partly expansion, and pardy withdrawal of government responsibility.
Tadics for withdrawal: letting benefit value fa ll privatising and makingpeople pay
Individuals had to face a more indirect way of government disengagement, which 
happened through the loss of real value of social benefits. Family allowances, for example, 
fell by over 50% in real terms between 1990 and 1998 (Ferge 2001, p.121). The drop in the 
real value of per capita unemployment provision was about the same between 1992 and 
1998 (p. 118). The ‘passive* government policy, which ignored the indexation of benefits to 
inflation proved to be rather efficient in preventing major social protest58. As a result of all 
these changes in the welfare system, total social expenditure fell from 46% of the GDP in 
1991 to 30% in 1999 (IMF 2001).
Social spending on housing was cut back significandy, too. The generous subsidies for 
housing construction and maintenance proved to be unsustainable when inflation rose to 
two-digit figures in the late 1980s. The time bomb of subsidised loans with fixed interest
58 Similarly, and more strikingly, there was no public outcry at the huge real wage loss either. In contrast; 
certain, more apparent changes in the benefit system, however minor they were, mobilised large 
demonstrations of protest (for example the introduction of tuition fees in higher education).
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rates exploded. As a result, in 1990 the government greatly increased the interest rates and 
also offered a 40% reduction of the outstanding debt for those who opted for immediate 
repayment. A more important measure was, however, the transfer o f social housing stock 
to local governments in 1990. In this year a major privatisation also started. Between 1990 
and 1996 over half a million dwellings were sold, over two thirds of the existing social 
stock (Daniel 1997b; KSH 1997). As a result, the proportion of public housing declined to 
around 7%59. First the most valuable homes were sold. Despite the major cumulative 
backlog of deferred maintenance, housing privatisation proved to be a ‘national gift* 
(Daniel 1997b). According to Daniel, the main winners are the top groups in terms of 
housing value: those who lived in larger and better quality dwellings gained more and faced 
lower cost of renovation. The value of the privatisation ‘gift*, even after accounting for the 
costs of renovation, is estimated to be equal to about 11 years of average household 
income for the best quintile of housing.
The financing of the welfare system has increasingly become the individuals’ responsibility. 
While tax revenue during socialism primarily came from enterprises, with the economic 
changes individuals’ tax burden increased. In 1988 new taxes, such as Personal Income Tax 
and Value Added Tax were introduced, taxing incomes and consumption, respectively. In 
addition to this, individuals had to pay partly for their social security (in addition to their 
employers), including pension and health, and in addition to this, a contribution for a 
‘Solidarity Fund’ for the unemployed. The new pension system is also increasingly based 
on individuals’ contribution, or rather increases the link between benefits and contribution. 
The compulsory private pillar and the voluntary third pillar are both aimed to increase 
incentives to contribute, thus making people pay.
A striking feature of the welfare system, however, is the low level of tax awareness of 
people. As surveys show, Hungarians have major misconceptions of the ‘tax price’ of 
certain welfare services provided by the state: a high proportion of the population tends to 
significandy underestimate the actual costs (Csontos, Komai and Toth 1996; Komai 1997; 
Csontos, Komai and Toth 1998). This ‘fiscal illusion’ seems to result in excess demand for 
state provision and also in a nostalgia for ‘socialist welfare’. When, however, they were
59 The statistical data include not only state property, but all other, except private property (KSH 1997, Table 
6.2). The proportion of these were altogether 7.6% in 1996, which is predominandy made up of state property
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actually informed about the cost of services, the majority of the people opted for a limited 
role of the state, a ‘mixed system’ of private and public provision.
Enterprises as providers of welfare
What were the characteristics of occupational welfare during socialism? How has it 
transformed in the late 80s? What were the main components of this shift in welfare 
provision between the state and the enterprises?
The provision of enterprise benefits in Hungary during socialism had both political and 
economic goals. A political goal was for example to maintain central control, because in 
most cases only (Communist Party dominated) trade union members were actually eligible 
(Fajth and Lakatos 1997, p. 168). Enterprise services also served as a means of influence on 
local politics, since the investment decisions using mostly state subsidies benefited the local 
communities as well. The primary economic goal of welfare provision was to use it as an 
incentive to workers and as a direct gain for the decision-makers themselves60. This 
incentive effect was especially relevant in a socialist economy, where there was no major 
wage competition between firms and, due to the rigidities of the labour market, there was 
often a lack of adequate labour supply. These in-kind benefits were less important means 
for providing shortage goods for the workers than in other Eastem-European countries, 
because the market of goods in Hungary was relatively more developed. Nevertheless, in- 
kind benefits were less strictly regulated than wages in Hungary (after the reforms in 1968), 
moreover they were tax free. The most central planners did was that they prescribed a 
compulsory minimum of Svelfare funds’.
In the late 1980s, the major economic reforms included the introduction of a new tax 
system and a massive deregulation. The requirement for compulsory Svelfare funds’ was 
abolished. As Fajth and Lakatos remark ‘since then the former party-state pressure on 
employers to provide in-kind services has been replaced by complete neglect of the issue’ 
(Fajth and Lakatos 1997, p. 171). As a result, benefits provided in-kind have been declining. 
As studies from the mid 90s show there was a major cutback in creches, kindergartens,
(See also the discussion on occupational welfare later on.)
81
holiday homes for children, and workers’ hostels, and a smaller fall in the number of 
holiday homes (Fajth and Lakatos 1997; Rein and Friedman 1997). In the meantime, 
however, other type of benefits, such as meal subsidies, clothing and subsidised housing 
loans have increased (Rein and Friedman 1997, Table 7.6, p. 146). As the data from 1992 
show, the main item of the ‘enterprise welfare’ is food, including subsidised canteens and 
food coupons (ibid.).
At the same time, however the government transferred some of its social security tasks to 
the enterprises. New responsibilities of enterprises included contribution to unemployment 
compensation, severance payments, introduced in 1991, and early retirement Some 
benefits financed by the social security system have been transferred to employers. For 
example, employers became increasingly responsible for the financing of sick pay for their 
workers. As a result, there has been a restructuring in occupational welfare: the declining 
proportion of benefits-in-kind has been accompanied by a rise in cash benefits. Total 
occupational welfare has become increasingly important: its share gready increased as a 
proportion of real wages between 1988 and 1994 (Fajth and Lakatos 1997, p. 184). 
Although this is attributable to a fall in real wages, and these benefits have actually declined 
in real terms, this clearly shows dieir increasing role in the remuneration of employees. 
According to one calculation, total non-wage enterprise benefits reached 23% of gross 
wages in 1992 (Table 8.1, p. 177)61. Since the distribution of occupational welfare tends to 
be rather unequal, benefiting those in high-income positions the most, it most likely 
aggravates income inequalities.
2.4 CONCLUSION
Overall, it seems that the Hungarian situation resembles that of other Central European 
countries. Both die HDI and the level of GDP revealed a major divide both from ‘the 
West*, from the countries of the European Union, and also from the ‘East*, including the
60 As Fajth and Lakatos note, the privileges of high-ranking political cadres were primarily linked to the 
Communist Party itself, not to the enterprises (Fajth and Lakatos 1997, p.169).
61 This figure includes social security payments paid by the enterprises, often on a compulsory basis, replacing 
public provision. Such payments are for example sick pay, early retirement, disability insurance and severance 
pay.
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former Soviet Union and other East-European countries. The level of Hungarian GDP in 
1997 was one third of the UK, Germany or Austria. Total output fell by 20% during the 
‘transformational recession*, but regained its pre-transition level by 1999. Household 
incomes followed the decline of GDP, but showed a smoother pattern in the early 1990s 
due to government protection.
There are numerous specific features of social conditions in Hungary. The ratio of labour 
market participation is particularly low by European standards, even compared to Poland 
and the Czech Republic. This is not due to high unemployment, rather to high inactivity. 
The demographic and health situation is unfavourable in numerous respects as well. 
Fertility is somewhat worse than the European Union situation on average, but mortality 
and life expectancy statistics are particularly grave in relative terms. Hungarians stand very 
badly in the number of suicides as well, approaching the leaders of the league table*, Russia 
and the Baltic states. Other indicators of health also reveal comparative disadvantage: there 
is relatively high consumption of alcohol and a high share of overweight population.
The dynamics of change over time shows that there was a major decline of labour market 
participation during transition, reaching nearly 30%. This meant declining opportunities for 
the majority, but particularly for the low skilled and the elderly labour force. An opening 
window of opportunity was that of entrepreneurship, as a result of greater liberalisation. 
Demographic and health indicators show a mixed picture. The divorce rate continued to 
increase in the 1990s, following a long-term trend. The number of suicides, however, 
appears to have gradually declined in this period.
The welfare state withdrew in the 1990s, both as a redistributor and as a provider, and 
delegated some of its responsibilities to individuals and to enterprises. Undisputable ways 
of government withdrawal included the erosion of the real value of most cash benefits, and 
a major housing privatisation programme. Eligibility criteria were often modified at 
changes of government, which meant a ‘pendulum politics*, since so far all the democratic 
elections (that is every four years) removed the incumbent from political power.
Has the transforming welfare system, which was labelled as ‘paternalist* during socialism, 
provided increasing choices for the people? The welfare state traditionally has had some 
positive features in terms of choice, which have only moderately increased, if at all. One
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major characteristic of the socialist system was die generous maternity provision, combined 
with strongly subsidised day care for children. This provided most women a real choice 
between work and home care for their children. The declining value of these benefits, and 
the trimming of eligibility (even if these are often restored), together with the cutback of 
kindergarten facilities by enterprises made this work-welfare choice more constrained. An 
element of increasing choice is related to the new pension system: optional private pension 
was introduced and made part of the whole pension scheme.
This chapter gave an overview of the level of well-being in Hungary and its changes over 
time. The following analysis will look at the distributional aspects of these issues. What are 
the implications o f the presented facts for the later chapters? As mentioned, there was a 
rise in both inequality and poverty during the 1990s. What are the major inequalities in 
terms of income? What are the main lines of division in income position? Is it Tiuman 
capital’ and labour market situation as hypothesised previously? These issues will be 
examined in the following chapter.
A major negative consequence of transition was the decline in labour force participation. 
Later discussion in chapter 4 and 7 should find out which social groups suffered the most. 
As briefly mentioned, the gender gap in Hungary is relatively low by international 
standards. Was the shrinking of the labour market ‘gender neutral? Also, is the low share 
of part-time jobs an indication of low participation of women?
A possibly major change in the welfare system is that o f housing privatisation. The winners 
and losers of the privatisation have been already analysed in the literature. There is litde 
said on what happened to the ‘leftover’ public housing. What is its quality and who are the 
remaining tenants? Is tenant status an indication of social disadvantage? I will look at these 
issues in Chapter 4.
The Hungarian population in general has very unfavourable indicators of health and mental 
health. Both in terms of those indicators, which are related to health care (such as 
mortality), and which are related to life-styles, thus individuals’ choices (alcohol 
consumption, suicide). Does this refer to a general social crisis of alineation and anomie? Is 
Hungary a pessimist nation suffering from grave dissatisfaction? This issue will be analysed 
in the second part of the thesis, in chapter 5. A potentially interesting issue is to what
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extent health determines happiness? Later analysis in chapter 5 will include this issue, when 
discussing the relationship between people’s satisfaction with various aspects of their lives 
and their general life satisfaction.
The increasing share of market incomes within total incomes shows that people have to 
increasingly rely on their own performance in earning their living. How does people’s 
income determine their overall happiness? Has income increasingly become a condition for 
happiness?
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ANNEX 2. 
MAJOR CHANGES IN THE HUNGARIAN WELFARE SYSTEM, 1985-1998
Area. 1985-1989 1990 (Election yea r)-1991 1992-1993
Economy policy — 
relating to social welfare
1988: introducing personal income tax and 1990: Abolition of price control by state bodies 
value added tax 1991: bankruptcy law (the first one, passed in 
1989: foreign trade liberalisation 1986 has not been enforced)
Pensions 1989: Social Secunty Funds become 1991: introduction of early retirement 1992: Social Security fund is replaced by two separate 
independent of the central budget funds for Pension and Health — with elected governing
bodies of representatives of employers and employees 
(and not the government)
Tartial pension’ is introduced for those who do not 
have the necessary insurance period; indexing of 
pensions to net wages
Family support 1985: introduction o f the eamings related 1990: existing family allowance is made universal 1993: introduction of a lump sum maternity grant 
maternity allowance (gyed) (up until 2 yrs of (replacing employment as eligibility criteria) introduction of child raising grant for mothers who 
age of the child) stay at home caring for three or more children below 
1986: extending the eligibility for flat rate the age of 10 (gyet) (flat rate, means-tested) 
maternity benefit (gyes) (up until 3 yrs)
Employment 1986: first, partial unemployment support 1991: Employment Act: creation of the ‘Solidarity 1992 and 1993: reduction in unemployment benefit 
scheme Fund’ (extra-budgetary fund), levels and entitlement periods (to 12 months by 1993), 
1989: introduction of comprehensive introduction of training grants for the increases in the rate of contribution 
unemployment support unemployed, and that of
compulsory severance payment
Social assistance 1990: major local government reform: new 1993: Social Act: local governments receive extensive 
financing system, new financial resources for discretionary rights in the provision of cash benefits 
social policy purposes introduction of new benefits, e.g. the public health
voucher system, which provides free medicine 
Introduction of ‘income compensation allowance’ for 
the long-term unemployed (with no time limit)
Health care 1990: health care financing is moved from central 1992: new financing, getting closer to an ‘insurance’ 
budget to the separate Social Security Fund principle
Other Abolition of statutory state support for nurseries
Area 1994 (Election year) -1995 1996-1997 1998 (Election year)
Economy policy — 
relating to social 
welfare
1995: Restrictive *601005 package’ with a series of 
measures aiming to stabilise the economy and restrict 
government spending (some of the measures were later 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and 
were abolished)
Pensions 1994: Entitlement for early retirement is extended (from 3 
to 4 yrs before retirement age)
Employment during early retirement is restricted.
1994: Voluntary pension funds introduced next to existing 
state pension system; major tax allowance on contributions
1997: Pension age is increased to 62 years, both 
for men and women (from 60 and 55 yrs, 
respectively)
1997: Pension Reform Act introduction of a 
new pension system based on three pillars
Modifying the implementation of the pension 
law in order to keep ‘status quo’ (maintain the 
share of contributions to the state pillar)
Family support 1995: Family allowance: becomes means-tested for families 
with one or two children, for others it remains universal 
Maternity allowance (gyed) is eliminated 
Maternity benefit (gyes) becomes means-tested
1997: Child Protection Act statutory income- 
tested child protection support
Family allowance becomes universal again (on 
the condition that children above 6 attend 
school regularly)
Maternity benefit (gyes) becomes universal 
again
Child raising grant (gyet) becomes universal
Employment *Income compensation allowance’ for the long-term 
unemployed is restricted to 2 years
More extensive active labour market measures 
Employers are obliged to cover 1/3 of sick pay.
Equal opportunities Act for people with 
disabilities
Social assistance
Health care 1995: New system of pharmaceutical subsidies — as a 
result, medicine prices increase by 53% in March 
Decision on reducing hospital beds by 10,000.
Introduction of user fees in health care 
(examination fees)
Other State support for nurseries is reintroduced.
Sources: (Toth 1994; Komai 1996a; Ferge 2001)
In c o m e  in e q u a l it y
This chapter discusses inequality of incomes. What makes incomes interesting, despite the 
general focus of this work on ‘functionings’, or well-being? As explained in detail in the 
first chapter, the objects of value are ‘ends’ in this thesis. Income is just a ‘means*. Income, 
however, is a major determinant of well-being. It expresses a certain level of freedom, a 
potential command over goods and ultimately over a certain quality of life. It is due to this 
characteristic that income is often used in the literature as a sole approximation of well­
being. Much of the literature on income inequality and income poverty is based on the 
assumption that people are the best judges in promoting their own welfare given their 
resources. It then follows that it is enough to be concerned about the resources they have. 
Although this may be a problematic daim on many grounds, it is indisputable that the use 
of income makes interpersonal comparisons possible and enables methodological 
parsimony. Primarily, however, it is due to its importance as a determinant o f well-being 
that income will be discussed in greater detail here. In sum, income may be called a proxy 
for well-being as an ‘end’.
The main concern of this chapter is income inequality: its level, its change over time and its 
explanation. The explanation focuses on the differences between various social groups, or 
in a dynamic approach, the winners and losers of the transition process. The notion of 
income used will be one which seems to be the closest to ‘well-being’: household income, 
adjusted for household size. This means that I assume that family members share their 
incomes equally. This may be a rather generalising, and at times crude assumption, but 
seems more suitable than the other simple alternative, assuming no sharing at all. (This 
issue will be discussed in more detail later on.) Although earnings are more clearly related 
to individual performance, and appear to be a valuable means for assessing economic 
transition to a market economy, they are less relevant from the point of view of the current 
research, and so are not considered in depth.
Due to the fact that most of the existing empirical evidence on Hungary gives very limited 
or no account at all of the methodological choices made. I have dedicated the substantive 
part of this chapter to explaining these. The analysis will use income variables, all of which 
have been aggregated or generated by the author, following the instructions of the survey 
institution. This gave full control of the content of these variables. In addition, I have 
implemented an imputation procedure for both surveys, thus allowing comparability. The 
main reason for this was that the 1992 dataset did not use any imputation and the use of
the raw data would have meant a greater number of missing cases. Imputation procedures 
are widely used elsewhere, including e.g. the British Household Panel Study in the UK. 
The methodology of the imputation is described in detail in Appendix D.
3.1 INEQUALITY AND TRANSITION: EXISTING EVIDENCE
For most domestic policy makers and foreign advisors, income inequality and poverty 
were not cardinal issues to be considered during the years of transition. Their focus on the 
restructuring of the economy, first of all privatisation and market-oriented legislation, and 
macroeconomic stability may be interpreted as a primary concern with efficiency. Some 
believe that efficiency was to be promoted at the cost of equality. This trade-off, as 
formulated in the classic study of Okun, implies diat any efficiency gain has a cost in terms 
of equality (Okun 1975). A more specific formulation of the relationship between equality 
and economic growth has been proposed by Kuznets in a seminal article (1955). He 
assumes that in the early phases of economic development inequality rises, and when a 
maximum in inequality is reached, it reduces again. The relationship between inequality 
and GDP growth may be depicted as a curve following an inverted U-shape. Kuznets 
discusses long term historic trends of inequality, e.g. identifies the phase of growing 
inequality as the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society (that is for England 
from 1780 to 1850) (pp 18-19)62. Holscher argues that the Kuznets curve may be adequate 
for describing Poland and Hungary (2001). It is not entirely clear how he arrives at such a 
conclusion, since in his argument the level of inequality in these countries has not reached 
the maximum point yet, so it is doubtful whedier further economic growth would go 
together with declining inequality or not63. From placing of the Hungarian situation before 
the maximum on the Kuznets curve, follows the provocative conclusion: ‘some more 
inequality for the benefit of the upper middle classes [...] would have a growtii promoting 
effect through increased demand for household consumption’ (p. 23)
62 Especially for this historic aspect of Kuznets’ idea, it appears problematic to refer to his approach as a 
possible application for the relatively short time-span of Eastem-European changes.
63 Aghion and Commander arrive to a similar conclusion, namely that a Kuznets curve may exist in Central- 
Europe, but not in Russia (1999). Their argument, however, is built entirely on a theoretical model. They 
acknowledge, that their results are sensitive to the starting hypothesis. I f  inequality in labour income within 
the private sector is assumed to be relatively high, the Kuznets curve representation will not apply* (1999, p. 
291).
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Rising inequality, however, may not matter necessarily per se, depending on one’s 
objectives. If the position of the least well-off does not deteriorate in absolute terms, or on 
the long run it improves, then the increasing relative advantage of the better-off may not 
be ethically problematic. This criterion of justice is based on the gready influential work of 
Rawls (1971)64. A pragmatic position, which may be also related to this criterion of justice 
is the so-called ‘trickle down’ view. According to this, economic growth is to be pursued, 
because greater prosperity will improve the absolute position of the disadvantaged. The 
assessment of such views is not the subject of this study here. An important implication of 
this, however, is that the analysis of inequality cannot be solely reduced to the exploration 
of the relative position of certain population groups. The actual material situation, the 
absolute position has to be also considered.
For the assessment of the transition process it is essential to be aware of the starting 
position. This was the aspiration of the research of Anthony Atkinson and John 
Micklewright, which provides a comprehensive overview of income distribution during 
socialism in Eastern Europe (1992). As long-term trends show, rising income inequality is 
not exclusively a feature of economic transition in Hungary. Inequality started to rise 
already in the 1980s, following the liberalisation of private sector ventures. This has 
continued in the economic restructuring of the 1990s (see Figure 3.1)
64 According to Rawls, social and economic inequalities “must be to the greatest benefit o f the least 
advantaged members o f society” (1985, p. 227).
Figure 3.1 Long term trends of inequality in Hungary
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Transition brought a significant decline in absolute incomes. As presented in die previous 
chapter, bodi household income and consumption have decreased. The surveys used here 
show a 30% drop of die average net equivalised annual household income in real terms 
between 1991/92 and 1997/199865. Similarly, total personal income fell by 32%. The 
extent of diis fall is the largest among the bottom two income decile groups. The average 
real income of the bottom decile group shrank to 44% by 1998 compared to 1992. The 
decline of income in the diird to tendi decile groups, between 69% and 73%, was relatively 
less, but still rather high. Official statistical data show a significant volatility during die 
1990s (see Figure 2.3), but the degree of income fall in die same period is much smaller, 
makes up only a few percentages. Unfortunately diere is no clear definition of die income 
variable (‘real income’) used by die Central Statistical Office, which prevents die 
comparison of die official information with diat of the survey used here. Nevertheless, the 
discrepancy between the figures raises some concerns about data quality, which 
unfortunately cannot be resolved here.
There is some disagreement about die actual level o f inequality in the 1990s, but die rising 
trend is clearly apparent in all studies (see Table 3.1). A good example for the controversy
65 O w n  c a lc u la t io n s ,  u s i n g  a n n u a l  C P I s  f o r  t h e  A p r i l  t o  M a r c h  p e r i o d  in  o r d e r  t o  m a t c h  t h e  s u r v e y  p e r io d .
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over levels is given by Hungarian scholars, who challenge a World Bank report66, which 
claims that income inequality in Hungary is the smallest in the region, including Poland, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria (Andorka, Ferge and Toth 1997). In 
their review of the existing empirical evidence on inequality in these countries the authors 
seem to successfully challenge the claim of the World Bank, but for example cannot clearly 
conclude whether inequality is higher in Hungary or in Poland. The results of these studies 
differ even when the same measure is used, the Gini coefficient Why do various measures 
of inequality differ?
66 A widely used secondary data-set on income inequality is assembled by Deininger and Squire (1996) at the 
World Bank. Atkinson and Brandolini ( 1 9 9 9 )  criticise this dataset for the limited information available on 
methodological choices, and on the limited number of observations (one per country per year), which does 
not allow for differences in the units o f analysis, equivalence scales, weighting, and die concept o f resources.
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Table 3 .11ncome inequality in Hungary, overview of existing publications
Reference Data source Population Measurement
unit
Income variable Measure of 
inequality
1987 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
(Galasi 1998) Household Panel Survey (A)‘ Total Individual Household per capita 
income
Gini (%) 28.53 28.20 30.66 31.78 31.19
(Toth 2001 and personal 
communication)
Household Panel Survey 
1992-97 (B)“ 
Household Monitor 1998
Total Individual Household per capita 
income
Gini (%)
26.34 27.21 29.42 29.57 29.04 29.41 27.59
(Medgyesi, Szivos and 
Toth 2000)
Household Panel Survey 
1992-97 (A); Household 
Monitor 1998
Total"" Household Equivalised household 
income (e=0.73)
Gini (%)
29.50 27.75 29.47 31.62 30.85 30.85 3200
(Redmond and Kattuman 
2001)
HBS 1987,1995 Working
age
Household Equivalised household 
income (OECD scale)
Gini (%) 18.8 25.2
(Milanovic 1998) HBS 1987,1993 Total Household Household per capita 
income
Gini (%) 21.0 22.6
(Andorka et al. 1997) SOCO 1994 Total n.a. Equivalised household 
income (e=0.5)
Gini {%) 27.9
World Development 
Report 1996, Table 4.1" 
(World Bank)
World Bank data n.a. n.a. n.a. Gini (%) 23.0
(Galasi 1998) Household Panel Survey (A) Total Individual Household per capita 
income
P90/P10 3.35 3.38 3.96 3.90 4.13
(Redmond and Kattuman 
2001)
HBS 1987,1995 Working
age
Household Equivalised household 
income (OECD scale)
P90/P10 225 3.03
(Toth 2001 and personal 
communication)
Household Panel Survey (B); 
Household Monitor survey 
1998
Total Individual Household per capita 
income
P90/P10
3.14 3.28 3.46 3.59 3.55 3.68 3.27
1 Household Panel Survey (A): N=5770 (1992)
“Household Panel Survey (B): N=7265 (1992); sample A extended with a Budapest subsample 
“ excluding those cases where any income component is missing
" In the same document, on p. 197 the World Bank published a rather different figure for the same year, Gini=27.0. There was no methodological explanation given for the 
divergence. ‘Any differences in Gini coefficients [...] are due to differences in samples, time periods, definitions, or other technical assumptions’ (World Bank 1996, p. 69).
The differences between various results on inequality in Hungary have two main causes, the 
choice of the dataset, and methodological diversities. The major datasets used are the 
Hungarian Household Panel Survey, which was followed by an annual cross-sectional survey 
called Household Monitor produced by the same survey institution, TARKI, and the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the Central Statistical Office. Calculations using the HBS 
seem to show a lower level of inequality. A further cause of the divergence is due to ex-post 
changes in the Panel dataset itself. Earlier publications were based on a national sample of 
households (‘sample A3). This sample was a few years later expanded with a large Budapest 
subsample (surveyed at the same time), and this joint sample was kept representative of the 
population with the use of appropriate weights (‘sample B3). This extended sample is the 
dataset I am using here. This sample has been used by others only in recent publications, and 
seems to show lower level of inequality than the “original” dataset (Toth 2001)67.
67 A further reason for the divergence that in earlier publications all those cases (households) were excluded from 
‘sample A’, where any one of the income components of any household member was missing. This might have 
caused a selection bias. Here such cases are included, provided it was possible to impute income. This was exactly 
one of the main goals of die income imputation procedure, i.e. to reduce missing data.
Figure 3.2 Income inequality during transition, mrious measures
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As Figure 3.2 shows, there is a rising trend, although it is rather mild. Measures using the so- 
called extended dataset, the same one used in the following analysis, all show a ‘pit’ in 1998, a 
halt in the rising trend of inequality. The reasons for this are not explained in the literature. 
The choice of 1992 and 1998 as points of comparison, thus inevitably means that the 
measured rise in inequality is expected to be modest.
Methodological differences also cause divergence between estimates of income inequality. One 
major methodological choice is whether the household or the individual is the unit of the 
analysis. The most well-known published figures used household as the unit (e.g. Forster et al. 
1998; Medgyesi et al. 2000). This choice, and some other ones are often not clearly stated in 
the studies. This makes it rather difficult to clearly track the causes of the differences. 
Therefore, it is essential that here I explicitly describe the methodological choices, including 
those which are standard methods internationally and may be assumed to be used by the other 
Hungarian scholars.
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In this chapter I will explain the methodological background of the analysis. Rising inequality 
was accompanied by falling real incomes on average. I will present both absolute and relative 
measures of income distribution, which will capture the effects of this. The calculation of 
summary measures of inequality will be expanded with limited sensitivity tests, including the 
choice of the sampled population, the unit of analysis and the equivalence scale of household 
income. The scope of these, however, will remain limited, since my primary focus is not the 
description of overall inequality but the relative situation of specific population groups and the 
change of their situation during transition. In order to analyse these issues, I will present 
multivariate analysis.
Analyses of income inequality have so far primarily focused on the decomposition of 
inequality by sources of income (e.g. Milanovic 1998; Medgyesi et al. 2000; Kattuman and 
Redmond 2001; Redmond and Kattuman 2001) with less emphasis on decomposition by 
household or indindual characteristics (Redmond and Kattuman 2001; Toth 2001). The studies find 
that inequality of earnings rose, and at the same time earnings became more concentrated as a 
result of declining labour market participation. There was also an increasing diversity in the 
sources of income. As expected, income from self-employment rose, and increasingly 
contributed to inequality (Kattuman and Redmond 2001). A decomposition analysis of the 
change in the Gini coefficient between 1989 and 1993 shows that wages and to a less extent 
state pensions contributed to the rise in inequality, while other state transfers had an inequality 
reducing effect (Milanovic 1998, Table 4.2). Similar results are presented in the decomposition 
of inequality in 1993 and in 1996 by others (Kattuman and Redmond 2001). This reveals a 
somewhat counterintuitive role of the state in the redistribution.
State redistribution and its influence on income inequality have gradually declined during the 
transition period. First, in the years of early transition taxes and state transfers seem to have 
held back rising inequality of total household incomes. Later, state transfers became 
increasingly polarised, first of all pensions and other benefits68. Thus those who received 
pensions ‘maintained some parity with wage earners, while people who receive other sorts of
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state transfers have begun to fall far behind’ (Kattuman and Redmond 2001, p. 61). 
Altogether, however, state redistribution appears to have still reduced inequality of market 
incomes throughout the 1990s (Toth 2001, p. 16). It is noteworthy, that Kattuman and 
Redmond, using a different dataset, find that state transfers played a somewhat regressive role in 
1996 (2001, p. 60). The income tax system has also become less redistributive over time after 
its introduction in 1988. The main reasons are probably the declining importance of employee 
earnings, and the growing diversity of income sources, which resulted a declining efficacy of 
the tax collection.
There is a general agreement in the literature on the basic relationship between personal 
characteristics and the income position. Habich and Speder, using a panel study for the 
analysis of income dynamics during the early years of transition, find that the main groups of 
‘losers’ are those who stayed outside the labour market (1998). Children in the family are also a 
typical source of financial disadvantage. As with other studies (e.g. Toth 2001), they find that 
there is a significant regional disparity between the capital and smaller setdements, the former 
having far more prosperous inhabitants. Likely ‘winners’ are the groups of those in higher 
management positions, those with higher education, and the self-employed. There is also 
agreement on that Gypsy ethnicity is most likely associated with lower income. In sum, the 
role of human capital and labour market participation in determining a person’s income 
position seems to have increased over time (Redmond and Kattuman 2001).
3.2 CONCEPTUAL AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
Atkinson emphasises that the notion of income used by most economists differs from 
everyday definitions, for example from the definition of income for tax purposes. The former 
definition is described as the following
68 One reason for this polarisation was that pensions sustained their real value relatively well compared to 
unemployment compensation or family benefits (Lelkes 2000).
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‘income in a given period is an amount a person could have spent while maintaining the value 
of his wealth intact. Or, as it was described in the classic treatment by Simons, Personal 
income may be defined as the sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption 
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of 
the period” * (Atkinson 1983, p. 39) (originally in: Simons 1938, p. 50).
This is a comprehensive definition, and includes items such as capital gains, fringe benefits, 
production for home consumption, and imputed rent. How closely does the survey definition 
of income come to this interpretation in the dataset used in this thesis?
Components of income
Capital gains are clearly part of this definition of income. A change in the value of wealth, for 
example due to an increase of the value of the shares owned by the person on the stock 
market, enables her to spend this amount and also to maintain the value of her wealth. It 
follows that all positive and negative change in the value of wealth should be regarded as part 
of her income. Note, that this also means that if long-term real interest rate changes, then the 
value of wealth changes, even if the future income stream is identical. Such adjustment, 
however, is rather difficult not only on an individual, but also on a national level69. It would 
assume a clear knowledge of a person on the current value of all his wealth and a correct recall 
of its past value. In practice, this would result rather unreliable survey results. Thus, capital 
gains and losses are for practical reasons only exceptionally used as elements of the notion of 
income used here and in most studies (e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000).
Fringe benefits, benefits relating to employment should be part of income theoretically, and the 
current Hungarian surveys also try to include them. In Atkinson’s definition this refers to 
benefits in kind provided by the employer (Atkinson 1983). Others use it in a broader sense, 
referring to all cash and non-cash benefits beyond wages (Fajth and Lakatos 1997). Both
69 Although the inclusion of change in the value of assets is clearly acknowledged as part o f current income in the 
methodology of the national accounts of the state, in my experience in Hungary’s Ministry of Finance, such 
adjustment is very partially done. The main reason is that it would require detailed information on all the state- 
owned assets. Such a comprehensive account, to my knowledge, still has not been prepared up till now.
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surveys of 1992 and 1998 include questions referring to food, travel, housing, clothing and 
other subsidies provided by the employers. Since all these items have a Forint value, it is easy 
to include them in total income. In contrast, although the 1998 questionnaire investigates the 
ownership of company cars, it seems problematic to include this item into the calculation. One 
possible way would be to estimate a monthly cost of a similar car, had it been financed by the 
person himself. For this, the calculation would need to be based on the total cost of the car, its 
total lifetime and all the costs incurring during this period. Such estimation would be rather 
time consuming, since to my knowledge there has been no similar attempt in the country.
Production for horn consumption is also part of this notion of income defined before, because it 
enables households to consume without a change in their wealth. From this point of view, it 
makes no difference that these goods are actually not acquired through a market transaction. 
The Hungarian surveys investigate two measures of household production: animal farming 
and the growing of crops. The market value of these products is based on the estimate of the 
households themselves.
A similar type of income in kind is related to housing: those who own their homes enjoy the 
benefits of it without having to pay a rent for it. They consume, but in the meantime their 
wealth remains unchanged. Thus this saving, the imputed rent, is theoretically also part of the 
household’s current income. Including imputed rent into income would also enable us to treat 
all households equally, irrespective of their housing ownership. A similar argument applies to 
assets, such as a second home, a cottage, or a car, or to consumer durables. Among all these, 
however, housing is outstanding due to its significance. The imputation procedure, however, 
would require a well-functioning and undistorted private rental market. With this, and 
information on seasonal variation and price variation over region and time it would be 
possible to calculate hedonic indices. The private rental market, however, is very small and is 
mostly ‘hidden’ in Hungary, being based on informal contracts. Property markets are also very 
thin and the prices are very volatile. This seems to be a major barrier for such estimates. 
Pudney also strongly emphasises these problems in his calculations using 1991 data ( 1 9 9 5 ) .  
He measures the impact of implicit rent subsidies (but not that of mortgage subsidies), and 
finds that these are not targeted towards the poor, but on average increase with income.
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An alternative approach for accounting for differences in housing, used in the United 
Kingdom for example, is to compare incomes after the deduction of housing costs (Great 
Britain. Department of Social Security 1997). By using this method, differences in rent are 
considered. The obvious disadvantage of this method is that greater housing costs may be 
associated with better housing quality (Hills 1998). The British solution is the simultaneous use 
of the ‘before housing cost* and the ‘after housing cost* figures, which can also account for 
changes in housing subsidies. [More on this approach, including its critique, see (Gardiner, 
Hills, Falkingham, Lechene and Sutherland 1995).] In the following analysis I will not account 
for housing costs or subsidies in common with other analyses on Hungary.
Non-cash state benefits, also called benefits in-kind are also part of this definition of income, but 
due to measurement problems they are not included in the income definition used in the 
current thesis. The consumption of welfare services provided by the state, such as health care 
and education is a substantial part of households’ welfare. Interestingly, its inclusion into 
income would change the patterns of income distribution, since it affects different income 
groups to a varying extent. For example, the elderly, who have below average income, are 
major beneficiaries of the health care system. Thus, including in-kind benefits in total income 
would show the elderly relatively less poor compared to a distributional analysis based only on 
cash income. A distributional analysis of the changing provision of in-kind benefits by the 
government during transition seems to be a rather exciting topic. The inclusion of health care, 
however, would dominantly reflect differences in needy rather than that of living standards. 
Having greater need, being more sick, would thus appear as an addition to living standards. 
Therefore a possible correction for differences in health care, as proposed by Gardiner, Hills 
et al. is that a specific sum of health spending could be deducted from income, namely the 
value of health care needs, which are not covered by publicly available health care, or actual 
private health spending (Gardiner et al. 1995). The methodological problems, however, such 
as the actual consumption of these goods and their pricing, goes beyond the scope of this 
current work.
There are various alternative definitions of income for the treatment of taxation and ben fits  (see 
Table 3.2). The choice the phase of redistribution where someone is analysing income 
inequalities has major consequences on the outcome. As we would expect, redistribution by
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the welfare state decreases inequalities (e.g. see a study on Hungary: Medgyesi et al. 1999). This 
is a generally valid observation, even if redistribution is not the only and not the main goal of 
the welfare state. The survey questions come closest to the notion of disposable income, because 
they ask how much income a person has ‘taken home*. This thus considers the impact of 
direct taxes (personal income tax), but not that of indirect taxes (consumption taxes). The 
value of indirect taxes is generally not considered in the countries of the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) either, partly for disagreement on how to measure it (Gottschalk and Smeeding 
2000, p. 269).
Table 3.2 Income and the effect of taxes and benefits
Original income
+ cash benefits
Gross income
- ‘direct’ taxes
▼
Disposable income
- ‘indirect’ taxes
▼
Net income
+ non-cash benefits
V
Final income
A specific issue in the context of economic transformation is that ofprice subsidies, a typical way 
of market intervention during socialism, which has been mostly abolished in the early phase of 
transition. As Flemming and Micklewright emphasise the whole impact of state manipulation 
of the price system has to be examined, not only explicit consumption subsidies (2000, pp. 
852, 905). Contrary to expectations, however, it seems that the removal of price subsidies did 
not have any impact on the income distribution. Analysing panel data for the period between 
1987 and 1991, Newbery finds no evidence that the removal of subsidies and the introduction 
of VAT in 1988 had any significant distributional impact (1995). One possible explanation for 
this, proposed by the author, may be that the targeting of taxes and price subsidies was already 
rather weak, primarily because ‘by the early 1980s Hungary had already abandoned the indirect
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tax system as a mechanism for redistributing consumption preferentially towards the poor’ (p. 
862).
Income from the informal sector70 may cause major problems in the reliability of income measures. 
The reasons are that it is not recorded, and that its size is supposedly extensive. According to 
Janos Komai, in the late 1980s ‘ at least three-quarters of all Hungarian families’ made some 
contribution to the second economy (1988, p. 243). In addition to the various legal ways of 
participation in the second economy, there has been a prevailing culture of non-compliance, 
involving tax evasion and avoidance. Crudely, one-fifth to one-quarter of total national output 
may have been created outside the first economy in the 1980s (Komai 1988, p. 243; Gabor 
1989, p. 353). This has further increased later on, as a result of deregulation and the smaller 
enterprise size. The surveys include questions referring to occasional jobs, entrepreneurial 
income and also tips and gratuities. Certain under-reporting, however, is very likely. Under­
reporting is a typical data quality problem elsewhere, too, primarily affecting cross-national 
comparisons of inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000, pp. 270-1). One possible variant of 
this problem, that of non-response, was compensated for by generating incomes with 
imputation in the surveys used here. Although I cannot judge the real potential implications of 
underreporting, it seems reassuring that in general relative incomes follow the expected 
pattern; e.g. entrepreneurs have the highest average income among all labour market groups 
(see Figure 3.5 later).
Income unit: family, household, individual
Ultimately, we are interested in individual’s welfare. However, individuals are members of 
households, where incomes, resources are shared. How can the welfare of the individual be
70 As Bemabe shows in her comprehensive overview, there is a major terminological debate, and the term 
‘informal’, ‘black’, ‘underground’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘hidden’, ‘shadow’, ‘irregular* all have been used (Bemabe 2002). 
She developes a conceptual framework for the different types of ‘hidden activities’, and argues that in transition 
economies, especially in die former Soviet Union, informal activities are undertaken in order ‘to meet basic needs’. 
Informal sector in her typology is distinguished from ‘underground activities’, which are deliberately concealed from 
public authorities (e.g. tax evasion), from illegal activities and from household production for own consumption. The 
definition of informal sector used here is different from hers, since it also includes ‘underground activities’, 
unmeasured and unrecorded production.
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derived from household information, available in household surveys? There seem to be two 
major issues of concern. The first is the comparison of families with different size, with 
different needs. We clearly can’t compare total household incomes as a whole, irrespective of 
how many people actually live on that income. If we did, we would assume that the needs of 
households are the same, irrespective of the number and characteristics of the people who 
constitute it. Or we would assume that people are strongly altruistic, so that total household 
expenditure is the measure of individual welfare. This seems an unrealistic assumption. This 
leads us to the second problem: how should individuals be treated within a family? Do they 
share what they have? And how? In the following section I will discuss the assumptions and 
choices which form the basis of the analysis, choices, which may be often implicit.
Equivalisation
Comparison of households with different size is based on an adjustment procedure, called 
equivalisation. This means that different households are assumed to have different needs, and 
therefore we need to adjust for differences in household composition, using an equivalence 
scale. Since there is no single universal measure for differences in needs, the use of a specific 
equivalence scale is a matter of choice. A major issue is how differences in household 
characteristics (such as the age, health and location of members) are reflected.
Another concern of is how big ‘economies of scale’ are implied by the equivalisation measure, 
how much it is more ‘efficient’ to be a bigger household. One extreme for this answer would 
be that there is no difference. Running a household may involve only fixed costs, such as 
housing costs, and irrespective of how many people do actually live together, it would cost all 
the same. We could also say that the household consumes only public goods, which can be 
used at no additional costs by all members. The other extreme would say that household size 
matters enormously, each additional person, including a child, contributes to the same extent 
to total costs. Thus, there are only variable costs. In other words, the household consumes 
only pure private goods. Neither of these extremes seems to be grounded in reality. A 
widespread application, used most frequently in Hungarian official statistics, especially before 
the 1990s is the per capita household income. [Using official statistical sources, this concept of 
income is used by Atkinson and Micklewright as well (1992).] This measure acknowledges the
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existence of economies of scale. Most notably, however, it does not differentiate between the 
needs of adults and children within the household.
The first ‘equivalence scales’ were based on estimates of need. In one of the first studies of 
poverty, Rowntree estimated dietary needs plus ‘minimum necessary expenditure’ on rent, 
clothing and household items (1902). The problem of such expert judgment is well known in 
the poverty literature, namely that it is based on subjective judgement of the researcher 
(Piachaud 1987). It is rather difficult to justify the inclusion of certain items and the exclusion 
of others. The alternative approach uses objective standards, observed behaviour as a basis of 
comparison. This latter approach, called ‘Rothbarth method’
!supposes that we can find a commodity, such as beer or adult clothing, which is consumed 
only by adults and can be taken as an index of the adult standard of living. I f we then 
compare households with and without children, we shall expect that at any give income level, 
the consumption will be higher for the household with not children, since the adult standard of 
living is higher’ (Atkinson 1983, p.51).
The problem with this latter approach is that the choice of the ‘adult good’ may still lack 
adequate justification. It assumes a universal measure of ‘welfare’, and does not account for 
differences in tastes71. Interestingly, the official poverty standards in Hungary and in the 
United States similarly use both expert judgement, estimated requirements, and objective 
standards, observed differences between actual consumption patterns of households with 
different sizes72.
71 For a detailed critique of equivalence scales, including Rothbarth’s method, and considering poor countries, see 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1986; Deaton 1997).
72 The calculation of the so called ‘subsistence minimum5 in Hungary is done in two steps (KSH 1999a). First, a 
minimum food expenditure is calculated. For this, a food basket consisting of about 100 items (defined as ‘dietary 
minimum5) is priced and added up. Differences in dietary needs are also accounted for for example the 
‘prescribed minimum standard5 for children between 10 and 14 years is 77.8% of die adults. The dietary minimum 
for a household with two adults and two children below 14 is thus the sum of the four calculated ‘minimum sums5 
for two adults and two children. Following this, as the second stage they select a sample of households (with 
varying composition) whose food consumption is about the same as the previously calculated minimum amount 
(for households with similar composition). The monthly average of the total personal expenditure of these 
households is then defined as the ‘subsistence minimum5.
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A formal specification of equivalence scales as proposed by Buhmann et al. seems to capture 
well the general structure of these scales (1988):
M =s6’
where s is the number of persons per household (s—1,...,n), 0 is the scale relativity parameter 
(6>0)y and Ms is increasing in s and in 0. This means that larger households are assumed to 
have greater needs than smaller ones, and the larger the 0, the greater the allowance for needs 
— relative to that of a single-person household.
The most favourable characteristics of this formula is that as Coulter et al. note ‘this scale 
provides a good approximation to virtually all the different scales currently used in empirical 
studies of income distributions in developed countries — including several scales that are based 
on other household characteristics in addition to size’ (1992). As they note, researchers tend 
to choose scale relativities (6) in the range between 0.2 and 0.8. The official statistics73 in 
Britain can be summarised as 0 = 0.6. The previously mentioned income per capita 
equivalence scale uses 0=1.
There is no consensus in the literature on what the most appropriate equivalence scale is. 
Further to this, as empirical studies show, the results measuring income inequality are often 
highly sensitive to the equivalence scale used (e.g. Coulter et al. 1992; Jenkins and Cowell 
1994). This, however, mostly refers to the actual level of inequality. Country rankings and 
trends of inequality within a single country do not seem to be affected by the choice of the 
equivalence scale (Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000). What follows from all this? As Coulter et 
al. suggest various possible strategies. One of these is to check the sensitivity of the results, 
calculating measures using a wide range of equivalence scale relativities. Another solution 
‘involves decomposing overall distributional comparisons into a series of sub-comparisons of 
the distributions for each household type considered separately. Comparisons of 
corresponding within-group inequality terms are independent of the choice of equivalence 
scale, and so robust conclusions can be derived (Coulter et al. 1992)’. In the current analysis I 
will use an equivalence scale with 0=0.73. This is an approximation of the so-called OECD
73 Refers to publications of the Central Statistical Office and the Department of Social Security.
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scale and is widely used in the Hungarian literature. A similar scale is used by the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and has been also used in a various European comparative studies (for 
references, see Buhmann et al. 1988, pp. 120-21). I will then check the robustness of the 
findings to a series of adjustment for household size by applying a set of equivalence scales.
Assumptions on sharing
The analysis of income distribution involves a fundamental, although often implicit 
assumption, not mentioned so far: this is the assumption relating to sharing within the 
household. The traditional economic approach assumes that household decisions are based on 
‘unitary’ preferences (Becker 1981). This implies the all income is pooled and then allocated to 
maximise a single objective function. From this it follows that household demand, spending 
decisions, are independent of which family member receives the income. This has been 
challenged by recent evidence and an emerging theoretical economic literature, the economics 
of marriage (Lundberg and Poliak 1994; 1996; Lundberg, Poliak and Wales 1997). As Shelly 
Lundberg and her co-authors demonstrated, changes in benefit eligibility criteria in the United 
Kingdom, which transferred a substantial child tax allowance to wives in the late 1970s, 
resulted substantial changes in the spending pattern of households (1997). This empirical 
paper thus uses a ‘natural experiment’74 and shows that the original ownership of income plays 
a major role in spending decisions. Targeting of incomes is a meaningful policy instrument. 
Households do not have common preferences. Sharing is not really equal. Instead, household 
consumption decisions are rather like a ‘cooperative bargain’.
74 This natural experiment thus solves the problem of endogeneity of income. This problem arises, for example, at 
the analysis based on labour earnings of husbands and wives. As Lundberg argues, earnings are clearly 
endogenous with respect to the household’s allocation decisions. ‘In a cross-section,, differential effects of 
husband’s earnings and wife’s earnings on consumption patterns are consistent with the common preference 
framework, because households with different ratios of husband’s earnings to wife’s earnings are likely to face 
different prices and have different preferences, even with the total household income held constant (Lundbeig et 
al. 1997, p. 465)’. As an example she challenges that the finding showing that expenditure on restaurant meals is 
more elastic with respect to the wife’s earnings than the husband’s earnings could be a proof of bargaining theory. 
Instead, she argues, it could as well be explained by the ‘common preference’ model. As the wage of the wife is 
higher, the cost of the home-prepared meals becomes higher, too. Since the decision to eat out depends on the 
cost of substitutes, the couple may simply rationally choose the restaurant
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A further choice refers to the income-sharing unit Should we consider the family or the 
household? The latter includes all persons in a common residence, while the latter only those 
who are related by blood or marriage. Family members most likely share their resources, while 
for example co-habiting college students probably do not. A major advantage of the use of 
household as a unit, which is the choice of the Hungarian survey, is that it includes cohabiting 
couples as well.
Despite the apparendy convincing arguments that the approach is not ideal, demonstrated 
above, the underlying assumption of the current analysis will be that incomes are shared 
equally within the household. The main reason for this is that there are no data to justify any 
alternative, while assuming no sharing would be unrealistic. (The spending patterns of 
households would not provide guidance either, because of the nature of the data, being cross- 
sectional, we would face the previously mentioned problems of ‘endogeneity* of incomes to 
household’s allocation decisions; see footnote 11.) Moreover, the primary focus is the 
distribution of resources across population groups. The economics of marriage, including the 
work of Lundberg, however, makes it necessary to treat conclusions relating to differences 
between household members rather cautiously.
Inadequacies of coverage: non-household population
National surveys normally exclude the non-household population, including the homeless, 
people living in institutions such as residential care, or prison and those staying with the armed 
forces. Their number in the UK is estimated to be between 1.7% and 2.1 % of the total 
population (Evans 1995, p. 18). Official statistical data show that there were 67,000 people in 
residential care in Hungary in 1997, including the elderly, the handicapped, addicts and the 
homeless. Armed forces consisted of 61,000 in the same year, including officers and 
conscripts, plus 22,000 border guards. Prisons and other law enforcement institutions housed 
13,000 individuals. Based on these figures, the non-household population can be estimated to 
be roughly around 1.6% of the total population in the late 1990s. In the early 1990s this 
number was approximately around 1.8%. A major reason for the decline is the fall in the 
number of armed forces, especially that of conscripts, due to the shortening of the period of 
compulsory military service. Beyond these figures, however, there is a significant homeless
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population, which is not registered in any institution. The phenomenon of rough sleeping is 
relatively recent in Hungary, marking a negative consequence of the societal changes. Most of 
these population groups are expected to have low incomes, thus official surveys cannot 
capture the bottom of the distribution adequately. Thus, analysis of household data are likely 
to underestimate the extent of poverty and inequality. It may also leave certain aspects of the 
transition in Hungary inadequately covered. This is not a unique inadequacy of the Hungarian 
data, however. National samples of the LIS generally exclude the institutionalised population 
as well (Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000, p. 274).
3.3 DATA
The income variable used in the analysis is the end result of an aggregation procedure, 
including imputation of missing values. The details of these calculations and its methodology 
are explained in detail in Appendix D. The notion of income used in the analysis is disposable 
household income, which is, as explained before, income after direct taxes and transfers. It 
also includes estimated incomes from agricultural production and certain types of illegal 
income, such as tips or gratuities. Certain underreporting however, is still very likely. There is 
no correction for housing costs, in-kind benefits or indirect taxes. I assume equal sharing of 
resources within the household and adjust for economies of scale within the household by 
using an equivalence scale of 0=0.73. The surveys, similar to most other nations, exclude the 
so-called institutionalised population. The period of the analysis is one year. Annual incomes 
are surveyed at one point in time, asking a recall of incomes in the past year75.
The analysis uses two nationally representative household surveys, from an early and a later 
point in the transition process. The first survey investigates the period between April 1991 and 
March 1992. The later survey refers to the period between April 1997 and March 1998. The 
samples included 7265 and 5293 observations of individuals, and 2668 and 2011 households,
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respectively (for more details, see Appendix A). The unit of analysis in this chapter will be the 
household\ because as explained before the household income seems to be the best 
approximation of individual’s consumption opportunities. In later chapters, the focus will be 
on more direct measures of individual’s well-being and the unit of analysis will be the 
individual (for a description of the variables used in the thesis, see Appendix B).
3.4 RISING INEQUALITY DURING TRANSITION
Inequality of income rose between 1991 and 1998. This rising trend is prevalent according to 
all major measures of inequality. At the same time there was a major decline in the average real 
income during the same period. The datasets being used indicate a fall of no less then 30% 
between these two points in time. Therefore, for the assessment of the impact of transition a 
detailed analysis is also essential, comparing the changing position of specific population 
groups. This approach will be used in the later part of this chapter, when applying multivariate 
techniques.
7S The survey date is dose to the annual tax report deadline, which aims to ensure that people can recall accuratdy 
their past incomes. The surveys investigate incomes with specifying a particular month of the year (March), thus 
the specific survey date itsdf does not influence the responses.
Table 3.3 Summary measures of inequality, various definitions of the population
Totalpapulation Population ot>er 17years of age Working age papulation
1991/92 1997/98 1991/92 1997/98 1991/92 1997/98
Mean (thousand forints) 153.8 369.1 153.8 369.1 165.9 390.8
Median (thousand forints) 131.0 318.3 131.0 318.3 147.3 334.7
Percentages of the median:
8 plO 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.58 0.51■&
G p25 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.72
1 p75 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.32 1.41
p90 1.91 1.82 1.91 1.82 1.80 1.89
T3 Decile ratio
JS
V (p90/pl0) 3.11 3.23 3.11 3.23 3.11 3.70
v>
g MLD76 0.122 0.145 0.122 0.145 0.121 0.171
X Theil index 0.135 0.157 0.135 0.157 0.128 0.179
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.062 0.072 0.062 0.072 0.060 0.083
Atkinson (e=l) 0.115 0.135 0.115 0.135 0.114 0.157
Gini 0.270 0.285 0.270 0.285 0.266 0.310
Mean 157.4 364.9 161.2 376.4 169.4 386.6
Median 137.3 322.0 139.5 3323 148.7 337.9
Percentages of the median:
G plO 0.59 0.52 0.6 0.54 0.58 0.52
•B
3 p25 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.73
p75 1.34 1.37 1.35 1.36 1.34 1.40
.59 p90 1.86 1.80 1.87 1.80 1.81 1.86
•a Decile ratio
i
(p90/pl0) 3.16 3.44 3.10 3.30 3.1 3.60
MLD 0.122 0.142 0.121 0.138 0.122 0.154
3i—i Theil index 0.131 0.148 0.131 0.143 0.128 0.158
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.061 0.069 0.060 0.067 0.060 0.074
Atkinson (e=l) 0.115 0.133 0.114 0.129 0.114 0.143
Gini 0.266 0.282 0.267 0.278 0.266 0.294
Mean 161.0 370.8 169.6 381.6
Median 139.3 325.5 149.5 334.3
Percentages of the median:
G plO 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.51
•B T3
3 .£! p25 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.72.D 3^
1  -3 p75 1.35 1.36 1.34 1.39
W * "O p90 1.87 1.78 1.78 1.84
^  W5 
TO <U Decile ratio
3 '3
•13 § (p90/pl0) 3.08 3.26 3.09 3.60> v-(sg a MLD 0.120 0.137 0.120 0.154
3
HH Theil index 0.131 0.143 0.127 0.159
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.060 0.066 0.059 0.074
Atkinson (e=l) 0.113 0.128 0.113 0.143
Gini 0.266 0.277 0.264 0.294
Note: Definition of income: disposable equivalised household income, current prices, 0=0.73
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Why is it necessary to present various measures of inequality, instead of a single one, which is 
widely used, e.g. the Gini coefficient? As Atkinson emphasises, each summary measure of 
inequality has (mosdy an implicit) assumption about the form of the social welfare function 
(1970). These assumptions greatly influence the level of inequality measured by an indicator 
and also the ranking of income distributions. The conventional Gini coefficient, for example 
attaches more weight to transfers affecting middle income groups (most specifically those at 
the mode). Atkinson, critically, notes that ‘it is not clear that such a weighting would 
necessarily accord with social values’ (1970, p. 256). The Atkinson class of indexes, and the 
presented Theil index and the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), both of which belong to 
the so-called single parameter Generalized Enthropy Class (GE), differ in their sensitivities to 
income differences in different parts of the distribution. The more positive e, the ‘inequality 
aversion parameter’, is in the Atkinson index (A), the more weight is attached to transfers at 
the lower end of the distribution and less weight to transfers at the top77. Comparing the Theil 
index and the MLD, the latter is more sensitive to income differences at the top of the 
distribution (Coulter et al. 1992).
All these measures show a rise in inequality. Thus neither of the presented choices about the 
social welfare function, the sensitivity of the measure to specific parts of the income 
distribution, alters the finding that there has been an increase in inequality in Hungary during 
the 1990s. The measure, which attaches greater weight to the bottom of the distribution, A(l) 
compared to A(0.5), shows a larger increase (see Table 3.3). This is in line with the finding that 
the relative income of the poor (the 10th percentile) fell. The MLD index shows a greater 
increase in inequality over time than the Theil, a top-sensitive measure. This suggests that the 
rise in inequality over time was not primarily driven by the top end of the distribution. Note 
that the p90/p50 ratio seems to contradict other measures at times: it decreases when
76 Both the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) and the Theil index are members of the single parameter 
Generalized Entrhopy Class, GE(a). In case of the MIX), a parameter equals 0, for the Theil index, it is 1. The 
Theil is a ‘top-sensitive’ measure, while MLD is neither ‘top-sensitive’ nor ‘bottom-sensitive’. For more, see e.g. 
Coulter et al. (1992^ .
77 This reference to ‘transfers’ relates to the so-called Dalton principle of transfers. According to this, if there is a 
positive transfer from a richer person to a poorer one, than this should lead to a reduction in die index of 
inequality (other things remaining unchanged) (Dalton 1920, p.351). Atkinson notes that some popular measures, 
such as the relative mean deviation, supported by eg. Elteto and Frigyes, is not sensitive to transfers on the same 
side of the mean, thus does not meet this principle (Atkinson 1970, p. 256).
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measured among the total population or the adult population (but not among the working-age 
population). This, however, seems to be a statistical artefact. If a different equivalence scale, 
e=0.5 used, there is a rise from 183% to 186% (see the following paragraph on international 
comparison and footnote 19 on a possible explanation).
In an international comparison, Hungary had already greater inequality in 1992 than many 
European countries, including Sweden, Belgium, Austria and Germany (Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997, p. 661; 2000, p. 279). (For the Hungarian figures see Table 3.4 below)78. The 
extent of the rise by 1998 did not substantially change the ranking of the country: the level of 
inequality in Hungary still remained below that of in the United Kingdom or in Spain. An 
interesting feature of the Hungarian distribution of incomes in 1992 is the comparatively high 
income share of low income individuals. Comparing the income of the tenth percentile as a 
proportion of the median, Hungary, with its figure of 56.4%79, approaches Sweden, where this 
ratio was 57%. This ratio has declined to 53.0% by 1998, falling behind the Nordic countries 
and Italy, but was still higher than in Germany, Spain, France or the UK. It implies that the 
bottom end of the income distribution was comparatively well-off at the early phase of 
transition. By the late 1990s the Hungarian poor were still not very poor, in relative terms. The 
rich, however, seem to be well-off compared to other nations. The level of the 90th percentile 
as percent of the median, 183% in 1992 and 186% in 1998 is high in European standards80.
78 The measures of inequality used in this comparison are the decile ratio and the Gini coefficient The 
computations of Gottschalk and Smeeding are based on the Luxemburg Income Study. Both these and my own 
calculations for Hungary are based on disposable income per equivalent adult and use individual distributions. 
Since the scale relativity parameter used in the comparative study is 0=0.5, and it is quite likely based on existing 
evidence that the choice of a different e would affect the ranking of countries (Buhmann et aL 1988), I have also 
used 0=0.5 for computing the comparable the Hungarian summary measure of inequality.
79 The following calculations for Hungary present individual distribution for the sample representing the total 
population, with 0=0.5. This ensures comparability with the published LIS results.
80 We have to be aware, however, that this measure does not consider the top incomes of the countries. These are 
most likely show large variation, but are difficult to measure in survey data. It is also noteworthy that the relative 
income of the 90th percentile (p90/p50) increases between 1992 and 1998 when 0=0.5, but declines when 0=0.73. 
The reason is probably the variation in household sizes: the correlation between the percentile tank and 
household size is very small and varies in sign, for the two years and for the various sensitivity parameters. (E.g. a 
peculiarity is that average household size for p90 increases between the two years for 0=0.5, but declines for 
0=0.73.)
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In comparison with most East-European countries, the rise of inequality in Hungary was 
moderate. According to Milanovic, the rise in inequality during the early phase of transition, 
measured with the Gini coefficient, was very high in Russia, followed by Latvia and Bulgaria, 
then by Poland (1998, Table 4.2). Slovenia and Hungary had the smallest increase among these 
nations. The level of inequality in Hungary is significantly below that of most states of the CIS, 
including Russia and Ukraine (Table 4.1). Central European countries have a similar extent of 
income inequality. Calculations using LIS data from the early 1990s indicate that inequality in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic were less than in Hungary (Forster et al. 1998). The ranking 
of Poland and Hungary is not clear, different authors using varying data come to contradictory 
conclusions (Andorka et al. 1997).
How sensitive are the measures of inequality in Hungary? Table 3.3 presents various different 
measures of inequality, using different methodologies or samples. Inequality has risen among 
the working age population to a greater extent than in the total population. This is probably 
related to rising inequality of earnings, reported elsewhere (e.g. Redmond and Kattuman 2001; 
Toth 2001). One methodological choice presented in Table 3.3 is the use of household and 
individual distribution. For most indicators, the household distribution shows a higher 
inequality to some extent. The difference, however, is not major. For the purposes of this 
work, the individual distribution will get priority, since we are ultimately concerned with the 
well-being of individuals. In the specific analysis in later sections I will use a narrowed sample, 
including only those individuals who responded to a detailed questionnaire, so that a detailed 
information is available about them. Consequently both children (17 years and below) and 
those of whom only a so-called proxy have been completed, have been excluded from the 
sample (see Appendix A on basic sample description). As the presented measures of 
inequality show, the level of inequality is very similar in the restricted sample and in the total 
sample of the adult population (using individual distribution in both cases).
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Table 3.4 Inequality and the choice of equivalence scale, sensitivity analysis
1992 1998
6=0.25 6=0.5 6=0.73 6=1 6=0.25 6=0.5 6=0.73 6=1
Mean
(thousand forints) 281.4 206.9 157.4 115.8 639.9 474.8 364.9 272.0
Median
(thousand forints) 248.6 181.2 137.3 100.4 558.5 417.2 3220 240.0
Decile ratio 
(p90/pl0) 
MLD
3.71 3.25 3.16 3.09 3.83 3.51 3.44 3.49
0.147 0.128 0 .122 0.127 0.156 0.143 0.142 0.156
Theil index 0.150 0.136 0.131 0.136 0.157 0.147 0.148 0.162
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.071 0.063 0.061 0.063 0.075 0.069 0.069 0.075
Atkinson (e=l) 0.137 0.121 0.115 0.119 0.145 0.133 0.133 0.145
Gini 0.293 0.275 0.266 0.269 0.299 0.285 0.282 0.293
Note: individual distribution o f income, total sample
As Table 3.4 shows, the level of inequality significantly differs depending on the equivalence scale 
used, in other words, on the assumption referring to the economies of scale within a 
household. As the scale relativity parameter, 0, rises, inequality falls then rises in case of 
various measures, showing a U-shaped pattern. Why is it so? As Coulter et al. describe, the 
impact on inequality of changes in 0 is not obvious, because the General Enthropy Class 
measures (all of the presented measures are such) are ‘functions of ratios of group mean 
equivalent incomes to the overall average, and increasing 0 decreases both the numerator and 
the denominator of the ratios’ (1992). These effects for specific measures of inequality and 
their causes are extensively discussed in the literature (Coulter et al. 1992; Jenkins and Cowell 
1994). For the purposes of this analysis, the main conclusion is that the rise in inequality remains 
robust for various equivalence scales.
The findings presented are similar to the calculations based on the same sample. Toth, also 
using the Household Panel Survey and the Household Monitor, using per capita income 
measure, finds that the Gini has risen from 0.263 to 0.276 in the same period (2001 and 
personal communication). My figures indicate a rise from 0.269 to 0.293, when using the same 
equivalence scale (0=1). The decile ratios also show a more modest rise according to Toth, 
from 3.14 to 3.27, compared to my figures presented in Table 3.4, 3.09 and 3.49. The reason 
for the divergence is most likely that I have used imputed income data for both years, based 
on my own imputation for 1992, following the survey institution’s prescribed method for 
1998, mean substitution (see Appendix D for a detailed description). The 1998 data of Toth,
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however, seem to be ‘outliers’ in a negative direction in the general trend of inequality, and are 
significantly lower than both 1997 and 1999 figures. Overall, my calculations presented above 
fit well the trend described by others.
Figure 3.3 Income inequality, Kernel density estimates
■e 1991/2  b-----1997/8
.00001 -
5.0e-06 -
400000a
Real income, 1992=100%
No/e: ‘r e s tr ic t e d  s a m p le ’, e x c l u d i n g  c h i ld r e n  a n d  p r o x i e s  ( s e e  e x p l a n a t i o n  b e f o r e )
Kernel density estimates provide a visual presentation of the change in the income 
distribution. There was a major shift to the left, indicating that both the median and the modal 
income declined in real terms (Figure 3.3). The reason for this fall is that the number of people 
whose real income fell was greater than the number of those whose income rose. The second 
figure displays the distributions relative to the mean income of the actual year, thus highlights 
the relative change in the income situation (Figure 3.4). This shows that the distribution 
became more widely spread, thus both the number of people with very low incomes and the 
number of those with incomes somewhat above the mean increased. Notably, the situation of 
the high income groups did not seem to have changed. This, however, only means no change 
according to this survey data. Overall, the main finding of the density estimates is that the 
situation of the bottom income groups has deteriorated both in absolute and relative terms.
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The overall majority of the population has suffered income loss in absolute terms between 
1992 and 1998, but a significant proportion could improve their relative position.
Figure 3 A Income inequality, standardised by the mean, Kernel density estimates
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Note: ‘r e s t r ic t e d  s a m p le ’, e x c l u d i n g  c h i ld r e n  a n d  p r o x i e s  ( s e e  e x p l a n a t i o n  b e f o r e )
The 1990s saw a rise in inequality in Hungary, as both my results and the existing literature 
shows. The extent of this rise, however, appears to be rather moderate. At the same time, real 
incomes have dropped significantly for the majority of the population. What are the dynamic 
features of these processes? Income mobility research for Hungary, using panel data, shows 
that a relatively high share of the poor stayed poor over the transition. Habich and Speder find 
that 46% of those individuals who had income less than half of the mean in 1992 remained in 
the same group by 1996 (2000, Table 2)81. Mobility was similar at the top: 44% of those who 
had more than 150% of the mean income retained their relative income position over time. 
Comparing these figures with West-German mobility patterns between 1990 and 1994, it 
seems that Hungarian mobility was higher, as expected for a transforming society (2000, Table
81 T h e  a u th o r s  u s e  e q u iv a l is e d  h o u s e h o l d  in c o m e ,  w it h  a n  e q u iv a le n c e  s c a le  o f  0 .7 3 .
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2). The upward mobility of the poor, however, was only slightly better in Hungary, while the 
downward mobility of the rich was significantly larger than in West-Germany.
The mobility research also shows that a significant proportion of the middle income categories 
have slid down (2000, Table 2). Looking at lower middle category, the income group which 
had 75-100% of the mean income, 39% retained their position, 38% slid down, and only 23% 
improved it. The volatility in the upper middle group was greater. Out of those, who had 
incomes between 100 and 125% of the mean in 1992, only 24% remained in the same income 
group by 1996. 47% experienced a downward shift, and only 30% an upward one. A 
significant downward mobility, especially from more advantaged income groups, is a normal 
and expected phenomenon in open societies, as the West-German data also shows. What is 
striking in Hungary, however, is the relatively high share of those who slid down to a large 
extent. For example, 10% of the lower middle income groups have become relatively poor 
(having less than 50% of the mean) over the period examined. These results add a very useful 
dimension to the previously presented results. They, however, do not answer how much 
individual characteristics explain income mobility and income position. I do not aim for 
examining the determinants of mobility here, which moreover would not be possible due to 
the lack of panel data for 1992-1998. My concern instead is the relationship between income 
position and personal characteristics.
3.5 INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
The distribution of incomes among specific social groups is a major characteristic of a society. 
It involves issues such as how much the market values certain characteristics, for example the 
human capital and work effort, and how much role the state assumes in redirecting the original 
distribution of incomes. In other words, to what extent the principle of distribution is based 
on merit, or on need. Not much fortune-telling skill would have been necessary to predict in 
the early 1990s that the economic transition would change the determinants of income, the 
relationship between personal characteristics and income. Two separate issues worth 
considering in this respect. The first is a static inquiry, looking at which are the most important
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determinants of income at one point in time. This way, we can understand what attributes are 
likely to make someone rich or poor. The second aspect of the investigation has a dynamic 
property, assessing the impact of transition. Have the characteristics, which made someone 
rich changed over time? What attributes contributed to increasing consumption opportunities 
and what are the ones, which were factors in being left: behind?
First, the relationship between household characteristics and income will be examined at both 
1992 and 1998, providing two snapshot analyses, including a date in the beginning and another 
towards the end of the transition. As explained earlier, household income will be used, since I 
assume that this comes closer to the actual level of quality of life than other notions of 
income. It then follows that both the analysis will search for a relationship between household 
income and household characteristics.
Income position is greatly influenced by demographic factors, human capital and the labour 
market position of the household members. As Figure 3.5 shows, those who live in Budapest, 
where the head of household has higher education and there is an entrepreneur among the 
household members, enjoy relative financial advantage. Households of Gypsy ethnicity or with 
unemployed members are clearly worse off then the average. Note that pensioner 
households82 on average do not have significandy less total income than the mean. As 
mentioned before, pensions preserved their real value better than other social benefits and 
there was no backlog in the transfer of monthly payments. This relatively good position of 
pensioners is a feature of the Hungarian situation, rather distinct e.g. from most countries of 
the former Soviet Union. Households with a disability pensioner seem to do better than those 
which have unemployed members, thus those who exited the labour market in the former way 
seem to do relatively better than the unemployed.
82 Tensioners’ refers to old-age pensioners, thus exdudes disability pensioners..
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Figure 3.5 Income of specific houselx)ld types relative to the mean (equivalised household income, e=0.73)
No/e: t h e  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  r e f e r  t o  e i t h e r  t h e  h e a d  o f  h o u s e h o l d  ( B u d a p e s t ,  G y p s y  e t h n ic i t y ,  h ig h e r  e d u c a t io n )  o r  
t h e  h o u s e h o l d  a s  a w h o l e  ( la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t a t u s ,  e .g .  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  h a s  a  m e m b e r  w h o  i s  e n t r e p r e n e u r )
During the years of transition the polarisation between social groups appears to be primarily 
based on differences in labour market position and human capital. Households with 
entrepreneurs or a head with higher education managed to enlarge their relative advantage of 
1992. The unemployed, however, seem to increasingly lag behind. Interestingly, two-pensioner 
households have managed to improve their relative income position by 1998.
Entrepreneurs, who may particularly benefit from the increased freedom of a market 
economy, deserve special attention. As mentioned in the previous chapter the group of 
entrepreneurs is rather heterogeneous, consisting partly of successful entrepreneurs, with 
advantageous class position, education background and economic sector, partly of many 
others, who lost their jobs were ‘pushed’ into self-employment (Robert and Bukodi 2001). 
Some others became self-employed for purely tax evasion, but in reality still worked as 
employees. Since the general household surveys used here are not as specific as labour force 
surveys are, detailed analysis of subgroups of entrepreneurs is not possible. Instead, 
entrepreneurs can be divided into two groups, one, where they work with no employees and
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to another, where there are one or more employees. This appears to be a simple but useful 
way of separating those entrepreneurs who were less driven by the entrepreneurial spirit and 
opportunities but by necessities and the lack of opportunities elsewhere. Entrepreneurs with 
no employees had income over on third higher than the overall mean. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs with employees had about twice as much in both years.
These regularities, however, do not account for correlations between personal characteristics. 
Persons with higher education levels for example tend to be entrepreneurs more frequently. 
Entrepreneurs with tertiary education are more likely to have employees. Gypsy ethnicity is 
positively associated with low levels of education, and also with unemployment. Higher 
proportion of women have low education than men, but once age is controlled for, it becomes 
clear that it is not so among the younger generations. What is the net effect of certain 
personal characteristics on income? The answer to this calls for a multivariate model.
The specification of the model is very similar to the ones used in the literature (Redmond and 
Kattuman 2001; Toth 2001).
In c o m e r  ^ d e m o g r a ph ic  characteristics;, h u m a n  capital* em plo ym ent) ,
where demographic characteristics include for example the sex, the age, the ethnicity and the 
marital status of the head of household, human capital includes the education level of both the 
head of household and his or her spouse, and employment includes variables indicating the 
labour market participation of members of the household, e.g. the number of active earners. 
The unit of the analysis (i) is the household. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
income, accounting for the non-linear relationship between income and its determinants.
Income is strongly and positively associated with the number of active earners in the 
household and the education level of the head of household (see Table 3.5). Other factors, 
such as living in the capital, the education level of the spouse of head, and the number of 
pensioners in the household, are also significant at 1% level and enter positively. In contrast, 
other household characteristics such as when the household is headed by a female or there are 
small children in it are associated with lower income levels. Surprisingly, unemployment is a
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significant variable only in 1992, with the expected negative sign. Interestingly, Gypsy ethnicity 
is significant only in 1992, with a negative coefficient. Also in 1992 we can observe a 
curvilinear relationship between age and income, controlled for other characteristics. The 
maximum household income is on average at the age of 48 of the head of household. The 
separation of the disability pensioners from old-age pensioners seems justified on the basis of 
the results. While pensioner households tend to have more income compared to households 
with no pensioners, the presence of a disability pensioner in the household has no (1992) or 
just a minor (1998) such influence. Most likely, the employment position of the other 
household members plays a crucial role.
There are signs of regional disparity as well, although it seems to decline over time. In 1992 
those households which resided in the capital were significantly better off than others. By 
1998, the gap seems to have widened primarily between urban and rural areas. All the 
coefficients of the ‘urban’ variables are significant and positive, indicating higher income there 
than in the reference category of villages and small towns. The inhabitants of Budapest, 
however, seem to be still the most prosperous, even after controlling for labour market 
situation and educational level of household members.
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Table 3.5 Determinants of income among households, OLS regression
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of 
equivalised household income, e-0.73 Coef
1992 
Std. Err. Beta Coef.
1998 
Std. Err. Beta
Demographic characteristics 
Settlement type:
Town -0.0480*** 0.0180 -0.0455 0.0437* 0.0259 0.0351
County centre -0.0229 0.0227 -0.0170 0.0559* 0.0290 0.0401
Budapest 0.1031*** 0.0211 0.0870 0.0753*** 0.0292 0.0561
Sex o f  head o f household (female=l) -0.1150*** 0.0211 -0.1092 -0.0528* 0.0310 -0.0434
Age o f  head o f household 0.0130*** 0.0031 0.4400 0.0024 0.0040 0.0725
Age square o f head o f household -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.4860 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040
Age o f  smallest child:
3 yrs or less -0.3591*** 0.0293 -0.2270 -0.2643*** 0.0434 -0.1300
4-9 yrs -0.2297*** 0.0262 -0.1569 -0.2467*** 0.0364 -0.1418
10-16 yrs -0.2141*** 0.0230 -0.i600 -0.2905*** 0.0331 -0.1756
Marital status o f  head o f household
(married=1) -0.0446** 0.0226 -0.0452 -0.1016*** 0.0304 -0.0927
Ethnicity o f head o f household (gypsy=l) -0.2947*** 0.0433 -0.1077 -0.0846 0.0638 -0.0255
Human capital
Education level o f head o f household:
Vocational training 0.0839*** 0.0196 0.0784 0.1109*** 0.0270 0.0942
Secondary education 0.1877*** 0.0224 0.1565 0.2141*** 0.0321 0.1524
Higher education 0.3831*** 0.0275 0.2685 0.4270*** 0.0382 0.2696
Education level o f spouse o f head:
Secondary education 0.0868*** 0.0234 0.0661 0.0896*** 0.0321 0.0593
Higher education 0.1321*** 0.0336 0.0703 0.1893*** 0.0468 0.0877
Employment
No. o f active earners in the household:
1 0.2920*** 0.0231 0.2701 0.3711*** 0.0303 0.3105
2+ 0.4995*** 0.0269 0.5125 0.5695*** 0.0347 0.4842
No. o f  pensioners in the household:
1 0.0386* 0.0219 0.0373 0.1147*** 0.0283 0.1006
2+ 0.1481*** 0.0304 0.1066 0.2716*** 0.0394 0.1782
Disability pensioner in the household 0.0035 0.0241 0.0023 0.0534* 0.0302 0.0353
No. o f unemployed in the household:
1 -0.0238 0.0291 -0.0129 -0.2217*** 0.0402 -0.1048
2+ 0.0856 0.0747 0.0175 -0.2681** 0.1268 -0.0388
Constant 11.2726 0.0816 12.1729 0.1114
AdjR*
F ratio
Observations
0.4164
83.22
2651
0.3495
47.45
1989
Notes. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, *** denotes significance at 1% 
level
Base categories: village or small town, male, no child under 16, elementary education or less (of head of 
household), education below secondary level (of spouse of head), no active earner, no pensioner, no disability 
pensioner, no unemployed
123
The relative weight of these characteristics, however, greatly varies. As the beta weights 
indicate, the number of active earners in the household is one of the major explanatory factors 
of household equivalised incomes in both years. Another important variable is higher 
education of the head of household, which has also positive sign as expected.
There has been a considerable change in the determinants of income. A glance at the 
significance levels of the explanatory variables reveals that in 1998 fewer variables depicting 
demographic characteristics and more variables expressing employment situation are 
significant than in 1992. Testing the coefficients in the two equations gives confirmation that 
the coefficients of the numbers of pensioners and unemployed in the household are 
significantly different in 1992 and 199883, thus there was a change over time. The role of 
demographic factors appears to decline over time, while labour market participation seems to 
increasingly matter. This finding is confirmed by a brief comparative analysis of the three 
groups of determinants of the income position, presented in Table 3.6. This shows the results 
of different regression models, using only one set of variables at a time. The adjusted R2 values 
explain how much of the variance of the dependent variable, the log of income, is explained 
by the specific selection of explanatory variables altogether. The R2 values were similar for all 
three set of variables in 1992. In 1998, however, the exclusive use of demographic variables 
could much less explain the income position (12% of the variance) than the sole use of either 
human capital variables (17%), or those of employment status (19%).
Table 3.6 Comparison of main determinants ofincome among households
1992 1998
Demographic S  
characteristics
✓
Human capital ✓ ✓
Employment S ✓
Adj R2 0.2299 0.2212 0.2081 0.1217 0.1711 0.1930
Observations 2651 2651 2651 1989 1989 1989
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This implies that individual performance became a more powerful factor in determining 
someone’s quality of life, while innate characteristics seem to matter less. This may sound 
good news. If Gypsy ethnicity or being female as head of household become less of sources of 
disadvantage, as the lower coefficients show, then this may imply that there is less 
discrimination in the society. This, however, may be a simplistic conclusion. Romany ethnicity, 
for example, is associated with other forms of disadvantage, such as unemployment or lower 
levels of education (Kertesi 1995). Also, other demographic characteristics remained 
important. For example the existence of a small child in the household tends to bring lower 
income both in 1992 and in 1998.
3.6 CONCLUSION
A substantial section of this chapter discussed measurement issues and methodological 
choices, primarily due to the heterogeneity of existing approaches. This discussion highlighted 
clearly the choices made in the current study and also pointed to further potential ways of 
development. A positive aspect of the measurement of income in the survey is that there are 
detailed income questions. The total income aggregated from these is most likely more reliable 
than income based on a single survey question. My contribution to the improvement of the 
survey quality is that I have imputed incomes both for 1992 and 1998, in order to minimise 
missing values and the resulting information loss. Negative aspects of the survey were the 
possible underreporting of incomes, mostly from the informal sector, and the exclusion of 
non-household population. Possible further directions of future research could include the 
analysis of the distributional impact of in-kind benefits, and that of differences in housing 
costs. The assumption of equal sharing of resources within the household could also be put to 
the test.
83 t-test, where Ho: X1992 = X1998, where X1992 eg. is the coefficient of the number of active earners in the household 
in the regression equation for 1992 and X1998 is the same coefficient in the equation for 1998. The result of the 
test here is that we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal with a 95% confidence level
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There has been a rising inequality between 1992 and 1998, simultaneously with a major fall in 
average real income. The trend of inequality was shown to be robust to the choice of the 
measure of inequality and also to the choice of equivalence scale. The rise in inequality may 
not be necessarily a problem in itself, neither for efficiency nor for equity considerations. In 
Hungary, however, it does seem to be problematic. The results show a large decline in the 
income of the bottom income decile group in absolute terms, and the extent of this fall 
surpassed that of other income groups. In addition to this, other research shows that the 
bottom income group had relatively little upward mobility during the first half of the 1990s. 
Does this imply an increasing disadvantage of the poor in other aspects of well-being? Is the 
increasing financial disadvantage a source of ‘miser)?, in other words are the poor particularly 
unhappy? Although the majority of the population has experienced a loss of income in 
absolute terms, there is a proportion who became relatively better off compared to the 
average. How did these two processes altogether affect people’s satisfaction with their 
incomes? The high volatility of incomes may have made people risk averse. Has the existence 
of financial safeguards, especially savings, contributed significantly to people’s contentment? 
These issues will be discussed in the second part of the thesis, relating to subjective well-being.
Over the years of transition individuals’ human capital and labour market situation has 
increasingly determined their level of income. Those who could ‘join in’, the active earners, the 
entrepreneurs and the highly skilled could prosper. Those who ‘stayed out*, particularly the 
unemployed experienced the deterioration of their situation. There are signs of regional 
disparity as well, particularly between the capital and the rest of the country. This is in line with 
the starting hypothesis on the increasing ‘skill premiums’ of the market. If there is a 
strengthening link between labour market performance and income, how does a person’s own 
income generating ability contribute to his or her self-esteem? Does it make people more 
contented if they contribute significantly to the common household budget, or is their 
satisfaction primarily driven by their share of the household income, irrespective from its 
source? I will seek answer to these issues in chapter 5. What is the relationship between 
income and other measures of objective well-being? Does money buy better housing 
conditions for example? In an increasingly market-oriented society is there any change in the 
intensity or quality of social interactions? These questions are the major concerns of the next 
chapter.
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In contrast to the increasing importance of educational attainment and labour market 
participation, the explanatory power of demographic factors had declined over time. The 
multivariate analysis also shows that controlling for labour market status, educational 
attainment, and a series of demographic characteristics of the household, Gypsy ethnicity of 
the head of household was significant and negatively correlated with income only in 1992. 
This may suggest that being Romany in itself may not be a source of disadvantage in financial 
terms in 1998 any more, only indirectly, through disadvantages in terms of human capital and 
labour market participation. Do other aspects of well-being support this hypothesis? The 
focus of the analysis on household income, and the underlying assumption of equal sharing 
within the household did not enable the scrutiny of the gender dimension of income 
inequalities. The forthcoming analysis of well-being may shed light on possible gender 
differences as well. One major issue is the labour market participation of women. In the 
previous chapter we saw that the decline in labour market participation was a major feature of 
economic changes in Hungary. Was this process gender neutral, or how has if affected 
women? These issues lead us to the next chapter.
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ANNEX 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INCOME VARIABLES
Table A l.3 .1 Major aggregate income variables, descriptive statistics
Total sample
Variable Obs Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1992
Equivalised income, e=0.73 7232 5723 157,448 93,006 0 1,400,038
Equivalised income, OECD scale 7232 5723 151,848 89,043 0 1,419,109
Equivalised income, e=0.50 7232 5723 206,872 123,342 0 1,802,511
Equivalised income, e=0.25 7232 5723 281,431 174,093 0 2,372^38
1998
Equivalised income, e=0.73 5293 5294 364,917 235,169 0 4,019,140
Equivalised income, OECD scale 5293 5294 349,230 227,685 0 4,073,886
Equivalised income, e=0.50 5293 5294 474,775 300,955 0 5,174,531
Equivalised income, e=0.25 5293 5294 639,912 411,674 0 6,810,066
Restricted sample (including only those who are 17 or over and responded to the 
personal questionnaire)_________________________________________________
Variable Obs Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1992
Equivalised income, e=0.73 5310 4,034 160,961 95,464 0 1,400,038
Equivalised income, OECD scale 5310 4,034 154,096 90,794 0 1,419,109
Equivalised income, e=0.50 5310 4,034 207,863 125,868 0 1,802,511
Equivalised income, e=0.25 5310 4,034 277,768 176,662 0 2,372,238
Real income, 1992= 100% 5310 4,034 154,096 90,794 0 1,419,109
1998
Equivalised income, e=0.73 3795 5,074 371,114 237,049 0 4,019,140
Equivalised income, OECD scale 3795 5,074 354,047 229,895 0 4,073,886
Equivalised income, e=0.50 3795 5,074 473,537 300,310 0 5,174,531
Equivalised income, e=0.25 3795 5,074 625,669 408,636 0 6,810,066
Real income, 1992= 100% 3795 5,074 107,518 69,815 0 1,237,173
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4In e q u a l it y  o f  w e l l -b e i n g : n o n - in c o m e  m e a s u r e s
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe non-income measures of well-being in Hungary and 
their change over the period of economic transition. The analysis will use so-called objective 
measures, including labour market status, housing situation and social relations. The choice of 
these specific measures is partly justified by their importance as measures of quality of life, 
partly by limitations of the dataset, primarily that of issues of comparability over time. The 
analysis will be of a multidimensional nature, using multiple measures of well-being rather than 
a single index. The unit of the analysis will be the individual, because it is people’s well-being 
this thesis focuses on.
4.1 CHOICE OF INDICATORS
The use of non-income measures of well-being, as mentioned before, is not an unusual 
exercise. The theoretical justification of such measures was discussed in the first chapter of the 
thesis. In sum, money is not the sole and ultimate measure of well-being. The recendy 
expanding literature on social exclusion emphasises that disadvantaged social position needs to 
be addressed in a multidimensional way, looking beyond the traditional measure of income 
poverty. Social policy at the level of the European Union also seems to move in this direction. 
The Nice summit in Dec 2000 discussed ways of fighting not just poverty but also social 
exclusion. The first step in this direction is to try to develop a common set of social indicators, 
which would be the basis of social monitoring and the assessment of social policies in member 
states countries. In this enterprise social scientists also play an active role, as the recent volume 
authored by Anthony Atkinson and others suggests (Atkinson et al. 2002). Given the 
importance of such efforts and their expected influence on Hungary as a future member of 
the Union, the current state of this discussion will be considered as a point of reference. In 
addition, existing social indicators on the performance of individual EU countries will be also 
used as a base for comparison.
The set of indicators recommended by Atkinson et al. aim to measure social exclusion. They 
focus on marginal social situations, which means that each of these is based on a specific 
criterion of exclusion and contains a cut-off point. The analysis here is not primarily aiming to
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look at such indicators, but rather measures of well-being and their distribution among social 
groups as a whole. Due to the complexity of these measures, however, there will be a 
considerable overlap of indicators used here and those recommended by Atkinson et al. Thus, 
both indicators of well-being and those of ‘ill-being* will be used. The choice of the specific 
measures from these two broad classes is based on a judgement related to which captures 
more accurately an attribute of living standards, which seems to identify something desirable 
or non-desirable from a normative point of view. There seems to be an analogy of this 
approach and the existing parallel terminology of ‘social exclusion* and ‘social inclusion’, both 
used in the European social agenda.
The Stockholm Summit in March 2001 proposed seven indicators of social inclusion. These 
included measures of poverty, income inequality, unemployment and education (Atkinson et 
al. 2002, p. 6). Extending these dimensions of social inclusion, Atkinson and his co-authors 
propose additional indicators of housing quality, health and social participation (Atkinson et al. 
2002, pp. 196-7). Notably, this set includes both objective and subjective indicators as well. 
The subjective measure used is that of self-assessed health, including those individuals who 
classify their health as bad or very bad.
The first set of measures used here analyse labour market participation (section 4.2). There are 
various reasons for this. Firsdy, transition brought major structural changes to the labour 
market, affecting practically all the working age population. Thus the analysis of the labour 
market is an essential element of the assessment of the social consequences of economic 
transition. Secondly, participation in the labour market is an element of well-being in itself. 
Labour market participation is socially valued in general, due to its income generating 
character for the individual and due to its contribution to the production of national income. 
It is regarded to be one of the major means for social integration as well. Jobs tend to bring 
opportunities for personal contacts, and so increase a person’s ‘social capital*, as the following 
analysis on social relations shows (section 4.4). But also,yo£ satisfaction appears to be a major element 
of an individuals overall life satifaction (see Chapter 5).
A major issue relating to labour market participation and other measures of social exclusion is 
that of individual agency, the distinction between individual choice and external constraints.
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Sodal exclusion, as Barry argues, should refer to only those cases where non-participation in a 
society’s mainstream institutions occurs for reasons beyond the control of those subject to it 
(Barry 2002). He points out that for example voluntary withdrawal from political participation 
does not constitute social injustice and should not be identified as social exclusion. Similarly, 
non-participation in the labour market may be the results of an individual’s choice, ‘self­
exclusion’ is possible.
Has transition brought increasing choice of the individual: choice of profession, and that of 
job? As Komai, in his review of the history of Socialism in Hungary describes (1988), there 
were severe restrictions by the ‘maximal state’ in the early fifties, including mandatory posting 
to the first job after education, and no voluntary change of job without the consent of 
superiors. Work, in the sense of a regular job, was mandated by law, and only precisely 
specified exceptions permitted for reasons of health, maternity, and the like. Those who did 
not conform were labelled as ‘parasites’ and were liable for prosecution (p. 245)’. Later, and 
especially in the reformed state of the mid 1980s this old law obliging people to work 
remained in force, but it was hardly enforced. Hungarians thus already had a certain freedom 
of choice before transition.
Political and economic transition has brought increasing freedom, but it may not affect all 
equally. The legal obligation to work was formally abolished. A greater variety of 
entrepreneurial forms provided a more varied choice between potential employers. Also, 
choosing non-employment, for example staying at home as a housewife, has also become a 
legally accepted option. Economically it appears to be less so. The declining real value of state 
benefits made the choice of withdrawal from the labour market more difficult. Particularly 
family support has suffered gready, which implies that the previously generous ‘sodal wage’ 
for women looking after small children at home possibly gready lost its attraction. It would be 
rather speculative and arbitrary to make distinction between inactivity as a personal choice and 
involuntary inactivity84. To get round this problem, only unemployment is examined as a form
84 Burchardt and Le Grand use various alternative definitions in order to estimate the possible range o f  voluntary 
non-employment in the U K  (Burchardt and Le Grand 2002). They find that at least one tenth o f  the non­
employment is ‘unambigously voluntary’.
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of involuntary withdrawal from the labour market. The definition of unemployment, that of 
the ILO, is based on the criteria that the individual is actively seeking job and is ready to start 
one. Unemployment is thus clearly involuntary, and will be used as a measure here.
Housing conditions are inherent parts of most analysis of social exclusion (e.g.Eurostat 2000; 
Atkinson et al. 2002). There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, housing quality tends to be 
poorly related to income. Secondly, as discussed in chapter 3, housing income is omitted from 
measured income here. The following analysis (in section 4.3) will focus on two main aspects 
of housing: ownership and housing quality. From the earlier discussion it follows that owning 
a home was desirable and highly valued, at least by the end of the transition process. Good 
housing conditions, or rather the lack of major quality shortfalls is an essential element of well­
being, and the opportunity to live in such places may be regarded as a *basic capability*.
Social interaction is valuable, both for its contribution to individual’s happiness and for their 
integration to society. The frequently used notion of poverty, defined as the lack of 
participation in the life of the society in some ways, seems to inherendy incorporate this aspect 
of individuals* functionings as well. Different measures of social participation, referring to e.g. 
participation in organisations, clubs, or to various forms of leisure activity with friends, are 
widely known measures of the recent social exclusion literature as well (e.g. Burchardt et al. 
1999; Stewart 2002).
Non-income measures of well-being used in the following analysis:
• Participation in the labour market as employee or self-employed
• Non-voluntary withdrawal from the labour market in the form of unemployment
• Housing ownership: tenant status
• Housing quality problems: occurrence of problems, multiple disadvantage
• Social relations: marital status, family ske, number of friends, lack of any friends,
rare contact or no contact with friends or relatives
This list may appear to have major omissions, especially health, education or political 
participation. Why is this? Health, although it would be a relevant indicator, regrettably cannot
be examined here due to the lack of comparable data. As discussed in section 1.3, educational 
attainment is no doubt an essential functioning. At the same time it is not just an end in itself, 
but a means to achieve other valuable things in life, such as having a satisfactory job, or being 
able to lead a certain lifestyle. In this analysis I focus on education as a determinant of well­
being, rather than an end in itself (see Figure 1.2 on the assumed relationship of various 
functionings and income). Political engagement was not included either. The main reason is 
that there is only a single measure, that of voting in the national elections, available in the 
surveys used here. In my view abstaining from voting might be an expression of the increased 
freedom in the new democracy, in contrast to Socialism, where not only the actual choice 
between candidates was very limited, but participation in voting was a sort of ‘duty5. More 
fruitful measures of political engagement, such as membership of an interest group or dub are 
not available. [Recent studies of well-being or sodal exclusion use these latter measures, e.g. 
(Burchardt et al. 2002; Stewart 2002)].
The analysis will look at main sodal divisions along gender, ethnic, age and educational lines. 
A particular focus will be on the relationship between income position and measures of well- 
bdng presented here, all of them bdng non-income measures. I will present these indicators 
for both 1992 and 1998. This will enable a static analysis of relative position of social groups at 
one point in time, but also changes over time. The definition of income used here will be 
equivalised household income, using OECD equivalence scale. Thus I assume that there is 
equal sharing within the household, and individual’s well-being is influenced by the incomes of 
their household members. A similar choice is proposed by Atkinson et al as well (Atkinson et 
al. 2002). For a more detailed definition of all the variables, see Appendix B.
4.2 LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION
Labour market partidpation is sodally valued in general, and is a frequendy used measure of 
well-bdng. Labour market partidpation, however, may not be desirable for all. Work in low 
paid, low quality jobs may bear high costs for an individual, and at the same time may provide 
few benefits in terms of income, job satisfaction, self-realisation, and sodal capital. As
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mentioned in chapter 2, there is a high prevalence of low-paid jobs in the country (full-time 
workers earning below 2/3 of full-time median earnings), reaching 22% (OECD 2001b). This 
is above the level of European OECD countries. Thus, the assumption that labour market 
participation in itself is an important capability of a person, remains on a rather general level.
A further important aspect of freedom, beyond the choice of job, is that of choice between 
work and leisure. There was a gradually increasing freedom in this respect as well during the 
Socialist era, as the opportunities for entrepreneurial activities and overtime work grew. How 
did people use this freedom? A phenomenon of the late Socialism, hardly known before, may 
be called ‘exhaustion from overwork’. limits on overtime work were lifted, and as a result 
many Hungarians chose to have second and third jobs in the late 1980s. Komai says that 
‘According to some estimates, at least half the adult population works for more than 60 hours 
a week, not counting household work, and a smaller fraction of the population works even 
more, 80 or 100 hours a week. As a result, many Hungarians are physically exhausted from 
overwork. But as far as the freedom of the individual to choose between work and leisure is 
concerned, it has expanded enormously (1988, pp. 245, 248).’
Economic transition has also increased the freedom of choice between work and leisure. How 
did people actually use this freedom? Changes of the labour market have somewhat altered 
these patterns of overwork. Comparing Komai’s results with survey data for 1992 show 
somewhat lower proportions of overtime work, which may be a sign of change in this respect. 
In 1992 22% of the respondents said that they worked altogether 60 hours or more a week on 
average. 9% claimed that they worked 80 hours or more. This might suggest, if the data are 
comparable85, that overwork remained a problem for many, but became less widespread by the 
early 90s86. According to the economic literature, choice between work and leisure is 
determined by marginal earnings, and also by personal preferences. It seems plausible to 
assume that it was partly the increasing skills premium in the labour market that has enabled 
for many a greater consumption of leisure (this means that the income effect of greater wages
85 There is no indication o f  the data source and the methodology in the article o f  K om ai
86 Unfortunately there is no similar data in the 1998 survey, so I cannot look at changes between 1992 and 1998.
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was bigger than the substitution effect, thus the total effect is that people chose to consume 
more leisure using their higher incomes).
Activities outside the labour market may also be both socially valued and desirable for 
individuals. Home care may be one such activity, for example looking after children or caring 
for elderly family members. The provision of welfare at home is emphasised particularly by 
feminist thinkers, as an equally important element of the welfare system as the state or the 
market (e.g. Williams 1989). The value home care is often acknowledged by the state as well. 
In Hungary, the child support system has elements, which may be regarded as a ‘wage* for 
child-care at home. A universal maternity grant was provided until the age of three of the child 
during most years of transition as well, until 1995 and then again from 1998 (Annex 2). The 
real value of the benefit, however, significantly declined over time. A crucial aspect of home 
care is whether it is based on free choice of the individual, and to what extent the welfare state 
enables such choice between labour and home care. State transfers which acknowledge home 
care are just one side of the coin, by enhancing individual’s freedom to be able to stay out of 
paid work. The state may also increase freedom of women to do paid work. One such example 
is day care for children, enabling mothers to return to the labour market. Enrolment in 
kindergartens did not decline in transition and is still high: the participation rate among the 3 
to 5-year olds was 86% in 1997 (UNICEF 1999, Table 7.1, p. 133). In contrast, day-care 
provision for children under 3 has substantially declined. The proportion of children in infant 
homes fell by 25% between 1989 and 1997 (Table 8.1, p. 136). Most likely the major 
explanation is the decline in the supply of such facilities (although we may also assume that it 
is also related to falling demand, related to growing inactivity of women). As discussed in 
chapter 2, there was a major fallback in the provision of such facilities by enterprises. This is 
expected to affect women’s opportunities for paid work negatively.
Falling labour market participation
There was a major decline of employment in the period examined here. As Figure 4.1 shows, 
employment fell from 73% to 60% among the working age population. The proportion of 
employees fell considerably, while there was a minor rise in the share of the self-employed. 
These figures imply that non-employment is a major issue in the Hungarian context. The large
136
number of pensioners in the total is particularly striking among the working age population, 
reaching 8 and 12% in the two years. Disability pensioner status and early retirement were 
typical ways of withdrawal from the labour market, enabled by a permissive legislation, and 
exploited by employers and employees who tried to avoid unemployment. This seems to be a 
typical third party payment problem, where neither the patient nor the doctor pays or 
contributes to the cost of the declared disability status.
Figure 4.1. Labour market participation among tlx working age population, 1992 &  1998
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The existence of pensioners other than disability pensioners among working-age population 
may seem surprising. The reason for this is early retirement. Most likely the older generations 
had a comparatively high risk of unemployment, even if retirement age was rather low in 
Hungary by international standards: 55 years for women and 60 years for men until the 1998 
pension reform, when it was raised universally to 62 years.
The proportion of the unemployed within the total working age population is largely 
unchanged87. The definition of unemployed used here is the generally used ILO definition. 
Thus those individuals are classified as unemployed who are not working, who are actively 
searching job and are available to work. Official statistics, using the Labour Force Survey and 
the ILO definition, shows that unemployment rate has declined from 9.3% in 1992 to 7.8% in 
1998 (KSH 1993, Table 3.2; 1999b, Table 4.3). In contrast, the registered unemployment rate 
has increased in the same period from 8.2% to 11% (KSH 1999b, Table 4.2). The reasons for 
the divergence between these two measures and their trends over time have been presented 
previously in chapter 2. The ILO unemployment rate was 7.6% in 1992 and 8.2% in 1998 in 
the sample used here. This former number is significantly less than the official unemployment 
rate. The difference may be due to the fact that the survey looks at unemployment at one 
particular point in time, i.e. March, while official statistics refer to annual averages of quarterly 
data.
There is a major increase in the proportion of students. Education policy during transition 
resulted an increasing enrolment in tertiary education. The previously existing strict entry 
requirements were eased, and the new state funding of institutions was based on the number 
of students. In addition, numerous private universities and polytechnics appeared. Between 
1990 and 1997 the number of admitted students in tertiary education increased by 2.5 times 
(KSH 1998, Table 11.19). At the same time, the number of students who applied has nearly 
doubled, probably thanks to the increasing opportunities. While in 1990 only one in three 
students who applied were accepted, by 1997 this ratio was one to two. Note, that I have
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focussed here on the working age population, where the issue of tertiary education was of 
major importance. In the educational policy in general there are grave issues for concern 
during transition88.
A possible way of exploration of the rapidly growing rather heterogeneous group of the ‘other 
inactive’ could be to separate the ‘socially valued activities’ from those which are probably not. 
This, however, seems problematic due to the inconsistency of categories at the two data 
points. The Labour Force Survey shows that the recipients of child-care support are remained 
largely on the same level, with a minor decline by 1998 (KSH 1998, Table 4.1). In addition to 
this, however, increasing number of people used the newly introduced scheme of child-care 
leave, which provides a flat-rate benefit for full-time mothers with three or more children. 
These figures, however, cannot capture other forms of social care. In addition, being a 
housewife may be equally regarded as a socially valued activity. In the 1998 survey used here, 
one third of the ‘other inactive’ in working age can be identified as participating in a ‘socially 
valued activity’. This predominantly consists of women on maternity leave89, with a rather 
small proportion of housewives and soldiers in national service. Who make up the remaining 
inactive? The majority of ‘other inactive’ receive unemployment benefit (but could not be 
classified as unemployed by the ILO definition) or live on social benefits. Notably, in 1998 
over one quarter of the ‘other inactive’ are ‘other dependants’, who do not receive benefits and 
are supported by family members. A slight majority of this latter group is made up of men. In 
sum, about one third of the non-student and non-pensioner inactive may participate in a 
socially valued activity in 1998. Noteworthy, that at the same time there is a substantial
87 The null hypothesis that the decline equals zero could not be rejected at a 10% significance level, thus the 
change is not significant Note, that the ratio tested here uses the total working age population as a base. In 
contrast, unemployment rate is defined with reference to the labour force, which indudes the employed and the 
unemployed, but not the inactive (induding also those who are discouraged).
88 Education spending has substantially declined, and the real wages of teachers have fallen. There was a major 
decentralisation of the primary and secondary education to municipalities, which brought increasing 
differentiation in educational attainment, a severe urban-rural gap (Micklewright 1999, p. 370). New forms of 
secondary education extended the length of education to 6 or 8 years, instead of the previous 4 years (Lannert 
1998). These new schools thus push the age of sdection much earlier, and increase selectivity. In the long run they 
may substantially reduce social mobility. Equality of opportunity is particularly problematic for the Gypsy 
minority (Lannert 1998, pp. 374-75).
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subgroup, one fourth, which does not receive social assistance at all. This clearly implies that 
their absence from the labour market is not due to incentive problems of the benefit system, 
Svelfare dependency*, thus they are most likely involuntary non-employed.
Social divisions of labour
The following analysis will focus on social inequalities of labour market status along four 
major demographic characteristics, gender, age, ethnicity and educational attainment. Only a 
working age sub-sample is used, which is defined as men between 17 and 60 years and women 
between 17 and 55 years. Two main questions are examined: a static one, referring to the 
social divisions at one point in time, and a dynamic one, changes over the years of transition.
Employment as employee
One of the major characteristics of the Hungarian labour market during Communism and in 
the early phase of the transition is the high participation rate of women by international 
standards. The proportion of female employees even outnumbered that of males in 1992. By 
the late 90s female participation has declined, shrinking opportunities primarily affected 
women. A further indicator of gender segregation may be that the proportion of women in 
leading positions also substantially fell between 1994 and 1998 (Frey 1999, p. 22).
Employee status substantially varies by age, ethnicity and educational attainment, as Table 4.1 
shows. Employees are most frequent among the middle age groups, and people with tertiary 
education. A very low proportion of the Gypsy ethnic group work as employees. Overall, we 
can see that the decline of employment hit all groups substantially and as a result the 
proportion of employees fell among all major social groups discussed here.
89 Only those are included here who are on maternity leave and have no job. Those mothers who stay away from 
their employment on maternity leave are included among the employees. Unfortunately the breakdown of 
inactivity is not consistent at the two data points. The earlier survey does not include the category of jobless 
women on maternity leave.
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Table 4.1 Ratio of employees, as a % of relevant social groups
1992 1998
Male 65.9 53.6
Female 69.4 52.8
Up to elementary education 50.3 34.0
Vocational training 74.4 61.4
High school 72.2 58.9
Higher education 89.2 72.2
Gypsy ethnicity 36.1 33.6
17-29yrs 61.5 45.5
30-39 yrs 78.8 62.9
40-49 yrs 72.2 62.4
50-62 yrs 54.8 44.6
All 67.6 53.2
N 2665 1556
Table 4.2 Empkyee status andpersonal characteristics, logit model
Dependent variable: 
employee (dummy) 1992 1998
Coef.§) Std error Coef ((I) Std error
Female 0.2908 0.0776 1.3376 0.0093 0.0890 1.0093
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.8326 0.1687 0.4349 -0.3313* 0.1976 0.7180
Education:
vocational training 0.9170 0.0982 2.5018 1.0887 0.1125 2.9703
Secondary 0.7746 0.0989 2.1698 1.0070 0.1185 2.7375
Higher 1.8767 0.1730 6.5322 1.3998 0.1647 4.0546
Age:
17-29 yrs -0.5140 0.1023 0.5981 -0.7503 0.1158 0.4722
30-39 yrs 0.3583 0.1133 1.4309 -0.1085 0.1271 0.8972
50-62 yrs -0.5753 0.1189 0.5625 -0.7408 0.1327 0.4767
Settlement type:
Town 0.0447 0.0933 1.0457 0.1591 0.1104 1.1724
County centre 0.0869 0.1175 1.0908 0.1522 0.1219 1.1644
Budapest 0.0730 0.1128 1.0758 0.1948 0.1345 1.2151
Constant 0.0899 0.1139 -0.2895** 0.1281
Observations 3556 2417
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0971 0.0789
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level
Base categories: elementary education or less, 40-49 years of age, village or small town
To what extent is the ethnic difference attributable to differences in educational attainment? In 
order to capture the net ethnicity effect, a rather simple logit model was estimated. This model 
estimates the probability of being an employee, using explanatory variables such as gender,
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education, ethnicity, age and settlement type. Controlling for differences in education, age and 
gender, Gypsy ethnicity is associated with lower probabilities of being an employee in both the 
early and the late 1990s (see Table 4.2). In 1998, although the coefficient still remained 
negative, the size of the effect was considerably smaller. Since in the logit model the size of 
the coefficient has no meaningful interpretation (only its sign and significance level)90,1  have 
also estimated the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the odds. The odds for 
Romany to be an employee are 0.43 times lower than for the non-Romany population in 1992. 
In other words the odds for being an employee versus not being one is expected to decrease 
0.43 times for the Romany, other things being equal. An alternative interpretation, indicating 
the marginal effect of ethnicity on the probability of someone working as an employee, shows 
that Gypsies were 19.8% less likely to be employees than non-Gypsies. These figures, 
however, present only rather crude estimates of the real ‘net* ethnicity effect, due to the lack of 
detailed labour market variables, including region specific characteristics. For the purposes of 
the analysis, however, these results indicate that there was an ethnic division over and above 
the differences in educational attainment, which may have declined over time.
Women were more likely to work as employees than men in 1992, controlling for differences 
in educational attainment, ethnicity and other characteristics. By 1998, this gender difference 
has disappeared.
Entrepreneurs}]#
Entrepreneurship existed during Socialism as well, but economic transition to capitalism 
greatly increased the opportunities, as discussed in chapter 2. Entrepreneurial activities, instead 
of being just ‘tolerated’, became inherent part of the more market spirited political ideology as 
well. As a result, the number of self-employed and ‘unincorporated enterprises’91 has doubled 
between 1990 and 1994 (Laky 1995). They have generated half a million new jobs, and by the
90 In the logit model the coefficients indicate the estimated change in the log of the odds.
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beginning of 1994 the active earners who worked in these reached 22% of the total number of 
active earners in the country (p. 687). Here I will focus on the group of the self-employed. 
Which social groups were they recruited from?
There is a greater number of self-employed among men compared to women, as the survey 
data used here shows (see Table 4.3). There is also a division line by educational level; those 
who have elementary school or less are much less likely to be entrepreneurs, but self- 
employment reaches 12% for those with higher education in 1998. The changes over time 
presented here confirm the finding of previous studies on increased stratification. Between 
1992 and 1998 there was a great increase of entrepreneurs among people with higher 
education and among men.
Table 4.3 Ratio of self-employed, as a % of relevant social groups
1992 1998
Male 6.4 8.1
Female 3.1 2.9
Up to elementary education 2.3 1.7
Vocational training 6.5 7.1
High school 6.0 5.9
Higher education 4.6 12.0
Gypsy ethnicity 3.4 1.7
17-29 yrs 3.8 2.9
30-39 yrs 5.7 8.2
40-49 yrs 5.9 8.0
50-62 yrs 3.7 4.9
All 4.8 5.6
N (unweighted) 201 177
Multivariate analysis reveals that there was no significant ethnic division, controlling for 
educational attainment and other factors (Table 4.4). Thus, most likely the ethnic difference 
can be explained by the lower educational attainment of the Gypsy population. The gender 
difference, however, remained prevalent, showing that women had a lower probability of
91 For ‘unincorporated enterprises’ and the self-employed, or ‘sole proprietors’ the property of the enterprise and 
that of the household is not separated, thus the entrepreneur is responsible for his activity with his entire 
property. As a consequence these entrepreneurs normally do not pay corporate tax on the revenue of the
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being self-employed, other things being equal. There was no significant change over time for 
women.
Table 4.4 Self-employed status andpersonal characteristics, logt model
Dependent variable: 
self-employed 1992 1998
Coef. (?) Std error Coef.§) Std error
Female -0.8530 0.1677 0.4262 -1.0325 0.2141 0.3561
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.0007 0.4313 0.9993 -0.4486 0.6918 0.6385
Education:
vocational training 0.8590 0.2365 2.3607 0.9689 0.3203 2.6350
secondary 0.8845 0.2438 2.4217 1.0731 0.3348 2.9244
higher 0.4439 0.3147 1.5588 1.6173 0.3539 5.0392
Age:
17-29 yrs -0.4045* 0.2096 0.6673 -0.7655 0.2691 0.4651
30-39 yrs -0.0524 0.1981 0.9490 -0.0521 0.2416 0.9492
50-62 yrs -0.4467* 0.2583 0.6397 -0.6004** 0.2925 0.5486
Settlement type:
Town 0.0714 0.1985 1.0740 0.1370 0.2526 1.1468
County centre 0.0410 0.2478 1.0418 0.0939 0.2783 1.0984
Budapest 0.4943** 0.2114 1.6393 0.2594 0.2840 1.2961
Constant -3.1061 0.2629 -3.2036 0.3372
Observations 3556 2417
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0467 0.0782
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 
1% level
Base categories: elementary education or less, 40-49 years of age, village or small town
Self-employment in Hungary is a predominantly individual enterprise. As mentioned before, 
there was only a slow evolution of large-scale entrepreneurs in the early years of transition 
(Robert 2001). The increasing proportion of self-employed with employees suggests growing 
prosperity. In 1992 82% of entrepreneurs had no employees or co-working family members. 
By 1998 this proportion declined to 68%. Still, however, the overall majority of the self- 
employed remained without employees.
enterprise, rather they pay personal income tax (Laky 1995). Typical unincorporated enterprises are ‘partnership 
without legal entity’, ‘general partnership’, and ‘limited partnership’ (KSH 1998).
Unemployment
Among the social groups listed in Table 4.5, the Gypsy population is the most hit by 
unemployment. One in every five persons of Gypsy ethnicity are unemployed, using the ILO 
definition of unemployment. Education, as expected, is clearly correlated with joblessness: the 
low skilled have the highest proportion of unemployed among them. There was no notable 
change over time in this ratio92. Further calculations indicate that the severe joblessness of the 
Gypsy population is at least partly attributable to their educational disadvantage. The overall 
majority of the Gypsy unemployed have elementary education or less, some have vocational 
training, and none of them has secondary or tertiary education. Is the joblessness of the Gypsy 
is exclusively attributable to their low levels of education?
Table 4.5 Ratio ofunemployed, as a % of relemnt social groups
1992 1998
Gypsy ethnicity 20.5 18.8
Up to elementary education 9.3 7.7
Vocational training 6.4 4.8
High school 4.0 4.0
Higher education 1.5 3.3
Male 7.6 5.5
Female 4.6 5.2
17-29 yrs 8.1 5.6
30-39 yrs 5.7 6.6
40-49 yrs 5.3 5.2
50-62 yrs 4.2 3.4
All 6.1 5.3
N (unweighted) 220 148
The results suggest that the unemployment of the Gypsy ethnic group cannot be explained 
exclusively by their educational disadvantage. Table 4.6 indicates that there may be another 
problem as well. There are many more unemployed among people who are both Romany and 
have only a certain level of elementary education than among the non-Romany who have 
similarly low educational attainment. Similarly, multivariate analysis shows that controlling for 
differences in education, age, gender and setdement type, people with Gypsy ethnicity are
92 The differences between the relative proportions in the two years have been tested using a t-test Only those 
changes are mentioned, which are found significant at least at a 10% significance level.
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more likely to be unemployed than the non-Gypsy (Table 4.7). This model is not suitable to 
describe the actual degree of ethnic disadvantage, however, it confirms that there is an ethnic 
dimension of joblessness, which cannot be explained by differences in human capital. Kertesi, 
using labour force survey from 1993, also finds possible signs of ethnic discrimination (1994). 
His model includes controls for additional (rather aggregate) controls for labour demand, such 
as industry level and local unemployment rate, beyond the variables used here.
Table 4.6 Ratio ofunemployed within ethnic groups, % (amongpeople with the lowest level of education)
1992 1998 1992 1998
% Frequency (weighted cases)
Gypsy (with lowest education) 
Non-Gypsy (with lowest
22.3 19.7 70 32
education) 7.7 6.8 oCMCO
Note: 100%: e.g. total Gypsy population with the lowest education (elementary education or less) in 1992
The results so far, including not only unemployment, but also employee status, suggest a 
systematically lower probability of labour market participation for the Romany, controlling for 
educational attainment. A further challenging question, which cannot be tackled here, is to 
what extent unemployment is voluntary or involuntary. As shown by others the 
unemployment problem of the Gypsy population is partly related to the regional mismatch 
between labour demand and supply (the Gypsy living in rural areas in great numbers) 
(Abraham and Kertesi 1996), thus it may be a type of structural unemployment. It is also 
shown that those working age non-employed who are actively seeking job is actually higher 
among the Romany (Kertesi 1994, p. 993). Possible further economic explanations which may 
explain some of the difference in joblessness could be that the labour of Gypsy is more 
‘expensive’ for employers, due to the potentially higher risk of quitting, absence from work, 
etc, beyond possible ‘cultural’ explanations. These issues, however, to my knowledge, have not 
been addressed in the literature so far. The consistent findings of my analysis and that of other 
evidence strongly suggest that discrimination does exist.
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Table 4.7 Unemployment andpersonal characteristics, logit model
Dependent variable: 
unemployed 1992 1998
Coef. §) Std error Coef. @) Std error
Female -0.6270 0.1469 0.5342 -0.2973* 0.1748 0.7428
Ethnicity (Gypsy) 1.0297 0.2140 2.8001 1.1228 0.2550 3.0735
Education:
vocational training -0.3259* 0.1732 0.7219 -0.3779* 0.2162 0.6853
secondary -0.6708 0.2008 0.5113 -0.5154** 0.2434 0.5973
higher -1.5934 0.4229 0.2032 -0.6648* 0.3527 0.5144
Age:
17-29 yrs 0.4098** 0.1910 1.5065 0.1367 0.2231 1.1465
30-39 yrs 0.0629 0.2082 1.0650 0.2586 0.2416 1.2951
50-62 yrs -0.4693* 0.2612 0.6254 -0.4894 0.3011 0.6130
Settlement type:
Town -0.1027 0.1667 0.9024 0.1547 0.2161 1.1674
County centre -0.3144 0.2283 0,7302 0.2175 0.2390 1.2430
Budapest -0.3457 0.2266 0.7078 0.2022 0.2697 1.2241
Constant -2.1168 0.2077 -2.5363 0.2482
Observations 3556 2417
Prob>chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0677 0.0371
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level
Base categories: elementary education or less, 40-49 years of age, village or small town
The proportion of unemployed declined among men (see Table 4.5). This most likely means 
that long-term unemployed people became discouraged from labour market participation, as 
the rising number of inactive among men shows (see Figure 4.2). The logit model indicates 
that women are less likely to become unemployed than men, controlling for educational 
differences and other factors, although the significance level of the coefficient has declined 
over time (Table 4.7). Notably, there seems to a weakening link between education and 
unemployment: the proportion of jobless within the groups with higher education increased 
over time. The multivariate analysis confirms this result, the coefficient of higher education 
has become lower over time, indicating that people with higher education are still less likely to 
become unemployed compared to the base category of people with primary education or less 
in 1998, but this probability may not be any different from the chances of those with 
secondary education.
Long-term unemployment makes up a substantial proportion of the unemployed. Defined as 
being unemployed for at least a year, their proportion was 59% at the early point in transition.
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This fell to 45%, probably due to the reduction of the eligibility period for benefits to one year 
(see Annex 2 in chapter 2). Women were somewhat more hit by long-term unemployment 
than men at the early transition date. This reversed over time and by 1998 in contrast to the 
50% ratio of men only 39% of unemployed women were jobless for a year or more. The 
relative proportion of long-term jobless Gypsies has declined over time, and in 1998 there was 
no significant difference between the Gypsy and non-Gypsy population groups. Similarly, 
there was an equalising trend among educational groups. In 1998 there was no significant 
difference among the proportions of long-term unemployed within specific education groups.
Social divisions in transition
Transition has brought a major gender division in the labour market, following a long period 
of high participation of women during Socialism. Women withdrew greater numbers from the 
labour market than men. As Table 4.1 suggests many of them lost their employee status and 
became inactive. These changes primarily hit those groups, which had low education. As a 
result, the educational structure of female employees improved over time. Women did not use 
the opportunity to become self-employed. This may be attributable to the way that they 
followed less the ‘puli’ or the ‘push’ effects of the labour market, in other words women used 
the opportunities or followed necessities to become entrepreneurs to a lesser extent than men. 
On the other hand, men and women seem to have exploited the opportunities for disability 
pension and early retirement to the same extent. The share of women among students rose, 
and as a result there are about equal numbers of male and female students in the working age 
population.
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Figure 4.2. Change in employment status by gender, 1992-1998 (in % points of tlse working age population of 
the same gender)
.20-1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bnployee Self- Unemployed Disability Pensioner Student Other 
employed pensioner inactive
The transition of the labour market has peculiar characteristics for specific age groups. The 
young became more involved in education93. The middle age groups tended to become 
entrepreneurs more, and they were highly represented among employees as well. Many of 
those in their fifties or over withdrew from the labour market, using opportunities for 
disability pension or early retirement.
There is no clear overall trend for the changing role of education in explaining labour market 
participation. People with higher education seem to have increasingly become entrepreneurs. 
This effect of higher education prevails after controlling for age and other personal 
characteristics. In contrast, higher education seems to have declining correlation with 
employee status. Unemployment affected people with higher educational attainment to a lesser 
extent at both particular data points. Over the 1990s, however, people with higher education 
became less protected from unemployment. In sum, there is evidence for systematic 
differences in labour market participation for various educational groups at both point in time.
93 T h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  p r iv a te  h ig h e r  e d u c a t io n  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  t h e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  tu it io n  f e e s  in  s ta te  u n iv e r s it ie s  
w e r e  n e w  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s .  D e s p i t e  t h e s e  in c r e a s in g  c h a r g e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a p p lic a n ts  t o  
h ig h e r  e d u c a t io n  in s t i tu t io n s  g r e a d y  in c r e a se d .
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There is no sign for the increasing importance of human capital in general over time, as 
measured here. This may be due to the simple measure used here, which does not include 
labour market experience, or due to the lack of controls for industry and occupational specific 
features in the models. Earlier results in chapter 3 indicated the increasing importance of 
educational level for incomes over time. Skills premiums have also increased: while in 1992 the 
earnings of people with tertiary education were 5.6 times higher than the earnings of those 
with only elementary education, this ratio rose to 6.8 by 1998. Probably this plays a great role 
in explaining the increasing willingness for studying in higher education, too.
4.3 HOUSING
The vast majority of publicly owned and heavily subsidised, rental housing was privatised in 
the early 1990’s (as mentioned already in section 2.3). Most of the tenants expected financial 
gains from this. Although many of them had to face a vast cost of renovation due to an 
existing repairs backlog, overall, the housing privatisation proved to be a ‘national gift’ (Daniel 
1997b). According to Daniel, the main winners are the top groups in terms of housing value: 
those who lived in larger and better quality dwellings gained more and faced lower cost of 
renovation.
This housing privatisation aggravated a previously existing injustice in the housing market. 
While most of those who owned their houses never received housing subsidies during the 
socialist system, and fully had to pay the price of their own home, those who were the major 
beneficiaries of the state system before the transition, gained even more during the 
privatisation process. As discussed earlier, these beneficiaries were not the most needy, since 
the principles of distribution of rental housing were based on partly political and ideological 
considerations. For example, members of the political elite often lived in rented 
accommodation (Daniel 1997a). Thus, those who always lived in owner-occupied housing, did 
not gain from the generous privatisation ‘gift’. In addition, those who remained tenants by the 
end of the transition period, were mostly those with the lowest quality of housing. Altogether, 
the process of housing privatisation may well have caused a feeling of injustice in many
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people. Unfortunately the available data do not allow me to identify changes in housing 
ownership during the 90s, thus I cannot test how different are the beneficiaries of the housing 
privatisation (new home owners) from the losers (home owners already before transition). 
Data on actual housing ownership status, however, enables me to test another groups of 
‘losers*, those who remained tenants by the end of the 90s.
The unit of the following analysis will be the individual. Although housing characteristics are 
typically refer to households, and all household members share these conditions, the ultimate 
concern of the thesis is individual’s well-being. This choice is also justified with the nature of 
this analysis: the focus is on the distribution of objective well-being rather than its explanation.
Ownership structure: declining share of tenants
The proportion of individuals who live in rented housing declined from 16% to 6% between 
1992 and 1998 (Figure 4.3)94. By the end of the 1990s the overwhelming majority of the 
population lived in their own homes. The small share of tenants seems to imply that both the 
market of public housing and that of rented private housing became marginal. What are the 
relative si2es of these two markets? The overall majority of tenants live in publicly owned 
housing (80% and 91%, respectively). Only a small proportion rents a private home (7% and 
2%, respectively). Interestingly, there is a considerable share of housing provided by 
enterprises, making up 11% and 10% of tenants in 1992 and 1998. These figures thus indicate 
that while there was a shrinking in the supply of public housing, its share increased in the 
rental market. At the same time private rental housing market decreased substantially.
94 A similar decline can be observed if households are the unit of the analysis. In 1992 18% of households were 
tenants, in contrast to 7% in 1998. The difference between the individual and household distribution of housing 
ownership implies that relatively smaller households tend to be tenants.
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Figure 4.3. Housing ownership, 1992 &  1998
1992
Other 
Tenant 4%
Owner-occupier
80%
1998
Other 
Tenant 3%
Owner-occupier
91%
Notes: T h e  o t h e r  c a t e g o r y  i n c lu d e d  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h o  l iv e  in  d i e  f la t  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  l o n g  t e r m  c a r e  o f  a n  e ld e r ly  
p e r s o n ,  t h o s e  w h o  l iv e  t h e r e  a s  f r ie n d s  o r  r e la t iv e s  o f  t h e  o w n e r ,  o r  t h o s e  w h o  u s e  t h e  f la t  i l le g a l ly .
S a m p le  s iz e :  N i 9 9 2 - 5 3 3 6 ;  N i9 9 8 :::3 7 9 4
The results presented in Table 4.8 seem to confirm the analysis of Daniel, discussed earlier, on 
two major accounts: (1) the distribution of tenant status was not based on ‘need’, but on a 
rather ad hoc distribution principle during Socialism, and (2) those who remained tenants after 
the massive housing privatisation, were the most needy who could not buy their homes thus 
could not profit from the opportunities due to lack of resources. The bulk of the privatisation 
still seemed to lie ahead at the point of the survey in 1992. Only 25% of tenants said that their 
housing was offered for sale by the local government, and the majority of public housing was
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not on sale yet. Altogether 6% of owner-occupiers were those who acquired their homes by 
purchasing it from the local government. Altogether, thus it seems plausible to speak of the 
traces of ‘Socialist* housing policy in 1992 despite the start of housing privatisation. Gypsies 
and lower income groups are highly represented among tenants in 1992, which shows that 
many of the needy received public housing. On the other hand, the better off are also highly 
represented among tenants. A further sign of the peculiar public housing policy of the Socialist 
era is that household size was not a specific criterion for entitlement either, as the lack of 
relationship between the number of children and tenant status indicates.
Table 4.8 Tenant status of individuals, as a % of relevant social group
1992 1998
Location of residence:
village or small town 1.6 0.9
town 14.8 2.3
county centre 25.1 11.6
capital 36.7 14.2
Income quintile group:
1 16.9 10.3
2 18.1 5.6
3 12.1 4.4
4 13.0 3.8
5 15.7 3.8
Number of children in the 
household:
None 15.7 5.3
1 16.6 5.2
2 11.8 6.5
3 or more 13.7 7.7
Gypsy ethnicity 28.8 18.1
All 15.1 5.5
N 1105 229
By the late 1990s the relationship between tenant status and ‘need* strengthened. Low-income 
groups, households with Gypsy ethnicity, or those with many children were relatively highly 
represented among tenants in 1998. This, however, does not refer to a fundamental change in 
housing policy. The apparently more ‘meritocratic* ownership structure of public housing 
simply comes from the selective process of housing privatisation. The groups who did not 
have the resources to buy their homes, or those whose home was not offered for sale, tend to
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be ‘the needy’. These ‘needy* were thus those who did not benefit from the grant ‘privatisation 
gift’ described earlier. The apparendy strengthening link between ‘need’ and public housing is 
thus far from being a most welcome outcome of economic transition.
There is a major concentration of social housing in urban areas. As expected, rented housing 
exists mosdy in cities and the capital. In Budapest over one third of the people lived as tenants 
in the early 1990s. By 1998 the share of tenants declined to 14%. The concentration of 
tenants, who, as discussed before, predominantly live in social housing, still remained the 
greatest in big cities: the county centres, and the capital. In villages and small settlements the 
overall majority of people own their homes and live in houses built by themselves95.
Housing quality: increasing disparity
Housing ownership is associated with housing quality: tenants faced worse housing conditions 
than owner-occupiers. As Figure 4.4 shows nearly about half of tenants reported some 
neighbourhood or housing quality problem both in 1992 and 1998. Despite the massive sale 
of public housing the ‘remainder* of public housing was apparently affected by problems in a 
similar extent96. There was a major improvement in the conditions of privately owned homes. 
This may appear unexpected, because it happened despite the fact that many privatised flats, 
which were recently purchased from the local governments, had a major renovation backlog. 
It thus seems that people trusted the security of the property rights in the new market system 
and expressed their ownership rights by spending on the improvement of their homes.
95 In 1992 among the inhabitants of villages and small setdements 59% lived in houses built by themselves. Only 
23% bought their homes and 13% inherited it
96 The t-test shows that the change was not significant at a=0.1. We thus cannot say that there was a dedine in the 
occurrence of housing problems among tenants in the original population.
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Figure 4.4 Occurrence of housing quality or neighbourhoodproblems by ownership status, 1992 &  1998
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□  Noisy 
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Owner-
occupiers
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Notes: ‘Housing quality problem': dampness, fungi, darkness, no separate entrance or other problem.
‘Airpollution and noiy in d ic a t e s  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  b o t h  p r o b l e m s .  T h u s ,  in  c o n t r a s t  t o  ‘n o i s y ’ o r  ‘a ir  p o l l u t i o n ’ 
c a t e g o r ie s  it  in d ic a t e s  a  g r a v e r  p r o b l e m ,  a n d  t h e r e  is  n o  o v e r la p  b e t w e e n  t h e  c a t e g o r ie s .  ( F o r  d ie  v a r ia b le  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  se e :  ‘n e i g h b o u r h o o d  p r o b l e m s ’ in  A p p e n d i x  B .)
Sample size: N 1992-5271; Nm8=3475
Housing quality problems became graver among tenants over time. Although there was no 
sign of escalating problems, measured by the share of homes affected by problems (Figure 
4.4), a different measure shows that the nature of these problems aggravated. As Figure 4.5 
indicates, the proportion of those people who live in housing with numerous serious faults 
increased. This seems to indicate a compositional change during the 1990s: housing 
privatisation was a selective process and many of those who remained tenants by the late 
1990s were those who had grave housing quality problems.
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Figure 4.5 Extent of i'musing quality or neighbourhoodproblems among tenants, 1992 <& 1998
□  Moderate 
B  Rather serious 
B  Serious
Note: Housing problems: d a m p n e s s ,  f u n g i ,  d a r k n e s s ,  a ir  p o l l u t i o n ,  n o i s e ,  d a n g e r o u s  n e i g h b o u r h o o d ,  n o  s e p a r a te  
e n t r a n c e  o r  o t h e r .  I f  o n e  p r o b l e m  o c c u r s ,  t h e n  i t  i s  l a b e l l e d  a s  ‘m o d e r a t e ’, i f  t w o ,  t h e n  ‘r a t h e r  s e r i o u s ’, i f  t h r e e ,  
t h e n  ‘s e r io u s ’. ( F o r  m o r e ,  s e e  A p p e n d i x  B .)
S a m p le  s iz e :  N i9 9 2 = 5 3 7 ;  N i9 9 8 = 9 3
In this section the analysis has so far concentrated on tenant status, which was mostly affected 
by the housing privatisation. From the point of view of the starting research question, 
however, housing quality problems indicate the lack of an essential element of well-being, and 
are interesting per se, irrespective of housing ownership, and also irrespective of how much 
direct responsibility the person has in resolving these problems.
Overall, there seems to be a significant upgrading of the housing quality. While in 1992 28% 
of the people lived in housing conditions with some quality problems, in 1998 this ratio was 
only 20% (Table 4.9). This improvement affected nearly all social groups. The extent of this 
improvement, however, was far from being equal for all.
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Table 4.9 Occurrence of bousing quality problems among individuals in specificpopulation groups, %
Any problem Serious problems
1992 1998 1992 1998
Location of residence: 
village or small town 23.3 21.6 2.5 2.4
town 24.8 15.4 1.5 1.5
county centre 27.0 19.2 2.0 4.2
capital 44.C 23.9 3.6 2.8
Income quintile group: 
1 33.2 32.1 5.6 6.9
2 31.4 22.0 1.8 2.7
3 29.1 20.5 2.1 2.4
4 18.7 15.3 0.3 1.5
5 28.5 11.4 2.2 0.0
Number of children in the 
household:
None 28.3 19.1 2.1 2.2
1 26.5 17.6 2.3 2.2
2 27.0 17.9 1.3 3.4
3 or more 35.2 43.1 8.7 7.5
Gypsy ethnicity 53.2 46.9 16.8 11.6
a  n 28.1 19.9 2.4 2.6
N 1660 683 138 87
Which social groups were primarily affected by housing problems in general? Housing quality 
problems are concentrated among the bottom quintile group, the Gypsy ethnicity, and families 
with three or more children. As Table 4.9 and Figure 4.6 show, the social divisions have 
increased in terms of housing quality over the 1990s: while the occurrence of such problems 
declined in the population in general, there was a minor or no decline at all among the 
mentioned disadvantaged groups. These regularities seem to be prevalent irrespective of the 
measure of housing quality problems used, either the occurrence of any problem or that of 
serious, accumulated problems. In sum, the changes of housing quality during economic transition 
increased the concentration of housing qualityfailures among certain specific disadvantaged social groups.
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Figure 4.6 Occurrence of housing quality problems among indiiiduals in various income quintile groups, 1992 
&  1998
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Note: “ s e r io u s  p r o b l e m s ” m e a n s  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  h o u s i n g  q u a l i ty  p r o b l e m s  
O b s e r v a t i o n s :  A n y  p r o b le m :  N i9 9 2 = 1 6 6 0 ;  N i9 9 8 = 6 8 3 ;  S e r io u s  p r o b le m :  N i9 9 2 = 1 3 8 ;  N i9 9 8 = 8 7
There was a regional disparity in housing quality in the early 1990s, which seems to have 
disappeared later on. In 1992 housing quality shortfalls were the highest among inhabitants of 
the capital. This can be probably attributed to the major renovation backlog of the large public 
housing stock of Budapest. The difference between housing quality in the capital and in small 
settlements, using both a ‘weak’ measure of ‘any problem’ or a ‘strong measure’ of ‘serious 
problems’, is not significant in 1998. This may be explained by the effort of new owners to 
upgrade their homes. Despite this, it seems somewhat counterintuitive that despite the 
relatively larger proportion of public housing in the capital, housing quality in general is not 
worse there than in small towns. A possible explanation may be the difference in incomes. As 
presented in the previous chapter, even after controlling for a series of household 
characteristics, including employment and human capital, households in villages and small 
settlements have significantly less household income than households living elsewhere. 
Owner-occupiers in villages thus may have comparatively less resources to keep up the quality 
of their homes.
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4.4 SOCIAL RELATIONS
The major demographic changes in Hungary during the 1990s included the rise of divorce 
rates, and an increase of the proportion of cohabitation and extramarital births. As discussed 
in chapter 2, there is a long-term trend of declining fertility, which resulted very low levels of 
birth rates in European comparisons. The datasets used here confirm these trends. As Table 
4.10 shows, the number of single people increased between 1992 and 1998, and the 
proportion of those who are married declined. The dataset cannot provide firm evidence for 
the spreading of co-habitation. Probably due to the small number of cases the increase in the 
proportion of cohabiting individuals is not significant
Table 4.10 Marital status of the adultpopulation, 1992 and 1998
1992 1998
Single 16.7 20.1
Married 63.7 57.4
Divorced 6.4 7.3
Widow/er 11.6 12.9
Cohabiting 1.7 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0
N 5336 3788
In the same period the number of children also declined. As Table 4.11 shows, the proportion 
of childless households increased. At the same time the share of one or two-children 
households fell. The large family model seems to keep its place: the share of families with 
three or more children did not change in the period observed here97.
97 The decline is not significant, in other words, the null hypothesis that the share o f  families with three or more 
children is the same in 1992 and in 1998 could not be rejected at 90% confidence level
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Table 4.11 Family si%e in 1992 and 1998, distribution among adult individuals
Number of children in the household 1992 1998
None 59.9 66.3
1 19.3 17.7
2 15.8 11.4
3 or more 4.9 4.6
Total 100.0 100.0
N 5336 3795
Decline in social contacts
A major change is the apparent decline in social contacts over the 1990s. Using secondary data 
from 1993, Figure 4.7 presents a considerable fall in the number of friends in Hungary by 
1998. Notably, while in 1993 one in five persons said that they had no friend with whom they 
could discuss minor or greater personal problems, by 1998 their number rose to more than 
one in three. Others also confirmed this declining trend, using data from 1993 and 1997 
(Albert and David 1998). Is this attributable to a possibly changing notion of friendship or can 
we suspect a deeper social phenomenon, for example an increasing degree of individualisation 
or in contrast, a growing reliance on close family ties? Unfortunately there is no other measure 
of comparable data on social interaction over time. Available information for 1998, including a 
different measure of social contacts, however, confirms that social relations are indeed in a 
grave situation, which may be called a crisis without overstatement.
160
Figure 4.7 Number of friends of indiiiduals with whom could discuss problems, 1993 <& 1998
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Source o f  1993 data: (Albert and David 1998, p. 258)
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Infrequent social contact seems to be grave problem in general in the country. The proportion 
of individuals who live in households, which say that they invite relatives or friends to their 
homes or who go to visit others in their homes less than a month or they never do it is 60%, 
according to data from 1998 (see Table 4.11). This ratio is very high in European standards. 
European Community Household Panel data shows that the average proportion of “relational 
(self)exclusion”, measured in a similar way to the indicator used here, is between 5 and 10% 
among the total population of 13 countries and it is not over 15% in any of the examined 
countries (Eurostat 2000, Figure 3.13)98. A possible explanation for this difference may be that 
the European survey asks about meeting people at home or elsewhere, while the Hungarian 
one investigates meeting people at liome. This difference in wording, however, cannot explain 
the extent of the disparity entirely. The reason is cultural: Hungarians do not typically go out a
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lot, so it is unlikely that they would have intense social interactions outside the sphere of their 
homes. As the data show, only 17% of the adult respondents say that they go out at least once 
a month to cafe or to pub. In sum, we may realistically assume that Hungarians have much 
less social contacts than people in EU countries.
Major social divisions by income groups
There is a considerable variation of social relations by income. As Figure 4.8 shows both the 
proportion of people with no friends and those who have rare contacts or no contacts at all is 
higher in the low-income groups. The share of people who say that they have no friend at all 
with whom they could discuss their smaller or greater personal problems is about twice as big 
in the bottom quintile group than in the top one. Similarly, the problem of limited social 
contacts occurs more frequently among the poor. Similar patterns exist in countries of the 
European Union. The share of persons with rare contacts or without contacts with friends 
and relatives is relatively high in France and Portugal, approaching 15% among the poor 
(Eurostat 2000, Figure 3.13). In the non-poor population the ratio is lower, reaching about 8 
and 10%, respectively. Why does income has any impact of social relations? One possible 
explanation is that higher income is associated with labour market participation, and it is 
actually this latter factor, which contributes to more social interaction. We may also suspect 
that households with low income can afford less to invite friends and relatives to their homes. 
It may be related to pride and standards of hospitality as well. Paraphrasing Adam Smith, this 
latter may be called ‘appearing in private without shame’. This assumption is supported by 
empirical evidence. The survey data used here shows that 70% of bottom quintile households 
said that they could spend less on receiving guests than they needed. In contrast, this ratio is 
36% in the top income quintile group, despite the fact that ‘need’ is subjectively interpreted, 
and has probably higher level among the well-off.
98 Kitty Stewart, also using the ECHP, shows that there are also major regional disparities within countries in 
terms of the frequency of social contacts, e.g. between the French and Flemish speaking parts of Belgium, and the 
Flemish have less contacts (Stewart 2002, pp. 45-46). A further interesting insight of her study is that the relative 
intensity of social participation measured as membership of dubs or organisations across countries is rather 
different from the country ranking in terms of the previously discussed measure of personal contacts. 
(Unfortunately the social participation measure is not available in the Hungarian dataset)
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Figure 4.8 Relational (selJ)exclusion in various income quintile groups, 1998
H No friends
■ Little or no social 
contact
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Income quintile group
Note: Share of people who have no friends and those who meet people less than once a month or never 
N=3746 (no friends); N =3789 (litde contact)
Inadequacy of personal relations rises with age, low educational attainment and is higher 
among the inactive and the unemployed. While 55% of the people over 62 years say that they 
have no friends with whom they can discuss problems, this ratio is only 15% among young 
adults under 30. The variation of interaction with friends by age may be linked to increasing 
family and work responsibilities among the middle-aged groups and possible difficulties of 
mobility due to declining health in older age. We might say that there is a possible replacement 
of friends for family contacts over time. This may cause particular problems at old age, at the 
death of the spouse. The relationship between friends and educational level suggests that 
human capital is correlated with social capital. Longer periods of education and the prolonged 
period of remaining single, which is normally associated with this, may contribute to the 
establishment of long-term friendships. Also, higher levels of education itself may also 
contribute to the development of social skills". People who do not participate in the labour 
market tend to have no friends in greater numbers compared to those who work or study in
99 Recent research shows that social skills are increasingly demanded by employers, beyond traditional criteria of 
‘merit’, such as job experience or educational attainment (Jackson et al. 2002). It follows from this that rational 
employees do better if they ‘invest’ in developing their social skills.
—-----
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full-time education. This confirms the widespread hypothesis that work is a major force of 
social integration.
Table 4.12 Relational (self)exclusion, measured in % of relevant social group, 1998
Share of persons with no 
friends with whom they 
could discuss problems
Share of persons who live in 
households which meet relatives or 
friends less often than once a month 
ornever
Male 36.1 60.7
Female 35.2 58.8
17-29yrs 15.1 58.2
30-39 yrs 29.1 50.3
40-49 yrs 34.3 61.9
50-62 yrs 43.3 64.3
63 or more yrs 54.9 61.3
Gypsy ethnicity 45.6 72.2
Up to elementary education 46.0 68.0
Vocational training 34.5 59.7
High school 22.7 50.9
Higher education 19.2 40.8
Location of residence: 
village or small town 42.2 69.2
Town 35.3 58.3
county centre 27.5 50.6
Capital 29.5 49.3
Labour market status: 
Employee 25.9 55.9
Unemployed 34.7 65.8
Disability pensioner 42.4 66.5
Pensioner 53.4 62.8
Self-employed 27.7 51.3
Student 4.7 57.9
Other inactive 39.4 60.3
Number of children in the household: 
None 37.4 58.5
1 29.8 65.5
2 30.5 52.2
3 or more 43.9 70.7
All 35.6 59.6
N 3746 3789
For larger families, social interaction with others outside the family seems to be less of a 
priority. Both indicators of social contact in Table 4.12 show that families with three or more 
children are more likely to have rare social contacts, and their adult family members more 
frequently live without friendship. Among large families thus it seems that external interaction 
is partly replaced by inter-family ties. The relationship between settlement size and social 
contact appears rather counterintuitive. Life in larger settlements apparently is associated with
less social isolation. There are several possible explanations for this. However, none of these 
offers a causal explanation. This would necessitate further in-depth analysis. Smaller settlement 
size at large is associated with lower average income and joblessness. These two factors were 
shown to be correlated with lower levels of social contacts. Also, the proportion of families 
with three or more children is the highest among residents of villages and small towns. This 
was also shown to be a factor of greater withdrawal from social interactions. The relatively 
‘disadvantaged’ situation of the Gypsy ethnicity group may be also related to similar factors, 
particularly that of greater family size. Nearly one third of Gypsy adults live in families with 
three or more children, as the current survey shows. This may explain why they keep contact 
with people outside their households less frequently.
Figure 4.9. People with no friends by income quintile groups witfjin specific age groups, 1998
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To what extent income levels explains the deprivation in personal relations? As shown before, 
the less well-off tend to experience social isolation more than the richer (Figure 4.6.). This, 
however, may not suggest that income is a dominant factor in social relations. One possible 
way of looking at the role of income is to compare the social isolation of various age groups. 
Age, as Table 4.12 shows, appears to have a pronounced pattern: the young are the most 
‘sociable’ and the elderly experience the most social isolation. If income was the main factor 
explaining variation in social contacts, then age differences would greatly diminish within a 
specific income group. Or to put it differently, the elderly would experience social isolation
165
primarily because they have low income, and the young would have many friends because they 
have high incomes. This does not sound plausible, and is not supported by evidence here. As 
Figure 4.9. shows many elderly people have no close friend, but most of these actually belong 
to the middle income groups. Thus it is notprimarily the poor within the elderly who suffer the mostfrom 
social isolation. Also, in various age groups we can see that there is no linear relationship 
between income and the lack of friends, higher income does not monotonically decrease the occurrence of 
social isolation among most age groups.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In the period examined here there was a major fall of labour market participation, in the 
supply of public housing and as a result of this latter, that of tenant status, and there were 
signs of diminishing social interaction between people. Although the elimination of existing 
legal constraints extended people’s personal freedom, the changes of the labour market, the 
housing market and that of social policy brought new constraints to them. Large numbers of 
people withdrew from the labour market, and we may well suspect that for most of them this 
was involuntary. In 1998 only one fourth of the non-student and non-pensioner inactive 
population could be clearly identified as Voluntary inactive’, because they participated in some 
sort of socially valued activity, e.g. they were on maternity leave.
There are major social disparities in most non-income measures of well-being, and also often 
signs of increasing gaps over time. The Gypy population is particularly struck by unemployment, 
which can only be partly explained by their comparatively low levels of education. Existing 
literature finds that even after accounting for their regional concentration and human capital, 
there is a considerable unexplained difference, which suggests that there is discrimination in 
the labour market against the Romany (Kertesi 1994; Abraham and Kertesi 1996). Women may 
be regarded losers in the labour market. Women’s participation in the labour market has 
declined greatly, and they did not benefit from increasing opportunities as entrepreneurs 
either. Tenants and low income groups are losers on the housing market. Finally, the old age
166
groups, the low educated and those with small income are deprived the most in terms of social 
relations.
Interestingly, the analysis found no clear overall trend for the changing role of educational attainment in 
explaining labour market participation. People with higher education seem to have increasingly 
become entrepreneurs. This effect of higher education prevails after controlling for age and 
other personal characteristics. In contrast, higher education seems to have declining 
correlation with employee status and also with unemployment, where the negative correlation 
decreased. In sum, there is no sign for the increasing importance of human capital in general 
over time, as measured here. However, earlier results in chapter 3 indicated the increasing 
importance of educational level for incomes over time. In addition, skills premiums have also 
increased: while in 1992 the earnings of people with tertiary education were 5.6 times higher 
than the earnings of those with only some level of elementary education, this ratio rose to 6.8 
by 1998.
The analysis revealed that there is a strengthening link between income level and housing conditions. The 
relative income situation has become more strongly correlated with tenant status and with 
lower housing quality after the completion of the massive social housing privatisation. An 
interesting finding is the prevalent positive association between social contacts and income 
level: tlx rich hating a richer life in social terms as well. Money thus seems to buy well-being to some 
extent. Also, money appears to increasingly influence what quality of life people can achieve. 
Is money a source of satisfaction for people? Has money become increasingly important as a 
determinant of happiness? These questions will be addressed in chapter 6 and 7.
The results also show that solely income would not be able to describe the disparities in well­
being and their changes of over time. Income situation had a weak relationship between tenant 
status and also with housing quality problems in 1992. Using a simple income measure would 
not have explained people’s housing situation at that time, thus it would not describe 
adequately the changes over time either. Income does not exclusively explain variation in social contacts 
either. As shown, age has a major role as well, nearly twice as many elderly people have no 
friend than young adults between 30 and 39 years. It is not, however, money, which explains 
the lack of friendship for the elderly: it is notprimarily the poor within the elderly who suffer the most.
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The starting position of this chapter was that at large certain labour market positions are 
valuable per se (employee status, self-employment), while others are less so (unemployment). 
Labour market participation, or participation in a different socially valued activity, as it was 
argued, is an essential element of human capabilities, thus are treated as objects of value here. 
This implies that there is a value attached to specific labour market categories, beyond their 
role as determinants of the individuals’ income position (labour market status was shown to be 
a main associate of total household income in the previous chapter, controlling for a series of 
demographic characteristics). To what extent do people’s personal assessment confirm these 
hypothesis? Are people in general happier if they are employees or entrepreneurs, controlling 
for their income level? Is unemployment a factor of distress, beyond the resulting lower level 
of income? These issues will be discussed in the forthcoming part of the thesis, looking at 
subjective well-being, and in chapter 7 in particular.
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5Su b je c t iv e  m ea su res  o f  w e l l -b e in g . A n  o v e r v iew
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The approach followed by this research is not primarily concerned by the distribution of 
goods among people, but the impact of these goods on them. The distribution of goods is 
relevant, if we can assume that the possession of these goods is valuable, or going further 
than this, if we can assume that the ownership or consumption of these goods contributes 
to something that may be called a ‘good life’. In other words, the ultimate object of value is 
ends, not means. Such ends are capabilities in Sen’s theory, utilities in economics. As 
described earlier in chapter 1, relating to the operationalisation of Sen’s capabilities theory, 
the major problem is to account for how individuals actually convert resources into 
capabilities, potential states of being. For empirical purposes a practical solution is to narrow 
down the concept to functionings, actual states of being. Functionings can account for 
individuals’ different abilities in converting resources into end-states. ‘States of being’ can 
be material, but can be social as well, for example family relations. Further to this, in my 
interpretation, ‘states of being’ can be psychological as well, such as an individual’s 
situation as perceived by himself. A major measure of this is how satisfied he is with his 
life.
The measure of individual’s satisfaction is relevant, both from a theoretical and from an 
empirical perspective. As I will argue, it is important and it is measurable. Very little has 
been done on subjective well-being (SWB) in transition countries. This is pardy due to the 
fact that very scant data were available in the years before transition. According to some, 
challenging that all were happy was an issue of political ‘taboo’. Somewhat more 
surprisingly, there is not much research on subjective well-being during transition either. 
This analysis will provide new empirical evidence on die micro structure of SWB in 
Hungary, and one of the very first studies on the relationship of social change and SWB in 
Eastern Europe. The second part of the thesis, including die coming three chapters, will 
analyse indicators of subjective well-being.
In this chapter I will present an introduction into the tiieoretical and empirical concepts of 
subjective well-being. There is a clear distinction, as I will argue, between measures of life 
satisfaction and measures of satisfaction with specific domains of life. Following this, the 
happiness or the unhappiness of Hungarians will be discussed, both in an international 
perspective and also in Hungary during the economic transition. I will seek to understand 
the relationship between various measures of satisfaction, primarily between indicators of 
life satisfaction and that of the so-called domain satisfactions, using survey data. How
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much particular aspects of life matter in people’s assessment of their overall well-being? I 
will also assess whether there is any systematic difference in people’s assessment of their 
life as it has been so far and that of their future perspectives. This analysis will include the 
analysis of different labour market groups. Finally, I will examine whether transition had 
significandy altered what things make people satisfied.
5.1 SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT
Measures of satisfaction are widely used indicators in social indicators research, starting 
with a few pioneering studies on the US in the 1960s and 70s (Cantril 1965; Andrews and 
Witney 1976; Campbell, Converse and Rodgers 1976). Quality of life has been increasingly 
conceived as having a ‘subjective’ dimension (Veenhoven 1996). This is also clearly 
conveyed by the growing body of literature on satisfaction in the journal Social Indicators 
Research during the past decade. ‘Subjective’ refers to the fact that criteria for judgement 
may vary from person to person, opposite to ‘objective’ quality of life measures, where 
measurement is based on external standards, on observable criteria. Subjective quality o f 
life includes a broad range of issues related to how people appreciate their lives. For 
example, how safe their neighbourhood is, how dose they fed to be to their family 
members or how satisfied they are with their income, job or health. Satisfaction measures 
seem to have a particular importance, because they can be regarded as aggregates of a 
series of personal concerns related to a speafic aspect of life, or to life as a whole.
Life satisfaction as a proxy for utility
The study of satisfaction in Hungary has a brief history, since there have been very few 
surveys of this sort before the late 1980’s. As one of the first analysts of subjective well­
being, Andorka, writes: “Under the Communist system few surveys induded questions on 
satisfaction, psychological well-being or manifestations of anomie and alienation. The 
offitial ideology claimed that every, or almost every, member of the soaety was satisfied, 
enjoying psychological well-being. By definition anomie and alienation were non­
existent. .. (1999, p. 147)”. Studies on satisfaction, following the tradition of A ndorka, tend 
to discuss satisfaction, alienation and anomie together (Andorka 1993; Speder, Paksi and 
Elekes 1998; Andorka 1999). Unfortunately there is little expliat discussion o f the
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theoretical origin of the notion of satisfaction in these writings, so it is not clear whether 
this joint presentation implies that they think about satisfaction as an alternative measure 
of psychological well-being next to alienation or anomie, or satisfaction is just one of the 
empirical measures of alienation or anomie.
Satisfaction, however, is by no means interchangeable with either alienation or anomie. 
Neither can alienation and anomie be blended together. Alienation, the concept of Marx, 
and anomie, that of Durkheim, despite their commonly emphasised communalities, are 
rather different100. Durkheim, using a biological analogy, regarded society as a series of 
organs that must be in contact with each other in order to function well. ‘If the division of 
labour does not produce solidarity it is because the relationship between the organs is not 
regulated; it is because they are in a state of anomii (1984, p. 304). Anomie, according to 
Durkheim, is the result of a situation where the development of rules and regulations has 
not kept space with the rapid development of the economy over the past two centuries. 
Anomie is not just a social phenomenon, it is also an individual’s state of mind. In his 
work on suicide he distinguishes the so-called anomic suicide, which may occur in economic 
crisis. It “results from man’s activity’s lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings” 
(1952, p. 258 ). Marx, writing at an earlier period of the nineteenth century emphasised a 
different aspect of capitalist development, focusing on the worker as a seller of his labour. 
“The alienation of the worker in the capitalist economy is founded upon this disparity 
between the productive power of labour, which becomes increasingly great with the 
expansion of capitalism, and the lack of control which the worker is able to exert over the 
objects which he produces (Giddens 1971, p. 11).”
Alienation and anomie, aldiough both refer to a subjective social condition and a state of 
mind, are however radically different in their criticisms of the society, and their underlying 
assumptions on human nature. As Steven Lukes notes:
The doctrines of M arx and Durkheim about human nature are representative of a long 
and distinguished tradition of such doctrines in the history o f political and social theory.
[ . . ]  Durkheim sides with Hobbes and Freud where M arx sides with Rousseau and
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the Utopians. For the former, man is a bundle of desires, which need to be regulated, 
tamed, repressed, manipulated and given direction for the sake of social order, whereas, 
for the latter, man is still an angel, rational and good, who requires a rational and good 
society in which to develop his essential nature — a form of association in which each, 
while uniting himself with all, may still obty himself alone”. For the former, coercion, 
external authority and restraint are necessaiy and desirable for social order and 
individual happiness; for the latter, thty are an offence against reason and an attack 
uponfreedom (1977,p. 84)'.
Thus, both of these concepts formulate a problem, which is only partly an individual level 
problem, and which is deeply embedded in social structure, and express a malfunctioning 
of this structure. In contrast, satisfaction in itself is purely an individual level measure. It 
has no a priori assumption referring to the nature of the individual or that of the society. 
Although satisfaction may be possibly used as a measurement of alienation or anomie in 
some ways, this would require a substantiating social theory, with clearly stated starting 
hypothesis. Based on the discussion before I can conclude that alienation and anomie perse 
are neither necessarily synonyms of satisfaction, nor provide a direct theoretical background 
for it.
General life satisfaction may be used, and is sometimes used, as a synonym for happiness. 
Happiness, due to humanity’s long term occupation with its understanding, has a 
substantial theoretical background. What is happiness, however? How do we define it? Is it 
measurable? Is it comparable across people? One major philosophical tradition stems from 
Aristode. Aristode defined happiness, ‘eudaimonia’ as something objective. It is an ‘object 
of desire and choice because it is desirable and choiceworthy, not simply because it is 
desired or chosen. [..] It is a state of being, not a mere feeling or experience.’ (Rasmussen 
1999, p. 3). A good life thus may or may not be accompanied by feelings or experiences. 
According to Aristode it also must come through an individual’s own effort, and not as a
100 These notions have led to an extensive literature o f conceptual refinement and empirical research. Most o f 
this, however, seems to be contradictory, and, as Lukes argues, much o f the original meaning o f these 
concepts has been lost Therefore I follow his approach and try to present the original notions as defined by 
Marx and Durkheim For more on various definitions o f alienation and anomie, see the essay o f Lukes 
(1977).
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result of factors beyond an individual’s control, such as sheer good luck. It means the 
active development of one’s virtues in order to attain the ‘good life’.
Aristode’s concept is thus rather different from self-reported accounts of happiness. It 
seems to share a common core with Sen’s approach, both of them being ‘objective’, 
claiming that there are objects with inherent value. Further to this, both of these believe 
that it is possible to identify these objects and make a strong case for it themselves. A 
contemporary, pragmatic interpretation of Aristotelian happiness, however, seems to be 
rather problematic, first of all due to its universalistic nature, which seems to be in sharp 
contrast with our pluralistic societies. Also, it may seem paternalistic. Therefore, instead of 
trying to understand who are those who live a ‘good life’, we may need to limit ourselves 
to understanding who live a life which they experience to be ‘good’, a life which brings 
them happiness. This life thus does not necessarily bring happiness for others.
Self-rated happiness, or more precisely self-rated satisfaction is the definition of happiness 
used in this study. This may be called a measure of subjective well-being, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. Subjective well-being is an individual’s own assessment of his or her 
well-being. Its usefulness as a complementary measure to objective measures was 
acknowledged by Sen himself as a valid operationalisation of his approach (1987), as 
already discussed in chapter 1. The primary merit o f the use of self-reported measures is 
that it avoids paternalism, the influence of external coercive powers in defining what is 
desirable or good. Further to this, economists tend to argue that individuals should be left 
alone because they generally know what is best for them. This assumption, however, has 
been challenged on many grounds101. One of the forerunners of incorporating 
psychological dieory into economics, Tibor Scitovsky argues that individuals tend to 
incorrectly estimate the future benefits of their consumption choices, thus tend to make 
suboptimal choices at present (1992). According to Scitovsky this may lead to over­
investment into ‘comfort’, for example food, and under-investment in ‘pleasure*, such as
101 Following Scitovsky, an outstanding economist himself, many others have challenged “the economists’ 
representation o f the consumer as someone whose tastes are set, who knows what he wants and fails to 
achieve it only for lack of means” (Scitovsky 1992, p. 11).
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culture102. Recently, others echoed similar views (Frank 1999; Lane 2000). In sum, it seems 
that the soundest basis for using self-reported measures of happiness lies in the inherent 
value of freedom, rather than the belief that people generally know what is good for them.
The study of happiness has a relatively brief history. It may have been George Gallup in 
1946 who had first the idea of asking people about their happiness. The systematic 
exploration, however started in the 1960’s with the works of Gerald Gurin, Hadley Cantril 
and others (Gurin, Veroff and Feld 1960; Cantril 1965; Bradbum 1969). Since then there 
has been an extensive conceptual development, although primarily centred around 
measurement issues [Diener distinguishes not less than 18 different measurement scales in 
his review article (1984, p. 546)]. Happiness has been criticised for being too vague a 
concept. The emerging theory of happiness is, according to some, ‘still considered to be in 
a primitive state’ (Lane 1991, p. 433 ). However, the involvement of economists and 
psychologists, and their interaction has substantially advanced this theory since the 1980’s.
One major theoretical foundation for happiness stems from economics103: an increasing 
number of economists draw link between happiness and the notion of utility. These 
authors argue that the earliest notion, utility, interpreted as pleasure or pain by Bentham, 
has been unjusdy set aside in economic writing from the nineteenth century in favour of 
‘utility as revealed choice’104. Returning to ‘cardinal utility’, or in the terminology of 
Kahneman and his co-authors, ‘experienced utility’, would (1) make interpersonal 
comparisons of utility possible (Ng 1997), (2) enable economics to incorporate systematic 
elements of human behaviour into conventional analysis (Rabin 1998). This can be done,
102 He sets out a conceptual distinction between ‘comfort’ and ‘pleasure’, describing in psychological terms 
‘comfort’ as a state which stems from a level o f arousal close to its optimum, and ‘pleasure’ as a change o f arousal 
towards the optimum (Scitovsky 1992, p. 71). He argues that by too much love for comfort people actually 
deprive themselves from pleasure. In a simple example, the pleasure o f eating is greater for those who are 
hungry, so those who avoid getting hungry by continuously eating snacks would hardly enjoy a meal 
Scitovsky’s distinction seems to be in line with two main psychological theories. The so-called ‘telic theoriei 
hold that ‘happiness is gained when some state, such as a goal or need, is reached’ (Diener 1984, p. 562). In 
contrast, ‘activity theories’ maintain that happiness is a by-product o f human activity, o f effort (for more see 
Diener 1984). Thus, it seems to me that the notion o f ‘comfort’ derives from ‘telic theories’, and that o f 
‘pleasure’ is associated with ‘activity theories’.
i°3 Psychological theories may also provide a useful, although yet not ‘sophisticated’ enough background for 
subjective well-being. For a review of such theories, see (Diener 1984).
104 Cardinal utility was assumed to be directly measurable, and comparable across individuals. This first 
notion o f utility was later ousted by ordinal utility, which relaxed this assumption to one where utilities can 
only be ranked for an individual, not directly compared. This more individualised notion, also denying the 
comparability o f different individuals’ states, made interpersonal comparisons of welfare more problematic.
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because ‘experienced utility* is measurable (Kahneman and Varey 1991; Kahneman, 
Wakker and Sarin 1997).
Some may argue that empirical measures of happiness express rather ad hoc individualistic 
accounts of mental states. These reservations seem to be eroded by the findings of existing 
empirical studies. Although individuals’ responses vary, reports of happiness show rather 
similar patterns across various populations. There is much evidence on the consistent 
correlation of demographic and other environmental factors with happiness. For example, 
education, income, marriage have positive effects, while unemployment and divorce are 
shown to have negative ones (see e.g. the review by Argyle 1999). A comparative analysis 
also shows that the correlates of happiness are similar across nations of Western Europe 
and the United States (Di Telia et al. 2001).
Until this point I have used the terms of happiness and general life satisfaction 
interchangeably. Some may argue that happiness seems to be less related to want 
satisfaction than the notion of satisfaction itself, and it may more reflect an individual’s 
assessment of good life and self-realisation in general. This reservation seems relevant for 
specific measures of satisfaction, such as satisfaction with financial situation or with family 
life, analysed in the forthcoming chapter. General life satisfaction, however, in my view, 
expresses a rather similar self-assessment of life as happiness. This seems to be supported 
by empirical evidence: correlates of happiness and that of life satisfaction seem to be 
similar across Western European nations (Di Telia, MacCulloch and Oswald 1999, p. 5).
Satisfaction with specific domains of life
There is a clear theoretical distinction between satisfaction with life in general and that of 
with specific domains of life. While the former is a well-studied subject of philosophy and 
recently also economics (as ‘experienced utility’), there is no dear theoretical background 
behind the second one. Domain satisfaction, for example satisfaction with income, job or 
marriage, is first of all an empirical concept. We might think of these specific measures as 
‘utils’, units of utility, which add up to ‘experienced utility’, general life satisfaction. For 
this, however, we need to assume that they are additive and they determine life- 
satisfaction. This seems to be a rather strict condition, which is challenged by empirical 
evidence. First of all, the direction of causality is undear. It seems that general satisfaction
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just as well explains specific domain satisfactions as vice versa, and also, an external factor, 
personality may pardy explain both (Diener 1984, see also Figure 6.2 in the next chapter). 
A jolly disposition, or a general state of happiness may just as well be the cause of 
someone’s contentment related to her income, job or marriage. Also, a cooperative 
character may find it easier to get on with others than a confrontational one, which may 
explain why such person may feel more satisfaction in various aspects of life.
Is satisfaction a meaningful empirical measure? Satisfaction measures the ‘result’ of 
objective conditions in people’s minds, thus seems to be a major step towards assessing 
‘ends’ rather than ‘means’. This subjective appraisal is particularly intriguing since early 
studies have shown how small actually the relationship is between objective conditions and 
their subjective appreciation (e.g. Campbell et al. 1976). Studies of satisfaction can address 
the causes and correlates of satisfaction, thus can help to understand this ‘puzzle*. If 
subjective measures, however, are only little correlated with objective qualities, does this 
mean that diey are arbitrary constructs? If the judgment is entirely based on the individual, 
how reliable is this measure?
The validity of these measures has been widely tested. They seem to show a considerable 
temporal stability (the correlation coefficient was in the range of 0.5 to 0.7 over a period of 
several years for global well-being, see Suh, Diener and Fujita 1996, pp. 1094-5 ). The 
measures are shown to converge with other methods of well-being measurement, such as 
reports of significant others, number of positive and negative events recalled, and clinical 
interviews (Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz 1993). The moderately strong stabilities also imply, 
however, that these measures are exposed to mood states or comparison effects (for a 
recent review see Schwarz and Strack 1999). A recent good event, such as the victory of 
the favourite football team, or an environmental condition, for example how pleasant the 
experimental room is, were shown to have an impact on people’s reported subjective well­
being. Similarly, individual’s satisfaction is somewhat influenced by both social 
comparison, how other people are perceived to live, and intra-individual comparison, such 
as one’s own previous experience. There is a considerable difference in how these may 
alter different measures of subjective well-being. General well-being seems to be more 
exposed to mood states, momentary feelings, while judgements of domain satisfaction may 
be based on intra- and inter-individual comparisons (p. 76).
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Although some economists assume that people have essentially the same desires and they 
only differ in their opportunities (Stigler and Becker 1977)105, this view seems problematic. 
As shown by Elster, people may cease to desire what they cannot get, as in the story of the 
fox and the sour grapes (Elster 1983). Similarly, Sen also notes that the poor may have 
diminished expectations. This phenomenon is referred to in the psychology literature as 
cognitive dissonance reduction, referring to a person’s adjustment of his attitudes in order 
to reduce the disparity between his attitudes, beliefs or actions. If, however, we can assume 
that people differ in their desires and preferences as well as in their opportunities, this 
seems to pose a potential problem to the interpretation of personal accounts of well-being.
A further problem may be related to interpersonal comparability of these measures. This 
issue has evoked intense and rather extensive discussions in welfare economics. From our 
point of view one specific issue seems to be the most relevant. Maximising economic 
welfare in standard economic models means a state when marginal utilities are equal. If in a 
real life situation, however, people have different endowments and desires at the starting 
point, this criterion may attach equal weight to the fulfilment of luxurious tastes of the 
rich, and to meeting basic needs of the poor. Although this seems to be a valid reservation, 
there is a strong counter evidence in the literature on subjective well-being.
It has been widely demonstrated in the empirical literature that levels of SWB are strongly 
correlated with the level of resources. Countries with higher level of incomes have been 
shown to have higher levels of SWB than poorer ones (Diener, Diener and Diener 1995), 
and rich individuals within a single country are happier compared to those who are less 
well-off (see the reviews of e.g. Easterlin 1974; Diener 1984; Veenhoven 1984; Argyle 
1999). Money seems to buy happiness106, the poor are indeed more dissatisfied than the 
rich. Beyond this, others have demonstrated that objective well-being also buys 
satisfaction, in other words there is systematic relationship between objective well-being 
and subjective one (Campbell et al. 1976; Allardt 1977). This implies that (1) there is clearly
105 Stigler and Becker argue that "...tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between people. 
On this interpretation one does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argues over the 
Rocky Mountains - both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the same to all men." (p.76)
106 This statement implies causality, that actually income causes happiness and not the other way round, and 
also that the correlation is not spurious, in other words it is not attributable to the effect o f a third factor, e.g. 
health, which could explain both happiness and the level o f income. This issue has been discussed by e.g. 
Veenhoven, who argues that most likely causality goes from income towards happiness. For example, those 
who have surpassed their fathers on the social ladder are not happier than average (1984, p. 195 ).
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an element of need-sadsfaction of SWB beyond pure ‘comparison’ and contextual effects, 
and (2) that certain needs are universal, there is no full adaptation to disadvantageous 
situations (Veenhoven 1991; Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz and Diener 1993).
This relationship between objective quality of life, first of all income, and SWB has two 
useful implications. First of all, measures of SWB seem to usefully capture certain aspects 
of differences between individual’s opportunities, thus they are valid measures of 
inequalities of quality of life. Secondly, SWB can provide a useful analytic tool for 
supporting public policy choices. Understanding causes and correlates of SWB, the policy 
makers can focus on those aspects of people’s lives, which actually make them satisfied. 
Multivariate analysis can be an essential tool for this, since it reveals how much certain 
specific environmental factors do contribute to SWB, and also allow us to make inferences 
about trade-offs between them.
As mentioned earlier, there is clear theoretical difference between specific domains of 
satisfaction and general life satisfaction. Indicators of domain satisfaction reveal 
differences in individual’s opportunities from a specific point of view. General measures of 
SWB, on the other hand, provide proxies for people’s overall happiness or life satisfaction 
and offer a potential way for assessing public policy choices. Due to this difference, they 
will be analysed separately. The next chapter will analyse people satisfaction with specific 
areas of their lives, then will examine the relationship between measures of ‘domain 
satisfaction’ and measures of overall life satisfaction. Finally, chapter 7 will analyse the 
relationship between individual characteristics and SWB, and using life satisfaction data, it 
will try to identify the winners and the losers of the transition process.
Data and methods
The Hungarian data for subjective well-being provide full comparability, since the 
questionnaires for 1992 and 1998 contain nine identical questions. These questions 
investigate levels of satisfaction, which is regarded as providing more specific and probably
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more reliable information than measurement o f overall happiness107. They are therefore
also more suitable for our purposes, especially for the comparisons of objective and
subjective measures of well-being.
‘ Please, say how satisfied you are with thefollowing things. I f  you are not satisfied at all, say 0, i f  fully 
satisfied, answer 10. How satisfied you are with your
1. life up till now, the course of your life?
2. future prospects?
3. living standards?
4. relationships within thefamily?
5. health?
6. job?
7. fiat?
8. housing neighbourhood?
9. income?’
The individual thus evaluates his or her own satisfaction related to each aspect of life listed 
above on a scale from 0 to 10. This numeric representation of satisfaction provides an 
interval-ratio measure, which enables the analysis to use more advanced statistical 
techniques, and also interpret the mean as such. The approach has probably been used first 
in the classic study of Cantril, and he called it the ladder device’ (Cantril 1965). His 
method was similarly one with a scale from 0 to 10, where actually the individual defined 
what the extremes meant for him or her. The difference is that Cantril explicitly asked the 
individuals to reveal what the ‘best’ and the ‘worst’ meant, and only then requested the 
assessment of their current situation by actually pointing to the specific point on the 
ladder. He gave the name ‘Self-Anchoring Striving Scale’ to his invention. Another widely 
used measurement scale in attitude surveys is an ordinal level measure. This means 
categorical measurement, where the categories can be ranked, but they have no explicit 
numerical value, thus the distance between points and the mean has no meaning. Such a 
measure can be found in the British Social Attitudes Survey, which investigates if people 
feel ‘very happy, fairly happy, not very happy, not at all happy* (Jowell, Curtice, Park and 
Thomson 1999).
The analysis presented here will be restricted to the adult population, as explained in 
Appendix A. In addition, as in previous chapters, those cases, which were based on the so-
107 Satisfaction with specific domains o f life is less exposed to ‘mood states’ compared to judgements on life 
in general A result o f a favourate football team, an ice-cream before the interview, or the colour o f the room 
seems to influence responses on overall happiness (Schwarz and Strack 1999).
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called proxies and those who denied response (and therefore only were mentioned in the 
household questionnaire by another member of household) were excluded. These cases 
had missing values for all measures of satisfaction. The resulting adult sample sizes (5424 
in 1992 and 3827 in 1998) are large enough to provide a suitable basis for detailed analysis 
of the relationship between individual characteristics and levels of satisfaction. Weights 
have been used in all steps of the analysis in order to allow for corrections of the sampling 
design and to improve the fit of the sample to the original population.
The estimation will also use a pooled dataset, consisting of the observations of both the 
1992 and the 1998 survey. This may be called ‘pooled cross-sectional time-series data’, 
although normally such time-series data are created from more than two cross-sectional 
datasets. The pooled dataset consists of 9251 observations. Since the sample sizes in 1992 
and 1998 were not equal, a special weight variable has been created in order to generate 
equal sub-samples. In this way, the probability of an observation to be included in the 
pooled sample is the same irrespective of whether it originally belongs to the 1992 or the 
1998 sub-sample. Using this dataset, I will study the impact of transition. For this, the 
model will include a year dummy, t. This will control for ‘external shocks’, for example 
inflation, and will also control for changes in the composition of the population, for 
example labour market changes, which have occurred between 1992 and 1998.
5.2 ‘PESSIMIST’ HUNGARIANS: A MYTH?
A widely supported claim among Hungarian social scientists that Hungarians are far more 
pessimistic and dissatisfied than other nations (Andorka 1993; 1994a; Speder et al. 1998; 
Andorka 1999; Robert 1999). Andorka assumes that the ‘grave dissatisfaction’ can be at 
least partly explained by the ‘widespread’ alienation and anomie in Hungarian society 
(1999, p. 151). Elsewhere, he talks about the crisis of alienation (1993). He also attributes 
this crisis to be one of the main factors in the collapse of communism. ‘The nonmaterial 
conditions of Hungarian society [...] worsened gradually, but continuously and resulted in 
a general crisis of values and norms — anomie and/or alienation — which finally 
delegitimized the whole system.’ (1994b, p. 51). Going beyond this, elsewhere he explicitly 
states that there was a causal relationship between the increasing anomie and alienation 
and the change of the system. (1992, pp. 317-8).
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There are serious problems with this argument, however. Firstly, and most importantly, 
such statements seem to be rather bold, since there are actually no time series on measures 
of alienation, anomie, or even satisfaction. Thus, although this statement implies it, we 
have no information on whether there was an escalating trend of ‘distress* during 
Communism, which would have peaked in the years just before the collapse of the political 
system. Alternative measures, such as suicide and alcoholism, do not seem to provide a 
satisfactory evidence for a causal relationship. The suicide rate, although outstanding in 
international comparison, peaked in 1984, and then stagnated until the major political 
changes in 1988. Alcoholism seems to have stopped increasing around 1980, then slowly 
declined before the transition (Elekes and Paksi 1999, p. 142). A second major shortfall of 
the argument is that it uses very scant international comparison. The collapse of the 
Communist political system was not an isolated phenomenon in Hungary. If alienation and 
anomie are possible major factors in this, than it needs to be discussed in the context of 
the whole region. Has Eastem-Europe in general had a severe crisis? Was Hungary 
specific? If it was, why? The presupposition needs to be tested in detail At this moment, 
the claim that the crisis of alienation and anomie was a major cause of the collapse of 
Communism, is unsubstantiated.
A further sloppiness of some arguments is that there is no theoretical distinction between 
various measures of satisfaction. Financial satisfaction, for example, is at times mentioned 
as a proxy for general ‘pessimism*. The New Democracies Barometer survey series (e.g. 
Rose and Haerpfer 1992; 1994), measuring satisfaction with ‘economic situation’, is used as 
a supportive evidence for the outstanding pessimism of Hungarians compared to 
neighbouring countries (Speder et al. 1998, p. 509). This, in my view, is problematic from 
various points of view. First of all, financial satisfaction is just one element of general life 
satisfaction, which we may call with some extrapolation general ‘optimism* or ‘pessimism*. 
The correlation is prevalent, according to the international literature (see later), but 
moderate. Secondly, satisfaction with the economic situation is highly driven by objective 
circumstances, for example past levels of income and comparative change. The 
outstanding nostalgia towards the past and dissatisfaction with the present may be 
explained by ‘goulash Communism’, namely that the Hungarian level of consumption was 
higher than elsewhere in the Socialist block. The relative dissatisfaction of Hungarians with
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their economic situation may thus well be attributable to their ‘realism*, rather than 
‘pessimism*.
It seems thus more appropriate to speak about a specific indicator, suicide instead of 
alienation, anomie or general dissatisfaction. Hungarians have indeed been reported to 
have the highest suicide rate in Europe in the mid 80s (e.g. Retterstol 1993, p. 26). These 
statistics, however, did not have any data on the Soviet Union. As recent data show suicide 
in many states of the ex Soviet Union has increased dramatically in the early years of 
transition (UNDP 1999b, Table 4.4 ). As a result, the Baltic states and Russia had suicide 
rates much above the Hungarian level (see Figure 2.7 earlier). Suicide, however, is a rather 
crude measure of ‘unhappiness*. It is subject to numerous measurement and 
methodological problems, which I cannot discuss here in detail. What really interests us is 
whether Hungarians are more unhappy than the rest of Europe?
International evidence: Hungarian ‘unhappiness’ refuted
Hungarians are not less happy than other nations in Central-Eastern Europe. To the contrary, 
they are actually more so than some others. About twice as many people say themselves to 
be very happy in Hungary than in the neighbouring Slovakia, Romania or Ukraine (see 
Table 5.1). The real division line thus lies not between Hungary and other countries in the 
region, but between Eastern and Western Europe. We may say, that there is a new ‘iron 
curtain*, an ‘iron curtain of unhappiness*, which separates a happier part o f Europe from 
less happier lands’108. This is indicated by the higher share of Very happy* or ‘satisfied* 
inhabitants in Wester European nations compared to that of Eastern European ones109. 
This difference cannot be purely attributed to simple cultural differences of the notion of 
happiness or life satisfaction.
108 Shakespeare’s phrase from Richard II, where John o f Gaunt in his ‘scepter’d isle speech’ refers to the 
English as a ‘happy breed o f men’, protected by the island as a natural fortress ‘against the envy o f less 
happier lands’.
109 Although the share o f Very happy’ people in Italy and Portugal is smaller than that o f Poland, if we 
compare the ‘satisfied’, we find that indeed more Italians and Portuguese are satisfied than Polish.
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Table 5.1 Happiness and satisfaction in Europe
W estem-
Europe
%
very happy*
%
satisfied**
Central- Eastem - 
Europe
%
very happy*
%
satisfied**
Iceland 42 85 Poland 14 57
Ireland 42 80 Slovenia 11 47
Netherlands 40 85 Hungary 11 44
Switzerland 38 86 Croatia 8
Great-Britain 38 74 Bulgaria 7 25
Belgium 37 79 Czech Rep. 6 50
Denmark 36 86 Romania 6 44
Sweden 36 84 Slovakia 6
Austria 30 64
Norway 29 78 CIS
France 23 59 Russia 6 32
Finland 20 79 Belarus 5 33
Spain 20 66 Ukraine 5
Germany 16 71 Estonia 4 45
Italy 13 71 Lithuania 4 44
Portugal 13 63 Moldova 4
Latvia 3 40
Source: World Values Survey; 1996 (happiness) and 1990-93 (satisfaction) (World Database o f Happiness; 
Inglehart, Basanez and Menendez Moreno 1998)
♦Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, or not at all 
happy?’
** ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?’ Ten-point scale: 
l=dissatisfied, and 10=satisfied; % ‘satisfied’ — codes 7 to 10
A similar East-West divide seems to exist when using other measures, satisfaction with life 
or the Bradbum Affect-Balance Scale110. The number of those who are satisfied with their 
lives is much lower in Eastern Europe than in the West While in Western Europe in most 
countries over 2 /3rd of the population say themselves to be satisfied, in Central-Eastern 
Europe this number, widi die exception of Poland and the Czech Republic, is less than
110 Index o f  10 questions on specific affects in the recent past 
'During the past few weeks, didyou ever feel (Y ts/ No)
- Particularly exited or interested in something ?
- So restless thatjou could not sit long in a chair?
- Proud because someone complemented you on somethingjou had done?
- Very lonely or remote from other people?
- Pleased about having accomplished something?
- Bored?
- On top of the world?
-  Depressed?
- That things weregoingyour way?
- Upset because someone critici^ edyou? ‘
[Positive affects: items 1,3,5,7,9/ Negative affects 2,4,6,8,10/ Scoring Positive A ffect yes =  +1, no =  0. 
Negative A ffect yes =  -1, no =  0. Computation o f  Affect Balance Score (ABS): Positive Affect Score, minus 
Negative Affect score (range -5 to +5). ]
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half. Although Hungarians seem to be less satisfied than the Poles or the Czechs according 
to the 1996 data, they remain on the level of Romania and the Baltic states. A similar 
division seems to exist when people are asked about recent positive and negative affects in 
their lives111. In sum, based on new survey evidence it seems clear that pessimism or 
disillusionment of people about their own lives is not outstanding in Hungary.
Growing optimism towards the future
International evidence suggests that people tend to report at any given point in their life 
cycle that they are happier in their present than in the past and think that they will be 
happier in the future than at present. In an early classic study, Cantril compared a sample 
of over 20,000 individuals from a rather heterogeneous set of thirteen countries, including 
not just developed countries such as the United States or Japan, but also Communist ones, 
such as Poland and Yugoslavia, and also developing nations, for example India and Brazil 
(1965). He has found that on average people in all the countries consequendy rated their 
future the highest, followed by their present, then by their past (pp. 365-377 ). The future 
was actually measured as people’s assessment of dieir situation in five years’ time. Similarly, 
‘past’ was conceived as dieir standing five years ago112. This systematic ranking of personal 
future, present, and past has been also confirmed in a later study on a sample from the US 
(Andrews and Witney 1976, p. 325).
In contrast, evidence from Hungary shows a reverse order of these beliefs. Using a scale from 0 
to 10 for evaluating levels of satisfaction, the analysis found that people were consistently more 
satified with their life up till now than with their future prospects (see Figure 5.1). The differences of 
these means have been tested and found to be significant.113 Thus, people were more 
satisfied with their previous lives, which presumably also implies the years before
111 The mean score for Hungarians was 0.86 in 1990, while it was 0.76 in Czechoslovakia, 0.71 in Romania, 
0.33 in Russia, in contrast to e.g. 1.70 in Great Britain, 1.77 in Austria and 2.90 in Sweden (World Database 
of Happiness). This scale, however, has been criticised in the literature, for example for measuring only the 
simple occurrence o f feelings, not their intensity o f frequency. (For more see Diener 1984)
112 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Cantril used a ladder device, called the Self-Anchoring Striving 
Scale, tanging from 0 to 10. The questions were the following: ‘Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the 
top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the best possible life for you and the bottom represent the worst possible Ufe for you. 
Where on tlx ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at tlx present 
time? Where on the ladder would you say you stoodfix years ago? And where do you think you will be on the ladderfive years 
from now?'
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transition. Probably the prospects of die economic transition caused dieir gloominess 
about their future prospects in 1992. By die late 1990s, experiencing die recession of 
transition and die fall of dieir real incomes, but also some signs of recovery, people’s self­
assessed past lives were gloomier than in 1992, but dieir judgement of their future showed 
clear signs of optimism. These changes in die level of life satisfaction over transition, thus do 
not seem to validate general claims about wide disappointment with transition, or people’s 
‘gritting the teedi’ (Robert 1999). Strikingly, however, people still rated higher their past 
than the future awaiting diem, even in 1998. Hungarians in the 1990’s tended to find the 
‘golden days’ of their lives in their past. Does diis mean that people give preference to the 
security of die Communist days over die riskier Capitalist system? Or that have they used 
up their savings during the years of transition, and now they face a lower future 
consumption level?
Figure 5.1 General measures of sati faction and their change over transition in Hungary, 1992 &  1998
■  Life up till now  
H Future prospects
Can we explain die difference between past and future satisfaction with diat people think 
about their personal past in a qualitatively different way than about dieir ‘future prospects’? 
Is it possible for example diat diey include personal factors, such as marriage, or friends in
113 T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s a m p le  m e a n s  w a s  t e s t e d  f o r  b o t h  1 9 9 2  a n d  1 9 9 8 ,  a n d  f o u n d  s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  1 %  
le v e l .
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past life, and think of their future in a more materialistic way?114 This latter explanation 
may be in line with Sdtovsky’s argument on how actually people misjudge what would 
bring them future happiness and consequendy make false choices (1992). Thus for 
example they may base the assessment of their future on material ‘comforts’, but actually 
when they look back to their past, they may see that rather different things brought them 
real pleasure. “People presumably rate their happiness on the basis of what they remember 
having felt in the past, and it is quite possible that they should only remember the 
highlights; the pleasure of stimulation and the pain of discomfort, taking for granted and 
forgetting what I have called comfort, that is, the absence of both pain and pleasure” 
(1992, p. 137 ). Unfortunately, we cannot really know the answer. The explanation for the 
preference of the past over the future, however, may be attributable to differing personal 
interpretations of these concepts, rather than simply general social ‘pessimism’. How do 
specific domain satisfactions contribute to our understanding of this issue? To what extent 
does satisfaction with specific aspects of life explain the overall level and the variation of 
general life satisfaction? These issues will be addressed in the forthcoming sections of this 
chapter.
Discontent with income, delight with family
People are generally dissatisfied with their income, unlike with their family life or with their 
job. Comparing specific domains of satisfaction, which use the same measurement scale 
from 0 to 10, there is a striking difference between sentiments towards income compared 
to other aspects of life. People in general say diat they are dissatisfied with their level of 
income; the average score is below the mid-scale point (see Figure 5.2). Health, work and 
housing seem to bring rather positive feelings for the majority of the people. The real 
source of contentment, however, is related to relationships within the family. Most people 
believe that their personal relationships bring them nearly as much satisfaction as they 
could possibly expect.
114 Recall that, as presented earlier, the wording o f the questions referring to the past and to the future is 
different; they investigate satisfaction with life up till now’ and ‘future prospects’. Both o f these are different 
from the classic Cantril question, cited before, where people are asked identical questions related to their lives 
‘five years ago’ and’ five years from now’ on. This wording difference between Cantril and the Hungarian 
survey might partly explain the divergence between these two results.
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Figure 5.2 Average level of satisfaction in various domains, 1992 <& 1998
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Levrels of satisfaction declined between 1992 and 1998 in most domains of life. People 
have become less satisfied widi their income, housing, neighbourhood, family relations, 
healdi and job. These changes, widi the exception of neighbourhood, are significant at 5% 
level. The patterns of change in general measures of SWB are more varied. Satisfaction 
widi life so far has declined, while people’s sentiments about their future prospects have 
improved. Transition thus seem to have brought increasing general discontent for die 
people. Unfortunately we do not know how it fits into a long-term context, because pre­
transition data for measures of satisfaction are not available.
At first sight it may appear puzzling that aldiough all possible ‘dimensions’ of lilting 
standards, such as income, housing, neighbourhood, health and job satisfaction decline 
over time, satisfaction with living standards itself remains on the same level. This may 
imply diat diere is a major unobserved element of living standards, which is not measured 
here, but contributes substantially to people’s well-being. Such examples might include 
household amenities, savings or ‘freedom’. This finding, might also provides a 
confirmation of the evidence in die literature discussed earlier: that we cannot perceive 
general measures of satisfaction as additive functions o f specific measures in various 
domains of life (Diener 1984). Instead of a ‘bottom-up’ approach, it is equally possible diat
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there is a ‘top-down* effect, or an unobservable variable, personality, which causes 
spurious correlations.
5.3 SOURCES OF LIFE SATISFACTION
What makes people satisfied in general? Scitovsky argues that it is actually ‘novelty* that 
brings satisfaction to people and challenges the simple claim that the higher someone’s 
income is the more satisfied they should be. Income can provide stimulation, but it is 
actually a rise, a change, which primarily does so, he advocates. Further to this, he asserts 
that income is not the main source of contentment ‘Most of our stimulation comes from 
other people, and in ways and situations that have little or nothing to do with economics* 
(1992, p. 137 ). Arriving to a similar conclusion, Robert Lane argues it is ‘companionship* 
rather than money, which makes people happy (2000). Robert Frank strongly criticises 
people’s luxurious consumption, ‘conspicuous consumption’, in the United States (1999). 
In many ways this argument seems to stem from Scitovsky, his idea of people’s 
overspending on their ‘comfort*. All of these provide a challenging critique for economics 
and in general for policy makers. What is in reality the best way to increase people’s well­
being? Is the primary concern with issues related to income justified?
What makes Hungarians satisfied? The following analysis will try to contribute to our 
understanding of this issue. If Hungarians are deeply materialistic compared to other 
nations, as measured by Inglehart (1997, pp.151-157), then we can expect that income is a 
major source of happiness for Hungarians, more so than family life for example. Also, 
there is evidence that in poorer nations financial satisfaction is a stronger correlate of life 
satisfaction than satisfaction with family (based on a sample of college students in 31 
nations, see Diener and Diener 1995, pp.656-657 ). Similarly, in a Russian student sample, 
financial domains were significantly stronger correlates of global SWB scales than social 
domains (Balatsky and Diener 1993, Table V I). I am going to test this presumption first 
by looking at the relationship between measures of satisfaction. This will show how much 
satisfaction with specific domains o f life associated with general life satisfaction. As a 
second step, I will identify the partial effects of specific measures of satisfaction on SWB 
in general.
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Framework for explanation: structure of ‘happiness’
As mentioned already, in the psychological literature happiness is described both with top- 
down and bottom up theories (Diener 1984). In the bottom-up approach, small pleasures 
tend to add up to a general state of happiness. In the top-down theory, general features of 
a personality influence how a person reacts to events. As Democritus expressed it, “a 
happy life does not depend on good fortune or indeed on any external contingencies, but 
also, and even to a greater extent, on a man’s cast of mind” (Diener 1984, p. 565 ). The 
debate is often formulated as whether happiness is a trait or a state. The former view 
emphasises predisposition, a propensity to react in a happy way. For example, a sanguine 
temperament probably tends to react to events in positive way. The second one holds the 
importance of many happy moments as a determinant of happiness. A supportive 
observation in favour of this latter is that Certain events are pleasurable to most people. In 
a longitudinal study, Diener and his co-authors tested the relative importance of life events 
and personality on predicting SWB. They found, interestingly, that life events have a 
relatively short-term impact on people’s SWB. In contrast, personality, the level of 
extraversion and neurotidsm predicted SWB over many years (Suh et al. 1996). 
Consequently, it is clear that there is no single causal model explaining SWB exclusively as 
a sum of domain satisfactions. In my view, in essence this implies that personality explains 
levels of subjective well-being, but life events explain more its variation.
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Figure 5.3 Overall life satifaction as ‘treat' and ‘state*
Objective well-being and Domain satisfactions General satisfaction (SWB)
latent variables
T r a i t ’
Personality
Satisfaction with 
life in general
Satisfaction with housing
Satisfaction with income
Satisfaction with health
Satisfaction with family relations
Job satisfaction
Satisfaction with neighbourhood
Events,
objective
circumstances
Satisfaction with 
living standards
Subjective well-being thus appears to be both a ‘state’ and a ‘trait*. I have tried to express 
the difference between these two views in the context of domain satisfaction and general 
satisfaction. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, personality seems to influence general SWB both 
directly and indirectly, dirough specific domain satisfactions. Personality, however, is 
largely a latent variable. Psychological literature has proven the impact of certain specific 
personality types, such as extraversion and neurotidsm. This proof, however, despite the 
spedfic psychological approach, is only partial yet. In this current survey, only rather crude 
approximations could be used for personality, such as demographic characteristics. This is 
far too inadequate to estimate a ‘true model’ on the interplay of domain satisfactions and 
general satisfaction. Instead, I need to remain with a simpler approach, trying to look at the 
partial effects of each spedfic domain satisfaction on general satisfaction. This, however, 
by no means assumes that domain satisfactions are exogenous variables, which would give 
a causal explanation for the variation of overall satisfaction.
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Relationship between measures of satisfaction: overview
The previous presumption on die qualitative difference between subjective assessment of 
the past and of the future seems to be confirmed by die survey evidence. Firsdy, as we can 
see in Tables 5.2-3, die correlation between satisfaction with life up till now and future 
prospects is moderately strong, but it is far from showing a perfect linear relationship. 
Thus, people clearly make distinctions between diese two, the future is not just an 
extrapolation of their past experiences. Secondly, there is a consequendy distinct group of 
specific satisfaction variables which are more strongly associated with each of die two 
indicators of general SWB.
Table 5.2 Correlation matrix between various measures of satisfaction, 1992
Life up till 
now
Future
prospects
Living
standards
Income Housing
Neighbour
hood
Job Health
Life up till now 1.00
Future prospects 0.53 1.00
Living standards 0.55 0.60 1.00
Income 0.37 0.44 0.51 1.00
Housing 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.23 1.00
Neighbourhood 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.47 1.00
Job 0.30 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.23 0.17 1.00
Health 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.25 1.00
Family relations 0.27 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.12
No/e: shading indicates whether the specific domain has a higher correlation with life up till now  or with 
future prospects
Table 5.3 Correlation matrix between various measures of sati faction, 1998
Life up till 
now
Future
prospects
Living
standards
Income Housing
Neighbour
hood
Job Health
Life up till now 1.00
Future prospects 0.65 1.00
Living standards 0.63 . 0  67 1.00
Income 0.43 0 . 4 6 0.55 1.00
Housing 0.41 0.32 0.44 0.29 1.00
Neighbourhood 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.19 0.52 1.00
Job 0.41 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.24 1.00
Health 0.33 0.41 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.24 1.00
Family relations 0.34 0.24 0.23 0.10 0.28 0.3d 0.25 0.18
Note', shading indicates whether the specific domain has a higher correlation with life up till now  or with 
future prospects
What are the relatively more important associates of satisfaction with life so far compared 
to that of future prospects? The assessment of life up till now seems to be more associated
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with satisfaction with housing, neighbourhood, job and family relations (indicated with 
shaded cells in Tables 5.2-3.). Satisfaction with living standards, income and health on the 
other hand, seems to be relatively more associated with future prospects. This pattern 
consequently prevails in both 1992 and 1998. Thus, it seems that personal assessment of 
life so far is more driven by stimulation coming from family relations and job, while future 
prospects are more influenced by material concerns, ‘comforts’, such as living standards 
and income. Assessment of health is also more associated with future hopes. This may be 
explained by ageing: those who experience health problems may expect the deterioration 
of their health, and this plays an increasing role in their assessment of future.
Why is satisfaction with housing and with neighbourhood relatively more associated with 
life up till now, however? These clearly seem to be elements of living standards, so why are 
they not stronger associates of future prospects? A possible explanation may be that 
housing is a major achievement for many people, as nearly half of the population lives in 
homes which were actually built by themselves. Achievement brings happiness, according 
to the so-called ‘activity theories’, which hold that happiness is a by-product of human 
activity, of effort (see footnote 3). Beyond this, having a house was most likely a change 
for the better for the majority of people. So it might be this change, which makes this 
element of living standards particularly relevant for the past.
Materialistic Hungarians?
As presented earlier, family is a domain of life, which brings high contentment for most 
people, while sentiments about income are mosdy those of dissatisfaction (see Figure 5.2). 
How do these influence people’s general sense of well-being? Satisfaction with family may 
be high, but if people do not really think it is very important for them, say for example that 
they are deeply materialistic, then it is not likely to influence their overall satisfaction. 
Observing the survey evidence, it seems that indeed, both general measures of SWB are 
more strongly associated with satisfaction with living standards or income than with 
satisfaction with family relations. This means that variation in SWB is more explained by 
the variation in living standards. Put it simply, having little or much money can explain 
better why people are miserable or happy. In contrast, happy family life, although it is 
clearly declared to be happy by most people, may just be taken for granted. As Tolstoy put
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it in his starting sentence of Anna Karenina: “All happy families resemble one another; 
each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”.
This evidence also confirms that people are more concerned about what their money buys 
for them rather than with the money itself. The relationship between general SWB 
measures and satisfaction with living standards is stronger than the one between overall 
SWB and income satisfaction. This may show that people actually evaluate their pleasure 
derived from consumption. Further to this, ‘living standards’ may be thought of as a state 
enjoyed from resources pooled over time, in contrast to ‘income’, which is just a measure 
at one point in time. There may be also a difference in terms of pooling within the family; 
people evaluating primarily their own income when thinking about satisfaction with 
income, and, in contrast, the actual income they get within the family as an element of 
their current living standards. Whatever die reasons are, this significance of the measure of 
satisfaction with living standards seems to give a justification to die fundamental approach 
to this diesis, namely to use measures of well-being other than income.
These relationships and the following explanations only hold rather tentatively. Firsdy, die 
tables present only bivariate associations; there is no control for other potentially 
influential factors. Secondly, they present only associations, without any indication of 
causality. Thirdly, die presented variables are all subjective measures, exclude important 
objective factors, first of all the personality itself. All these points need further explanation.
‘Experienced’ satisfaction differs from ‘expected’ satisfaction
First, the multivariate technique will address a similar question to that tackled before: does 
the assessment of future prospects differ from that of personal past? Following this, I will 
analyse the relationship between domain satisfaction and general satisfaction separately for 
specific labour market groups in order to be able to (1) examine the role of job satisfaction 
(2) to test how much these groups differ in their ways of assessing their overall SWB. 
Finally, I will analyse whether the relationship between domain satisfactions and general 
satisfaction has changed during transition, whether people in general apply a different 
mental process for judging how well they do in general.
194
Table 5.4 Partial correlation ofdomain satisfactions with general measures of life satisfaction
Partial correlation with
satisfaction with satisfaction with
life up till now future prospects
Satisfaction with ...
living standards 03972 0.4735
income 0.1187 0.1556
family relations 0.1946 0.0554
health 0.1427 0.2255
housing 0.1329 -0.0024
neighbourhood -0.0128 -0.0148
Year (dummy, T998’=l) -0.0125 0.1446
Observations 8128 7883
Notes: Bold denotes significance at 1% level.
The estimations are based on a pooled dataset o f the two cross-sectional surveys.
Controlling for other domains of satisfaction and time, general life satisfaction is most 
strongly associated with satisfaction with living standards (Table 5.4). Any other domain, 
including that of family life explains a far smaller proportion of the variance of general life 
satisfaction. This corroborates the results of the bivariate analysis (Tables 5.2-3). Thus, 
Hungarians primarily think about their living standards when they assess their overall SWB. Whether 
the explanation is that they are fundamentally materialistic, or that the material conditions 
have changed the most in the recent past, that’s why they matter more than more stable 
elements of their lives, remains unknown.
The multivariate analysis confirms the earlier finding correlates of the past do gready 
differ from those of the future. The difference between each pair of coefficients has been 
tested: with 1% confidence I could reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
specific domain satisfactions are equal in the equation for life so far with that of future 
prospects, except for one case, satisfaction with the neighbourhood115. So, for example, 
living standards as a correlate of life so far and living standards as a correlate of future 
prospects have been joindy tested and found to be significandy different.
115 The underlying model for partial correlation is actually multivariate regression. In order to test whether the 
coefficients in the specific two equations are different, I ran a joint regression, the so-called ‘seemingly 
unrelated regression’, .then performed a series o f joint tests, including coefficients from both equations.
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The interpretation of these results appears to be intriguing for another reason, not 
mentioned so far. Domain satisfactions, the explanatory variables in the model are 
expected to be correlated with current circumstances, and therefore they are more likely to 
determine satisfaction with life up till now (including current life satisfaction and 
‘discounted’ past satisfaction) rather than self-assessed future prospects. As the results 
show, however, this is not the case: the strength of association between domain 
satisfactions and satisfaction with life up till now is not stronger than that between domain 
satisfactions and satisfaction with future prospects. In addition, we would expect future 
satisfaction to have stronger association with those aspects of current self-assessed well­
being, which have a greater inter-temporal stability. Housing and neighbourhood domains 
are such, and for them, this expectation seems to be realistic. For health, we may assume 
an ageing effect, thus current health problems may be stronger associated with overall 
well-being in the future rather than with well-being in life up till now.
For income and family relations the results are rather counterintuitive. Satisfaction with 
income, the explanatory variable in this model, is the subjective assessment of current 
income. On the other hand, it is likely that satisfaction with future prospects is associated 
with discounted future incomes, and also satisfaction with future incomes. As discussed 
before, income mobility patterns indicate that the incomes were rather volatile in the 
1990s, with litde stability over time. Therefore the link between satisfaction with (current) 
income and the assessment of future prospects should be weaker than the relationship 
between satisfaction with (current) income and satisfaction with life up till now. The 
results presented here, indicate the opposite. In addition, the weak association between 
satisfaction with family life and satisfaction widi future prospects is also radier unexpected. 
Family relations, especially ‘happy’ family relations, are probably more stable than income 
or odier external, material circumstances. All this seems to support die presumption that 
there is a systematic difference between the determinants of ‘experienced satisfaction’ and 
‘expected satisfaction’.
Satisfaction with living standards and satisfaction with income are stronger associates of 
future prospects than of life up till now. Family relations seem to be marginal for the 
assessment of the future, although they are the second most important associates of 
contentment widi the past. This may provide evidence for Sdtovsky’s and others’ claims 
diat people are bad judges in matters of dieir own happiness: things which diey think
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would bring them happiness are rather different from those which actually turn out to 
have done so. In Sdtovsky’s terminology, it seems that Hungarians are more concerned 
about their ‘comfort* when they think about their future contentment and they value 
‘pleasure’ more when they assess their personal past. This, however, is just a relative 
difference. Overall, the conclusion is that general material ‘comfort’ is by far the major 
element associated with SWB, either past or future satisfaction. Interestingly, however, 
people tend to gready underestimate the positive effect of family relations on their future 
satisfaction.
Life satisfaction and labour market position
The distribution of various measures of satisfaction across specific labour market groups, 
shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, implies that there is a particular group of measures 
expressing ‘material’ well-being, including living standards, income and housing. Other 
measures of subjective well-being, including satisfaction with family life, with healdi and 
possibly with job express qualitatively different aspects of people’s lives. Satisfaction with 
income tends to be the lowest for the unemployed and the inactive in both years. Similarly 
these groups have the lowest satisfaction widi housing and living standards.
Satisfaction with living standards is consistendy higher than income for all groups and 
shows a somewhat smoother pattern. This most likely reflects the generally high 
satisfaction of people with their housing, itself an element of living standards. Income, as 
described in chapter 3, was seriously affected by economic transition, more so than 
housing conditions, as shown in chapter 4. The relative satisfaction of people widi their 
housing and with their living standards seems to support a starting assumption of the 
thesis, that income is the most volatile measure of well-being during transition, and may 
actually express people’s general living standards poorly.
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Figure 5.4 Labour market status and satisfaction with specific domains of life, 1992
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Figure 5.5 Labour market status and satisfaction ivith specific domains of life, 1998
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Satisfaction with family relations is high and varies very little among different labour 
market groups. Health, in contrast, is the most volatile measure of subjective well-being. 
The disability pensioners in particular, but also pensioners tend to be very dissatisfied with 
dieir health. In contrast, students are very contented. A great part of this variation is most 
likely attributable to age differences: the young (dius students) tend to be healthy and 
therefore satisfied widi dieir health, the elderly (thus pensioners) tend to have health 
problems and therefore litde satisfied widi dieir health. One issue which is not clear,
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namely whether the low satisfaction of the disability pensioners is actually related to their 
poor health, or just reflects a ‘falsification’ of reality in case they do not health major 
problems but they perceive the survey as a means of external surveillance. As described 
earlier (see chapter 2), a substantial number of workers exploited the permissive disability 
pensioner scheme as an exit strategy from the labour market. Did these people actually 
also experience impairing health problems? My calculations from the 1998 survey suggest 
that health problems among disability pensioners are more common than among pensioners. In order to 
discount for deteriorating health at very old age, and also for the relatively higher average 
age of pensioners, I excluded those who were older than 65 years from the comparison. I 
found that 87% of disability pensioners take regular medication, while 65% of pensioners, 
and 31% of disability pensioners have been in hospital for over a week in the past year, 
while this rate is ‘only’ 18% of pensioners. Thus ‘disability’ of disability pensioners appears 
to be more than just a device to claim benefits.
Job satisfaction tends to be rather high on average (for those with jobs), higher than 
satisfaction with any ‘material’ domain of life. Is it also a major element o f overall life 
satisfaction? If it is, we may assume that those who are involuntary non-employed the lack 
of job is a major source of discontentment. Job satisfaction indeed turns out to be a major 
correlate of satisfaction widi life (Table 6.6). Interestingly, it is particularly the case for the 
self-employed. As indicated by Figure 5.5, average job satisfaction of the self-employed has 
significandy surpassed that of employees in 1998. In the early 1990’s, in contrast, 
employees were more satisfied with their jobs, as Figure 5.4 shows, which indicates a 
gradually improving relative situation of entrepreneurs. It seems thus that increased 
autonomy in influencing the circumstances of the job is reflected in the greater weight of 
job satisfaction as an element of general well-being. Similar evidence was found in other 
countries as well.
Entrepreneurship brings higher job satisfaction, and a large number of people would 
prefer to be self-employed, both in Eastern and Western Europe (Blanchflower et al. 
2001). Their survey data show that half of Hungarians would prefer to be self-employed. A 
possible explanation for this is given in the classic study of Schumpeter, who describes the 
motivations of the entrepreneur. What drives the entrepreneur, ‘are primarily three things: 
(1) ‘the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, [...], also a dynasty*; (2)
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‘the will to conquer: [...], to succeed for die sake, not of the fruits of success, but of 
success itself; and (3) ‘the joy of creating’ (1934, p. 93).
Table 5.5 Partial correlation of domain satifactions with satisfaction with life up till now for various 
labour market groups
Partial correlation with satisfaction with life up till now
employees self-employed unemployed
disability
pensioners pensioners
other
inactive
Satisfaction with 
living standards 0.3615 0.3857 03452 0.4079 03977 0.4753
income 0.0766 0.0005 0.1111* 0.1185 0.1235 0.0826**
family relations 0.1940 0.1958 0.1940 0.2164 0.1673 0.1620
job 0.1469 0.2017
health 0.0967 0.1007* -0.0061 0.1288 0.1493 0.1845
housing 0.1174 0.1614 0.1228** 0.1682 0.0700 0.1817
neighbourhood -0.0278* -0.1983 0.0245 0.0256 0.0230 0.0336
Year -0.0245 0.0073 -0.0058 -0.0208 -0.0077 0.0428
Observations 3721 330 278 552 2421 650
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level
Counterintuitively, family life does not seem to play a particularly strong role for the group 
of inactive who are neither pensioners nor students, despite that we can expect many of 
them are supposedly ‘home-makers’. As Table 5.5 shows the correlation between 
satisfaction with family relations and overall life satisfaction is lower for the other inactive 
than for other labour market groups. This may indicate that for most of them family life is 
not a more important factor than for others, their absence from the labour market might 
not have been driven by the desire to try to improve their family relations.
Table 5.6 Partial correlation of domain satifactions with sati, faction with future prospects for various 
labour market groups
Partial correlation nith satisfaction nith future prospects
employees self-employed unemployed
disability
pensioners pensioners
other
inactive
Satisfaction with
living standards 0.4341 0.5776 03893 0.4597 0.4952 0.5255
income 0.1425 0.0318 0.1724 0.0912** 0.1315 0.1148
family relations 0.0653 -0.0435 -0.0656 0.0518 0.0630 -0.0129
job 0.0696 0.2102
health 0.1803 0.1958 0.1296 0.1541 0.1806 0.2360
housing -0.0104 -0.1214** -0.0331 0.1446 0.0069 -0.0695*
neighbourhood -0.0659 -0.0619 0.0841 -0.0493 0.0485** 0.0505
Year 0.1664 0.2177 0.1201** 0.1158 0.1143 0.1527
Observations 3667 325 276 534 2284 626
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level
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In contrast to the assessment of life so far, where there is no general change attributable to 
transition itself (the coefficient of the year dummy is insignificant), future satisfaction 
seems to have significandy and positively changed in the 90s for all labour market groups 
(see Table 5.6). The major improvement is for the self-employed, who seem to have 
become the most optimistic over time, controlling for domain satisfactions. Satisfaction 
with living standards is undoubtedly the major partial correlate of satisfaction with future 
for all labour market groups. Satisfaction with income seems to play a particularly 
important role for the unemployed.
Associates of life satisfaction largely unchanged during transition
How has transition affected the interrelationship between domain satisfactions and general 
life satisfaction? Has the mental process of ‘happiness as a state* changed during the 90s? 
Have people become more focused on their personal achievements, their income, or their 
living standards? In order to test this, I have introduced interaction terms into a regression 
model, where each domain of satisfaction was interacted with a year dummy. Thus, the 
partial effect, if significant, shows a change over time. A special population group was 
selected, that of employees, in order to be able to include job satisfaction into the model.
SWBpast = f  (DSls DSx* t,. . ,  DS7, DS7*t, t)
SWBfatuie = g (DSt, D S A  ..., DS7, DS7*t, t)
SWBpast means satisfaction with life up till now, SW Bf^ means satisfaction with future 
prospects, DSj to DS7 are specific domain satisfactions, t is a dummy, which takes the 
value 1 if the year is 1998 and 0 if 1992.
As Table 5.7 shows, mostly the main effects of the coefficients are significant, but only few 
of the interactions. This means that variation in general measures of satisfaction is not primarily 
attributable to the transition itself The interaction term of job satisfaction and satisfaction with 
the neighbourhood are significant and positive in both models, although have a small 
coefficient. Job satisfaction and satisfaction with neighbourhood have become increasingly 
correlated both with satisfaction with life so far and with satisfaction with future prospects 
in the group examined here, i.e. employees. This implies the increasing role o f job satifaction 
and sati faction with the neighbourhood in people's life. The greater importance of job satisfaction
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may be attributable to changing role of jobs in people’s lives: employment seems to have 
become increasingly a source of contentment or dissatisfaction for people.
Table 5.7 'Relationship between domain satisfactions and two measures of life sati faction among employees, 
OLS recession
Satisfaction with life up till now Satisfaction with 
future prospects
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Satisfaction with... 
living standards 03858 0.0267 0.4694 0.0258
living standards*year 0.0232 0.0482 0.0997* 0.0532
income 0.0729 0.0222 0.1820 0.0239
income*year -0.0044 0.0380 -0.0966** 0.0439
family relations 0.1892 0.0245 0.0347 0.0232
family relations*year 0.0059 0.0358 0.0586 0.0361
job 0.0959 0.Q245 0.0251 0.0243
job*year 0.0634* 0.0368 0.0726** 0.0357
health 0.0733 0.0211 0.1299 0.0215
health*year 0.0100 0.0337 0.0504 0.0355
housing 0.1199 0.0232 0.0178 0.0219
housing*year -0.0403 0.0401 -0.0635* 0.0376
neighbourhood -0.0554 0.0207 -0.0837 0.0200
neighbourhood*year 0.0726 0.0334 0.0562* 0.0333
Year -1.0092 0.3317 -0.7707** 0.3311
Constant 0.5714 0.2453 0.5486 0.2363
Observations
F-ratio
R2
3721
151.83
0.3815
3667
160.48
0.4085
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level
The model has been corrected for heteroscedasticity116.
5.4 HAPPINESS IN TRANSITION: SYNTHESIS OF A SUBJECTIVE
EXPLANATION
In contrast to some previous literature, Hungarians are not unhappier than other nations 
in the region. The survey evidence, however, reveals that there is a major difference in the 
level of happiness between Westem-Europe and that of Central-Eastern Europe, and also
116 The so-called Huber/White or sandwich estimator of variance was used in place of the traditional 
calculation. This alternative variance estimator produces consistent standard errors if the residuals are not 
identically distributed.
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that in general countries of the former Soviet Union score worse than other Eastem- 
European nations. This also implies that the relatively high suicide rate in Hungary (see chapter 
2), which has been used as a proxy for alienation, anomie and life satisfaction by 
Hungarian scholars, appears to be only a poor predictor of overall happiness.
Transition has somewhat lowered satisfaction with life up till now, but satisfaction with 
future prospects grew between 1992 and 1998, which is probably a sign of growing 
optimism. A peculiarity of the Hungarian situation is that, unlike other countries, the level 
of satisfaction with the life so far is greater than that of the future. Possible reasons for this 
may be past nostalgia, income loss during transition, or interpretational differences 
between these two notions of general life satisfaction. Detailed measures of satisfaction 
show that people in general are very delighted with their family relations and rather 
discontented with their incomes and living standards. During the 1990s there was a 
moderate decline in most measures of satisfaction with particular domains of life, although 
satisfaction with living standards remained on the same level.
Health was found to be the most volatile measure of subjective well-being. The disability 
pensioners in particular, but also pensioners tend to be very dissatisfied wit their health. 
The poor health reported by disability pensioners is not simply a falsification of reality in 
order to justify the benefit status. Disability pensioners do tend to have worse health, as 
also indicated by the higher share of people taking regular medication or of those who had 
hospital treatment in the past year compared to ‘young’ pensioners, those below the age of 
65.
I have attempted to look at the relationship between domain satisfactions and general 
measures of life satisfaction in order to understand the underlying ‘structure of happiness’, 
the possible differences between self-assessed life so far and that in the future. As 
emphasised, this interpretation of ‘expected utility’ as an aggregate of ‘utils’ is just one 
particular approach in describing happiness, which shows similarity to the so-called 
‘bottom-up’ approach in psychology. Since other factors, first o f all personality, are also 
expected to play a role, the results do not substantiate a causal interpretation.
Sati faction with living standards is the strongest correlate of both measures of life sati faction, stronger 
than satisfaction with income. This provides a powerful justification for the use of non­
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income measures of well-being. There is also evidence that other factors of quality of life 
are also significandy correlated with overall well-being. Job satisfaction, self-assessed health 
and family relations, and also housing quality are all important elements of life satisfaction. 
They have remained to be so, even after controlling for the effect of satisfaction with 
income. These particular aspects of life are thus significant, over and above the effect of 
self-assessed income situation.
A peculiar finding is that associates of ‘experienced satisfaction’ differ from ‘expected 
satisfaction’ in a somewhat counterintuitive way. Satisfaction with future prospects was 
shown to be a stronger correlate of the income and living standards situation, while family 
relations mattered more for the assessment of the course of life so far. This is 
counterintuitive, because the inter-temporal stability of family relations is probably greater 
than that of income, thus we might expect satisfaction with current income to be a 
stronger associate of life up till now (‘experienced utility3) than that of future prospects 
(discounted future utilities). Thus if people follow their judgements on future utilities and 
will be primarily concerned about dieir incomes rather dian their personal relations, they 
may not actually maximise their happiness. The reason for this may be the classic, although 
to my knowledge empirically yet not substantiated, claim of Scitovsky, that people tend to 
misjudge what brings them happiness, and as a result tend to overinvest into ‘comfort’ at 
the expense of ‘pleasure’.
The sources of happiness appear to differ greatly among specific labour market groups. 
Job satisfaction was a stronger correlate for the self-employed than employees, indicating 
the success or failure in the job matters more for the self-employed due to their greater 
autonomy and responsibility with respect to their employment. Job satisfaction of die self- 
employed has substantially improved over time relative to employees, and in 1998 it was 
substantially higher among the former. Satisfaction widi family relations was not a 
particularly strong factor in the life satisfaction of the housewives and other inactive 
groups, which might imply that their absence from the labour market may not be a 
voluntary choice due to their strong preferences for family life. This finding is tentative at 
this stage, and appears to be a promising future research issue with using more specific 
groups of the inactive population.
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General measures of life satisfaction were shown to be rather stable over time, their 
variation was little affected by the transition process, except for job satisfaction and 
satisfaction with neighbourhood. Job satisfaction and satisfaction with neighbourhood seem to play 
an increasing role in people’s life. Controlling for other domains of satisfaction, the analysis 
found that both job satisfaction and satisfaction with the neighbourhood have become 
more strongly associated with general measures of life satisfaction.
From a policy perspective a challenging further issue is the relationship between objective 
factors and subjective well-being. How do circumstances relate to self-assessed situation? 
How do personal characteristics explain variations in satisfaction? The starting hypothesis 
of ‘meritocracy’ is a major relevant issue in this respect as well: are labour market 
participation and income level primary determinant of satisfaction, or do gender and ethnic 
differences also matter?
These issues, and the relationship between objective and subjective well-being in particular, 
will be the concern of the following part of the thesis. Chapter 6 will analyse three specific 
domains of satisfaction, satisfaction with income, with housing and neighbourhood, and 
satisfaction with family relations. This focus follows on from the main concerns of chapter 
4 related to objective measures of well-being. Job satisfaction, unfortunately, will not be 
examined here, since it would require detailed specific labour market data, unavailable in a 
general purpose household survey. The final part of the analysis, in chapter 7, will examine 
the relationship between personal characteristics, objective circumstances and general life 
satisfaction. It may also be called the analysis of social inequalities in terms of happiness. I 
will also examine the consequences of economic transition, and the changes in these 
inequalities over time.
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ANNEX 5. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
VARIABLES
Table A 5 .1 Summary table of subjective well-being variables
Variable
(Satisfaction with...) Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax Observations
Weighted
observations
1992
Life up till now 5.73 2.73 0 10 5278 4011.04
Future prospects 4.16 2.77 0 10 5067 3849.03
Living standards 4.52 2.61 0 10 5277 4144.19
Income 3.63 2.77 0 10 5065 3979.94
Relationships within the family 8.61 2.10 0 10 5252 4125.76
Health 5.36 3.23 0 10 5290 4154.80
Work 7.41 2.54 0 10 2755 2095.68
Flat 7.12 2.78 0 10 5272 4137.40
N eighbourhood 7.29 2.81 0 10 5273 4142.58
1998
Life up till now 5.50 2.58 0 10 3770 5041.36
Future prospects 4.65 2.61 0 10 3689 4939.51
Living standards 4.51 2.44 0 10 3769 3727.14
Income 3.43 2.51 0 10 3253 3167.42
Relationships within the family 8.31 2.22 0 10 3754 3714.85
Health 5.27 3.16 0 10 3775 3733.22
Work 7.20 2.45 0 10 1544 1589.70
Flat 5.61 2.70 0 10 3770 3725.91
N eighbourhood 7.01 2.69 0 10 3776 3733.72
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6’H a y in g ’ a n d  ’b e in g ’: o b j e c t iv e  w e l l -b e in g , p e r s o n a l
CHARACTERISTICS AND SATISFACTION
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This chapter examines satisfaction with specific domains of life, shortly domain 
satisfaction, including satisfaction with income, housing and family relations. As shown 
before, there was a significant decline in satisfaction with income, housing and with family 
relations between 1992 and 1998 (see Figure 5.2). What may be the underlying causes of 
these changes? What are the main social patterns of satisfaction at one point in time? Have 
these patterns changed during transition? One major question is how strong is the 
relationship between objective circumstances and their subjective assessment. Is it income, 
housing quality or labour market status, which primarily drives satisfaction, or is it personal 
characteristics that matter more? How much can we explain different levels of satisfaction 
by these observable characteristics?
Measures of satisfaction are undoubtedly individual level measures, in contrast to certain 
objective conditions, which are shared by family members. Income or housing conditions 
are typically such shared qualities of objective well-being. Subjective well-being may shed 
light on the intriguing issue of distribution of income within the household. One related 
question is whether there is any systematic ‘deprivation’ of women within the household?
Studies on satisfaction in Hungary primarily focus on level of satisfaction, and its 
relationship to mental health, to alienation and anomie. Andorka has analysed early years 
of the transition (Andorka 1993; 1999) and was puzzled by the finding that satisfaction 
with income and with living standards increased between 1992 and 1994 despite falling 
average real income and widening inequalities. Later evidence shows a decline in these 
measures of satisfaction by 1997 (Speder et al. 1998).
A general finding is that income situation and educational level are strongly related to 
levels of satisfaction: people with more income or with higher education tend to be more 
contented (Andorka 1993; Speder et al. 1998, p. 508). There is also evidence that the young 
and the old are more contented than the middle-aged (Andorka 1993). These studies, 
however, do not seem to go beyond describing simple bivariate relationships, for example 
between education level and satisfaction. They all seem to discuss issues of satisfaction 
together with alienation and anomie. All this seems to be essential in order to establish 
satisfaction as a measure of quality of life in the country. My analysis, however, will go 
further than this, and will provide an in-depth analysis of social patterns of satisfaction 
with using multivariate statistical techniques.
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6.1 DOES PLENTY MAKE PEOPLE HAPPY?
Intuitively, one may expect a strong relationship between a domain satisfaction and the 
objective measure of that particular domain. Thus, satisfaction with income is expected to 
be driven by income, and similarly, one can presume a strong relationship between 
satisfaction with housing and housing quality, and also between satisfaction with family 
relationships and the nature and quality of those relationships. Survey evidence from other 
countries shows that the relationship between objective circumstances and their subjective 
appraisal undoubtedly exists, although it is not very strong (e.g. Campbell et al. 1976; 
Allardt 1977). A classic study on the United States finds that objective variables explain 
12% of satisfaction with housing and 8.8% of satisfaction with family life (Campbell et al. 
1976). As mentioned in the previous chapter, money tends to buy happiness, both across 
countries and across individuals within a single country (for a recent review on this issue, 
see Diener and Oishi 2000). These findings and the positive results of tests, which 
scrutinized the validity and reliability of subjective well-being measures suggest, as I argued 
in the previous chapter, that subjective well-being can be used as a useful indicator of 
differences in individuals’ opportunities. One task of this chapter is to assess to what 
extent plenty makes people contented in Hungary.
Hypothesis
People’s subjective assessment of their living standards may highlight specific aspects of 
the relationship between objective and subjective well-being. One such issue is whether 
current household income is an adequate description of the income situation of individuals. 
Firstly, people may not just consider their current income levels, but rather a more 
‘permanent’ definition of income, including income in the past and possibly in the future 
as well. They may also compare their own situation with that of others, especially with that 
of their reference group. As a result of these, personal characteristics may be strongly 
correlated with satisfaction with income. Primarily those variables, which refer to an 
income generating ability are expected to show a latent income effect’, thus may be 
significant after controlling for income. I will also test whether wealth influences the 
assessment of current income, using measures of savings, household assets and amenities.
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Secondly, although equivalised household income, assuming equal sharing, seems to be the 
best proxy for individual’s living standards, as argued before in the methodological section 
of chapter 3, this notion may be inadequate. Criticising conventional methods of poverty 
research Cantillon and Nolan argue in favour of the use of non-monetary indicators, which 
could possibly capture gender differences within the household (1998; 2001). They focus 
on indicators, which capture differences in consumption, the control and management of 
resources, and access to leisure activities (2001, p. 14). Subjective well-being, a typically 
individual level variable of well-being, appears to capture some aspects of these issues. Is 
there any gender difference, controlling for income and other personal characteristics? 
What is the distribution of resources within the household and how does it affect 
household members? I will introduce a measure of individual’s own contribution to the 
common household budget. This income share is expected to be significant, controlling 
for equivalised household income, if people’s well-being differs from that provided by 
their equal share within total household resources. This may be a tentative attempt to 
examine the possible differences in the bargaining position of partners within the 
household. Following on from this, the next chapter will examine whether there are gender 
differences in overall satisfaction.
This chapter will discuss satisfaction with income, family relations, and housing. Job 
satisfaction, however important it seems to be, will not be discussed in detail. The reason is 
the nature of the available dataset: it does not include variables which are commonly 
described as the main factors driving job satisfaction in the literature, such as employment 
stability, relationships within the workplace, career perspectives, etc117. The main focus 
will be on income, primarily due to its specific relevance as an economic variable.
A major contribution of this research will be to show whether patterns of satisfaction have 
substantially changed between population groups or they remained stable over time despite 
being exposed to fundamental external changes during the transition process. The analysis 
of such an external shock will shed light on the fundamental nature of measures of 
satisfaction. This ‘natural experiment’ will show whether the relationship between
117 Existing studies on job satisfaction in Hungary are based on the International Social Survey Programme, 
see (Medgyesi and Robert 1998; 2000).
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environmental factors or personal characteristics and measures of satisfaction is exposed 
to environmental change, and if it is, which factors are volatile.
What is the expected ‘transition effect’ on people’s satisfaction? The hypothesis referring 
to the stability of satisfaction patterns need to remain on a speculative level The reason is 
that it is a rather unique historical situation, and there has been very little research done on 
this issue so far. The discussion in earlier chapters suggests that three phenomena may 
particularly have an impact on people’s satisfaction: (1) changes in the level and 
distribution of income, (2) changes in the labour market and (3) restructuring in the 
housing market.
Firstly, there was an overall decline in satisfaction with income, as shown in chapter 5. This 
may be attributable to the drop of real income for most people and growing inequality. 
Inequality has been shown to have a negative impact on happiness in general (e.g. 
Morawetz, Atia, Bin-Nuh, Felous et aL 1977). Further to this, we may assume that growing 
inequality particularly affects those who are left behind. A rather different reasoning seem 
to lead to a similar conclusion. The poor may also be dissatisfied, because they are ‘needy’, 
to wit they suffer from the lack of means to meet their objectively existing needs. This 
view is strongly represented by critiques of the ‘relative’ theories (Veenhoven 1991). A 
negative association between low income status and satisfaction with income might 
become stronger if satisfaction is primarily driven by the growing ‘need’ of the poor. On the 
contrary to diis, however, the misery of ‘need/ in an environment of ‘losers’ may lessen. 
Thus, die association may decline over time if social comparison effects dominate. The 
analysis will test whedier there is any significant change in the satisfaction with income for 
a particular income group over time.
A second major aspect of the transition process is that many people lost their employment. 
Being without job, either as unemployed or as inactive, is expected to cause dissatisfaction, 
due to the lower level of income and other non-pecuniary costs (Clark and Oswald 1994; 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). Labour market position is one of the major 
determinants of income in Hungary, as shown in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5). Non­
participation in the labour market, due to its impact on incomes, is expected to lower 
people’s satisfaction with material aspects of life. Declining participation affected women
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more than men (chapter 4). Is there any change in satisfaction with income for specific 
labour market groups?
Thirdly, the vast public housing privatisation programme left behind only a very small 
number of tenants, and these lived in dwellings increasingly hit by major quality shortfalls 
(see discussion in chapters 2 and 4). Are tenants increasingly dissatisfied with their housing 
and their neighbourhood? Is there any increasing association between objective measures 
of housing quality and satisfaction?
It is not just plenty, however, which drives satisfaction. Psychologists emphasise that 
personality ‘traits* are just as important as objective circumstances as determinants of 
subjective well-being (see Figure 5.3). Therefore personal characteristics, observable 
features of ‘personality* are just as essential elements of models of subjective well-being. 
These may also be called, following the terminology of Veenhoven, the “‘art of living’; to 
wit, personal abilities to exploit given chances, and life-events; happenings, partly due to 
good or bad luck” (1996, p. 24 ). As shown, die satisfied tend to be socially extravert and 
open to experience (see a review by Veenhoven 1996). The features examined here are 
mosdy of demographic and economic nature, with very limited use of specific measures of 
psychological attributes of personality, due to the nature of the survey. Variables, which 
express specific value orientation may be useful from this point of view: first of all 
religiosity or age. These are expected to influence people’s expectations, aspirations, dius 
the assessment of their actual life situation. Other personal characteristics most likely 
influence how well they can adapt to economic changes. Educational level and age may be 
such characteristics.
Methodology
The multivariate analysis will use varying sets of explanatory variables. Some of these will 
be proxies of objective well-being. Another group will present personal characteristics. 
These will include mostly variables used in the previous analysis already. An additional 
variable is religiosity, which is expected to reveal possible specific attitudes, based on the 
existing literature. (For a description of all the variables used here, see Appendix B.) It is 
not possible to identify a unique specification of the ‘optimal model’ based on the 
literature. Instead, the forthcoming models are based on the starting research question, the
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characteristics of the dataset, and the goal of parsimony. Details of specification will be 
discussed alongside the estimation results.
The regression method is linear regression, using the OLS estimation method, or binary 
logit model (for family relations). In most cases (for income, housing and neighbourhood) 
I used OLS regression, which means that I treat satisfactions as continuous variables. 
Thus, I assume that respondents, when answering these questions, actually think of the 
response scale in numerical terms, considering distances as equal. For this, it is essential 
that the survey question is actually raised in numerical format, and it has relatively large 
number of categories, eleven118. [Similar to my approach, others have also used OLS 
estimation technique for analysing life satisfaction (Di Telia et al. 2001).] Nevertheless, I 
have also tested whether the use of ordered logit model would have modified the results.
6.2 SATISFACTION WITH INCOME
What kind of relationship do we expect between a series of personal characteristics and 
satisfaction with income? Primarily, satisfaction with income is expected to be driven by 
income. Personal characteristics, however, may influence how income is converted into the 
subjective assessment of income. Examining the strength of association between income 
and satisfaction with income, we have to be aware that the concept of income used in the 
analysis is annual income, measured in a survey at one point in time. Contentment with 
income, however, may be based on the assessment of various notions of income. To some 
extent people may think about their current flow of income, thinking of a time horizon 
much less than a year. Beyond this, the interpretation may also consider a more permanent 
income, pooled over a period of time, which may include past and expected future 
incomes as well. As a result, the analysis, using current income, may underestimate the 
actual connection between income and satisfaction with income, or other factors may take 
on an income effect in the multivariate analysis.
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Figure 6.1 'Relationship between income level and satisfaction with income
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It seems that money in some sense buys satisfaction. Level of income appears to be 
strongly associated with satisfaction with income, as Figure 6.1 shows. People in higher 
income decile groups tend to be more satisfied with dieir incomes. The contentment of 
the top decile group is the highest, die average score is twice as high as diat o f the bottom 
one. I have also tested whether diis result is sensitive to die definition of income used, and 
found diat similar positive correlation exists between annual personal income and 
satisfaction with income as well.
Satisfaction widi income is greater for people widi higher levels of education; diose widi 
university education being markedly die most satisfied (Table 6.1). Satisfaction varies a lot 
in different employment status groups, on average the self-employed and the employees 
are die most contented widi dieir income and die unemployed and the inactive being the 
least (Table 5.2 in the previous chapter). This, however, is at least partly attributable to 
differences in income. Is there any effect of these variables over and above that o f income? 
This question will be addressed in the coming section on multivariate analysis.
118 T h i s  is  r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  s t a n d a r d  h a p p in e s s  q u e s t io n s ,  w h i c h  o f t e n  h a v e  th r e e  v e r b a l  la b e ls ,  t h u s  a r e  
o r d in a l  d is c r e t e  v a r ia b le s . ( T h e  h a p p in e s s  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  S o c ia l  S u r v e y  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  is: Taken 
a ll toget/jer, how would you say things are tim e days -  would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?’)  
T h e s e  v a r ia b le s  u n d o u b t e d ly  n e c e s s i ta te  d i f f e r e n t  t e c h n iq u e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  o r d e r e d  lo g i t  o r  p r o b i t  m o d e l s .
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Table 6.1 Satisfaction with income by education level\ labour market status and gender
Satisfaction with 
income (mean score)
1992 1998
Education level:
Not completed
elementary education 3.18 3.06
Elementary education 3.14 2.77
Vocational training 3.48 3.32
High school 4.17 3.94
Higher education 4.75 4.79
Labour market status:
Employee 4.11 3.96
Self-employed 4.50 4.36
Unemployed 1.40 1.35
Disability pensioner 2.43 2.39
Pensioner 3.74 3.39
Student 3.35 3.53
Other inactive 1.63 2.01
Gender:
Male 3.69 3.65
Female 3.57 3.25
Multivariate analysis: higher income brings more sati faction
In order to understand what factors may influence satisfaction with income, an ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression equation was estimated. The dependent variable is 
satisfaction widi income, and the explanatory variables include income, labour market 
status, educational attainment, age, gender, ethnicity and other personal characteristics. 
Most of die explanatory variables have been defined as dummy variables or sets of 
dummies, because we expect a non-linear relationship between these and the dependent 
variable. The notion of income used in the model is equivalised household income, which 
is assumed to capture the best the real consumption opportunities of household members. 
Other right hand side variables, especially labour market status and educational level, may 
capture a more permanent income, including expected future incomes, and probably are in 
part proxies for personal income. Variables of personal characteristics, such as age or 
religiosity, may be observed variables of ‘personality*, thus may play a role in how people 
actually assess dieir objective circumstances (see Figure 5.3 in the previous chapter). The 
results have been compared with the outcome of a possible alternative estimation 
technique, ordered logit, but found no major divergence (see Table A6.1 in the annex).
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Multivariate results confirm diat higher income groups tend to be more contented, other 
things being equal. The coefficients of income quintile groups are all significant and show 
that the bottom two income quintile groups are less satisfied, and the top two quintile 
groups are more satisfied than the middle quintile group both in 1992 and 1998. There is a 
clear increasing trend in satisfaction alongside increasing ranks in the income distribution, 
accounting for a number of personal characteristics, including labour market status and 
educational level, (see table 6.1). This result has been found robust to various alternative 
notions of income as well. Using other measures, such as personal income, and the 
logarithm of equivalised household income in the model brought similar results: the 
coefficient of income was significant at 1% level and had a positive sign.
There is no significant change in most of the coefficients of income over time, except that 
of the bottom income group at 10% significance level. The bottom quintile group seems 
to have become relatively less dissatisfied over time. This, however, may be attributable to 
the declining satisfaction of the reference category, as suggested by Figure 6.1. The 
underlying reason may be that the mean income has declined over time, and as a 
consequence the relative situation of the low-income group has somewhat improved, as 
discussed earlier (see Figure 3.3-4 with the Kernel density estimates).
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Table 6.2 Satisfaction with income - OLS regression
1992 1998
Coef. Std. Err Beta Coef. Std. Err Beta
Income: (quintile group)
1* -0.845 0.132 -0.119 •0.562 0.141 -0.0812 nd -0.409 0.124 -0.059 -0.324** 0.125 -0.052
4th 0.414 0.126 0.060 0.454 0.125 0.075
5th 0.978 0.132 0.144 1.082 0.144 0.179
Labour market status
Unemployed -2.109 0.177 -0.151 -1.821 0.220 -0.118
Disability pensioner •1.424 0.169 -0.120 -0.993 0.154 -0.113
Pensioner -0.919 0.147 -0.148 -0.568 0.150 -0.104
Self-employed 0.151 0.228 0.010 0.251 0.228 0.020
Student -0.709* 0.373 -0.037 -0.874* 0.496 -0.034
Other inactive -1.915 0.163 -0.170 -1.366 0.170 -0.148
Education:
vocat. training -0.006 0.112 -0.001 0.071 0.116 0.013
secondary 0.405 0.115 0.061 0.553 0.127 0.091
higher edu 0.535 0.152 0.059 1-001 0.166 0.126
Other personal characteristics:
Female -0.093 0.084 -0.017 -0.295 0.091 -0.059
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.314 0.196 -0.022 -0.287 0.228 -0.022
Lives in Budapest 0.082 0.085 0.011 -0.195* 0.114 -0.029
Age:17-29 yrs 0.022 0.145 0.003 0.361** 0.170 0.055
30-39 yrs -0.016 0.134 -0.002 0.173 0.147 0.026
50-62 yrs 0.326** 0.141 0.049 0.198 0.137 0.034
63 and more 1.402 0.179 0.211 0.949 0.181 0.160
Marital status:
manried -0.067 0.147 -0.011 -0.119 0.164 -0.023
divorced -0.341* 0.201 -0.032 -0.485** 0.205 -0.053
widow/er 0.018 0.197 0.002 0.136 0.204 0.019
Number of children:
1 -0.050 0.117 -0.007 0.268** 0.132 0.040
2 0.135 0.141 0.018 0.422** 0.164 0.054
3 or more 0.087 0.196 0.007 0.446* 0.230 0.038
Religious 0.317 0.104 0.045 0.364 0.115 0.057
Constant 3.651 0.205 0.000 3.182 0.208 0.000
Adjusted R* 0.1667 0.1801
F ratio 44.45 28.93
Observations 4904 3149
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level
Base categories: 40-49 years, elementary education or below, employee, single, no children, 3rd quintile 
The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity. The so-called Huber/White or sandwich estimator 
o f variance was used in place of the traditional calculation. This alternative variance estimator produces 
consistent standard errors if the residuals are not identically distributed.
Some non-income variables may also capture an income effect. As mentioned earlier, the 
concept of income used here is annual income, which may be different from the notion of 
income assessed by the individual. This latter may include past shocks and future risks of 
income loss or gain. It may also be a relative income, rather than absolute one. The ‘risk* 
factor associated with income may be captured by the labour market status or by the 
educational level, since both of these approximate a person’s general income generating 
abilities. The problem of relative versus absolute income is avoided to some extent due to
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the applied income variable. Income quintiles reflect relative standing in the income 
distribution. A significant coefficient of a particular income quintile, however, may both 
imply that people have different levels of satisfaction than the base category because they 
have more or less absolute income or because they have comparatively more or less than 
others. It is very likely, however, that the notion of relativity depends not just on the 
overall social pattern of income distribution, but relates to a particular reference group.
Income generating capacity: education and employment
Higher educational attainment seems to bring satisfaction. This is increasingly so for those 
with higher education, the coefficient in 1998 is significandy higher than diat in 1992. 
Educational level is a good approximation of an individual’s income generating potential 
over a period of time, thus education may partly refer to an income effect. Those with 
higher education for example are both expected to earn more and to be able to acquire a 
stable source of income compared to those with low level of schooling. This finding is 
particularly interesting, because we may expect a counter effect as well: higher education is 
likely to bring a higher comparison wage level, and higher expectations for income. 
[Previous literature, using British data, suggests that worker’s job satisfaction is inversely 
related to their comparison wage rates (Clark and Oswald 1996)]. The positive relationship 
between higher levels of education and satisfaction thus is likely to be a net effect of these 
two contrasting things, showing that higher and more stable income has a bigger impact 
on satisfaction than higher relative expectations.
Disadvantageous labour market status appears to be strongly associated with 
discontentment with income. Particularly the unemployed are much worse off than the 
employees, the reference category, as the size of the coefficient suggests. Thus, controlling 
for the level of income, the jobless are still relatively discontented. The reason maybe most 
likely related to the experience of income loss compared to their previous earnings level. 
Disability pensioners, many of them being laid off as redundant, are still worse off than the 
employees, but comparatively better than the unemployed. The reason may be that 
disability pensioners can rely on a stable source of income, in contrast to the unemployed. 
Or simply being ‘disabled’ is a more acceptable reason for ‘failure’. A major revelation of 
the results is the low satisfaction of the inactive other than students or pensioners. Being 
inactive seems to be a main cause of discontent, together with unemployment. Why is this?
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Those inactive, who are not involved in full-time study or do not live on pension may be 
discontented with their income for various reasons. It may relate to sharing of income 
within the household. Since they are not likely to contribute substantially to the total 
household income, their actual income position may differ from the one based on the 
assumption of equal sharing between adults. The analysis is based on the latter assumption. 
Thus if their actual income position is lower than this and it is reflected in their level of 
satisfaction, it will be captured in the coefficient of inactivity rather than that of income 
itself.
Dissatisfaction of women
A striking feature of the transition process is that women became dissatisfied over time. While in 
1992 women and men did not differ in their assessment of their income situation, other 
things being equal, by 1998 women became significandy more discontented than men 
(Table 6.2). The results, however, also might be consistent with there being no change 
over time, as shown by the t-test on the difference in the estimates (t= 1.631), which 
indicates no significant change at 5% level. This latter finding is very likely attributable to 
the sample size, which may not enable to detect changes over time. What could be a 
reason for the increasing dissatisfaction of women?
The labour market participation of women has gready fallen, the fall surpassing that of 
men (see Figure 4.2 in chapter 4). The model includes actual labour market situation, but 
does not control for its changes in the past. The relative dissatisfaction of women may be 
related to the fact diat many of diem have lost previous employment and earnings. 
Alternatively, the declining real value of family support may negatively affect the relative 
income of women within the household. The relative dissatisfaction of women dius may 
be attributed to changes in their labour market status, earnings or in the real value of social 
benefits, rather than their actual level. This dynamic aspect unfortunately cannot be tested 
here.
A plausible further explanation for the dissatisfaction of women is die possibly they have 
more responsibility in die family for making ends meet. Survey evidence on handling the 
money widiin the family suggests that die overall majority of households (95%) merge the 
income of partners into a common budget (Nagy 1999). In most cases the partners handle
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this jointly (60%), and if it is a single partner, then it tends to be the wife who is 
responsible for the common resources (30%).
Higher income share brings satisfaction: bargaining within the household?
The traditional economic approach assumes that household decisions are based on 
‘unitary’ preferences (Becker 1981). From this it follows that household demand, spending 
decisions, are independent of which family member receives the income. This has been 
challenged by recent empirical evidence, which may be called the economics of marriage 
(Lundberg and Poliak 1994; 1996; Lundberg et al. 1997). As discussed earlier in chapter 3, 
they conclude that households do not have common preferences. Instead, household 
consumption decisions are rather like a ‘bargain’.
This might be true in Hungary as well, although so far no research has tried to address this 
issue. My findings may shed light on the subjective aspect of this issue. The majority of the 
couples tend to pool their incomes together and dien manage it jointly, as the evidence 
cited above indicates. Is this joint decision making based on the principle of equality? Or is 
it determined by the ‘bargaining power* of parties? If it is the case, it is thus very likely to 
be influenced by the relative contribution of the partners.
Does income matter as a source of bargaining power within the household? If people’s 
consumption depends only on total household income, dien it does not matter how much 
they actually contribute to the total income of the household, since they receive their ‘fair* 
share. We expect, however, diat an individual’s contribution to die resources of the 
household is very likely to influence his or her role in the decisions of the household. An 
alternative, although less likely, interpretation might suggest that for a truly altruist person, 
caring for the family may be part of his utility function, which may also explain why greater 
contribution to die common budget would bring him higher satisfaction. The hypothesis 
referring to the importance of individual contribution seems to be validated by the 
regression model (see Table 6.3). Including a new variable, which describes the share of 
the individual’s income within the total household income, and includes earnings, capital 
income and social benefits, considerably improves die fit of the models, both in 1992 and 
in 1998. The variable itself is significant at 1% level and has a positive coefficient. Thus, 
increasing contribution to the resources of the household seems to yield higher satisfaction 
with income.
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Table 6.3 Individuals’income share and satisfaction with income - OLS regression
1992 1998
1 II 1 II
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Share of individual’s
income within household 1.482 0.186 0.855 0.199
Income: (quintile group)
1* -0.846 0.132 -1.065 0.135 -0.591 0.141 -0.686 0.1442nd
-0.408 0.124 -0.501 0.124 -0.328 0.125 -0.382 0.1254«h 0.415 0.126 0.499 0.126 0.453 0.125 0.491 0.126
5th 0.979 0.132 1.143 0.133 1.082 0.144 1.151 0.144
Labour market status:
Unemployed -2.114 0.178 -1.868 0.183 -1.812 0.220 -1.686 0.219
Disability pensioner -1.424 0.169 -1.249 0.170 -0.991 0.154 -0.898 0.153
Pensioner -0.919 0.147 -0.837 0.146 -0.573 0.151 -0.556 0.150
Self-employed 0.151 0.228 0.089 0.228 0.252 0.228 0.241 0.228
Student -0.709* 0.373 -0.282 0.372 -0.860* 0.496 -0.614 0.499
Other inactive -1.915 0.163 -1.546 0.168 -1.354 0.170 -1.219 0.171
Gender
female -0.092 0.084 0.107 0.088 -0.298 0.091 -0.231** 0.093
Other personal
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.651 0.205 2.900 0.227 3.177 0.208 2.787 0.225
Adjusted 0.1666 0.1793 0.1811 0.1863
F ratio 44.38 47.31 28.94 29.29
Observations 4901 4901 3136 3136
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level
Base categories: 40-49 years, elementary education or below, employee, single, no children, 3rd quintile. 
The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich estimator o f  
variance.
Other personal characteristics: educational level, ethnicity, age, marital status, number o f children, region, 
religiosity
It seems somewhat counterintuitive diat die relative disadvantage o f women in 1998 is not 
smaller, once accounting for dieir contribution to die common household income. This 
suggests that women still tend to be significandy more dissatisfied than men, over and 
above their own personal income, including both earnings and social benefits, and the total 
available income for the household. This seems to suggest that income share is a usefulproxy 
for bargaining power within the partners, as the relationship between income share and 
satisfaction with income suggests, but cannot capture gender differences entirely within the household. 
There is thus clearly a gender issue related satisfaction with income, which is presumably 
linked to the command over resources or their actual distribution within the household. 
This seems to be a challenging direction for future research.
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Savings bring contentment
Is the assessment of current income driven by the need or plenty of the household? Does 
the available wealth (savings) influence the satisfaction with current income flow? A 
striking characteristic of savings in Hungary is that low actually it is. In 1992 the majority 
of the households reported to have had no savings at all and only 44% of the people lived 
in households, which said they had some savings119. By 1998 this number has greatly fallen, 
only 16% had any savings, and nearly two thirds reported to have none. Refusal to 
respond has increased significantly, from 1% in 1992 to 20% in 1998. This had a clear 
income bias: those in higher income groups were less likely to respond at the later point in 
time. Those who may have become prosperous during transition, seem to have been 
particularly ‘shy* about it. This data problem causes some problem in the interpretation of 
the results.
There is a clear pattern between zero reported savings and income position. Those who 
are worse off are more likely to have no savings at all. In 1992 3A  of individuals in the 
bottom quintile group belonged to households with no savings. The similar ratio was only 
38% of the top quintile group. In 1998 no less dian 96% of the bottom fifth said to have 
had no savings at all. In contrast, 59% of the top fifth income group claimed so. This 
shows the existence of an income pattern to some extent.
Other measures of wealth, such as assets and household amenities are also expected to be 
indicators of long-term income position. They also indicate a certain level of living 
standards. Households which possess these may not need to invest in their purchase. On 
die other hand, certain assets, especially a car or a second home, may be cosdy, and their 
maintenance requires income.
In order to test the impact of wealth on satisfaction with income, I have included savings 
and a series of variables of assets and household amenities in the regression models 
(Tables 6.4 and 6.5). The savings variable shows the total savings of the household, either 
as cash, as bank account or as bonds. In order to account for diminishing returns of
119 A somewhat lower figure has been reported for non-saving in a different survey for 1992 In a sample o f  
1000 only 36% said that they tend to save regularly. Out of those who do not save, over 1/3 said they did not 
have savings at all, nearly 2/3 claimed they had not been able to save in the past two years (GKI Economic 
Research Co. 1992).
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additional units of saving, the natural logarithm of die forint amount was used. The assets 
variable consists of a series of dummy variables of household non-monetary assets, 
measuring whether the household has a second home, a cottage, or a car. Household 
amenities are also measured as a series of dummies, indicating whether the household 
owns specific items, such as a deep freezer or video (for a detailed definition of the 
variables, see Appendix B).
Table 6.4 Wealth and satisfacHon with income 1992 — OLS regression
I II III IV
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Savings
Assets
Household amenities 
Income: (quintile group) 
1st -0.852 0.134
0.052***
-0.774***
0.008
0.133 -0.834 0.133
Yes
Yes
-0.769*** 0.1372nd
•0.402 0.125 -0.354*** 0.125 - 0.404 0.124 -0.362*** 0.126
4th 0.411 0.127 0.364*** 0.127 0.411 0.126 0.352*** 0.126
5th 0.957 0.133 0.838*** 0.134 0.964 0.133 0.836*** 0.135
Labour market status:
Unemployed - 2.102 0.178 -2.069*** 0.175 - 2.109 0.177 -2.111*** 0.175
Disability pensioner - 1.417 0.169 -1.390*** 0.169 - 1.396 0.17C -1.376*** 0.168
Pensioner -0.915 0.149 -0.916*** 0.148 - 0.892 0.148 -0.869*** 0.148
Self-employed 0.145 0.228 0.149 0.222 0.129 0.229 -0.016 0.226
Student -0.793** 0.372 -0.858** 0.374 -0.706* 0.373 -0.906** 0.371
Other inactive - 1.911 0.163 -1.914*** 0.162 - 1.894 0.163 -1.893*** 0.165
Other personal 
characteristics 
Constant
Yes
2.839 0.182
Yes
2.762 0.182
Yes
3.622 0.205
Yes
3.370 0.282
Adjusted 
F ratio
Observations
0.1663
43.85
4840
0.1744
45.09
4840
0.1666
43.72
4868
0.1722
30.72
4868
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile, employee
Other personal characteristics: educational level, gender, ethnicity, age, marital status, number of children, 
region, religiosity
As expected, savings have a positive relationship with satisfaction with income (Tables 6.4- 
5). The coefficient is significant at 1% level, although its size is small compared to that of 
current income. The finding, however, is prevalent over both years analysed here: those 
who have more savings tend to be more contented. This may reflect a ‘permanent income 
effect’: savings provide the opportunity to pool resources over time. They increasingly
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enable the household to maintain an accustomed consumption level if there is a sudden 
drop in current household revenues.
Table 6.5 Wealth and satisfaction with income 1998 — OLS recession
I II III IV
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Savings
Assets
Household amenities
0.046*** 0.011
Yes
Yes
Income: (quintile group)
1* -0.705 0.151 -0.653*** 0.151 -0.565 0.141 -0.556*** 0.1412^ d
4«h
-0.383 0.136 -0.372*** 0.136 -0.306** 0.126 -0.316** 0.127
0.451 0.137 0.409*** 0.137 0.450 0.127 0.434*** 0.128
5th 0.960 0.159 0.817*** 0.160 1.066 0.145 0.983*** 0.147
Labour market status:
Unemployed -1.592 0.241 -1.601*** 0.243 -1.836 0.221 -1.844*** 0.215
Disability pensioner -0.953 0.162 -0.936*** 0.161 -1.036 0.154 -1.017*** 0.156
Pensioner -0.568 0.163 -0.545*** 0.162 -0.577 0.152 -0.523*** 0.153
Self-employed 0.243 0.256 0.235 0.253 0.143 0.229 0.090 0.225
Student -0.454 0.591 -0.488 0.573 -0.891* 0.497 -1.081** 0.497
Other inactive -1.250 0.181 -1.269*** 0.179 -1.374 0.170 -1.361*** 0.170
Other personal
characteristics:
Constant
Yes
3.223 0.223
Yes
3.129 0.224
Yes
3.175 0.209
Yes
2.843 0.297
Adjusted R2 
F ratio
Observations
0.1770
22.580
2545
0.1839
22.87
2545
0.1797
28.85
3097
0.1833
19.79
3097
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 %  level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile, employee
Other personal characteristics: educational level, gender, ethnicity, age, marital status, number of children, 
region, religiosity
The non-monetary assets of the households do not seem to notably influence the level o f 
satisfaction with income. The inclusion of assets and amenities into the equations does not 
increase substantially the models’ ability to describe the variance of the satisfaction score. 
In addition, the coefficients of the assets are in nearly all cases insignificant, indicating that 
most of these properties have no significant relationship with satisfaction with income.
In sum, savings are positively correlated to satisfaction with income. Savings seem to 
provide useful additional information in understanding satisfaction with current income: 
income stock does influence the assessment of income flow. This is much less so in case 
of household assets. This is not surprising, since savings are resources, which are probably
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more linked to current income position. Savings may be income, which is not spent yet. 
Savings can also be more easily mobilised if there is need for it, they are more likely 
provide a source for pooling of incomes over time.
Age and religiosity matter
Old age is positively correlated with satisfaction, accounting for a series of personal characteristics. 
The coefficient of the age group of 63 years or over is significant at the 1% level and has a 
positive sign in both years (Table 6.2). Considering, however, that this is a pensioner age 
group, and overwhelmingly consists of pensioners (86-90% respectively), the negative 
coefficient of the pensioner variable has to be taken into account. Elderly pensioners still 
tend to be somewhat more satisfied with their incomes than the reference group of 40-49 
year-old employees, accounting for income and other factors. The interpretation for this 
can be only speculative, the elderly might enjoy the relative stability of their pension 
income (compared to both other social incomes in general and earnings for many), or they 
may have lower material aspirations. It is possible to speak about causality in the 
relationship of age and subjective well-being. We can be certain that the relationship has a 
single direction, because satisfaction cannot influence age.
Religiosity proves to be consistently a source of contentment in this material dimension, 
ceteris paribus. The religious (churchgoers) are on average more satisfied with their income 
situation than those who are not. The size of the coefficient is small, however, thus 
religiosity matters less than income, labour market status or old age in explaining levels of 
satisfaction with income. This finding implies that religious people may have specific 
preferences, possibly having lower material aspirations. Recendy a small, but increasing 
economic literature suggests that identity, or attitudes do influence economic outcomes 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Ng and Wang 2001), including people’s utility, measured as 
self-reported happiness (Di Telia and MacCulloch 1998). There is very limited evidence on 
the relationship between religiosity and subjective well-being. This finding suggests that 
religiosity as a specific attitude affects people self-reported well-being.
Ethnicity is not significant in either years (see Table 6.2). Ethnicity thus does not refer to 
any personality feature, other things being equal, which may be accountable for the 
conversion of objective financial conditions into satisfaction with income.
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Relationship between income and satisfaction with income
How much does income explain variation in the level of satisfaction with income? What is 
the relationship between objective and subjective well-being in this respect? As presented 
by Table 6.6, income and personal characteristics together can explain about 17-18% of 
the variance in satisfaction with income (Model B). As expected, model B, with the 
inclusion of education and labour market status gives a better approximation of actual 
income than simply using observed income captured by the snapshot data, like in model A. 
Individual’s income share also contributes substantially to the improvement of the model, 
indicating that satisfaction indeed is pardy driven by the individual’s contribution to the 
common household budget Savings and assets also have some, although minor effect. 
Savings appear to be somewhat more significant than assets and household amenities for 
the positive assessment of income situation. In sum, there is a clear, although moderate 
correlation between objective and subjective dimensions of well-being.
Table 6.6 Goodness of fit of various models ofsatifaction with income
1992 1998
A B C D E A B C D E
Income ✓ S ✓ ✓ ✓ S ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Personal characteristics,
including labour market 
status and educational
S ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
level
Individual’s income
share within total ✓
household income
Savings
Assets and household
V
✓
✓
✓
amenities
Explained variance of 
satisfaction with 
income, % (Adj. R2)
9.1 179(16.6-16.7) 17.4 17.2 11.0 180 18 6 (17.7-18.1) 18.4 18.3
Note: Adj R2 o f model B varies depending on the sample size (see regression output before: baseline 
model in Table 6.2, figures in brackets in Tables 6.3-5).
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6.3 SATISFACTION W ITH HOUSING AND NEIGHBOURHOOD
People tend to be more satisfied with dieir housing and neighbourhood dian widi dieir 
living standards or income. The mean score of satisfaction with housing and 
neighbourhood is about twice as much as that of with income, bodi at the beginning of 
the transition period and at a later phase (see Figure 5.2 in the previous chapter). The 
majority of the people tend to be satisfied both with their housing situation and its 
neighbourhood. As shown in Figure 6.2, over 60% of the population were very satisfied or 
quite satisfied in 1992. By 1998 their proportion has fallen, but it remained well over 50%.
Figure 6.2 Levels ofsatifaction with housing and with neighbourhood
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
■  Very satisfied
□  Quite satisfied
□  Neither dissatisfied nor 
satisfied
□  Quite dissatisfied
■  Very dissatisfied
Note: Very satisfied: a score o f  9 or 10; quite satisfied: 7-8; neither dissatisfied nor satisfied: 4-6; quite 
dissatisfied: 2-3; very dissatisfied: 0-1.
Housing
Despite the relatively positive assessment of the housing situation, there is a clear fall in the 
degree of satisfaction by 1998. As we can see from Figure 6.2, the share of the most 
satisfied has fallen. A possible explanation may be that those who live in the best housing 
conditions were strongly affected by comparison effects, by the rich getting richer and 
investing into dieir properties. As reported by a recent survey by TARKI, one of the three 
main reference groups for Hungarians is people in the neighbourhood (Sagi 2000). This 
comparison effect dius may be the strongest for diose who live in wealdiy areas, where 
many people became better off.
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Correlation between objective housing conditions and subjective well-being is relatively 
strong. As Table 6.7 shows, the independent variables of the regression analysis explain 
23% of the variation of satisfaction. (For comparison, the goodness of fit, measured with 
adjusted R2 was between 35% and 42% in the regression model for the determinants of 
income. See Table 3.5.) Controlling for personal characteristics in the model, the explained 
variance somewhat increases (see Table 6.8 later).
The main correlates of housing satisfaction are housing value and problems related to 
housing. The first brings no surprise, those who live in more expensive housing tend to be more 
contented with it. Those who experience housing problems, on the other hand, seem to be markedly more 
dissatisfied than those who do not. These problems, first of all dampness, noise or darkness, 
which are mentioned as the three most frequent ones, seem to bring high dissatisfaction 
even after controlling for housing value and size.
The multivariate analysis confirms that remaining a tenant by the end of the transition 
period is a disadvantageous situation. As discussed previously in chapter 4, those who 
could not buy their homes are more likely to also live in a lower quality housing with major 
shortcomings. As Table 6.7 shows in 1992 tenant status in itself did not influence 
satisfaction in either way compared to owner-occupiers. By 1998 the coefficient of the 
tenant variable became significant with a negative sign. Controlling for the value of 
housing and the occurrence of housing problems tenants were on average markedly less satisfied 
with their housing situation that owner-occupiers. One possible reason may be a feeling associated 
with the vast housing privatisation of the 1990’s, tenants may have felt themselves to have 
been left behind. Public housing became residual and they may have felt they became 
marginalized.
Housing value, as expected, is positively correlated with satisfaction with housing. In order 
to avoid the information loss due to a large number of missing cases, which occurred for 
the housing value variable, I have included a dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if 
the household denied response for this specific question. The inclusion of this dummy 
variable thus enabled to keep nearly a thousand cases in the models. The housing value 
dummy variable is significant at 1% level and has a very large positive coefficient, 
indicating that those who did not reveal their estimates for the value of their own dwelling
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tend to be very contented, controlling for a series of other factors. This suggests that there 
was a systematic bias in the denial of the response, most likely affecting those who live in 
housing with excellent attributes.
Table 6.7 Satisfaction with housing — OLS regression
1992 1998
I II I II
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err
Ownership: tenant -0.073 0.112 0.075 0.117 -0.973 0.201 -0.917 0.208
other -1.246 0.251 -1.273 0.251 -0.634** 0.316 -0.649** 0.323
Housing value (In) 0.632 0.042 0.662 0.048 0.421 0.062 0.353 0.065
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 8.628 0.609 9.100 0.691 5.758 0.922 4.865 0.956
Living space per person
(In) 0.722 0.081 0.533 0.091 0.850 0.084 0.889 0.096
Major housing
problems:
moderate -1.258 0.099 -1.222 0.101 -1.425 0.144 -1.380 0.143
rather serious -2.419 0.186 -2.289 0.189 -2.474 0.228 -2.383 0.227
serious -3.690 0.264 -3.577 0.270 -3.515 0.283 -3.406 0.279
Income: (quintile group)
1* -0.644 0.126 •0.495 0.143
2nd -0.273** 0.114 -0.173 0.131
4th -0.100 0.107 0.159 0.124
5th -0.079 0.107 0.233* 0.129
Settlement type:
town -0.167** 0.095 0.135 0.109
county centre -0.183 0.125 0.184 0.125
capital -0.583 0.103 -0.079 0.132
Number of children:
1 -0.339 0.100 0.177 0.128
2 -0.591 0.112 0.041 0.141
3 or more -0.038 0.204 0.278 0.234
Constant -3.457 0.619 -2.766 0.671 -1.647* 0.928 -0.878 0.933
Observations 5146 5146 3402 3402
F ratio 166.2 81.88 120.12 58.55
Adjusted R2 0.2311 0.2434 0.2251 0.2321
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: owner-occupier, no major housing problems, 3rd income quintile, village or small town, no 
children
It may appear puzzling that the poorest households tend to be dissatisfied, even after 
accounting for differences in ownership status, housing value, quality problems and living 
space. Financial problems with rent payments seem to be significant when included in the 
model, nevertheless, the coefficient of the bottom quintile group remains negative and it is 
not significantly different This implies that there is an unobserved feature of the situation 
of the poor, which affects their satisfaction. This might be related to indebtedness, of 
which there is not adequate information here. There may be unobserved neighbourhood
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specific features of the housing condition as well. Alternatively the poor may be affected 
negatively by the limited future prospects for upgrading their homes, improving their 
housing quality or possibly buying their own homes if they are currendy tenants.
There is a limited evidence that the higher satisfaction of people in rural areas. In 1992 
most of those who lived in cities were comparatively less contented with their housing 
then the reference category of villages and small towns. In 1998 there was no sign for the 
existence of a similar rural urban divide.
Table 6.8 Satisfaction with housing objective circumstances andpersonal characteristics— OLS regression
1992 1998
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Ownership: tenant 0.070 0.118 -0.710 0.213
other -1.120 0.247 -0.640** 0.318
Housing value (In) 0.653 0.051 0.297 0.064
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 8.885 0.732 4.033 0.948
Living space per person (In) 0.599 0.101 0.912 0.108
Major housing problems:
moderate -1.201 0.101 -1.389 0.145
rather serious -2.206 0.188 -2.464 0.218
serious -3.454 0.288 -3.267 0.288
Income: (quintile group)
1st -0.645 0.129 -0.359** 0.1452nd -0.323 0.114 -0.178 0.132
4th 0.083 0.105 0.165 0.124
5th 0.234** 0.109 0.278** 0.137
Settlement type:
town -0.086 0.096 0.146 0.110
county centre -0.015 0.127 0.222* 0.126
capital -0.451 0.107 -0.070 0.141
Number of children:
1 0.088 0.107 0.314** 0.133
2 0.033 0.139 0.353** 0.171
3 or more 0.623 0.221 0.593** 0.251
Female 0.104 0.077 -0.061 0.091
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.302 0.240 -0.663** 0.310
Other personal characteristics Yes Yes
Constant -2.896 0.735 -0.104 0.939
Observations 5000 3291
F ratio 48.63 31.73
Adjusted R2 0.2727 0.2483
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: owner-occupier, no major housing problems, 3rd income quintile, village or small town, no 
children
Other personal characteristics include age, educational level, labour market status, marital status and 
religiosity
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There is no pure gender effect, and there is only limited evidence for an ethnic difference. 
The coefficient for females is not significant in either year. This suggests that there is no 
gender difference over and above the objective housing conditions and other observable 
personal characteristics. Tentatively this might imply that there is no systematic personality 
difference between the two sexes in the subjective assessment of the quality of housing. 
The ethnicity coefficient is not significant in 1992, but it has become so in 1998 and shows 
a negative sign. There is no clear explanation why edmidty could bring dissatisfaction over 
and above the housing value and housing problems. Possible interpretations include a 
neighbourhood disadvantage not observed by the right hand side variables of the model, 
or a systematic mismatch between the housing supply and the demands of the Gypsy, e.g. 
due to greater family size.
Neighbourhood
Similarly to satisfaction with housing, contentment with the neighbourhood has fallen over 
time. This is primarily due to the decrease in the number of those who were very satisfied 
(Figure 6.2). Although the patterns of satisfaction with housing and that of with 
neighbourhood show great similarity, people seem to make a clear distinction between 
diese two. Correlation is moderately strong 0.47 in 1992, which slighdy increases to 0.52 
by 1998 (see Tables 5.2-3 in the previous chapter). Thus, being satisfied with one’s housing 
situation does not necessarily mean satisfaction with the environment as well.
Tenants are markedly less satisfied with their neighbourhood than owner-occupiers (see 
Table 6.9). The relative dissatisfaction has increased over time. This coincides with earlier 
findings of the relatively worse position of tenants in terms of satisfaction with housing. 
Tenants thus, at the end of the transition process, following a large-scale housing 
privatisation, are worse off in terms of objective housing conditions (as discussed in 
chapter 4), which is well reflected in their lower levels of satisfaction with both their 
housing and their neighbourhood.
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Table 6.9 Satisfaction with neighbourhood and housing ownership
1992 1998
Housing ownership
Average N 
satisfaction
Average N 
satisfaction
Owner-occupiers
Tenants
Other
7.57 4007 
5.99 1035 
5.67 231
7.13 3446 
5.28 203 
5.50 126
Total 7.29 5273 7.01 3775
Inhabitants of Budapest consistently seem to be consistently less satisfied with their neighbourhood (see 
Table 6.10). Despite the general prosperity, the higher average personal incomes in the 
capital, it does not seem to be the best place to live in. By the end of the transition, residents 
of milages or small towns became more discontented. It may well be related to the increasing 
unemployment, which is particularly high in certain small settlements, causing a major 
disruption in the social patterns of local life. Rural areas, especially areas with high 
unemployment, also seem to have hardly benefited from the large inflow of foreign direct 
investment into the country, thus did not gain from its positive impact on local labour 
markets either (Fazekas 2000).
Table 6.10 Satisfaction with the neighbourhood and settlement type
1992 1998
Settlement type
Average
satisfaction N
Average
satisfaction
N
Village or small town 7.72 1636 5.93 1442
Town 7.28 1167 7.40 965
County centre 7.06 576 7.12 707
Capital 5.57 1894 5.47 662
Total 7.29 5273 7.01 3776
Neighbourhood problems, not surprisingly, seem to bring dissatisfaction (Table 6.11). 
Major factors of distress seem to be air pollution and noise (in 1992) and untidy, 
dangerous area (in 1998).
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Table 6.11 Satisfaction with the neighbourhood and reported neighbourhoodproblems
1992 1998
Neighbourhood problem
Average
satisfaction N
Average
satisfaction N
No 7.69 3573 7.35 2777
Air pollution 5.40 85 4.46 38
Noisy 5.94 297 5.99 168
Air pollution and noisy 5.09 59 4.47 8
Untidy, dangerous 5.36 52 3.13 36
Housing quality problem 5.55 1142 5.09 430
Total 7.30 520£ 7.04 3457
Table 6.12 Satisfaction with neighbourhood, OLS regression
1992 1998
I II I II
Coef. Std.Err Coef.
Std.
Err Coef.
Std.
Err Coef.
Std.
Err
Neighbourhood problem: 
air pollution 
noisy
air pollution and noisy 
untidy, dangerous 
housing quality problem
-2.403
-1.595
-2.242
-2.269
-1.043
0.380
0.215
0.483
0.440
0.109
-1.913
-1.294
-2.100
-1.845
-0.849
0.390
0.207
0.496
0.441
0.108
-2.962
-1.274
-2.519
-3.990
-1.256
0.536
0.251
0.946
0.525
0.155
-2.213
-0.984
-2.229
-3.216
-0.879
0.483
0.244
1.046
0.507
0.158
Settlement type: 
town
county centre 
capital
-0.492
-0.633
-0.915
0.104
0.132
0.096
-0.404
-0.399
-0.774
0.103
0.135
0.112
0.264
0.061
-0.585
0.111
0.126
0.138
0.230
0.230
-0.571
0.113
0.131
0.149
Housing value (In)
Housing value dummy 
for missing cases 
Living space per person 
(In)
0.240
3.530
0.249
0.051
0.725
0.092
0.333
4.738
0.664
0.068
1.003
0.105
Ownership:
tenant
other
-0.974
-0.596
0.135
0.228
-1.016
-0.211
0.236
0.286
Income: (quintile group) 
1st 
2nd 
4th 
5th
-0.297**
-0.075
-0.420
-0.259**
0.133
0.126
0.123
0.120
-0.125
-0.020
-0.011
0.112
0.154
0.134
0.134
0.135
Number of children: 
1 
2
3 or more 
Constant 8.061 0.063
-0.477
-0.780
-0.055
4.338
0.110
0.123
0.200
0.713 7.357 0.076
0.129
-0.255
0.474
0.324
0.133
0.154
0.258
0.967
Observations 
F ratio 
Adjusted R2
5148
48.08
0.0706
5148
30.7
0.1118
3407
28.29
0.0785
3407
20.14
0.1191
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: owner-occupier, 3rd income quintile, village or small town, no children
The regression analysis confirms that there is a significant and moderately strong 
relationship between objective and subjective measures of well-being. Neighbourhood 
problems seem to be major correlates of satisfaction with neighbourhood, having 
accounted for differences in housing value, ownership, region and other characteristics 
(Table 6.12). Especially those who live in untidy, dangerous areas, and those, who suffer 
from air pollution said themselves to be dissatisfied by the end of the transition. Residents o f 
the capital are markedly less satisfied with their neighbourhood than those of small settlements, 
ceteris paribus. In contrast to the somewhat unclear income pattern in 1992, there is no
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net income effect in 1998. Tenants are less satisfied than owner-occupiers, the coefficient 
is negative and significant at 1 % level in both years. The relative dissatisfaction of tenants 
has not increased over time compared to the reference group.
Housing value and the dwelling’s living space are positively related to satisfaction. This 
may show that property value is partly an indicator of the quality of the neighbourhood. 
The high level of significance and the large size of the housing value dummy for missing 
cases implies that many of those who are very contented did not reveal their housing value. 
This suggests that the denial in response to housing value may have had a systematic 
pattern, and occurred the most frequendy in case of homes in outstanding or possibly 
luxurious environment.
Campbell, Converse and Rodgers have found similar relationship between neighbourhood 
characteristics and satisfaction in the US in their classic study (1976, pp 247-248 ). 
Residents who live in neighbourhoods, which are ‘well kept up’ were found to be more 
satisfied than residents in more rundown environment. Also, people who live in big cities 
were less satisfied with their housing than others in smaller places.
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Table 6.13 Satisfaction with neighbourhood, objective circumstances and personal characteristics -  OLS
regression
1992 1998
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Neighbourhood problem:
air pollution -1.778 0.399 -2.002 0.481
noisy -1.270 0.210 -1.073 0.238
air pollution and noisy -1.921 0.520 -2.251** 0.994
untidy, dangerous -1.687 0.426 -3.230 0.539
housing quality problem -0.810 0.111 -0.923 0.166
Settlement type:
town -0.312 0.104 0.236** 0.115
county centre -0.192 0.137 0.258* 0.136
capital -0.625 0.116 -0.546 0.160
Housing value (In) 0.269 0.054 0.326 0.070
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 3.794 0.765 4.595 1.025
Living space per person (In) 0.210** (MOO 0.568 0.121
Ownership:
tenant -1.050 0.136 -0.815 0.238
other -0.383* 0.227 -0.155 0.291
Income: (quintile group)
1st 0.230* 0.135 -0.043 0.159
2nd 0.373 0.135 -0.005 0.158
4th 0.120 0.141 0.005 0.161
5th 0.476 0.143 0.244 0.171
Number of children:
1 -0.040 0.119 0.202 0.142
2 -0.092 0.146 -0.117 0.183
3 or more 0.648 0.227 0.687** 0.274
Female 0.024 0.085 0.070 0.098
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.595 0.264 -0.766** 0.315
Other personal characteristics Yes Yes
Constant 3.385 0.738 0.374 0.981
Observations 5003 3296
F ratio 21.18 11.51
Adjusted R2 0.1393 0.1294
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
leveL The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: owner-occupier, 3ld income quintile, village or small town, no children
Other personal characteristics include age, educational level, labour market status, marital status and
religiosity
Similar to satisfaction with housing, there is no net gender effect, although there is more 
pronounced ethnic difference (see Table 6.13). Women are not significantly different in 
their satisfaction with neighbourhood from men, controlling for neighbourhood 
characteristics and a number of personal characteristics. The Romany tend to be less 
satisfied with their neighbourhood. This may suggest that there may be a specific
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unobservable neighbourhood feature, which specifically affects the Gypsy population. 
Alternatively, they might have specific preferences, and as a result similar conditions could 
make them more dissatisfied. The detailed assessment of these issues could be a 
challenging direction of future research, including more specific data on neighbourhoods, 
preferably including data on local public services, local unemployment and crime rates.
Relationship between housing neighbourhood and satisfaction
How well do objective housing and neighbourhood characteristics explain people’s 
satisfaction with their housing and neighbourhood? As Table 6.14 shows housing 
conditions, ownership and other characteristics explain 20-24% of the variance of 
satisfaction with housing (for details on model A and B see Table 6.7, for more on model 
C see Table 6.8). Neighbourhood characteristics available in the dataset and personal 
characteristics predict satisfaction with neighbourhood to a much lower extent, explained 
variance is only 10-11% (Table 6.15, for details of the models see Tables 6.12 and 6.13). 
This may be largely due to that neighbourhood characteristics are observed less well than 
housing characteristics. Objective measures may be less related to subjective ones in this 
case, because they are less adequate. In conclusion, as with the findings referring to 
income, there is a moderate correlation between objective conditions and subjective measures related to 
housing and neighbourhood
Table 6.14 Housing and satisfaction with housing
1992 1998
A B C A B C
Ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y
Housing quality Y Y Y Y Y Y
Income Y Y Y Y
Settlement type Y Y Y Y
Number of children Y Y Y Y
Other personal characteristics y Y
Explained variance of satisfaction 
with housing (Adj. R2) 23% 24% 21% 23% 23% 25%
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Table 6.15 Goodness of fitfo r various models ofsatifaction with neighbourhood
1992 1998
A B c A B C
Neighbourhood problems y y y y y y
Setdement type y y y y y y
Housing quality y y y y
Ownership y y y y
Income y y y y
Number of children y y y y
Other personal characteristics y y
Explained variance of satisfaction 
with neighbourhood (Adj. R2) 7% 11% 14% 8% 12% 13%
6.4 SATISFACTION WITH FAMILY RELATIONS
People tend to be very contented with their family relations, as presented earlier, however, 
it seems to influence their overall happiness only to a minor extent In 1992 80% of the 
people were highly satisfied with their relationships within the family120. Although in 1998 
this number is somewhat lower, 74%, the magnitude of the contentment remains 
outstanding. Not less than around half of the people (54% in 1992 and 46% in 1998) say 
that they are fully satisfied with their relationships within the family, giving a maximum 
score of 10. It means that every second Hungarian adult believes that they have a family 
life, which gives them as much satisfaction as they can possibly expect. This level is not 
outstanding in international comparison, however. A very similar degree of contentment 
has been found in East- and West-Germany in the early 90s (Andorka 1993).
Marital status seems to play a clear role. Those who are married are consistently more 
satisfied than others, including cohabiting couples (see Table 6.16). Among those who do 
not have a partner, the widowers say themselves the most contented, followed by those 
who are single. Divorced people are the least satisfied121. The interpretation of the survey 
question, whether what people mean by their family relationships, is subject to the 
individuals. It probably includes marital satisfaction for those who are married, the 
assessment of relationship with those family members living in the same household, which
120 Highly satisfied means here that the respondent gave a score of either 8,9 or 10 on a scale of 0 to 10.
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means children in most cases. It might also refer to the extended family, grandparents or 
brothers and sisters living in different households. Primarily, however, it is most likely to 
be driven by marital satisfaction. The results presented here seem to confirm this 
assumption.
Table 6.16 Satisfaction with family relationships by marital status
Marital status Mean score of satisfaction 
1992 1998
Married 8.79 8.58
Cohabiting 8.26 7.85
Widow/er 8.51 8.13
Single 8.24 8.12
Divorced 7.93 7.16
The firmest evidence for ‘social division* in terms of satisfaction with family life is 
interestingly refers to the Romany ethnicity, while age and gender differences are not 
consistent. The Gypsy ethnic group tends to be less satisfied in both years, as table 6.17 
shows. There is no sufficient evidence for the change or satisfaction with family 
relationships over the life cycle. The main finding is that older age groups, those with 50 
years or more, had the highest satisfaction in 1992. No such pattern exists in 1998, and the 
differences between the group means are not significant, as the outcomes of t-tests 
indicate. The literature on marital satisfaction suggests that there is a U-shape pattern, 
prevalent in other countries. Existing evidence suggest that couples are the happiest in 
their honeymoon and die empty nest period (for reviews of the literature see Michalos 
1986; Argyle 1999). In Hungary, women are significandy more contented with family than 
men in 1998, but no such difference exists in 1992.
121 The differences between the mean satisfaction scores by marital status has been tested and found 
significant at 5% leveL The only exception is the difference between the widows and the single in 1998, where 
I could not reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal
Table 6.17 Satisfaction with family relationships by age, gender and ethnicity
Mean score of satisfaction 
1992 1998
Age (years): 
17-29 8.44 8.34
30-39 8.52 8.41
40-49 8.43 8.19
50-62 8.75 8.31
63+ 8.84 8.32
Male 8.60 8.20
Female 8.61 8.40
Gypsy 7.89 7.69
Non-Gypsy 8.65 8.35
Total 8.61 8.31
Relative satifaction of women and the elderly
Explaining why certain people are more contented with family relations, however, seems 
to be rather problematic. Due to the rather skewed distribution of responses (about half of 
the people said themselves to be fully satisfied), I dichotomised the satisfaction variable 
and used a logit model to describe the characteristics of those who are fully satisfied (Table 
6.18)122. The fully satisfied were defined as those who gave a score of 10 on a scale from 0 
to 10. The models used the standard set of variables, which have been used so far, 
including a series of personal characteristics, such as marital status and number of children. 
These variables altogether, however, could only very poorly explain the probability of 
being fully satisfied. Pseudo R , although it is probably most widely used goodness of fit 
statistics, has no simple interpretation like R . Using very similar explanatory variables — 
the same ones, except labour market status, where the occupation of head was used — in a 
classis study on Americans Campbell et al. find that these variables explain 8.8% of the 
total variance of satisfaction widi family life (Campbell et al. 1976, p.338 )123.
122 The normality of the dependent variable is a pre-requisite for OLS since the distribution of the dependent 
variable governs that of the error term - and the assumptions about the latter is that they are independent and 
identically distributed (normally distributee!) (i.i.d) with mean 0 and variance a2.
123 Their methodology is multiple classification analysis.
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Table 6.18 Satisfaction with relations within the family, logit model
Dependent variable: 
fully satisfied with 
family relations
1992 1998
I
Coef. Std. Err
II
Coef. Std. Err
I
Coef. Std. Enr
II
Coef. Std. Err
Marital status:
married 0.258** 0.110 0.286** 0.115 0.688 0.133 0.698 0.139
divorced -0.069 0.154 -0.001 0.157 -0.042 0.181 -0.024 0.186
widow/er -0.094 0.152 -0.041 0.157 0.668 0.170 0.672 0.175
Number of children:
1 0.074 0.089 0.089 0.090 -0.171 0.104 -0.160 0.105
2 -0.052 0.108 -0.036 0.109 -0.344** 0.137 -0.316** 0.139
3 or more -0.042 0.162 0.021 0.166 -0.065 0.195 -0.047 0.198
Age:17-29 yrs -0.003 0.117 -0.015 0.119 0.317** 0.142 0.293** 0.146
30-39 yrs -0.085 0.110 -0.096 0.110 0.167 0.133 0.168 0.134
50-62 yrs 0.397 0.107 0.372 0.115 0.168 0.113 0.145 0.123
63 and more 0.534 0.116 0.527 0.147 0.308** 0.123 0.278* 0.158
Female 0.205 0.065 0.205 0.066 0.137* 0.074 0.143* 0.075
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.436** 0.171 -0.296* 0.177 -0.089 0.191 -0.068 0.196
Lives in Budapest •0.222 0.063 -0.249 0.065 -0.124 0.096 -0.143 0.097
Education:
vocat. training 0.229 0.086 0.215** 0.089 0.275 0.095 0.284 0.098
secondary -0.072 0.084 -0.114 0.088 0.175* 0.098 0.152 0.102
higher edu -0.294 0.107 -0.342 0.113 0.185 0.129 0.140 0.138
Religious 0.069 0.081 0.070 0.082 0.054 0.090 0.047 0.090
Unemployed -0.122 0.159 -0.105 0.193
Disability pensioner 0.050 0.151 0.094 0.145
Pensioner 0.056 0.123 0.088 0.134
Self-employed -0.034 0.159 0.250 0.187
Student 0.222 0.175 0.160 0.190
Other inactive 0.043 0.136 0.085 0.132
Income: 1st quintile -0.337 0.106 0.016 0.117
2nd quintile -0.088 0.099 -0.059 0.109
4th quintile -0.002 0.099 0.052 0.107
5th quintile -0.031 0.100 0.124 0.116
Constant -0.237* 0.138 -0.180 0.161 -0.967 0.157 -1.041 0.182
Observations 5080 5080 3634 3634
Wald chi2 144.9 161.58 95.73 102.32
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0228 0.0256 0.0202 0.0214
Log likelihood -3422.63 -3413.01 -2456.98 -2453.81
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: single, no children, 40-49 years, elementary education or below, employee, 3rd income 
quintile
Married people, people over 62 years and women tend to be consistendy more satisfied 
with their family relationships, accounting for other personal characteristics. Marriage is 
highly significant and has a positive coefficient in both years. This implies that married 
people are more likely to be fully contented with their family lives than the reference 
category, single people. This is in line with bivariate relationship presented earlier (see
241
Table 6.14). The divorced, however, do not seem to have lower satisfaction than those 
who are single, other things being equal. There is partial support for a life-cycle pattern. In 
1998 the youngest and the oldest age groups were more contented than their middle-aged 
compatriots. Thus, those who are most likely either starting their own family lives and 
those who live in the ‘empty nest* phase are significandy more contented. There is only 
partial confirmation for this pattern in 1992, only the relative satisfaction of those over 50 
years is prevalent. The number of children in itself does not have a consistent effect. More 
specific characteristics of the children may explain some of the variation of the satisfaction 
measure. Income situation has no consistent relationship with satisfaction with family life. 
In 1998 none of the income groups had significandy distinct pattern of satisfaction. There 
is no evidence for ethnic differences, accounting for other personal characteristics.
People who have litde contact with family and friends are less likely to be very satisfied 
with their family life, as expected, controlling for marital status and other personal 
characteristics. The odier indicator of ‘social capital’, the existence of personal friendships, 
however, is not significant This variable is a dummy, indicating an extreme situation when 
someone declared that they have no friends with whom they could discuss personal 
matters at all. (I have also tested an alternative measure, using various categories indicating 
the number of friends, but none of these categories were significant either.) The lack o f 
significance of friendships might be interpreted that there is no such positive externality o f 
having close friendship on family life, which is not captured already by the other variable, 
indicating the frequency of contacts. (Note that the variables themselves are not strongly 
associated, thus there is no perfect multicollinearity.) The direction of causality between 
self-assessed family life and the significant variable, indicating small frequency or lack of 
social contacts, however, is far from being obvious. Most likely the former variable refers 
to co-habiting family members, the survey question mentions ‘family’, while social contact 
variable refers to wider circles, the survey talks about ‘relatives’ and ‘friends’ here. 
Shortfalls in social contacts may indicate that people who have inadequate family relations 
are less likely to want to meet others, but also that an intense social life improves the 
quality of the small family life, which is the direction of the relationship implied here by the 
model.
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Table 6.19 Satisfaction with relations within the family, social contacts and fatalism, b g t model
Dependent variable: 1998
fully satisfied with 1 II III
family relations Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Little contact with
relatives or friends -0.333 0.075 -0.272 0.076
No friends 0.006 0.079 0.058 0.080
Fatalism -0.110 0.012
Marital status:
married 0.717 0.142 0.692 0.143 0.585 0.148
divorced -0.048 0.189 -0.099 0.190 -0.079 0.195
widow/er 0.721 0.181 0.678 0.183 0.784 0.188
Number of children:
1 -0.144 0.106 -0.104 0.107 -0.131 0.108
2 -0.278** 0.139 -0.277** 0.140 -0.265* 0.140
3 or more -0.076 0.204 -0.016 0.205 -0.118 0.209
Age: 17-29 yrs -0.196 0.152 -0.217 0.153 -0.130 0.156
30-39 yrs -0.279* 0.149 -0.249* 0.150 -0.120 0.153
50-62 yrs -0.215 0.164 -0.171 0.166 -0.040 0.169
63 and more -0.032 0.195 0.004 0.196 0.189 0.202
Female 0.107 0.077 0.102 0.077 0.169** 0.079
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.180 0.204 -0.178 0.204 -0.090 0.205
Lives in Budapest -0.114 0.099 -0.137 0.100 -0.120 0.101
Other personal 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.673 0.167 -0.431** 0.177 1.050 0.234
Observations 3472 3472 3472
Wald chi2 97.05 114.39 194.17
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0214 0.0257 0.0462
Log likelihood -2339.96 -2329.68 -2280.662
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator of variance.
Base categories: single, no children, 40-49 years
Other personal characteristics include educational level, labour market status, and religiosity
What are the major explanatory factors for the subjective assessment of family life, if, as 
we saw, demographic characteristics are only of limited relevance? Campbell and his 
colleagues show that primarily the perception of family relationships explain satisfaction 
(altogether 20.4%), first of all perceived relationship to spouse, then relationship to 
children (1976, p. 338). This is however, explaining a subjective measure with other 
subjective attributes. Both of these (satisfaction with family life and perceived relationship 
to spouse) may be related to other variables, first of all, personality. This seems to be 
supported by the current analysis. As we can see, the inclusion of a fatalism variable 
(describing powerlessness by a series of measures) the fit becomes twice as good (see 
Table 6.19). This implies that other personality related variables are also expected to be important.
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According to the literature, personality traits do powerfully predict life events and general 
SWB (e.g. Suh et al. 1996. See also discussion in Chapter 5.). This appears to be the case 
also in a specific and rather personal domain of satisfaction, that of family life.
6.5 CONCLUSION
The findings of this chapter have provided a systematic analysis of patterns of satisfaction 
with income, housing, neighbourhood and family life, to my knowledge the first such 
systematic study on Hungary. Results confirmed that as expected, there is a correlation 
between objective and subjective measures of well-being. These results thus also seem to 
have provided a test of validity for measures of satisfaction. The analysis has revealed the 
strongest relationship between housing and satisfaction with housing, followed by the 
association between income and satisfaction with income. Family life appears to be an 
aspect of life most hidden from the eyes of the external investigator: satisfaction can be 
only rather moderately explained by characteristics such as marital status, age or number of 
children. As shown, patterns of satisfaction seem to have been largely stable over time, 
although certain changes in the relative satisfaction of specific social groups are of major 
importance from the point of view of the focus of this analysis.
There is some evidence for increasing ‘meritocracy’, or returns to skills over time. People 
with higher education have become significandy more satisfied with their incomes over 
time compared to the low educated population group, other things being equal.
Women have become dissatisfied widi their incomes by the late 1990s, controlling for 
labour market status, education and other characteristics. This gender division in subjective 
well-being has remained even after controlling for personal incomes within the household 
budget. A possible explanation may be that there is a ‘bargaining’ within the household, as 
suggested by the fact that people’s income share tend to make a difference in their 
reported well-being, but it cannot be solely explained by relative income positions. The 
systematic test of gender differences in terms of die distribution of resources within the 
household appears to be a challenging direction for future investigation.
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There is no similar gender difference related to satisfaction with housing and 
neighbourhood, and women tend to be more likely to be very contented with their family 
relations than men, ceteris paribus. These findings suggest that women in general are not 
pessimistic, so there is no ‘gender bias* in the personal assessment of objective 
circumstances. All this makes the relative dissatisfaction of women with their income 
situation a more intriguing phenomenon.
Ethnicity in itself does not show any particular pattern of subjective well-being in most 
cases, except that of satisfaction with neighbourhood. Controlling for neighbourhood 
problems, housing quality, ownership, settlement type and other factors, the Romany 
population tends to be consistendy more discontented with their neighbourhood then the 
non-Romany population. This seems to suggest that there are certain specific features of 
the neighbourhood which matter especially for the Gypsy groups. A more specific analysis 
of neighbourhood features, including for example local labour markets and social services 
could possible give insight into the causes of this division. This specific ‘area focus* is very 
limited in existing literature on Hungary.
Higher income groups tend to be more satisfied widi their incomes, controlling for other 
personal characteristics. There is only minor evidence for a change over time in the relative 
position of specific income groups, the relatively lower satisfaction of the bottom quintile 
group has somewhat lessened. A somewhat puzzling relationship between income 
situation and subjective well-being prevails for the housing situation. The poor tend to be 
dissatisfied with their housing over and above the impact of housing problems, housing 
value and ownership status. A speculative explanation may be their limited prospects for 
future improvement of their housing conditions. Alternatively, unobserved neighbourhood 
characteristics may play a role.
Tenants appear to be not just a disadvantaged group in some sense, but also a group of 
‘losers*. Tenants tend to be significandy less satisfied with their neighbourhood than 
owner-occupiers, ceteris paribus. This relative disadvantage prevailed both in the early and 
in the late 1990s. A different measure, satisfaction with housing, however, suggests a 
deterioration of their well-being. While in 1992 there was no significant difference between 
tenants and owner-occupiers, the former group became discontent by 1998. This relative 
dissatisfaction prevails in the multivariate analysis as well, which for example includes
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controls for housing quality. This decline in satisfaction of tenants is likely to be 
attributable to the large scale housing privatisation and their resulting ‘marginalised’ 
position.
It seems to be worse to live in cities, particularly in the capital. Controlling for 
neighbourhood problems and property characteristics, inhabitants o f Budapest were 
significandy less satisfied with their neighbourhood than those who live in rural areas. This 
effect was significant in both years and also in various models, including an extended one, 
which accounted for various personal characteristics as well.
‘Tersonality” seems to matter, as some findings suggests. Religiosity and old age are 
positive associates of satisfaction with income, ceteris paribus, indicating that they may 
indicate specific attitudes to material aspects of life. I have also shown that fatalism is 
negatively related to satisfaction widi family. Fatalism as a personality feature was a 
crucially important variable in describing patterns of satisfaction, as the improvement of 
the goodness of fit of the model indicated.
How do people feel in general? How happy, how contented they are with their lives? 
These are the issues, which seem ultimately occupy not just statesmen, but philosophers, 
scientists and probably all people. Happiness may be the ultimate goal guiding our lives, 
and our actions may well promote or foolishly obstruct its achievement. These issues lead 
us to the next chapter, which will turn towards these fundamental issues analysing general 
life satisfaction.
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ANNEX 6
Table A .6.1 Satisfaction with income, ordered fogt model
1992 1998
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Income: (quintile group)
1“ •0.610 0.096 -0.526 0.1142nd •0.260 0.086 -0.281 0.101
4th 0.282 0.086 0.359 0.097
5th 0.642 0.089 0.780 0.110
Labour market status
Unemployed -1.824 0.166 -1.645 0.217
Disability pensioner -0.959 0.124 -0.831 0.129
Pensioner -0.652 0.104 -0.445 0.121
Self-employed 0.088 0.162 0.240 0.178
Student -0.749 0.287 -0.688* 0.372
Other inactive -1.559 0.139 -1.166 0.143
Education:
vocat. training 0.037 0.081 0.037 0.092
secondary 0.321 0.082 0.409 0.098
higher edu 0.417 0.107 0.725 0.125
Other personal characteristics:
Female -0.069 0.059 -0.233 0.071
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.261 0.165 -0.234 0.215
Lives in Budapest 0.054 0.058 -0.101 0.086
Age:17-29 yrs 0.021 0.104 0.310** 0.130
30-39 yrs 0.047 0.094 0.169 0.117
50-62 yrs 0.242** 0.101 0.153 0.107
63 and more 0.969 0.128 0.672 0.143
Marital status:
married 0.017 0.109 -0.041 0.122
divorced -0.213 0.145 -0.313* 0.162
widow/er 0.060 0.141 0.162 0.152
Number of children:
1 -0.080 0.083 0.189* 0.102
2 0.054 0.100 0.302** 0.126
3 or more 0.014 0.146 0.328* 0.183
Religious 0.236 0.072 0.269 0.087
CUt1 -1.668 0.149 -1.915 0.163
cut2 -1.049 0.147 -1.071 0.159
cut3 -0.471 0.146 -0.269 0.157
cut4 0.062 0.146 0.421 0.157
cut5 0.435 0.147 0.871 0.158
cut6 1.412 0.149 1.851 0.161
cut7 1.870 0.150 2.343 0.164
cut8 2.377 0.153 3.002 0.171
cut9 3.248 0.160 3.916 0.189
cut 10 3.728 0.168 4.475 0.208
Observations 4904 3149
Wald chi2 867.16 620.88
Pseudo R2 0.0466 0.0491
Log likelihood -10409.2 -6588.4
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity, using the Huber/White or sandwich 
estimator o f variance.
Base categories: 40-49 years, elementary education or below, employee, single, no children, 3rd quintile
Table A.6.2 Summaiy statistics of housing related variables
Variable Obs Weight Mean Std Dev. Min Max
1992
Value of housing 4618 3699 1793028 1953612 0 2.60E+07
Value of housing (In) 4607 3691 14.0 1.0 5.9 17.1
Living space per person (m2) 5293 4151 27.4 15.5 4.0 251.0
Living space per person (m2) (In) 5293 4151 3.2 0.5 1.4 5.5
1998
Value of housing 2875 2860 3284552 3986341 0 5.00E+07
Value of housing (In) 2874 2859 14.7 0.9 5.7 17.9
Living space per person (m2) 3760 3717 28.8 17.2 2.9 150.0
Living space per person (m2) (In) 3760 3717 3.2 0.5 1.0 5.0
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This chapter will analyse the ‘distribution’ of general life satisfaction, or simply, who are 
happier than others. Hence, the relationship between personal characteristics, objective 
circumstances and life satisfaction will be studied Is the microeconometric structure of 
happiness different in Hungary from elsewhere? How much has transition affected this 
structure? Who are the winners and losers o f transition?
Previously, in chapter 5 ,1 have shown that general measures of life satifaction are consistendy 
related to domain satifactions. First of all, satisfaction with living standards was the strongest 
correlate of satisfaction with life so far and with future prospects, followed by satisfaction 
with income. Although the majority of people tend to be very satisfied with their family 
lives, this does not seem to contribute significandy to their overall life satisfaction. 
Following on, chapter 6 addressed the relationship between objective circumstances, personal 
characteristics and sati faction with particular domains of life. These latter included satisfaction with 
income, with housing, with neighbourhood and with family relations, in line with main 
measures of objective well-being analysed earlier in chapter 4. The results found a 
systematic relationship between objective circumstances and specific measures of 
satisfaction. I have also shown that it is not just what we have, but also what we are, that 
matters in explaining satisfaction widi income, housing and family life. This chapter will 
address the final, missing part of the analytical framework, presented in Figure 5.3, that is 
the relationship between objective well-being, personal characteristics and satifaction with life 
as a whole. Based on the results of the previous analysis, we can expect consistendy 
prevailing relationships, although the relative size of the specific factors is yet to be 
discovered.
General life satisfaction can be interpreted as one of various elements of a person’s overall 
well-being. In Sen’s terminology, it can be interpreted as a specific functioning. As such, it 
can contribute with a further dimension to previously examined aspects of people’s well­
being. Common patterns of satisfaction across social groups may be interpreted as specific 
‘class positions’, based on shared subjective experience (Weber 1947, pp. 424). The main 
question is whether social inequalities measured in happiness are significandy different 
from social divisions in terms of other measures of well-being. Is there a gender, or an 
ethnic division? A further question is to what extent life satisfaction reveals additional 
information compared to that of income? Does money make people happy? If it does, is
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money the main explanation for differences among people in their reported levels of 
happiness?
Alternatively, general life satisfaction can be thought of as a measure of ‘experienced 
utility*, as defined in chapter 5. As such, it can be interpreted as a single measure of 
individuals’ well-being. Different, and challenging questions arise from this approach. How 
do specific aspects of objective well-being influence utility? What are the tradeoffs between 
income, labour market situation, housing conditions and social relations? What are the 
main sources of happiness for people? What is the role of personality and personal 
characteristics in converting objective well-being into happiness? If personal characteristics 
are included in the model, is there still a relationship between objective well-being and 
happiness? This is a fundamental question not just for the validity of subjective well-being 
(confirming that they are not arbitrary mental constructs), but also for the justification for 
government action in promoting aggregate welfare by income redistribution and other 
measures, influencing observable, objective conditions. This possible dualistic 
interpretation of general life satisfaction, both as one specific aspect of people’s well-being, 
and as a measure of overall welfare as utility, is expected to be fruitful as a concluding 
piece of our empirical analysis, by providing an opportunity for synthesis.
Various studies have analysed happiness in Western European nations. Multivariate 
analysis on Eastern European or developing nations is scarce. The analysis below 
contributes with important evidence on whether life satisfaction is culturally determined 
and if it is, to what extent. Are Hungarians, socialised in a different social and economic 
environment in their past, different from citizens in the West? Is their joy driven by 
specific tilings or is it pretty much like that of their European fellows?
How much are the patterns of happiness stable and to what extent are they exposed to a 
social context? The unique historical context of transition provides a useful ‘social 
experiment’ in order to test the stability of the social structure of happiness. Are the things 
which bring contentment to people fundamentally the same? Or do these depend on the 
social context? Analysis of life satisfaction during transition sheds light on whether how 
much the pattern of life satisfaction is universal and how much it is particularistic, subject 
to a social and economic context.
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Transition is a unique historic event. This research focuses on a specific case study, 
Hungary. Therefore it cannot aim for developing a general social theory of happiness 
during transition. Instead, what it can realistically aim for, is to contribute to understanding 
the regularities in subjective well-being. It may be possible to confirm or reject existing 
‘social mechanisms’124 observed in rather different contexts and extend or restrict the 
scope of validity of those. Beyond this, the analysis may tentatively extend the scope of 
observed regularities in transition, which so far exclusively remained in the domain of 
‘objective’ well-being.
7.1 HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
Several scholars have tried to challenge the basic economic assumption that ‘money brings 
happiness’, that a higher budget constraint enables people to achieve a higher level of 
utility. One major challenge came from the field of psychology, for example from the work 
of Scitovsky in 1976 (Sdtovsky 1992), discussed earlier, and more recently, by Kahneman, 
Tversky and others (Kahneman and Varey 1991). They argue that there is a difference 
between ‘level’ and ‘change’, and stimulation primarily comes from the latter. This would 
imply that primarily income growth makes people happy, rather than income itself. This 
idea is the basis for some sociological research, which emphasises adaptation. According to 
diis theory, people’s aspirations adapt to their situations, thus subjective well-being only 
varies according to recent changes (Inglehart and Rabier 1986; Inglehart 1990), e.g. in this 
case change in their incomes. In addition, as Kahneman and his co-authors argue, people’s 
decision-making diverges from standard economic assumptions due to factors called 
‘status quo bias’, ‘endowment effects’ and loss aversion (Kahneman and Varey 1991). 
Others emphasise that satisfaction primarily comes from social comparison effects, the 
relative standing of an individual compared to his environment or reference group. One 
major proponent of this view is Easterlin, who claims that while there is a difference 
between the happiness of the rich and the poor within one country, there is no consistent 
difference across rich and poor nations (Easterlin 1974). These views together are often 
referred to as the ‘relative position’.
124 I use the term ‘social mechanism’ as defined by Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg (1998a), which will
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Critiques of this position have powerfully demonstrated the flaws of some of these 
arguments. Veenhoven, recalculating Easterlin’s own data, concluded that there is 
covariation between income and happiness across countries (Veenhoven 1991). He found 
that there is a curvilinear relationship between income and happiness. Their correlation is 
largest in poor countries, and it decreases as national income rises. Veenhoven’s 
explanation for this is that happiness gready depends on the gratification of ‘basic bio- 
psychological needs’. Diener, looking at patterns of SWB both within and across countries 
and also using a much bigger sample of countries than his predecessors, fundamentally 
challenges the relative standards approach (Diener et al. 1993). He also claims that ‘income 
seems to have some effect on happiness far beyond the level of meeting subsistence needs’ 
(p. 220). In my view there is one major unresolved matter in this debate, that we do not 
really know with whom people actually compare themselves, what their real reference 
groups are. Altogether, however, there seems to be strong empirical support for absolute 
position mattering, and SWB cannot be entirely explained by relative standing.
Hypotheses
Does money bring happiness for Hungarians? It probably does so, unless Hungarians are 
markedly different from other nations. As presented in chapter 6, income is strongly 
associated with satisfaction with income. Prior to this, it was shown in chapter 5 that 
satisfaction with income is positively correlated with both life satisfaction and satisfaction 
with future prospects. Consequendy, it seems plausible to expect a positive relationship 
between income level and overall satisfaction.
1) The level of overall life satisfaction is expected to rise by income level
A major consequence of economic transition is the appearance of unemployment. It was a 
new phenomenon in its ‘Capitalist’ form, fundamentally different from the ‘joblessness 
within factory walls’, a familiar phenomenon for most Hungarians. Unemployment is 
clearly identified as a source of unhappiness in the economic literature (Clark and Oswald 
1994; Oswald 1997; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). The causal relationship has been
be explained in the final concluding chapter.
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reaffirmed by studies using panel datasets (e.g. Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). The 
relationship between unemployment and life satisfaction will be tested. Beyond this, I will 
extend the analysis to other forms of withdrawal from the labour market. Many people 
have been pushed away from the market or been discouraged from job search, this may 
possibly be a source of distress for them, since their withdrawal from the labour market 
was involuntary. I will particularly look at those who are on ‘disability pension* and the 
‘inactive’.
2) The unemployed are veiy likely to be unsatisfied. Similarly those whose withdrawal from the 
labour market was not entirely voluntary, first of all the disability pensioners, but also many of the 
inactive are expected to be relatively dissatisfied.
Previous analysis of the housing market has shown that there was a marked social division 
in housing quality: those o f Gypsy ethnicity in particular, but also the poorest income 
quintile group had significantly worse housing conditions than others. The massive 
housing privatisation led to a very small public housing sector. Those who remained 
tenants lived in worse conditions on average than before. This probably indicates that 
privatisation must have primarily incorporated the better quality properties, and those who 
lived in worse conditions were the ones who remained tenants by the late 1990s. Housing 
problems were shown in chapter 6 to be strongly correlated to the self-assessed housing 
situation. Thus, we can expect housing conditions to be a factor in general life satisfaction 
as well. Following die limits of adaptation discussed beforehand related to income, we may 
assume that there is no adaptation to serious housing quality problems, especially to those 
where certain basic needs are not met. Satisfaction with housing was previously shown to 
deteriorate over time for those who were tenants, controlling for odier housing 
characteristics. Is housing ownership a possible source of life satisfaction as well over and 
above the characteristics of the dwelling?
3) People who live in unsatifactory housing conditions are expected to be discontented.
Social relations are expected to influence people’s happiness, as existing evidence for other 
countries suggests, but marriage has been shown to have a stronger effect on happiness 
(see the review of Argyle 1999, pp 359-62). Married people were found to be happier and 
healthier in general than non-married ones. Various studies have suggested diat there is a
254
causal relationship between marriage and happiness. Social contact with friends, colleagues 
and neighbours have also been shown to contribute positively to life satisfaction, as 
Argyle’s summary indicates (ibid.). My earlier results indicate that social contact with 
relatives and friends were strongly related to satisfaction with family life, while a measure 
of loneliness, the lack of any intimate friend was not.
4) Life satifaction is expected to be negatively associated with deprivation in social contacts. 
Marriage is expected to be a source of happiness, while divorce is most likely to be an unhappy 
state.
Tersonality’, measured as fatalism, was a major associate of satisfaction with family life, as 
shown in chapter 6. Fatalism, a person’s limited ability to have control over his life, is most 
likely to have a negative impact on his general life satisfaction as well. The reason for this 
may be that such person evaluates systematically worse what they have, what their fate 
brings to diem, or very likely diey actually have less favourable conditions of objective 
well-being due to their lesser ability to pursue their goals.
5) People who report extensive fatalism are expected to have significantly lower levels of general life 
satifaction.
Is it primarily income or is it companionship which brings happiness for people? What is 
the relative importance of specific indicators of objective well-being in determining overall 
life satisfaction? Is income, labour market status, housing conditions or social relations the 
most important factor of life satisfaction? A tentative hypothesis may be that those 
elements of objective well-being are more likely to influence happiness die most which are 
relatively short standing. Adaptation is likely to occur, at least to some extent, to extended 
periods of a certain experience. This logic can be extended to the domains of well-being 
examined here.
6) Housing quality problems are expected to be weaker correlates of life satifaction than labour 
market status or income.
Religiosity is a new aspect of the analysis introduced here. Why is religiosity part of the 
models on life satisfaction? Religion influences economic behaviour, for example work
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activity, school attendance, and economically important social behaviour, such as marriage, 
fertility and social misbehaviour [see the review be Iannaccone (1998)]. Religious 
institutions encourage appropriate behaviour and employ various methods o f social 
control. Hull and Bold (1995) find, using US data, that church membership discourages 
social misbehaviour by providing property rights enforcement. Freeman (1986) argues that 
the influence of churchgoing on economic behaviour is at least to some extent a causal 
impact. Religion was also shown to contribute positively to subjective well-being, including 
life satisfaction and personal happiness among people in the US (Ellison 1991). The author 
also finds that ‘strong religious faith makes traumatic events easier to bear’(p. 90) The 
focus of Ellison’s analysis is on the multifaceted relationship between religious activity and 
subjective well-being. The influence of religion on what makes people happy, however, is 
not discussed.
The collapse of the long-standing atheist regime brought increasing social influence for the 
churches, but this does not seem to be accompanied with a lasting religious revival in the 
country. Although the right to free practice of religion existed during socialism, diere were 
numerous legal and administrative constraints which seriously limited the freedom of 
religion. In the new political system churches were given back much of their properties 
nationalized after the second world war, including many church schools. Previously 
banned religious orders became legalized again. Law enabled the establishment of new 
churches as well. All this suggests that there was an increase in die freedom of religion, 
including a gradual expansion of the institutionalized religion as a whole.
Formal church affiliation is widely prevalent in the country, but stronger commitment as 
religious participation is only a minority feature. As data from 1994 shows, diree-fourdis of 
the population have some religious affiliation, out of which 24% attend sendees more than 
once a month (Need and Evans 2001, pp 236-7)125. Data from the World Values Survey 
show that 23% of Hungarians attended a religious service at least once a month in 1991 
(N=999, own calculations). This measure uses a somewhat broader definition of church 
attendance, thus these two figures appear to be consistent. Despite prevailing problems
125 N=1307. The survey data are part of the ESRC funded research programme on Eastern Europe. The 
authors also warn of the inadequacy of data on religiosity, both for international comparison and also for 
observing the changes in religiosity over time (Need and Evans 2001). For this reason, it appears difficult to 
test the hypothesis o f ‘religious survival’ in Eastern European countries.
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with such data in general, it seems clear that religious participation in Hungary is about on 
the same level as in Britain, and much greater than in Russia or in the Czech Republic. 
Church attendance of Hungarians is, however, much below that of the Polish, the Irish 
and that of people in the US. The surveys used in this paper (see below) show that 20 and 
19% of the people attended a religious service at least once a month in 1992 and 1998, 
respectively. Less conservative measures from the same dataset show a significant social 
role of religion. 90-91% of the people have been registered with a religious denomination 
at their birth, and only around 5% claim themselves to be atheists. The largest church is 
the Catholic, with over 2/3 of the population, followed by the Calvinist, where 18-19% is 
registered, and the Lutheran church, with 3-4%.
The collapse of Communism and more openness to the secularised Europe did not bring a 
major religious revival in the country. There was no significant rise in the ratio of 
churchgoers during the 1990s. There was, however, a change in the age structure of the 
religious, widi a rising ratio of young adults. The surveys used here indicate that people 
between die age of 17 and 30 have become increasingly religious. By 1998 13.6% of this 
group participated in religious activities, in contrast to 11.6% in 1992. At the same time, 
however, religious involvement declined among the older age groups, especially those 
between 50 and 62 years. Tomka and Harcsa (1994), studying long term trends of religious 
activities in 1992-93, find no signs of major restructuring except at the time of the 
genocide of World War II. Analysing the social pattern of churchgoers they show that 
their ratio is particularly high among low skilled agricultural workers. Interestingly, among 
die ‘intelligentsia’, both the ratios of churchgoers and that of conscious atheists are 
outstanding. Similarly, odiers have also found positive relationship between education and 
church attendance in Hungary, using multivariate regression (Need and Evans 2001). This 
appears to be a distinct feature of religiosity in Hungary, since this relationship was shown 
to be negative in most other Eastern European countries (p. 240, Table V).
7) Religiosity is ejected to contribute positively to life satifaction. We migpt also expect a rise in the 
contentment of the churchgoers, due to the increasing social role ofthe churches.
Is there a relationship in general between ageing and people’s self-rated happiness? 
Evidence on the life-cycle pattern of happiness is not consistent There seems to be 
substantial support for a positive relation (Cantril 1965; Argyle 1987; 1999), but some
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claim that there is no relationship at all (Easterlin 2001), and yet others report a U-shaped 
relation (Oswald 1997). This inconsistency may largely due to methodological differences. 
Most of the early studies looked at only bivariate relationships, not controlling for the 
effect of other factors that may change over the life-time. Recent studies of economists use 
controls for a number of personal characteristics, including unemployment, income, 
education, marital status, thus seem to capture a real age effect. They claim that happiness 
is U-shaped in age (Oswald 1997; Di Telia et al. 1999; Blanchflower and Oswald 2000). 
Their results seem to be consistendy valid over various countries, including the US, Britain, 
and about a dozen other European countries. The limitation of these studies is that they 
mosdy use cross-sectional datasets. Longitudinal data would be necessary to appropriately 
test the life cycle pattern of SWB126.
Following the analysis of life satisfaction at two particular points in time, 1992 and 1998, 
the- second part of the analysis will address how these relationships have changed over 
time. Who are the winners and losers of the transition? Are they in any way different from 
what is expected from the Western literature? Especially, have the changes in the labour 
market influenced overall satisfaction? Have the population got used to the phenomena of 
unemployment, dius is it a state associated with less dissatisfaction over time? Has the gap 
between the rich and the poor increased in terms of their life satisfaction as well? In 
general, have those who seemed to have an advantageous position at early transition 
managed to keep or increase their advantage? The use of self-reported general satisfaction 
will provide a useful means for assessing people’s well-being or utility and in that way 
answer these questions.
Methodology
In the first part of the analysis ordinary-least-square (OLS) regressions will be used to 
analyse the patterns of life satisfaction across population groups in 1992 and 1998. In 
order to test the sensitivity of the results, I have also estimated ordered logit models with
126 Easterlin has used a so-called ‘synthetic cohort’ approach, linking consecutive years over the period o f 24 
years, using the US General Social Survey. This is not an appropriate longitudinal study either. More 
importantly, however, he uses only education as a control, and does not control for other presumably very 
important correlates of happiness, such as income, marital status, labour market status, etc. (Easterlin 2001).
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the same specification127. The regression models incorporated sampling weights for the 
correction of sampling design (1992) and of sample fit (1998). The second part of the 
analysis will use a pooled dataset, consisting of a pooled sample of the two surveys. Thus 
the pooled dataset consists of 9251 observations128.
The models used in the first and second part, respectively, are the following:
Model I:
LIFE SATISFACTION*) = f (INCOME*), LABOURMARKETSTo, HOUSING*), X»)
LIFE SATISFACTION j! = f (INCOME^, LABOURMARKETSTji, HOUSING* SOCIAL 
RELATIONSji, PERSONALITYji, X,,)
where LIFE SATISFACTION^ is satisfaction with life up till now for individual i in 1992, 
while LIFE SATISFACTION^ is the same measure of life satisfaction for individual j in 
1998. INCOMEjo, and INCOME^ indicate income quintile groups based on equivalised 
household income, LABOURMARKETSTjo and LABOURMARKETST^stand for the 
labour market status of individual i in 1992 and j in 1998, respectively, HOUSING*, and 
HOUSING^ refer to a series of indicators related to housing, including ownership status 
and housing conditions, and X*, and Xjt stand for other personal characteristics. The model 
for 1998 includes additional variables: SOCIAL RELATIONSj, indicates limited social 
contacts or the lack of friends for individual j, and PERSONALITY^ refers to fatalism.
Model II:
LIFE SATISFACHONpooLEDk = h (INCOMEk, LABOURMARKETSTo HOUSING* X*,
IN COME** YEAR, LABOURMARKETSTk* YEAR, HOUSINGk*YEAR, Xk*YEAR)
where l i f e  s a t i s f a c t i o N p o o l e d  k stands for satisfaction with life so far in the pooled dataset 
over 1992 and 1998 for individual k, and YEAR is a dummy, which takes a value of one in 
1998.
The analysis thus prim arily focuses on the relative importance o f  specific measures of 
objective well-being, thus includes these measures as explanatory variables. Beyond these,
127 I have already presented a justification of the use of OLS method instead o f ordered logit or probit in
chapter 6. As mentioned, OLS is also used by some economists for estimating life satisfaction (e.g. Di Telia et 
aL 2001).
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personal characteristics, such as sex, ethnicity, region, age, educational level, marital status, 
number of children, and religion were also included as explanatory variables. The choice of 
this latter set of variables pardy reflects their importance as personal attributes, such as 
gender and ethnicity, and pardy findings of the existing literature. The literature provided 
particularly strong support for die inclusion of unemployment, income, marital status and 
also that of religion. Overall, the specification is largely similar to those frequendy used in 
the economics literature of happiness (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald 2000; Di Telia et al. 
2001). The main diversion is the inclusion of housing conditions, social relations and the 
measure of fatalism.
Religiosity is defined as going to church at least once a week. This definition is 
intentionally a narrow one in order to rapture commitment, thus potential attitude effects. 
The definitions of other variables are consistent with those used earlier in the thesis, and 
can be read in detail in Appendix B.
128 Since the sample sizes in 1992 and 1998 were not equal, a special weight variable has been created in order 
to generate equal sub-samples. In this way, the probability of an observation to be included in the pooled 
sample is the same irrespective of whether it originally belongs to the 1992 or the 1998 sub-sample.
7.2 FALLING SATISFACTION -  BUT N O T FOR ALL
Life satisfaction declined over economic transition. As shown previously, at the later point 
of transition people’s average satisfaction widi their lives so far was somewhat smaller than 
at the early phase (see Figure 5.2). This implies that the increase of freedom, including 
greater opportunities to voice political preferences, which were shown to contribute to 
happiness elsewhere (Frey and Stutzer 2000), had less impact than the negative economic 
consequences of transition. There is considerable variation by income, labour market 
status and also by other personal characteristics.
Figure 7.1 Life satifaction and income
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Overall satisfaction varies by income, die higher income groups tend to be more contented 
on average. The middle income groups became markedly more dissatisfied over time. There is no 
significant change in the reported well-being of either die bottom or the top decile group. 
Interestingly, previous analysis has found a very similar pattern of satifaction with income 
across various income decile groups (see Figure 6.1).
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Table 7.1 Satisfaction with life up till now by labour market status
1992 1998
Employee 5.97 5.83
Self-employed 5.85 6.36
Unemployed 4.26 4.09
Disability pensioner 4.79 4.57
Pensioner 5.69 5.28
Student 7.27 6.85
Other inactive 4.99 5.14
Total 5.73 5.5
There is a systematic difference between the life satisfaction of various labour market 
groups. The unemployed are the least satisfied. Students are the other extreme, being the 
most contented. Disability pensioners report much lower levels of satisfaction than old age 
pensioners, but higher than the unemployed. This specific group of pensioners thus seems 
to show distinct characteristics from that of old age pensioners. The difference between 
employees and self-employed is not significant in 1992, but it has become so by 1998. The 
self-employed became a distinct group within the employed over the transition, with 
markedly higher contentment
Table 7.2 Satifaction with life by gender, ethnicity and other personal characteristics
1992 1998
Male 5.69 5.56
Female 5.76 5.46
Gypsy ethnicity 4.18 4.05
Non-Gypsy 5.81 5.59
Up to elementary education 5.27 4.91
Vocational training 5.62 5.47
High school 6.23 6.19
Higher education 6.87 6.69
Budapest 6.03 5.64
Non-Budapest 5.66 5.47
Religious 6.01 5.82
Non-religious 5.68 5.44
Life satisfaction is greater for people with higher levels of education (Table 7.2). The 
Gypsy ethnic group is significantly less satisfied than the non-gypsy. There is no significant 
difference between the life satisfaction of men and women. People who live in the capital 
were more satisfied than others in 1992, while this difference was not significant in 1998. 
Those who are religious report significantly higher levels of well-being at both points in 
time. With regard to changes over time, the decline of satisfaction was prevalent among
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both the religious and the non-religious population. Age has a U-shaped relationship widi 
life satisfaction, the young being the most contented (Figure 7.2). Satisfaction is the lowest 
in late middle age, between 40 and 49 years. In the period examined here there was a large 
decline in the satisfaction of the 50 to 62 year old age group, including those who are still 
of working age but probably had to face declining opportunities in die labour market.
Figure 7.2. Life satifaction in various age groups
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7.3 LIFE SATISFACTION EQUATIONS
The following sections will discuss die relationship between life satisfaction and specific 
measures of objective well-being, controlling for a set of personal characteristics. I will 
conclude widi discussing die relative importance of diese specific measures. Following 
diis, I will discuss variation of satisfaction by personal characteristics.
Life satifaction and objective well-being
Income situation is consistendy correlated widi life satisfaction, in both years and in all the 
models, as Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below indicate. The bottom quintile group is less satisfied 
dian the diird quintile group, die coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level. The top 
quintile group is more satisfied than die reference category, controlling for education, age 
and other personal characteristics. This income effect remains prevalent even if labour 
market status and housing conditions are included in the model (model IV). The relative
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situation of the second and fourth quintile groups is at times not significandy different 
from that of the third quintile group. Nevertheless, the overall pattern, that higher incomes 
tends to bring more satisfaction is clearly prevalent in both years.
Interestingly, there is some evidence that the lack of money contributes to misery more 
than plenty of money adds to contentment. In 1992 the relative dissatisfaction of the 
bottom quintile group was significandy greater than the relative satisfaction of the top 
quintile group compared to the middle quintile group, controlling for a series of personal 
characteristics (model I). This difference remained prevalent (at 5% significance level) even 
when a series of other measures of objective well-being were added to the model, 
including labour market status, housing conditions (model IV). There was no similar 
pattern in 1998.
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Table 7.3 General life satifaction and objective well-being in 1992 - OLS regression
/ II III IV
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err
Income:
1* quintile group •0.961 0.140 -0.836 0.138 -0.878 0.139 -0.771 0.137
2nd quintile group -0.529 0.126 -0.468 0.124 -0.475 0.126 -0.421 0.124
4th quintile group 0.201 0.123 0.157 0.122 0.103 0.123 0.077 0.122
5th quintile group 0.542 0.123 0.456 0.123 0.470 0.123 0.407 0.122
Labour market status:
Unemployed -0.982 0.216 -0.923 0.216
Disability pensioner -0.810 0.204 •0.807 0.202
Pensioner -0.239 0.160 -0.214 0.159
Self-employed -0.186 0.201 -0.277 0.201
Student 1.887 0.189 1.819 0.189
Other inactive -0.501 0.174 -0.484 0.174
Housing:
Ownership: tenant -0.316 0.120 -0.346 0.118
other -0.128 0.206 -0.108 0.203
Housing value (In) 0.159 0.054 0.109** 0.053
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 2.147 0.764 1.510** 0.759
Living space per
person (In) 0.140 0.103 0.163 0.101
Housing problems:
moderate -0.327 0.099 •0.342 0.097
rather serious -0.580 0.183 -0.528 0.180
serious -1.102 0.300 -1.048 0.299
Other personal char.::
Female 0.237 0.082 0.242 0.082 0.240 0.082 0.243 0.082
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.821 0.241 -0.504** 0.241 -0.368 0.245 -0.112 0.245
Vocational training 0.173 0.114 0.309 0.115 0.123 0.114 0.266** 0.116
Secondary ed. 0.556 0.110 0.579 0.108 0.489 0.110 0.528 0.109
Higher ed. 0.969 0.136 1.020 0.139 0.894 0.138 0.960 0.141
17-29 yrs 0.706 0.149 0.464 0.150 0.761 0.150 0.521 0.150
30-39 yrs 0.169 0.139 0.122 0.138 0.157 0.138 0.106 0.137
50-62 yrs 0.360 0.137 0.454 0.145 0.330** 0.137 0.413 0.145
63 and more 0.937 0.152 1.010 0.189 0.914 0.153 0.960 0.189
Budapest -0.028 0.081 -0.065 0.080 0.140 0.093 0.124 0.091
Married 0.465 0.147 0.790 0.150 0.455 0.148 0.772 0.152
Divorced -0.883 0.210 -0.593 0.211 -0.795 0.209 -0.531** 0.210
Widow/er -0.497** 0.206 -0.221 0.210 -0.477** 0.208 -0.230 0.212
1 child 0.126 0.114 0.055 0.111 0.141 0.117 0.083 0.114
2 children 0.311** 0.142 0.266* 0.139 0.362 0.145 0.334** 0.143
3 children or more 0.417** 0.210 0.438 0.206 0.516** 0.217 0.552** 0.213
Religious 0.415 0.103 0.397 0.102 0.360 0.102 0.343 0.101
Constant 4.692 0.202 4.534 0.211 2.192 0.769 2.651 0.767
Observations 5003 5003 5003 5003
F ratio 27.66 27.99 22.63 23.56
Adj. R2 0.1071 0.1327 0.1207 0.1443
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber/White estimator o f  
variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
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Table 7.4 General life satifaction and objective well-being in 1998 - OLS regression
/ II III
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Income:
1" quintile group -0.652 0.152 -0.562 0.152 -0.547 0.150
2nd quintile group -0.129 0.142 -0.085 0.139 -0.107 0.140
4th quintile group 0.458 0.132 0.426 0.129 0.408 0.131
5th quintile group 0.821 0.135 0.741 0.134 0.715 0.134
Labour market status:
Unemployed -1.122 0.268
Disability pensioner -0.645 0.173
Pensioner -0.422** 0.166
Self-employed 0.376* 0.202
Student 1.472 0.200
Other inactive -0.282 0.177
Housing:
Ownership: tenant -0.091 0.200
other -0.066 0.281
Housing value (In) 0.132** 0.065
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 1.766* 0.951
Living space per person (In) 0.190* 0.107
Housing problems:
moderate -0.286** 0.137
rather serious -1.123 0.244
serious -1.210 0.310
Other personal characteristics:
Female 0.045 0.093 0.063 0.092 0.047 0.092
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.761 0.291 -0.538* 0.283 -0.564** 0.284
Vocational training 0.256** 0.123 0.370 0.122 0.194 0.122
Secondary education 0.822 0.121 0.822 0.119 0.718 0.121
Higher education 1.205 0.160 1.193 0.163 1.045 0.162
17-29 yrs 1.049 0.177 0.809 0.179 1.048 0.176
30-39 yrs 0.472 0.154 0.479 0.152 0.463 0.153
50-62 yrs 0.083 0.137 0.243 0.151 0.057 0.136
63 and more 0.646 0.156 0.909 0.200 0.673 0.157
Budapest -0.182 0.120 -0.193 0.118 -0.112 0.125
Mamed 0.384** 0.166 0.705 0.168 0.339** 0.165
Divorced -0.922 0.214 -0.598 0.214 -0.895 0.211
Widow/er -0.050 0.225 0.283 0.228 -0.136 0.224
1 child 0.077 0.127 0.013 0.124 0.123 0.132
2 children 0.138 0.166 0.099 0.164 0.214 0.168
3 children or more 0.251 0.259 0.222 0.251 0.567** 0.258
Religious 0.360 0.109 0.305 0.109 0.314 0.110
Constant 4.345 0.208 4.171 0.211 2.016 0.953
Observations 3160 3160 3160
F ratio 25.18 24.36 21.52
Adj. R2 0.1319 0.1597 0.1507
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level. The models have been corrected for beteroscedasticity using the Huber/White estimator o f  
variance.
Base categories: 3ld quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
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Table 7.5 General life satifaction, objective mil-being andpersonality in 1998 - OLS regression
IV V VI
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Income:
1* quintile group -0.621 0.151 -0.437 0.143 -0.334** 0.144
2nd quintile group -0.080 0.141 -0.001 0.132 0.036 0.130
4th quintile group 0.444 0.131 0.349 0.127 0.305** 0.125
5th quintile group 0.764 0.135 0.550 0.128 0.461 0.128
Labour market status:
Unemployed -0.782 0.249
Disability pensioner -0.457 0.164
Pensioner -0.320** 0.155
Self-employed 0.164 0.184
Student 1.138 0.194
Other inactive -0.242 0.163
Housing:
Ownership: tenant 0.006 0.181
other 0.069 0.277
Housing value (In) 0.019 0.059
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 0.188 0.863
Living space per person (In) 0.206** 0.102
Housing problems:
moderate -0.119 0.127
rather serious •0.928 0.220
serious -0.826 0.275
Social relations:
Little contact with relatives or friends -0.457 0.090 -0.282 0.086 -0.279 0.085
No friends -0.150 0.100 -0.018 0.094 0.013 0.093
Personality:
Fatalism -0.251 0.013 •0.230 0.013
Other personal characteristics:
Female 0.030 0.093 0.190** 0.087 0.196** 0.086
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.739** 0.289 -0.509** 0.271 -0.251 0.260
Vocational training 0.229** 0.122 0.105 0.115 0.173 0.116
Secondary education 0.765 0.121 0.395 0.114 0.367 0.113
Higher education 1.111 0.160 0.494 0.152 0.448 0.156
17-29 yrs 0.987 0.178 0.609 0.169 0.479 0.170
30-39 yrs 0.393** 0.154 0.278* 0.145 0.279* 0.144
50-62 yrs 0.110 0.136 0.165 0.128 0.242* 0.142
63 and more 0.673 0.156 0.835 0.147 1.005 0.187
Budapest -0.218* 0.120 -0.160 0.113 -0.110 0.117
Married 0.374** 0.165 0.152 0.153 0.406 0.156
Divorced -0.967 0.211 -0.865 0.197 -0.623 0.196
Widow/er -0.093 0.223 0.153 0.211 0.310 0.216
1 child 0.135 0.127 0.089 0.120 0.095 0.122
2 children 0.136 0.166 0.181 0.154 0.239 0.159
3 children or more 0.349 0.262 0.101 0.243 0.366 0.239
Religious 0.342 0.109 0.243** 0.103 0.176* 0.104
Constant 4.732 0.219 8.246 0.274 6.969 0.885
Observations 3160 3160 3160
F ratio 24.59 41.76 31.92
Adj. R2 0.1398 0.2399 0.2637
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using Zfo Huber/White estimator o f  
variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
Certain labour market groups, the unemployed, disability pensioners and students have 
markedly different levels of overall satisfaction from that of employees, both in the early
267
and in the late 1990s (see Model II in both Table 7.3 and 7.4). The unemployed tend to be 
significandy less satisfied than employees, the variables are highly significant and negative 
in both years examined here. This means that unemployment is a state of distress, the cost 
of joblessness gready surpasses that of income loss. The cost of unemployment may be a 
psychological cost, but may be a cost associated with lost future earnings. It is not dear 
which causes lower SWB for the unemployed. Disability pensioners are also dissatisfied. 
Students seem to be a rather distinct group within the inactive, with outstanding level of 
relative satisfaction, over and above the large and positive effect of young age.
There is some evidence that disability pensioners are a distinct group within all pensioners, 
probably with characteristics similar to the unemployed. At the early point in transition, 
disability pensioners were significandy less satisfied than old age pensioners, controlling for 
income and other personal characteristics. At the same time, there was no significant 
difference between the coeffidents of the unemployed and the disability pensioners. The 
inactive, other than pensioners or students, were also more dissatisfied than employees in 
1992. This may be attributable to high proportion of discouraged people among the 
inactive, who no longer search for jobs. European evidence for the relative well-being of 
those ‘keeping home’ is inconsistent, although for example in the US and in Britain their 
status is assodated with relative dissatisfaction (Di Telia et al. 1999; Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2000).
The self-employed show certain signs of optimism in 1998. Controlling for the effect of 
income, the self-employed reported significandy higher level of satisfaction than 
employees (Model II in Table 7.4). This effect is not significant once personality is also 
induded in the model (Model VI in Table 7.5). This suggests diat entrepreneurs are most 
likely to be those who lack fatalism. Why are entrepreneurs possibly more satisfied than 
employees? One explanation may be their higher job satisfaction in 1998 and the relatively 
higher role of job satisfaction in the assessment of their overall satisfaction (see Figures 
5.4-5.5 and Table 5.5 previously).
Housing conditions are clearly elements of overall life satisfaction. Problematic housing 
conditions, especially severe housing problems, are negatively associated with life 
satisfaction, accounting for educational differences, gender, ethnidty and other 
characteristics of the respondents. This effect remains the same even after controlling for
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differences in income and labour market status. The coefficient of housing value, as 
expected, is positive in most models. Counterintuitive is the relationship between housing 
ownership and life satisfaction. Tenants are significandy less satisfied than owner- 
occupiers, ceteris paribus. This effect, however, is observable only in 1992 and not in 1998. 
Previously, tenants were found to be dissatisfied with their housing situation only in 1998. 
People’s self-assessed housing situation thus differs from overall self-reported life 
satisfaction. A possible explanation might be the uncertainty of many tenants in the early 
1990s, not knowing whether their properties will be offered for sale and what the 
conditions are going to be. The lack of any effect in 1998 suggests that ownership status is 
not related to overall life satisfaction over and above the effect of housing conditions and 
property value. This might be a prevailing general relationship in times with no major 
changes. This preposition, however, is only a possible issue for future research, not testable 
here.
Social relations are also correlated with life satisfaction. Those who have litde or no 
contact with relatives of friends are less satisfied with their lives, controlling for income, 
age, family status, number of children and other personal characteristics. The coefficient is 
significant at 1% level, and has a negative sign. The variable showing the lack of intimate 
friends is not significant. This shows that it is actually the actual practice of social contacts, 
which matters, rather than the sheer existence of friendship.
Personality, measured as fatalism here, is one of the most important explanatory variables in 
the life satisfaction equations. The goodness of fit gready increases when fatalism is 
included in die model: the adjusted R2 rises from 14% to 24%. Those people, who 
reported high degree of fatalism, in other words who feel that they have limited control 
over their lives, tend to be much less satisfied with their lives than those who do not have 
such problem.
All of the measures of objective well-being used here seem to be important factors o f life 
satisfaction. The inclusion of labour market status, housing situation, and social relations 
all improve the fit of the models in both years, and there is always at least one significant 
variable in these specific domains. As the aggregate models indicate (see model IV in Table 
7.3 and model VI in Table 7.5), all of these specific domains add to our understanding of 
life satisfaction. There are significant variables in each domain, controlling for other
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domains and personal characteristics. It is noteworthy that this also shows that measures of 
objective well-being represent valuable information over and above that of income level The relative 
impact of the non-income measures often greatly surpasses that of income. This indicates 
the importance of all of these measures of well-being in their own right, and also that all of these represent 
qualitatively different aspects of people's lives.
These specific measures of objective well-being, however, are related to overall satisfaction 
to a varying extent. As expected, labour market status is a more important aspect of life 
satisfaction than housing conditions. This is shown by the higher adjusted R2 of the model 
which includes labour market variables compared to that including housing characteristics. 
Results referring to 1998 suggest that the role of social relations is less than labour market 
or housing situation. This, however, might well be attributable to the inadequacy of the 
measure of social relations used here. Personality seems to be one of the core variables in 
explaining differences of subjective well-being across people. Similar to satisfaction with 
family relations, life satisfaction is strongly related to fatalism. The inclusion of the variable 
of fatalism improves the fit of the model more than any set of measures of objective well­
being.
What is the trade-off between the specific measures? In an OLS model the ratio of any 
two variables shows how much one variable should change in order to maintain the same 
level of life satisfaction when the other variable is altered. To compensate people for 
unemployment the government would have to provide an annual transfer of nearly 1 
million forints (in 1998 prices), which is somewhat higher than average annual earnings 
(see Table A7.2 in Annex A)129. This confirms existing evidence on that die cost of job loss 
gready surpasses diat of sheer income reduction. A transfer of a similar amount is expected 
to raise the well-being of people who live in severely problematic housing conditions to 
the same level as those who have no such problems at all. The compensation for inactivity 
is on average 300,000 forints. A marriage is ‘worth’ half a million per year in this 
calculation, so this much would have to be paid to those who are single so that they could 
enjoy equal level of happiness as those who live in marriage, other things being equal.
129 For the sake of the simplicity of the interpretation, a specific OLS model had to be estimated, with a 
continuous and linear income variable.
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In sum, the findings indicate a significant and consistent relationship between measures of 
objective well-being and life satisfaction. The results are not sensitive to the estimation 
technique used here, OLS regression, as indicated by the outputs of the ordered logit 
estimates for both years (see Table A7.1 in the annex). The direction of the relationship is 
similar to what was expected from existing literature for other countries and from earlier 
analysis in this thesis. All this seems to powerfully demonstrate the explanatory power, and 
also to some extent the reliability of the measure of life satisfaction used here.
Social divisions in terms of happiness
There is some evidence for the relative satisfaction of women and limited signs of possible 
relative dissatisfaction of those with Gypsy ethnicity. Women were more satisfied than 
men in 1992, ceteris paribus. In 1998, the coefficient for female is significant in those two 
models which control for fatalism, including the aggregate model with all measures of 
objective well-being. The ordered logit estimates show a significant and positive 
relationship between gender and satisfaction. The evidence for a possible ethnicity effect is 
very weak. Ethnicity in the ordered logit estimates is insignificant. The variable for Gypsy 
ethnicity is significant and has a negative sign consistendy in both years only in those OLS 
models, which indude income and labour market status (models I and II). Controlling for 
all the measures of objective well-being and also for personality in 1998, Gypsy ethnicity is 
not significant, however.
Educational attainment seems to be a major factor of life satisfaction, the higher educated 
being the most satisfied. The regression results indicate a consistent ‘returns to skills’ in 
terms of life satisfaction, controlling for income and other personal characteristics. 
Education may in itself make people contented, e.g. through the appreciation of culture, 
knowledge or the resulting empowerment of individuals over their lives. It may also just 
contribute to people’s happiness because with higher levds of education their future 
income is expected to be higher. Thus, the net education effect in multivariate analysis may 
simply result from the difference between current income and ‘permanent income’, which 
includes discounted future incomes. Education, thus, may be just a proxy for permanent 
income, but only if die labour market ‘rewards’ higher educational attainment. The lack of 
this latter condition might be the cause why a study on happiness in Kyrgyzstan during 
early transition did not find evidence for increasing satisfaction by education (Namazie and 
Sanfey 2001), in contrast to other countries (Argyle 1999) and also to Hungary.
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Age seems to have a U-shaped pattern, the youngest and the oldest age groups are the 
happiest, controlling for other personal characteristics. People below 30 years and those 
who are 63 or more are consistendy more satisfied than the reference category of the 40 to 
49-year old age group, in both years and in both the OLS and ordered logit estimates. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is rather large: age 
is correlated to life satisfaction at least as strongly as income. This may suggest that age 
brings specific attitudes, thus may be also interpreted as an element o f ‘personality’. This 
U-shaped pattern is similar to recent, and not widely known findings in the literature about 
Western European countries (e.g. Di Telia et al. 1999; Blanchflower and Oswald 2000). 
What is a possible explanation for the variation of happiness across age groups?
Age appears to be a particularly interesting demographic variable during transition. The 
New Democracies Barometer Surveys show that the younger were on average the most 
supportive of the new market system (Rose and Haerpfer 1996; 1998). Their favourable 
judgement on the change of the economic and political environment is expected to 
contribute positively to their general sense of well-being. A Hungarian study finds that the 
occurrence of depressive syndrome is by far the smallest among the younger age groups, 
among those below 30, and has decreased between 1988 and 1995 (Kopp, Skrabski, Loke 
and Szedmak 1999). In the meantime, the frequency of depression among those over fifty 
had substantially increased, reaching over 60% among women over sixty years in 1995130. 
The relative satisfaction of the pensioner age group thus seems rather counterintuitive. 
Earlier analysis in chapter 6 has shown that the elderly tend to be relatively more satisfied 
with family life than the middle age group, controlling for a series of personal 
characteristics. Although pensioners as an occupational group were relatively more 
dissatisfied with their incomes than employees, die pensioner age group was very satisfied. 
These two effects together still indicated a mild positive relative satisfaction of elderly 
pensioners in contrast to the reference group of middle aged employees. These two 
previous findings seem to support the finding here. The elderly may be more satisfied with
130 The study makes distinction between mild, moderate and severe form of depression, o f which mild 
depression is the most frequent Among women over 60, however, more than half of depressive syndrome 
cases are moderate or severe. During the early period of transition, between 1988 and 1995, severe depression 
has considerably grown among both men and women over 50, reaching the highest figure, about 20% among 
women over 60 (p. 124, Kopp et aL 1999).
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their lives in general than people in their fourties, because their incomes make them 
contented and more importandy, they regard their family life to be happy.
Married people tend to be more satisfied than the single, and those who are divorced are 
relatively dissatisfied, other things being equal. The widows and widowers are not a clearly 
distinct group in terms of life satisfaction, the coefficient is in most cases insignificant 
There is limited evidence for their relative dissatisfaction in 1992. The number of children 
in the household, when significant, is associated with higher levels of satisfaction.
Religious involvement is positively correlated with life satisfaction. The effect is prevalent 
at both the beginning and the end of the transition process. The size of the coefficient 
remains about the same over time. The effect is modest religiosity increases the probability 
of being fully satisfied by 2.6% (1.5%) in 1992 (1998), as estimates of marginal probability 
suggest. Similar positive correlations between religion, particularly churchgoing, and SWB 
have been found in a series of Western European countries and the United States [see the 
review of Argyle (1999)]. There is no such pattern if ‘faith’ is used as an explanatory 
variable in this model instead of religiosity defined as regular churchgoing. The possible 
reason is that it is the institutional aspect of religious involvement that enhances the 
development of specific norms, different from those prevailing in the society at large. We 
may also assume that people derive satisfaction from the activity of participation itself.
We may speak of causal effects in case of those variables, which are mosdy beyond an 
individual’s choice. Thus, personal characteristics, such as age, sex, and ethnicity cause 
varying levels of satisfaction. Being young is a major source of satisfaction in general. We 
can say without hesitation that it is youth, which causes happiness, since (for some, 
unfortunately) choosing our age depending on our attitudes is not possible. Gypsy 
ethnicity may be accountable (with the reservations mentioned before) for a negative effect 
on satisfaction. The causal effect of education is less clear-cut We can assume that 
education contributes to self-esteem, social respect and financial prosperity, thus it causes 
contentment. We can also assume, however, that an individual’s distress, extreme 
dissatisfaction has a negative impact on educational attainments. Since educational 
achievements are related to long-term performance, only long-standing patterns of 
satisfaction itself would explain educational levels. Most likely, however, is that the 
direction of causality is primarily leads from education to overall satisfaction. Similarly,
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marriage may be a cause of happiness, but it may as well be more likely that individuals 
with cheerful disposition are more likely to get married.
7.4 WINNERS AND LOSERS OF TRANSITION
This section specifically assesses changes in the micro structure of SWB over time. Which 
objective conditions or personal characteristics have become increasingly important over 
time in explaining satisfaction? Which ones have significandy declined? How stable are the 
social patterns of SWB in Hungary? Has there been a significant restructuring as a result of 
the transition process? These and similar questions can be addressed with the use of a 
pooled dataset, which contains a united sample consisting of both the observations of 
1992 and 1998.
Increasing economic freedom, as expected, benefited those who could use this freedom 
the most: the entrepreneurs (see Table 7.6). Entrepreneurship has become more positively 
associated with life satisfaction over time, even after controlling for income, education, age 
and a series of other personal characteristics. This is indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient of die interaction term, which indicates die change in die strength of 
the relationship by 1998, compared to 1992. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level, 
and is relatively high. The degree of increase in satisfaction over time for the self-employed 
is about as high as much the rich (top income quintile group) is happier than the middle 
income group (third income quintile group). Entrepreneurs are die only labour market 
group, which seems to have improved its situation in die observed period, dius diey may 
be called the winners of the transition process.
Entrepreneurship is not a product of the economic change, but already existed during 
Socialism. As described earlier, entrepreneurs have probably experienced increasing 
economic freedom as various legal barriers have been lifted. One possible explanation for 
the increasing satisfaction is that they may have experienced a more stabile economic and 
regulatory environment in 1998 compared to 1992, or they may have perceived this 
environment to be like diat. Either way, this would contribute to a sense of security. The 
optimism of the self-employed might be explained by a selection process; many of those 
who were entrepreneurs in 1998 had actually been successful beforehand
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Why does entrepreneurship have a positive effect beyond that of higher earnings? 
Entrepreneurship brings higher job satisfaction, and a large number of people would 
prefer to be self-employed, both in Eastern and Western Europe (Blanchflower et al. 
2001). Earlier results in chapter 5 suggested that job satisfaction is a particularly strong 
correlate of overall life satisfaction for the self-employed (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Job 
satisfaction of the self-employed had increased, and had become greater than that of 
employees by 1998 (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Earlier results, showing the significant impact 
of fatalism on people’s overall satisfaction suggest that the lack of control over one’s life is 
a source of unhappiness. Contrary to this, we may expect that entrepreneurs’ control over 
their working life would lead to greater happiness. This implies that money is not the sole 
and ultimate motivation of an entrepreneur. The growing satisfaction of entrepreneurs 
even after controlling for income, the empirical results presented earlier, appears to 
supports this.
It seems that transition has affected the microeconometric structure of life satisfaction 
only to a minor extent. There is some change in the coefficients o f the second and fourth 
income quintile groups compared to the third one. This is most likely attributable to the 
declining satisfaction of the middle income group, as Figure 7.1 suggests. The unchanged 
relationship between satisfaction and income at the top and at the bottom implies that 
there was no substantial change in the role of income group. A further sign of change 
during the period examined here refers to housing. Housing problems seem to contribute 
increasingly to relative dissatisfaction, other tilings being equal.
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Table 7.6 The effect of transition on life satifaction - OLS recession,pooled data
I II III IV
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err Coef. Err
Interactbn effects
Income:
1* quintile group*year 0.309 0.202 0.264 0.202 0.321 0.200 0.277 0.199
2nd quintile group*year 0.379** 0.186 0.349* 0.183 0.337* 0.185 0.311* 0.182
4th quintile group*year 0.256 0.177 0.266 0.175 0.300* 0.177 0.298* 0.175
5th quintile group*year 0.267 0.181 0.276 0.180 0.242 0.180 0.245 0.179
Labour market status:
Unemployed*year 0.021 0.338 0.027 0.336
Disability pensioner*year 0.183 0.265 0.209 0.261
Pensioner*year -0.227 0.229 -0.252 0.227
Self-employed*year 0.583** 0.282 0.589** 0.280
Student*year -0.424 0.273 -0.420 0.274
Other inactive*year 0.163 0.245 0.148 0.243
Housing:
Ownership: tenant*year 0.222 0.230 0.301 0.228
other*year 0.137 0.350 0.078 0.344
Housing value (ln)*year -0.043 0.083 -0.021 0.082
Housing value dummy
for missing cases*year -0.621 1.203 -0.371 1.192
Living space per person
(In) * year 0.018 0.146 -0.005 0.145
Housing problems:
moderate*year 0.039 0.165 0.071 0.163
rather serious*year -0.585* 0.301 -0.600** 0.292
serious*year -0.029 0.432 -0.011 0.436
Female*year -0.162 0.123 -0.138 0.122 -0.169 0.121 -0.143 0.121
Ethnicity (Gypsy)*year -0.042 0.368 -0.139 0.363 -0.309 0.367 -0.382 0.362
Vocational training*year 0.070 0.165 0.042 0.166 0.059 0.165 0.027 0.166
Secondary ed.*year 0.259 0.161 0.226 0.159 0.223 0.162 0.183 0.159
Higher ed.*year 0.293 0.208 0.221 0.211 0.224 0.210 0.154 0.214
Religiosity*year -0.026 0.148 -0.059 0.147 -0.007 0.148 -0.037 0.147
Main effects
Income:
1st quintile group -0.969 0.139 -0.844 0.138 -0.879 0.138 -0.773 0.137
2nd quintile group -0.521 0.126 -0.460 0.124 -0.465 0.126 -0.411 0.124
4th quintile group 0.204* 0.123 0.163 0.122 0.105 0.123 0.083 0.122
5th quintile group 0.550 0.123 0.468 0.123 0.478 0.123 0.419 0.122
Labour market status:
Unemployed -0.991 0.213 -0.937 0.213
Disability pensioner -0.782 0.204 -0.779 0.202
Pensioner -0.223 0.161 -0.197 0.159
Self-employed -0.188 0.201 -0.285 0.201
Student 1.867 0.189 1.803 0.190
Other inactive -0.437 0.172 -0.416 0.172
Housing:
Ownership: tenant -0.328 0.118 -0.360 0.117
other -0.019 0.214 0.032 0.211
Housing value (In) 0.166 0.054 0.116** 0.053
Housing value dummy
for missing cases 2.261 0.762 1.623** 0.757
Living space per person
(In) 0.133 0.102 0.157 0.101
Housing problems:
moderate -0.331 0.098 -0.345 0.097
rather serious -0.576 0.184 -0.523 0.180
serious -1.068 0.297 -1.017 0.297
Female 0.235 0.082 0.236 0.082 0.237 0.082 0.236 0.082
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.790 0.241 -0.483 0.241 -0.337 0.244 -0.086 0.245
Vocational training 0.175 0.114 0.312 0.115 0.122 0.114 0.267** 0.115
Secondary ed. 0.563 0.109 0.588 0.108 0.496 0.110 0.537 0.109
Higher ed. 0.971 0.136 1.024 0.139 0.896 0.138 0.963 0.141
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Religiosity
Year
Other personal controls 
Constant
0.408 0.102 
-0.387 0.284 
Yes 
4.691 0.201
0.392* 0.102 
-0.390 0.293 
Yes 
4.633 0.211
0.352 0.102 
0.115 1.206 
Yes
2.117** 0.769
0.338 0.101 
-0.107 1.198 
Yes 
2.572 0.767
Observations 8373 8373 8373 8373
F ratio 27.73 27.85 23.59 23.26
Adj. R2 0.1218 0.1467 0.1371 0.1597
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance 
at 1% level. The models have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber/White estimator of  
variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
Other personal controls: includes age, marital status, number o f children
The relative situation of women and the Gypsy did not change significantly over time, 
ceteris paribus. Somewhat contrary to our expectations, there is no evidence for increasing 
returns to education in terms of happiness. Higher educational attainment is a strongly and 
positively correlated with life satisfaction, as the main effect suggests, but there is no 
change over time, over and above the changes in income and labour market status.
Religiosity was not a source of increasing satisfaction over time. The interaction effect is 
not significant, which implies that the relationship between religious involvement and 
SWB did not change over time. Contrary to the starting hypothesis, the greater social role 
of religious institutions did not affect church members. This may suggest personal 
autonomy: people’s utility does not depend on the social or political power of the 
institution they ‘belong to’. This also seems to imply that the sense of personal religious 
freedom was rather developed, and was well established in the constitutional changes of 
1989, which reinstated religious freedom in a legal sense. Religiosity thus was not making 
people increasingly satisfied over time, but was a stable positive correlate of life 
satisfaction, as the main effect and previous evidence shows.
Overall, it seems that the major social and economic transformation of the 1990s affected 
the structure of happiness in a very limited way. This suggests that the determinants of 
happiness may be rather stable. This suggests that similar things tend to make people 
happy, but this does not imply that people have preserved their specific attributed which 
make them happy or unhappy. In other words, there may have been a compositional 
change over time. I have to note here, that this analysis does not refer to the change in the 
situation of specific individuals, since I did not use panel data. The findings compare social 
groups with particular characteristics at two points in time. Possible compositional
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changes, for example changes in the income position are most likely affected life 
satisfaction. The study of income mobility and labour market transitions would most likely 
contribute with valuable information on these issues.
7.5 CONCLUSION
The estimated micro-econometric well-being equations are increasing in income as 
assumed in Hypothesis 1 and show largely similar structures to those described in the 
existing literature on Western Europe and the United States (e.g. Di Telia et al. 1999; 
Alesina, Telia and MacCulloch 2001). Unemployment and disability pensioner status, a 
typical way of withdrawal from the labour market in Hungary, and divorce is negatively, 
and high income, higher levels of education, and marriage are positively correlated with life 
satisfaction (Hypotheses 2 and 4). There is a U-shaped pattern between age and self- 
reported well-being; other things being equal. Religious people have a consistendy higher 
level of satisfaction, as assumed earlier (see Hypothesis 7). In addition, as expected in 
Hypothesis 3, people living in unsatisfactory housing conditions tend to be dissatisfied, 
controlling for differences in incomes and other personal characteristics.
Previously used indicators of objective well-being, including labour market status, housing 
conditions, and social relations are significant elements of overall satisfaction, controlling 
for income and personal characteristics. These results seem to confirm the starting 
proposition of die thesis on die importance of diese measures as elements of people’s 
functionings. The findings indicate a significant and consistent relationship between 
measures of objective well-being and life satisfaction. The results are not sensitive to the 
estimation technique used here, OLS regression, as indicated by the output of the ordered 
logit estimates. The relative impact of the non-income measures often greatly surpasses that of income. 
This indicates the importance of all of these measures of well-being in their own right, and also that all of 
these represent qualitatively different aspects of people’s lives. At the starting point of the thesis I 
argued that these measures are valuable per se, because they represent something 
inherendy ‘good’. In addition, it seems that objective well-being is not just (good\ but also desired by 
people.
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These specific measures of objective well-being, however, are related to overall satisfaction 
to a varying extent. As hypothesised, labour market status is a more important aspect of life 
satifaction than housing conditions (see hypothesis 6). The role of social relations appears to be 
smaller than labour market or housing situation. This, however, may be attributable to the 
limited measures of social relations used here. 'Personality seems to be one of the core 
variables in explaining differences of subjective well-being across people. Personality seems 
to be one of the core variables in explaining differences of subjective well-being across 
people. Similar to satisfaction with family relations, studied in the previous chapter, life 
satisfaction is negatively related to fatalism, as expected in hypothesis 5. The inclusion of 
the variable of fatalism improves the fit of the model more than any set of measures of 
objective well-being.
What is the trade-off between the specific measures? In order to ‘compensate* people for 
unemployment the government would need to provide an annual transfer of nearly 1 
million forint (in 1998 prices), which is somewhat higher than the average annual earning. 
This confirms existing evidence that the cost of job loss gready surpasses that o f sheer 
income reduction. A transfer of a similar amount is expected to raise the well-being of 
people who live in severely problematic housing conditions to the same level as those who 
have no such problems at all. The compensation for inactivity would be on average 
300,000 forints. A marriage is ‘worth’ half a million in this calculation, so this much could 
be paid for those who are single so that they could enjoy equal level of happiness as those 
who live in marriage.
It was shown that increasing ‘ideological freedom’ did not affect people, but growing 
‘economic freedom’ did. Somewhat contrary to hypothesis 7, the religious population was 
not positively affected by increasing ideological freedom. The happiness of the religious, 
measured as regular churchgoing, was not influenced by the expansion of the church, 
‘institutionalised religiosity’, in social life. People, in contrast, seem to care about the 
growth of economic freedom. The soundest evidence on the impact of transition relates to 
the group of entrepreneurs. Their self-assessed well-being has increased over time. The 
entrepreneurs may thus be identified as the major winners of the transition process.
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A N N E X  7.
Table A .7.1 Life satisfaction, objective well-being andpersonality - ordered logit model
1992 1998
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Income:
1st quintile group -0.547 0.098 -0.255** 0.119
2nd quintile group -0.304 0.087 0.008 0.109
4th quintile group 0.059 0.086 0.250** 0.103
5th quintile group 0.281 0.087 0.364 0.106
Labour market status:
Unemployed -0.658 0.152 -0.655 0.206
Disability pensioner -0.541 0.143 -0.344 0.129
Pensioner -0.144 0.115 -0.212* 0.127
Self-employed -0.207 0.141 0.138 0.159
Student 1.246 0.133 0.905 0.159
Other inactive -0.316** 0.125 -0.172 0.141
Housing:
Ownership: tenant -0.219 0.083 0.032 0.155
other -0.094 0.141 0.134 0.228
Housing value (In) 0.080** 0.038 0.035 0.051
Housing value dummy for missing
cases 1.133** 0.539 0.465 0.745
Living space per person (In) 0.116 0.072 0.166* 0.085
Housing problems:
moderate -0.223 0.068 -0.115 0.105
rather serious -0.331 0.123 -0.742 0.190
serious -0.785 0.205 -0.677 0.226
Social relations:
Little contact with relatives or friends -0.203 0.071
No friends 0.008 0.078
Personality:
Fatalism -0.194 0.012
Other personal characteristics:
Female 0.170 0.057 0.166** 0.071
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.068 0.171 -0.172 0.214
Vocational training 0.189** 0.083 0.135 0.095
Secondary education 0.372 0.078 0.338 0.094
Higher education 0.667 0.102 0.432 0.131
17-29 yrs 0.356 0.104 0.383 0.140
30-39 yrs 0.052 0.094 0.211* 0.117
50-62 yrs 0.262 0.101 0.166 0.113
63 and more 0.660 0.135 0.794 0.154
Other personal controls Yes Yes
CUt1 -0.693 0.544 -4.445 0.762
cut2 -0.300 0.544 -3.906 0.759
cut3 0.074 0.543 -3.373 0.758
cut4 0.583 0.543 -2.670 0.757
cut5 0.863 0.543 -2.237 0.758
cut6 2.324 0.544 -0.747 0.758
cut7 2.706 0.545 -0.153 0.758
cut8 3.219 0.545 0.505 0.758
cut9 4.002 0.546 1.396 0.759
cut 10 4.420 0.548 1.882 0.761
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Observations 5003 3160
Wald chi2 708.91 922.59
Pseudo R2 0.0366 0.0731
Log likelihood -10367.1 -6390.65
Other personal characteristics include Budapest, marital status, number o f children, religiosity
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 1% 
level. The models have been corrected for beteroscedasticily using the Huber/White estimator o f variance.
Base categories: 3rd quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
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Table A.7.2 Life satifaction and objective well-being in 1998, OLS estimate
Coef. Std. Err
Income
(equivalised annual household income) 0.00000126 0.000
Labour market status:
Unemployed -1.186 0.260
Disability pensioner -0.677 0.170
Pensioner -0.447 0.164
Self-employed 0.215 0.198
Student 1.343 0.200
Other inactive -0.406** 0.169
Housing:
Ownership: tenant -0.056 0.201
other -0.052 0.269
Housing value (In) 0.124* 0.064
Housing value dummy for missing cases 1.643* 0.946
Living Space per person (In) 0.178* 0.107
Housing problems:
moderate -0.280 0.135
rather serious -1.114 0.235
serious -1.227 0.309
Female 0.070 0.091
Ethnicity (Gypsy) -0.455 0.277
Vocational training 0.361 0.122
Secondary education 0.809 0.117
Higher education 1.077 0.162
17-29 yrs 0.885 0.177
30-39 yrs 0.456 0.152
50-62 yrs 0.226 0.148
63 and more 0.958 0.199
Budapest -0.103 0.123
Married 0.673 0.168
Divorced -0.596 0.211
Widow/er 0.213 0.229
1 child 0.038 0.129
2 children 0.141 0.166
3 children or more 0.426* 0.253
Religious 0.266** 0.110
Constant 1.653* 0.934
Observations 3160
F ratio 22.26
R2 0.1788
Notes: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5 % level, bold denotes significance at 
1% level.
Base categories: 3rd quintile group, employee, owner-occupier, no housing problems, elementary education 
or below, 40-49 years, single, no children
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8W e l l -b e in g  in  H u n g a r y : p a t c h w o r k  in e q u a l it y
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The thesis has provided a systematic and comprehensive analysis of social inequalities in 
Hungary during economic transition along specific dimensions of well-being, including 
gender and ethnic divisions, which have not been studied this way so far. It also provides 
the first systematic examination of subjective well-being in Hungary, and one of the very 
first studies for Eastern Europe.
The thesis has aimed to answer the following questions:
1. What were the differences in the well-being of various socioeconomic groups in 
Hungary at an early point of the transition, 1991-1992 and at a later phase, 1997- 
1998?
2. How did these differences evolve during the period 1992-1998?
3. What is the added value of the analysis of inequalities of various indicators of well­
being compared to using current income measures?
4. How is satisfaction related to objective well-being, human capital and other 
personal characteristics?
5. Who are the ’winners’ and ’losers’ of transition in terms of happiness?
The period of social transformation may change social order in a fundamental way. The 
window of opportunity which opened in die late 1980s is that of increased personal and 
economic freedom. People may have felt increasing freedom to practice their religion or to 
start entrepreneurial activity. It seems, however, that the change of political regime did not 
bring real opportunities for all. The economic consequences of the transition, the 
transformational recession, however resulted in a 20% drop in GDP, a decline in incomes 
for the majority of the population and brought a nearly 30% fall in labour market 
participation, die latter being radier exceptional n Eastern Europe (Figure 2.4). At the 
same time, the welfare state substantially shrinked as well. Social expenditure declined from 
46% of the GDP in 1991 to 30% by 1998. In real terms, it accounted to a 30% fall. (Own 
calculations, based on (IMF 2001), see also Figure 2.9.) Although a certain cutback of 
social expenditure appears to be well justified both from an economic policy point of view 
(Komai 1996b) and from a certain ideological perspective, which attributes a smaller role 
to the state, it may be regarded as a failure of the welfare system that the state did not 
protect the most needy. Relative poverty, measured as the population below 50% of mean 
equivalised household income, grew from 10% to 14% between 1992 and 1997 (Speder 
1998). Using the 1992 relative criterion as an absolute poverty standard (adjusted to annual
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inflation), the rise is more dramatic: absolute poverty has increased from 10% to 31% in 
the same period (ibid.). Poverty has particularly affected children under the age of 6. In 
contrast, the relative income position of the elderly population has somewhat improved 
(see section 2.2 for details).
The main hypothesis of the thesis included the following:
1. The overview of various major empirical works measuring people’s well-being in 
section 1.2 suggested that there is a certain important aspect of the quality of life, 
which is not adequately addressed by a sole income measure. A major comparative 
measure of this sort was the Human Development Index, which has redirected the 
simple emphasis on GDP as a measure of development. Other approaches, 
concerned with the distribution of resources across people, including studies on 
deprivation, social exclusion, on well-being, and also on happiness indicated the 
recurrence of disparities across social groups which remained uncaptured by a 
single income measure (see Table 1.1 for an overview of this literature).
2. A more specific hypothesis on the Hungarian situation may be called that of 
increased ‘meritocracy’, in other words increased returns to human capital Human 
capital may increasingly influence earnings and also labour market participation in 
an economic system increasingly driven by the ‘market coordination mechanism’ 
(on the latter issue see Figure 2.1). It may also happen that ‘abnormal quasi rents’ 
will accrue to specific types of human capital, since labour supply adjusts to 
changing demand with some delay (Flemming and Micklewright 2000).
3. Existing literature reports a prevailing disadvantage of the major minority ethnic 
population, the Romany. This includes their particularly low labour market 
participation, their very low average level of educational attainment and also spatial 
concentration most hit by economic recession (Kertesi 1994; 1995; Ladanyi 2001). 
There were various accounts on systematic discrimination against Gypsy people, 
including social services (Guglielmo and Waters 1996). Based on this, it was 
expected that the analysis would find signs of disadvantage in terms of various 
measures of well-being of the Gypsy ethnic group. Beyond this, they might be a 
worsening in the relative position of the Gypsy population, thus they may be 
potential group of losers of the transition process.
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4. Existing empirical research on Hungary showed that beyond educational 
attainment labour market position plays a major role in ‘success’, measured in terms of 
income (Habich and Speder 1998). Employment, or rather the lack of it, is a 
frequently measure of social exclusion or social cohesion. International evidence 
also suggests for example that the unemployed tend to be unhappy. Therefore it is 
expected that labour market participation would influence other elements of well­
being over and above income. Unemployment, and inactivity are thus expected to 
be sources of disadvantage in other ways than simply causing low income. In 
contrast, entrepreneurs are expected to have gained from the increased economic 
freedom during transition.
5. Finally, it is expected that the advancing of transformation into capitalism has 
affected the relationship between various aspects of well-being. Increasing self-reliance of 
individuals made them increasingly liable for the promotion of their own well­
being. Also, people may have been able to ‘ cushion’ themselves during the early 
shock of transition against the negative impact of the decline of their incomes, by 
using past saving or changing their consumption patterns. This may have been less 
so over time. All this suggests that we can expect that the role of income as a 
determinant of well-being has strengthened over time.
How did the thesis aim to address these issues? The range of indicators of well-being used 
here included (1) objective well-being: income, housing quality, employment status, 
contacts with friends and relatives, and (2) subjective well-being: self-reported satisfaction 
widi income, housing, neighbourhood, family life and widi life as a whole up till now. The 
empirical analysis was based on two nationally representative surveys of Hungarian 
households, one of them covering the period from April 1991 to March 1992, the other 
the period from April 1997 to March 1998. The actual time period of the specific variables 
somewhat varies131.
131 Income is calculated as an annual average during the period before March 1992 or 1998, respectively, 
while housing conditions, labour market status and subjective well-being are indicators of the individual’s 
state at one particular point in time, at the 31st of March of the relevant year. Therefore at times it seems 
appropriate to refer to the period between 1991 and 1997, other times 1992 and 1998 seem more accurate.
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In the following sections of the conclusion I will explain the focus of the thesis on well­
being from a theoretical point o f view. Later sections will summarise the findings relating 
to the relationship between measures of well-being and income, the patterns of inequality 
across various population groups, and the changes of these disparities between 1992 and 
1992. This will lead on to the sketches of an ambitious future research agenda. Finally, I 
will conclude with policy implications of the research.
8.1 WHAT IS THE SEN-SIBLE MEASURE OF WELL-BEING? NORMATIVE 
GOOD AND PERSONAL PREFERENCES
The theoretical basis of the thesis was Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach. Sen establishes 
his normative position with a detailed critique of traditional economic approaches and 
other accounts of social justice. He argues that utilitarianism, interpreted either as revealed 
preference welfarism or as desire-fulfilment, is problematic on various grounds. First of all, 
utilitarianism is concerned with the maximisation of total utility, irrespective of its 
distribution across people, i.e. ‘if it is shared by many or grabbed by a few’ (Sen 1984c, p. 
308). Utility in addition does not distinguish between different sources of pleasures or 
pain. Actions, rules, and institutions matter only to the extent they promote individuals’ 
happiness. Although Sen expresses how much he had been inspired by John Rawls’ theory 
of justice (1971), he criticises the focus on ‘primary goods’, which represent means rather 
than ends. A similar criticism holds for Dworkin’s theory arguing for the equality of 
resources (Dworkin 1981). A further shortfall of both Rawls’ and Dworkin’s philosophies 
of social justice, according to Sen, is that they fail to account for interpersonal differences 
in converting resources into end-states. Libertarian theories (e.g. Nozick 1974), Sen argues, 
are inadequate, because they ignore consequences of actions. What is a more appropriate 
basis for social justice then?
Sen’s theory of social good is concerned with what makes a good life for a human being. 
This ‘good life’, however, is not subject to recognition by local traditions and individual 
judgements, but rather is a common feature of humanity. This account of human good has 
strong theoretical connection’s with Aristotle’s classic view. ‘Eudaimonia’, or ‘human 
flourishing’ as recent ethics translate it, is an objective good, and it is desirable and 
choiceworthy not simply because it is desired or chosen. Sen, however, clearly
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distinguishes his account from the Aristotelian tradition by emphasising that in contrast to 
the overspedfied view of good human life of that tradition, he does not aim for a full 
account of desirable human states. Rather, what Sen seems to aim for, is the identification 
of the ‘space* of value-objects. His ‘capability* perspective is concerned with the 
assessment of people’s well-being and their freedom to pursue well-being. He names die 
former functionings and the latter capabilities. Functionings thus express actual 
achievements, states of ‘doings or beings’ for specific individuals. Capabilities are a broader 
notion, which also include real opportunity for people to achieve what they value. 
Capabilities include the ability to be adequately nourished, to avoid premature mortality, to 
take part in the life of the community, but also that of being able to be happy. 
Functionings, in contrast, are the state of being well nourished and actually taking part in 
the life of the community and leading a happy life, It is noteworthy that Sen regards 
happiness as a measure of functionings, although he strongly challenges it as an ultimate 
measure of social good (1984c, p. 308). This may seem contradictory. The core argument 
of Sen, however, is that happiness cannot be a sole criterion of measuring individual or 
social success. Happiness, nevertheless, is an object of value and as such can be part of an 
evaluative framework of the quality of life.
Although Sen’s work received wide acclamation for advancing normative dieory, many 
scholars have expressed their scepticism on the empirical applicability of his theory of 
capabilities. Sen deliberately refrains from providing a comprehensive list of capabilities, or 
even that of basic capabilities. He does not give a clear guidance on the methodology of 
evaluation either. How are die features of good life to be defined then? Nussbaum (2001) 
argues diat a basic list of capabilities could be a basis for political principles. Such a list is 
not a complete account of human flourishing, and informed desires of people play a large 
role in finding such a list132. Similarly, Harsanyi also believes that there is a surprising 
uniformity in people’s basic preferences, their basic desires (1997). ‘Substantive goods’ are 
intrinsically valuable, he argues, because ‘they are the objects of our basic desires, which we 
largely share with other human beings, due to our common human nature and to our common 
biological andpsychological needi (1997, p. 141).
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There is and should be a good measure of convergence between an intelligently normative 
proceduralism and a substantive good theory of a non-Platonist kind, sensitive to people's 
actual beliefs and values. The capabilities approach, rooted in a respect for desire as well 
as in an account of human dignity and other substantive human goods, balances these 
concerns well, refusing to take existing preferences as a benchmark of social policy, but 
refusing# as well, to dismiss utterly the psychology of imperfect human beings' (Nussbaum 
2001, p. 87).
Various empirical studies have already used social standards as benchmarks for evaluation, 
to a lesser or greater extent. A recent classic approach is that of the Breadline Britain 
survey, which uses contemporary social standards as a criterion of enforced deprivation 
(Mack and Lansley 1985). In this logic, it is not just the lack of certain resources matters, 
but also whether those resources are regarded to be basic necessities by the majority of the 
community. Recendy Nolan and Whelan argued (1996) for the simultaneous use of such 
enforced deprivation criteria and that of income for the measurement of deprivation. An 
interesting approach uses self-reliance as a poverty criterion, which is based on estimates 
on eamings-capadty, rather dian actual lack of resources (Haveman and Bershadker 1998). 
Burchardt and Le Grand focus in the labour market, and try to identify voluntary non­
employment (2002). One of the theoretical problems of such efforts in my view is that it is 
not really possible to empirically measure ‘informed desire accounts’, or ‘informed 
preferences’. ‘Informed preferences’ of a person, as defined by Harsanyi, the Budapest- 
bom Nobel laureate economist, ‘are the hypodietical preferences he would have if he had all 
the relevant information and had made full use of this information’ (1997, p. 133), and 
these preferences are simply not available for scrutiny133. Informed preferences, as 
Harsanyi notes, at times may be antisocial preferences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, 
and malice. These preferences must be excluded (1982, p. 56). Also, a social consensus 
might include preferences which are bad for the people themselves or other ones which
132 Nussbaum herself does provide a list of ‘central human capabilities’ (2001, pp. 87-88). This includes 
capabilities relating to life, bodily health, emotions, affiliation, control over one’s environment and others. She 
argues that the list has been subject to both cross-cultural academic discussion and also discussion in 
women’s groups (2001, p. 85). Thus it includes items people would choose, and is based on informed 
agreement
133 In earlier publications (e.g. 1982), Harsanyi uses the term ‘true preferences’, but later he prefers the use o f  
‘informed preferences’ instead.
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inhibit the freedom or rights of others. These considerations seem to call for the 
application of a certain moral criterion in setting standards of evaluation.
My starting position seems to lie very close to that of Nussbaum (2001): basic capabilities 
need to have intrinsic worth, but they also need to consider people’s actual preferences to 
some extent. This latter condition will also help to avoid paternalism. I believe that the 
cherishable overlap between people’s preferences and a ‘substantive good theory’ in case 
of basic capabilities. The use of basic capabilities is also compatible with the core feature of 
a liberal democracy, which entails the plurality of values and beliefs, which are often 
conflicting or incommesurable.
Measurement of well-being in the thesis
It follows from this that a normative account of people’s well-being needs to focus 
primarily on basic indicators of well-being. Also, desires, people’s subjective assessment of 
their situation, is an inherent element of such evaluation. This is the approach followed in 
the thesis. Therefore two distinct measures of well-being have been used: objective well­
being and subjective one. Objective means here that the assessment is based on external 
standards. Subjective well-being is based on a self-assessed account. Objective measures 
included income, housing quality, employment status and contact with friends and 
relatives. Health, however important it seems for this purpose, unfortunately had to be 
omitted due to the lack of comparable data. Subjective measures of well-being included 
satisfaction with income, with housing, with neighbourhood, with family life, and with life 
up till now, and a few other measures. Satisfaction with life up till now will be used as a 
proxy for overall happiness.
Happiness is a measure of well-being examined in the thesis. Happiness can be interpreted 
as one element of a person’s well-being, but alternatively it can also be used as a single measure 
of an individual’s welfare. The latter approach is increasingly used in the emerging 
‘economics of happiness’, which uses survey data on people’s self-reported happiness or 
life satisfaction as a proxy for ‘experienced utility’ in order to test standard economic 
assumptions and theories, e.g. whether unemployment is ‘bad’. Due to this dualistic nature 
of the happiness measure, I can say that the thesis not only includes happiness as a 
particular and rather important element of well-being, but in addition it is able to analyse
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the relationship of various measures of well-being to ‘utility*. This means that the analysis 
can draw together various different approaches o f measuring individuals’ quality of life, 
including resources (income), functionings and utility, each of them representing different 
objects of value, stemming from a rather different theoretical background. This 
unintended consequence of the plurality of the operationalisation of Sen’s concept of well­
being, may prove to be insightful in its own right.
The measurement of quality of life here focuses on actual states of people, i.e. functionings. 
These are ‘realised capabilities’, and do not incorporate the element of personal freedom. 
As I have argued in the introductory chapter, this implies that the most valued option of 
the capability set is being evaluated, if we assume rational, maximising behaviour. 
Increasing freedom is a major positive outcome of the political and economic transition. 
Although freedom has inherent value, the informational requirement of measuring 
capabilities would be immense. Available household surveys certainly would not lead us 
very far if we aimed to describe what are people’s possible states of well-being, including 
options they could have chosen but have not done so. In the approach of the thesis, 
freedom is still an object of value: freedom matters to the extent as it actually enables 
people to achieve a certain state of well-being. Increased personal and economic freedom 
is expected to have had an impact on the actual ways people live their lives. If the fact that 
people have more freedom, and are able to be ‘masters of their lives’ to a greater extent 
than during Socialism is an important development of the transition process, it should be 
reflected in people’s overall life satisfaction.
In my view it is not growing freedom which is a major underlying feature of the social 
processes studied here, but instead that of people getting accustomed to greater freedom 
and the resulting new institutions. The period studied here is from April 1991 to March 
1998. Major political changes, first of all the first democratic election, preceded this date, 
and were held in 1990. Economic liberalisation had already started in the late 1980s, but 
major changes such as the abolition of price control, and the introduction of a bankruptcy 
law took place in 1990 and 1991134 (for more, see Annex 2.1). The development of a vivid 
civil society, just to mention one phenomenon, however, takes a long time and had 
certainly not fully happened even by the late 1990s. My analysis thus captures ways of how
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people are actually using their greater personal freedom, which also includes the aspect of 
how they are able to use their freedom, radier than trying to look at personalised accounts 
of people’s possible realisation of their freedom.
8.2 FOR RICHER, FOR POORER? WELL-BEING AND INCOME
I have argued previously that functionings, measures which capture particular aspects of 
people’s quality of life, are valuable in themselves, because they represent a ‘social good’. 
As mentioned before, income is a measure of means rather than ends, thus is not a ‘social 
good’ in itself. If income, however, has a causal relationship with ‘ends’, i.e. with 
individuals’ quality of life, then it provides an adequate measure of social inequality, 
moreover a parsimonious one. All that remains then, is to justify methodological choices 
relating to the use of income, and to ensure that the survey information is of good quality. 
Complementary measures of living standards then are just of minor importance, for 
example in assessing particular policy outcomes. This leads us to a major issue which 
concerns both academics and policy makers: is it worthwhile to embark into die 
complexity of non-income measures, and use multiple social indicators rather than just use 
income? The results of the thesis have contributed with substantial pieces of new evidence 
to this debate.
Money matters
Money was shown to be correlated widi well-being in certain cases. The poor were more 
frequendy facing housing problems, particularly serious problems (see Figure 4.6). This 
pattern became particularly pronounced in 1998. Rather interestingly, money was shown to 
be related to social relations (Figure 4.8). Higher income groups were less likely to suffer 
from social isolation, measured either as having no friends or having litde or no contact 
with friends or relatives. The poorest 20% of the income distribution reported most 
commonly that they had no friends with whom they could discuss personal matters. 
Satisfaction, satisfaction with income, and satisfaction with life so far in particular, were 
increasing with income, controlling for a series of personal characteristics, such as age,
134 The previous bankruptcy law, passed in 1986 had not been enforced.
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gender, ethnicity, labour market status and others (Tables 6.2 and 7.3). Money thus does 
tend to bring satisfaction to people, other things being equal.
Income is inadequate: intra-household distribution is unknown
Money, however, may be an inadequate measure of an individual*s well-being. A major 
shortfall of any income measure is that we have no information on the actual distribution 
of resources within the household. Individual incomes are inadequate measures of actual 
consumption opportunities, because people tend to share their resources within the 
household. Household income thus is a more adequate measure, but the issue of intra­
household distribution remains unresolved (see section 3.2). There are major generally 
accepted accounts of sharing rules, which primarily account for differences in needs 
between adult and children household members. Beyond this, however, there may be 
significant differences in the relative consumption opportunities of adult members of the 
household. Marriage may be a ‘bargain’, where bargaining positions are based on specific 
and often unobservable factors (Lundberg and Poliak 1996; Lundberg et al. 1997). By 
contrast, individual level measures are able to capture a particular, individualised account 
of well-being. Resources, particularly access to leisure may be such measures (Cantillon and 
Nolan 2001). Satisfaction with income, or with life as a whole, may also be such alternative 
indicators.
Is there any gender difference which has been prevalent and would have remained 
uncovered, had I used solely equivalised household income, assuming equal sharing within 
the partners? The analysis has shown that women were particularly affected by labour 
market shrinking, and lost their jobs in much greater numbers than men did (Figure 4.2). 
In addition, women are less likely to become entrepreneurs than men (Table 4.4). There is 
some evidence that women tend to be more dissatisfied with their incomes than men, 
controlling for a series of personal characteristics, although this holds only in 1998 (Table
6.2). One possible explanation for this could have been that their consumption 
opportunities, thus their satisfaction, is primarily driven by their contribution to the 
common budget. The results show that over and above the household’s income position, 
individuals satisfaction with income is positively correlated with their personal incomes 
(Table 6.3). This, however, could not give an explanation for the relative dissatisfaction of 
women, they remained relatively discontented even after controlling for their personal 
income. A possible, but speculative explanation is that women bear a greater responsibility
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for managing the finances of the family, of making ends meets. This issue, however, would 
need further, more specific exploration. One possible explanation could be refuted, 
however: this difference is not attributable to the generally gloomy disposition of women. Women do 
not assess their housing and neighbourhood in any significandy different way than men do 
(Tables 6.8 and 6.13). Moreover, if anything, they tend to have a ‘jolly disposition’. Women 
are consistendy more satisfied with family life than men, ceteris paribus (Table 6.18). They 
may be also more satisfied with their lives as a whole, although this holds consistendy only 
in 1992 and only in certain models in 1998 (Tables 7.3-7.5). In sum, these results suggest 
that for a gender-specific account of well-being household income is an inadequate measure, even augmented 
by personal income.
Income is inadequate: housing
Money is, moreover, at times very little correlated with certain aspects of well-being. 
Income was not correlated with eidier housing quality or with home ownership in 1992 
(see section 4.3). This seems to reflect the fact that the housing market was heavily 
regulated by the state, and the distribution of public housing was not based on need, but 
on a co-existence of ad hoc principles (Daniel 1997a). The results also show that there was 
a significant change between 1992 and 1998, which resulted a strengthening association 
between money and housing quality. This most likely reflects the outcome of the major 
housing privatisation, the greater scope of individual responsibility in housing 
maintenance. These changes in the housing market could not have been described 
accurately by solely focusing on income.
Well-being contributes to happiness over and above income
One of the core findings of the diesis is diat objective well-being does matter over and above income, 
in the sense that its specific measures contribute significandy and consistendy to people’s 
life satisfaction. The analysis in chapter 7 has shown that controlling for income, people’s 
overall satisfaction is still correlated with their educational attainment, dieir labour market 
situation, their housing conditions and widi their social relations (Tables 7.3-7.5). People 
who live in bad housing conditions tend to be markedly less happy than those who do not 
have to face such problems. The unemployed and the disability pensioners have 
significandy lower life satisfaction than employees, other things being equal Students, on 
the other hand, enjoy much greater satisfaction on average. These results are similar to 
existing literature on Western Europe and the United States, which show that
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unemployment tends to contribute to unhappiness (Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann 
and Winkelmann 1998; Di Telia et al. 2001). My analysis, extending this framework, also 
shows that disability pensioners are also unhappy, controlling for income and other 
personal characteristics. Disability pensioners were also shown to have worse health 
condition than the pensioner population of the same age. This might suggest, that for 
many people entry into disability pensioner status may have been an undesirable event, and 
they could have been better off had they had the opportunity for keeping their jobs. A 
government who aims to maximise people’s happiness, thus follows a rational strategy if it 
is concerned with various aspects of people’s quality of life, over and above their income 
level.
In sum, contrary to die starting hypothesis (5), the analysis found no signs of consistently 
strengthening relationship between income and other measures of well-being, with the exception of 
housing conditions. Beyond this, the discussion has confirmed hypothesis 1 relating to the 
limited adequacy of a sole income measure and has shown that a wider focus than income, 
may be useful in various ways:
1) It can address issues of gender inequality, and that of the intra-household distribution of 
resources in particular
2) Certain measures may capture longer term patterns of income. Education in particular, 
but also labour market status to some extent, which were shown to correlate with 
income, life satisfaction and various other measures, may be proxies for 
‘permanent income’: they may help to predict future incomes or to smooth 
fluctuations in current incomes.
3) Income may be an inadequate measure of well-being if a non-market allocation of 
commodities or services prevails. This seems to be the case of the housing market 
during Socialism, the consequences of which still prevailed in the early 1990s.
4) Happiness and specific measures of satisfaction may capture those aspects of 
people’s lives which are beyond the realm of the market. Social relations, family life, 
religiosity and personality were all found to be major factors in determining overall 
happiness.
Thus, 1) and 2) refer to ways in which we can get a better measure of ‘income’ indirecdy. 
3) and 4) highlight the importance of factors which are beyond income but play a major 
role in people’s quality of life.
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8.3 STATIC ASPECTS OF INEQUALITY. IS THERE A SINGLE GROUP OF 
WELL-BEING POOR AND WELL-BEING RICH?
A recurring debate in social sciences is whether there is a specific social group, which is 
excluded from the mainstream society. The two main issues are whether specific groups 
experience disadvantage in various aspects of their lives, and whether people remain so 
over a longer period of time. These may be simply called multidimensionality and 
dynamics over time. Some scholars who use the term "underclass’ seem to emphasise the 
persistence of the phenomenon over time. Some of them talks about a ‘culture of poverty’, 
which is largely the fault of the poor themselves. The poor are poor due to their own 
choices, the argument goes, because they rely on social assistance rather than their own 
earnings from work, large numbers of them have out of wedlock child-births at a young 
age, or are even engaged in criminal activities (Murray 1984). The issue of the ‘underclass*, 
although it has been criticised by many, it seems to have drawn attention to the 
geographical concentration of deprived social groups (Wilson 1987).
The concept of social exclusion is increasingly gaining attention both at the level of the 
European Union and in various European countries. The term social exclusion is rather 
contested itself. A possible definition, developed by members of die Centre for Analysis of 
Social Exclusion, is as follows: lA.n individual is socially excluded i f  he or she does not participate in 
key activities of the society in which he or she lived (Burchardt et al. 2002, p. 30). For Britain, the 
authors define four particular dimensions, that of consumption, production, political 
engagement and social interaction. They find that the poorest twenty percent of the 
population tend to show less political engagement and social interaction than others (Table 
3.5, p. 36). Income, however, was correlated with specific aspects of social exclusion to a 
varying extent and at times only moderately, thus cannot describe these phenomena 
adequately and equally well. Strikingly, however, they find that practically nobody 
experienced social exclusion on all dimensions over four years or more (Table 3.9, p. 41). 
What can the focus on social exclusion add to our understanding of social inequalities? It 
seems that the primary merit of the approach is to redirect the attention of policy makers 
and that of the public from just the single measure of income towards non-monetary 
measures of the quality of life. This seems to be reflected in the recent agreement of the
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EU on social indicators, which includes an extended list of non-income measures (Social 
Protection Committee 2001; Atkinson et al. 2002).
The approach pursued in the thesis is not that of social exclusion, i.e. the focus on the 
bottom of the distribution, but the whole range of the population. The reason is that I am 
concerned with social inequalities in general, and how these were affected by the economic 
transition. Transition is expected to increase chances of fundamental changes in 
individual’s Tates’, by opening windows of opportunity or by closing others. A further 
convincing argument for the focus on inequality rather than deprivation comes from the 
political theorist, Brian Barry (2002). He notes that there may be two thresholds, rather 
than one in a society, including one of the deprived and that of the privileged few, both of 
which are detached from mainstream institutions. The rich may have exclusive access to 
certain resources, including e.g. political lobbying (in the US), or private insurance (in the 
UK).
Recurring patterns of inequality
There are a few recurring patterns of inequalities in Hungary in the period studied here. 
The highly educated do seem to do particularly well in various aspects of their lives. High 
levels of education tend to have positive returns in all measures of well-being. Greater 
educational attainment brings more income (Table 3.5), tends to increase chances of 
labour market participation (Tables 4.2 and 4.7), and in addition, the more educated tend 
to be more contented (chapters 5 and 7). This may be pardy attributable to that education 
expresses past and future earning capacities, thus captures a certain aspect of ‘permanent 
income’. High educational attainment, in addition, may also be a source of enjoyment, due 
to the increased understanding of the world or improved abilities to enjoy leisure135. The 
one exception, satisfaction with family relations, does not seem to challenge fundamentally 
this generally prevailing regularity.
The well-being of Romany ethnic group displays various signs of disadvantage, confirming the 
starting hypothesis (see Hypothesis 3). They have significandy lower labour market
135 Scitovsky argues that people do not really know how to create pleasure in their lives, and mentions that 
die enjoyment of culture for example needs a certain initial effort (1992).
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participation. 1993 survey data show that unemployment among the Gypsy population is 
three times as high as that among the non-Gypsy (Kertesi 1994, p. 993). My results for 
1998 show that only one in every three Roma works as an employee, while this ratio was 
over one in every two for the others (Table 4.1). Only 1.7% of the Roma were self- 
employed at this time, which is less than a third of the rate among the total population 
(Table 4.3). The high unemployment rate of the Romany population cannot be purely 
explained by their educational disadvantage (Table 4.7). It has been demonstrated by 
others previously that job search is more prevalent among the non-employed Gypsy 
population, thus low employment is not a result of their reluctance to work (Kertesi 1994). 
The occurrence of severe housing quality problems is 5-7 times as frequent among those 
of Gypsy ethnicity (Table 4.9). Somewhat unexpectedly they seem to have less social 
contacts (Table 4.12). They are also less satisfied with their neighbourhood, even after 
accounting for neighbourhood problems and settlement type (Table 6.13). The Romany 
also have lower mean equivalised household income (Table 3.5). This difference seems to 
be explained by labour market status and educational differences at the later data point, 
1998. These findings, together with observations from the Helsinki Human Rights Watch 
group suggest that there is a prevailing discrimination against the Romany population.
Disability pensioners have bad health, both in subjective and objective standards. Their 
satisfaction with health was the lowest among all labour market groups, surpassing that of 
pensioners who have higher average age thus are expected to have poor health (Figures 
5.4-5.5). As the 1998 survey data suggest, health problems also tend to be more frequent 
among disability pensioners than among pensioners below the age of 65 years (section 5.3). 
Disability pensioners also tend to be dissatisfied with their incomes and living standards. 
Their relative situation, however, seems to be somewhat better than die unemployed or 
the group of inactive who are neither students nor pensioners, but it remains below that of 
old age pensioners. Disability pensioners are also significandy less happy than employees, 
controlling for differences in income, age and other personal characteristics. This might be 
attributable to their poorer health or may be a sign that their withdrawal from the labour 
market is to a large extent involuntary.
A further recurring pattern is the relative contentment of those who are religious, defined as 
those who regularly attend religious services. The religious tend to be more satisfied with 
various aspects of their lives, and also with dieir life in general. This relative difference
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prevails even after accounting for major correlates of subjective well-being, including 
income, labour market status, age, and a series of other characteristics (chapters 6 and 7). It 
is noteworthy, however, that the period of between 1992 and 1998 did not bring increasing 
satisfaction for the churchgoers, however, despite the increasing social role of 
institutionalised religion (Table 7.6). A possible explanation may be that it was the political 
changes in the early 1990s which had affected people’s personal ideological freedom the 
most At this time the new liberal political system distanced itself from the atheist 
ideological tradition of the Socialist regime, and a variety of personal beliefs could be 
expressed more openly.
Patchwork inequality
Living in the capital seems to bring various advantages, but it also has dear downsides. 
Inhabitants of Budapest seem to prosper better than others: their income is significandy 
higher (Table 3.5). Somewhat counterintuitively, they tend to experience less social 
isolation than people who live in villages and small towns. It seems that the life in the 
capital, and actually life in cities as well, increases the probability of people having at least 
one dose friend and also that of seeing their relatives and friends at least once a month 
(Table 4.12). They, however, tend to be more dissatisfied with their neighbourhood (Table 
6.13). From the point of view of overall happiness, however, the location of residence 
does not seem to matter, once controlling for income and personal characteristics (Tables 
7.3-7.5).
Age plays a varying, but at times a major role in explaining differences of well-being across 
people. Age has an inverted U-shaped pattern for income (in 1992) (Table 3.5), for employee 
status (Table 4.2), and for entrepreneurship (Table 4.4), thus the middle-aged groups tend 
to have the highest income and the highest probability of being in employment Results for 
1992 show that those households where the head was 48 years old had the highest 
equivalised income, controlling for differences in labour market participation rates and 
other factors (Table 3.5). The age of the head of household, however, had no significant 
impact of on income in 1998. These findings are similar to that of Redmond and 
Kattuman for Hungary, who find that age of the head of household is significant in 1987, 
but not in 1995 (2001, Table 2, p. 472). This seems to imply that the role of demographic 
characteristics has declined over time, and rather education and labour market became the
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major determinants of income (see Table 3.6 in chapter 3). Results for labour market 
participation show that the young (containing many new labour market entrants), those 
between 17 and 29, and also the oldest working age group, those between 50 and 62 are 
much less likely to be in work, either as an employee or as a self-employed, than those in 
between.
Age, in contrast, tends to have a pronounced U-shaped pattern for life satisfaction. Young 
adults, those below 30, and the pensioner age group tend to be much more satisfied with 
their life so far than the middle-aged group (Tables 7.3-7.5). The impact of youth is at least 
as great as richness, that is belonging to the top 20% of the income distribution. 
Interestingly, old age seems to play a particular role in satisfaction with incomes. 
Pensioners tend to be more contented with their incomes than middle age people in work, 
controlling for differences in incomes and other personal characteristics (Table 6.2). This 
might be explained with differences in aspirations.
In conclusion, it seems that social inequalities show a rather complex picture, which cannot be solely 
reduced to the existence of particular groups of well-being poor and well-being rich. People with high 
education tend to enjoy success not purely in money terms, but also in terms of their 
overall quality of life. The religious were found to be consistently happier than non 
churchgoers. In contrast, the results show that the Romany ethnic group tends to have 
lower levels of well-being in various ways. As discussed previously, women were 
particularly hit by the overall decline of employment. They tend to be less satisfied with 
their incomes, but at die same time they are more contented with dieir family lives, other 
things being equal. Odier personal characteristics, such as residence in the capital, or 
middle age, were correlated widi high incomes, but turned out to play a more complex role 
in social inequalities in general. Aldiough interestingly life in the capital decreases the 
prevalence of social isolation, it tends to bring lower satisfaction with the neighbourhood. 
Middle age in itself tends to be the most unhappy stage in life, controlling for income and 
other personal characteristics.
8.4 DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF INEQUALITY: CHANGES OYER THE 1990S
The research also aimed to understand the stability of die patterns of social inequality. 
Were there any particular changes in die relative position of social groups between 1991
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and 1998? The results show that people’s satisfaction with their life so far has declined 
over time. Similarly, most other specific measures of subjective well-being, including 
satisfaction with income, housing and health have fallen (Figure 5.2). This has lead some 
scholars to conclude that Hungarians are embittered with the change of the system 
(Robert 1999). This, however, seems to be an overstatement in my view, because there is a 
clear rise in people’s assessment of their future prospects by 1998. Have the determinants 
of subjective well-being, and overall life satisfaction in particular changed over time? Do 
these changes help to explain the overall decline in reported satisfaction with life so far?
Higher education brought more income for people in the late 1990s than early on. The 
educational attainment of household members, and that of the head of household in 
particular, increasingly determined the income of the household (Table 3.5). Tertiary 
education also brought increasing ‘skills premiums’, the earnings gap compared to the 
lowest educated (unskilled) group has widened over time (section 4.2). These findings 
seem to validate the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2. Economic success thus 
increasingly depends on an individual’s human capital, and also probably on her effort 
(which remains unobserved here). Higher education in particular plays a positive role. 
Contrary to the expectations, the analysis found no clear overall trend for the increasing 
role of educational attainment in labour market participation. There was not evidence for 
the increased role of education in overall life satisfaction either.
As a result of the massive housing privatisation in the early 1990s, tenant status is 
increasingly associated with relative disadvantage. Those who remained tenants tend to 
experience more severe housing quality problems (Figure 4.5), and they are less satisfied 
with dieir housing and their neighbourhood (Tables 6.7-9 and 6.12). There is strengdiening 
link between low income and tenant status, which suggests that it is mosdy the needy who 
live in social housing (Table 4.8). To consider it as a positive achievement of housing 
policy, however, would be a rushed judgement As the analysis of David shows, housing 
privatisation was to a large extent a ‘national gift’, primarily benefiting those the most who 
lived in the most valuable properties and those who could afford to buy their homes 
(Daniel 1997b).
The life satisfaction of the middle income group has markedly declined in the period 
examined here (see Figure 7.1). Nevertheless, life satisfaction still remains a monotonically
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increasing function of income, controlling for labour market participation and other 
personal characteristics. Income thus tends to bring happiness for Hungarians, similar to 
citizens of other nations (Easterlin 1974; Diener and Oishi 2000). This is supported by the 
results in chapter 5, which show that satisfaction with income is positively correlated with 
satisfaction with life so far and also with satisfaction with future prospects (Tables 5.2 and
5.3). A further interesting aspect of the relationship of income and utility is how income 
change affects utility. For this, however, a panel dataset would be necessary, which keeps 
track of the situation of particular individuals over time. Psychological evidence suggests 
that people are more sensitive to losses than gains (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991). 
This implies that the majority of the Hungarian population, who were affected by the 
decline in their incomes in real terms, may have suffered a decline in their subjective well­
being.
The self-employed may be called one of the major winners of the transition process, 
indicated by their increased life satisfaction or in economic terms, ‘experienced utility>. 
While die self-employed do not appear to be any happier than employees in 1992, their 
level of happiness shows a major improvement between 1992 and 1998, controlling for 
income, education and various other personal characteristics (Tables 7.3-6). There is also 
evidence for the increasing job satisfaction of the self-employed over time, which 
surpassed that of employees by 1998 (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Existing research shows that 
entrepreneurs are a rather stratified group, consisting in part of those who were pushed 
into self-employment due to the loss of their jobs (Robert 2001; Robert and Bukodi 2001). 
The overall improvement of their situation, however, does not seem to be surprising, as 
the international literature suggests. Entrepreneurship brings higher job satisfaction, and 
a large number of people would prefer to be self-employed, both in Eastern and 
Western Europe (Blanchflower et al. 2001).
Interestingly, the results show that the fundamental sources of happiness have mosdy 
remained unchanged despite the turmoil of transition. The majority of the coefficients of 
the estimated micro-econometric functions which aim to estimate changes over time are 
not significant (see Table 7.6). One exception is the improvement in the situation of the 
self-employed. How is the declining overall life satisfaction may be explained then? 
Declining happiness may be due to a compositional changer, the factors which bring 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction to people are largely the same, and radier it is the possession
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of such resources or characteristics that have changed over time and it was this change that 
lead to increasing or declining satisfaction for specific groups. Growing non-employment 
for example, a major feature of economic changes in Hungary, which includes not only 
unemployment but also involuntary withdrawal from the labour market, is expected to 
contribute to lower the satisfaction of those affected by it.
8.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH: ‘SOCIAL MECHANISMS’ 
RATHER THAN CASE STUDIES
The analysis presented here can be regarded as a case study of the social impacts of a major 
societal transformation. (The section which summarises these findings is ‘8.4 Dynamic 
aspects of inequality’.) It may be also thought of as a case study addressing the links 
between various measures of quality of life, including income, objective well-being, 
subjective well-being and also happiness. (See e.g. section 8.2 on ‘For richer, for poorer? 
Well-being and income’.) It may be also regarded as a series of case studies, which observe and 
analyze inequalities in various distinct aspects of people’s lives and searches for regularities 
in these aspects, in the factors which influence these inequalities. (Section 8.3 - ‘Recurring 
patterns of inequality’ and ‘Patchwork inequality’ - addresses these issues.)
The thesis provides new empirical evidence, which may be valuable in itself. A more 
important matter, in my view, is however the contribution of the thesis in extending the 
validity of regularities which have been observed in other, often rather different, countries from Hungary. 
One such example is the study of happiness during transition. Existing literature on 
happiness prim arily focused on Western Europe and the United States, and found 
recurring patterns in the micro-econometric structure of happiness. My results show that 
the determinants of happiness are largely unaffected even by a major societal landslide. 
Unemployment is a source of discontentment, and students tend to be happy. This has not 
changed over time, but the particular individuals who are unemployed and students are 
different and also their number has changed.
International literature also provided a benchmark for assessing methodological choices 
and indicated possible ways to develop future research. The analysis of income inequality 
in chapter 3 was preceded by a detailed account of the methodological choices. This led to
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the conclusion that future research could include an analysis of the distributional impact of 
in-kind benefits, and that of differences in housing costs. The assumption of equal sharing 
of resources within the household could also be put to the test.
The thesis also contributes to knowledge by the critical assessment of existing literature. I have 
challenged the recurring claim that Hungarians are hugely pessimistic. As shown in chapter 
5, Hungarians are not unhappier than other nations in the region. The survey evidence, 
however, reveals that there is a systematic difference in the level of happiness between 
Westem-Europe and that of Central-Eastern Europe, and also that in general countries of 
the former Soviet Union score worse than other Eastern European nations (Table 5.1). 
This also implies that the relatively high suicide rate in Hungary (Figure 2.8), which has 
been used as a proxy for alienation, anomie and life satisfaction by Hungarian scholars, 
appears to be only a poor predictor of overall happiness in the country. In the period 
examined here, satisfaction with life so far has somewhat declined, but satisfaction with 
future prospects grew, which is probably a sign of growing optimism (Figure 5.1). On the 
basis of this survey evidence, assertions in the literature relating to the nation’s general 
disappointment with transition, and people ‘gritting their teeth*, appear to be unfounded.
A further contribution of the thesis is die discovery of newfacts. Such possible new discovery 
is that basic indicators of objective well-being (‘functionings’) may not be purely ‘good’ 
from a moral philosophy point of view, but also desirable for people. As shown in chapter 
7, measures of housing quality, labour market participation and also social contacts tend to 
contribute to people’s happiness, even after accounting for differences in income and a 
series of personal characteristics. A further, intriguing finding refers to the relative 
dissatisfaction of women widi dieir incomes, even after controlling for die income level of 
the household and also for the person’s own contribution to it. Many of diese, however, 
call for further explanation. Are these a peculiar one-time phenomenon, or possibly just 
statistical artifacts? (Women’s relative dissatisfaction with their incomes holds only in 
1998.) Or do they refer to social regularities which have remained unobserved thus far and 
call for further future research? Beyond this, what is the explanation for these phenomenon?
A possibly fruitful direction for future research is the route offered by some social 
theorists, who call for 'social mechanisms'. Societies are rather driven by ‘mechanisms’, rather 
than laws. As Elster explains, ‘mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognisable causal
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patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences. They 
allow us to explain but not to predict* (1998, p. 45, original emphasis). The quest for 
mechanisms is the attainable ultimate research goal, since laws are just not inherent in the 
way society functions. Hedstrom and Swedberg note that the mechanism approach is 
interdisciplinary, including most economists, psychologists, and interestingly also 
biologists, and they argue that ‘the notion of “laws’* is generally reserved for physics, which 
is the only science that can produce explanations based upon powerful and often 
counterintuitive laws with no significant exceptions’ (1998b, p. 3). Hedstrom and 
Swedberg and many others address their criticisms primarily to the discipline of sociology, 
for its T>ad* theorising (Boudon 1991, p. 519), and also for inferring causality purely from 
statistical results, rather than meaningful connection between events (such criticism is 
formulated by e.g. Coleman 1986; Esping-Andersen 2000; Goldthorpe 2000).
What we need, as several outstanding sociologists argue, are ‘middle-range’ theories, using 
the term of Robert Merton (Merton 1967; Boudon 1991), or die exploration of 
mechanisms which describe the interaction between macro-level events and individual 
actors (Coleman 1986; 1990). The so-called macro-micro-macro model, initially described 
by Coleman (1986, p. 1322) includes three different types of social mechanisms. The first 
tries to establish the relationship between macro-level events and the individual. The 
second analyses how the individual assimilates the impact of these events. The third, and 
possibly most challenging, type of mechanisms seek to explain how a number of 
individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate macro-level outcomes. A 
widely dted example of such approach in sociology is the classic work of Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930). According to Coleman the main diread of 
Weber’s argument is to explain how Protestant religious doctrine (macro level) affected 
individual values (micro level), then how these values changed orientations to economic 
behaviour (micro level). Coleman goes on to say that what Weber ‘fails to show is how 
these individual orientations combined to produce the structure of economic organization 
that we call capitalism’ (Coleman 1986, p. 1323). This link between micro to macro level 
appears to be, in Coleman’s words, ‘the main intellectual hurdle* both for empirical 
research and for theory. It is this issue which is addressed in the modem classic of Thomas 
Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour (1978), and in its probably most famous essay on 
segregation, ‘Sorting and mixing: race and sex’.
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The principles of such research agenda seems to include methodological individualism, the use 
of large scale datasets, and possibly also rational action theory (Blossfeld and Prein 1998; 
Goldthorpe 2000). The focus of the current thesis on the individual as a unit of analysis 
thus seems to be justified on various grounds. Individuals are the main concern of research 
on the quality of life and also that of the theory of capabilities, which justifies the focus on 
individuals from a normative point of view. In addition, as it has just been argued here, 
social theory needs to explain social phenomenon based on individual actors. This is the 
approach followed by mainstream economics as well. The use of large scale datasets 
provides a useful analytic tool for the observation of regularities and also that of causality. 
The latter, however, as argued before, however cannot be purely justified on the basis o f 
statistical findings. Rational action theory is probably the most disputed element of this 
agenda (e.g. Simon 1982). Certain behavioral assumptions, however, are essential for 
modeling individual’s behaviour. Interestingly, recendy several economists call for an 
increased reliance on psychology within standard economics, more precisely for the 
integration of certain behavioral regularities (Rabin 1998), such as framing effects and 
reference level effects (with a large contribution of Kahneman on these issues, discussed in 
chapter 5). Such synthesis would sustain the acclaimed parsimony of economics, and it 
would also increase the behavioral validity of its basic assumptions.
Future research on well-being has various possible intriguing alternatives in this intellectual 
framework. (1) How do welfare policies affect people? This involves a causal analysis of the 
impact of specific policies on people’s well-being. Changes in benefit entidement for 
example may have an impact on consumption patterns. (On this see e.g. Lundberg et al. 
1997, discussed in chapter 3). Anodier possible issue is whether more equal opportunities 
in education for the Romany would achieve higher educational attainment. (2) Do diese 
changes in well-being trigger changes in people’s behaviour? Do people adjust to new 
circumstances? These issues could be addressed by a longitudinal analysis of individuals’ well­
being, possibly including measures of subjective well-being. Referring back to the example 
cited before, does higher educational attainment of the Romany population contribute to 
greater labour market participation and ultimately greater social integration? (3) The 
possible, and more difficult micro-to-macro link would address how these individual level 
changes affect society, and policy making in particular. The analysis needs to address how 
individuals interact and how specific actions are summoned to a macro level, which 
involves the analysis of collective action and also diat of existing institutional structures.
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Following the example used here, a new Romany intelligentsia for example may form a 
powerful interest group, which could increase the political and social influence of the 
whole ethnic group. These issues appear to be most commonly addressed by political 
scientists.
A key issue whether future research will be able to analyse dynamic processes. From a 
social science point of view it is rather worrying that there is no general household panel 
data for Hungary since 1997. In addition, there are very limited resources for even cross- 
sectional surveys, which necessitates a partly commercial orientation of the actual survey 
questions.
The thesis has raised various possibly promising directions for future research. Many of 
these, however, have substantive new data requirements. One such issue is that of relative 
deprivation within the household. Is there evidence for the deprivation of wives? In what aspects 
of well-being? If diere is such deprivation, what is the explanation for these disparities 
between partners? Empirical research could increasingly address issues relating to regions or 
areas. This could for example explain some of the so far unexplained ethnic disparities. 
There is particularly litde evidence on neighbourhood effects. Is there a possible specific 
social exclusion problem, affecting certain areas in particular? Is there any specific ‘context’ 
effect other than household and economic factors determining poverty (e.g. local 
unemployment rates, social services, etc.)? Finally, an intriguing issue is that of the 
interaction between various aspects of well-being in the longer run. For example, does 
long-term non-employment bring deteriorating health, social isolation and increasing 
unhappiness? Do bad housing conditions affect people’s health or social interaction 
between neighbours? To what extent does poor health inhibit labour market participation 
for the disabled who want to work? These questions illustrate the set of possible problems 
and the magnitude of these issues.
8.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Measurement of well-being, over and above that of income, is a major issue, justified by 
various considerations, but it has received rather limited attention in policy making in 
Hungary so far. Why should policy increasingly focus on social indicators?
307
Promoting well-being, a meansfor maximising overall we fare
If a government is intent on maximising utility, then promoting well-being is just as 
‘rational’ as going for growth and higher personal incomes. As I have shown before, well­
being of people is an important element of overall happiness, over and above income. For 
example, the renovation of public housing and control of noise and air pollution are not 
purely justified because they generally regarded to be socially good or efficient, but it is 
shown that they also contribute to the subjective well-being of people. The loss of 
happiness for those who are non-employed, over and above their dissatisfaction resulting 
from their lower income level, suggests that policies which promote labour market 
participation for those who wish to work would increase overall welfare.
Raising the educational attainment of marginal social groups appears to be a major 
mechanism for their social integration. As Kertesi argues, a substantial investment into the 
education of the Gypsy population, particularly raising their participation in secondary 
education, is a possible key to their future social integration (1994; 1995). He dtes (1994) 
the example of the United States on a similar policy relating to the black population, which 
has most successfully contributed to the creation of a new, black middle class (see Smith 
and Welch 1989).
Measures of mil-being as indicators ofsocial cohesion
If the government aims to promote social cohesion, then it is not enough to focus simply 
on policies relating to the redistribution of income136. As argued before, income is often 
poorly correlated with even rather basic indicators of well-being. Indicators of well-being 
do provide valuable information for policy assessment, policy development and the co­
ordination of specific policy tools.
Unlike other European countries, social exclusion or well-being has not received particular 
attention among policy makers in Hungary. This, however, may change, as a result o f the
136 Note, however, that ‘social cohesion’ is not the sole reason for this. Similar argument can be also made on 
efficiency grounds: for example in favour of the provision of public goods by the state when the market 
would foil to produce a Pareto efficient outcome.
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increasing academic evidence137 or more likely due to the increasing political pressure from 
the European Union. The problem of social exclusion seems to be particularly relevant 
from the perspective of the possibly inherent middle class ‘bias’ of welfare policies. 
Welfare state programs tend to benefit the middle classes to a great extent (Stigler 1970; 
Goodin and Le Grand 1987). As the Director’s law argues, ‘public expenditures are made 
for the primary benefit of the middle classes, and financed with taxes which are bome in 
considerable part by the poor and the rich’ (Stigler 1970). If the government aims to 
promote social cohesion, this effort necessitates a more detailed monitoring of prevailing 
social disparities and the assessment of policies in terms of their social outcomes.
Volig makespolitics ’
Political scientists seem to discover increasingly that ‘new policies create new politics’, thus 
rather than treating policy as a result of political forces (the dependent variable), they 
analyse policy as a cause of those forces (the independent variable) (e.g. Pierson 1993). 
Pierson argues that the activity of interest groups often follows the implementation of 
public policies, rather than precedes them. In particular the redistribution of resources and 
the incentive effects of government programs can shape interest groups. One further issue 
of concern is whedier policy choices create so-called ‘lock in effects’. Lock in effects occur 
when people make important commitments as a response to policy arrangements, and as a 
result future policy changes may cause major disruptions. Policy outcomes thus matter as 
causes of future policy making. From diis point of view, information on the ‘losers’ and 
‘winners’ of specific policies is of crucial political importance for the incumbent political 
party.
Greater public demandfor performance indicators
The development of the civil society and also the strengthening of particular interest 
groups may highlight the importance of a consistent system of social indicators. Citizens 
may increasingly demand information on the performance of the government, as dieir tax 
awareness increases. In this respect, the performance of the welfare system in particular is 
expected to be one of the top priorities.
137 Such approaches have proved to be particularly fruitful for the analysis o f transition countries (Comia et
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Monitoring social outcomes in the 'European Union
Recent developments in the European social agenda are expected to affect future member 
states as well, including Hungary. Social inclusion was accepted as one of the key overall 
strategies of the Union for the next decade by the Lisbon European Council in March 
2000. For the implementation of this strategy the Council agreed to introduce a new ‘open 
method of coordination’. This means that combating social exclusion is the member states* 
responsibility, following Union guidelines and including periodic monitoring and 
evaluation. Later, in the Laeken meeting in December 2001, the member states agreed on 
the establishment of a set of common indicators (Social Protection Committee 2001). This 
meeting has also expressed the intention that ten candidate countries, including Hungary, 
would be members by the 2004 European Parliament elections.
The set of indicators, gready influenced by the Atkinson report (2002), includes primary 
indicators such as low income, the persistence of low income, regional cohesion, long term 
unemployment rate, people living in jobless households, early school leavers, life 
expectancy and self perceived health status (Social Protection Committee 2001). These are 
complemented with secondary indicators, which both support the lead indicators and also 
describe other dimensions of the problems. Beyond these, diere may also be a third level 
of indicators, accepted by the member states themselves in their national Action Plans on 
Social Inclusion. These, however, would not be harmonized at EU level. The Social 
Protection Committee notes that further work needs to be done e.g. relating to housing, 
social participation, territorial issues and the gender dimension of social exclusion. They 
add that social monitoring may be severely constrained due to the lack of adequate data, 
thus the development of statistical capacity is a crucial issue. The Laeken declaration 
explicitly refers to the candidate countries: The European Council stresses the need to 
reinforce the statistical machinery and calls on the Commission gradually to involve the 
candidate countries in this process’ (European Council 2001, p. 8, my emphasis).
Enlargement will gready increase disparities within the European Union, probably even 
doubling the income gaps between countries and regions. As the Cohesion Report notes, if
aL 1996; Micklewright 1999; Micklewright and Ismail 2001).
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a Union of 27 existed tomorrow ‘at national level, over one-third of the population would 
live in countries with an income per head less than 90% of the Union average — the current 
threshold for eligibility for aid under the Cohesion Fund — compared to one-sixth in the 
present EU15’ (European Commission 2001). Social cohesion, which has been a matter of 
concern for a long time in the Union, will draw even greater attention with the 
enlargement of the Union. The adequate monitoring social exclusion in Central and 
Eastern European countries seems to be already a concern for the European Union. The 
pressure for greater statistical capacity to measure people’s well-being in the candidate 
countries is very likely to grow. In this case, the comparability of the indicators with 
current member states will become essential. For Hungary, in the limelight of the 
forthcoming accession, the issue of social indicators might turn into an important 
domestic policy issue.
In sum, a greater use of social indicators, which aim to measure the well-being of citizens is 
by no means only a matter of how ‘benevolent’ or paternalist the incumbent political 
power is. Rather, it appears to be inherently part of the rational strategy of a vote- 
maximising government. The forthcoming EU accession of Hungary also seems to point 
in the same direction. Information on social inequalities, and the explanation of the 
underlying causes is thus essential for the politics of the near future. The study of social 
inequalities is essential, because paraphrasing Tolstoy, the poor may all look alike, but each 
of them is unhappy in their own way.
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A p p e n d ic e s
APPENDIX A 
BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Basic features:
• Nationally representative samples of households
• Sampling strata: 4 (region, settlement size, feature of neighbourhood based on 
census, flat)
•  1991/92: Hungarian Household Panel Survey, wave 1 (The panel has finished in 
1996/97. Due to the very high attrition the use of the 6* wave did not seem to be 
appropriate.)
• 1997/98: Hungarian Household Monitor
•  The original sample of 7265 and 5293 individuals in 1991/92 and 1997/98, 
respectively was restricted to the adult population, which means persons over the 
age of 16. The so-called ‘proxies’ were also excluded, in other words those 
individuals who did not give response to the detailed ‘individual’s questionnaire’. 
The resulting sample sizes are 5424 and 3827 in the two survey years (unweighted).
• The two datasets have weights of a rather different nature. In 1992, a so-called 
‘population weight’ was used in order to correct the overrepresentation of the 
Budapest population, which resulted from the sample design. The ‘analytic weight* 
of 1998 is less crucial, since it only adjusts for a better fit o f the sample to the 
original population (based on the data of the microcensus in 1996).
Table 1. Basic sample characteristics
1991/92 1997/98
Sample size:
Households (unweighted) 2668 2011
Individuals (unweighted) 7265 5293
Out of which.
Personal questionnaire 5424 3827
Proxy 347 565
No questionnaire
(respondent is child or other
reason) 1493 901
Survey period* April 1991 - March 1992 April 1997-March 1998
Survey date 27 April -  6 July 1992 11 May —4 June 1998
*The choice of the survey period is related to the annual tax report deadline in March. The 
survey institution believes that this is the time when individuals’ knowledge on the income
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situation of the past 12 months is the most thorough, thus the income data are most likely 
to be reliable.
Sampling
Both samples are household probability samples with proportional stratification.
The Hungarian Household Panel (HHP) 1992, the first wave of the panel, applied four 
strata for selecting household, including region, setdement size, neighbourhood feature 
and finally, household. Firsdy, 75 setdements were selected based on region and setdement 
size. Secondly the households were selected using the data of the Central Registry and 
Election Office. The households had equal probability of being selected within their 
neighbourhood strata. The sample has included additional observations over the desired 
sample size, considering expected dropouts. Had it not been done so, the basic condition 
of probability samples would not have been fulfilled for the additional households, namely 
that of having equal probability for being selected.
Originally HHP consisted of two samples: a Budapest subsample and a national sample. 
The national sample consisted of approximately 2000 households and the capital 
subsample of about 600. After finishing the HHP study a new database was created by 
merging the two subsamples. Since the Hungarian capital was oversampled in the new, 
unified sample a specific weight was introduced. Households living in Budapest and their 
members were given a weight of 0.4. Other (non-Budapest) households got a value of 1, 
including all their members. This merged dataset was used in the thesis.
The sampling method of the Household Monitor (HM) was the same as that of the HHP, 
equally using four strata. The HM was based on a strata of 89 setdements, and at the final 
stage included 2011 individuals.
The samples consisted of 2668 and 2011 households and 7265 and 5293 individuals in the 
two survey years, respectively (Table 1.). The surveys are tiius comparable in size, but at 
certain points of the analysis this size may have resulted inadequate precision of estimates. 
In particular, the sample size may be small for detecting changes between surveys in 
parameters estimated in multivariate models. (Ceteris paribus, a doubling of sample size 
would achieve a reduction in standard errors by a factor of root 2.)
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Variable definitions
The Household Monitor can be regarded as a continuation of the Household Panel, 
preserving its mains topics but not its longitudinal feature. The definition of income is 
comparable and is equally based on a detailed investigation of income components. The 
very few changes in the surveys reflect policy changes referring to specific income types. 
Both surveys include detailed and comparable information on the labour market status, 
housing conditions and subjective well-being of respondents, and also on their 
demographic characteristics.
'Response rates
Response rates have fallen during transition in various countries, which seems to cause 
concerns for representativeness and coverage (Flemming and Micklewright 1999, 2000). 
Flemming and Micklewright describe a decline in the willingness of households to respond 
to surveys in various countries. Evidence for Hungary indicates that the response rates to 
budget surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Office fell from an average of 78% in 
the years between 1983 and 1987 to an average of 61% by 1993-1995 (1999, p. 52). There 
was also some decline in the response rates in the TARKI household surveys used in this 
study. The response rates for households fell from 71% in 1992 to 66% in 1998. The 
problem was particularly grave in Budapest, while families in small towns and villages were 
the most willing to participate. Therefore die previously mentioned sampling method, 
which accounted for the possible dropouts, was essential in preserving the 
representativeness of die surveys.
The declining participation is also reflected in the increasing number of the so-called 
proxies, which are simplified questionnaires for those household members who are not 
present or who do not want to complete the full personal questionnaire. As Table 1 
shows, the number of proxies had increased from 5% to 11% 7in percentage of the 
individuals approached within the responding households.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of basic survey variables (unweighted, individual level variables)
1991/92 1997/98
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender:
Female 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Age:
(continuous var., years) 38.4 22.6 41.1 22.6
Age:
(categorical var., years) 
0-16 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.38
17-29 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38
30-39 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
40-49 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.36
50-62 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39
63+ 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
Educational attainment.
Up to elementary education 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49
Vocational training 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
High school (A level) 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42
Higher education 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31
Settlement type:
Village or small town 0.31 0.46 0.37 0.48
Town 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
County centre 0.11 0.31 0.19 0.39
Capital (Budapest) 0.35 0.48 0.19 0.39
Employment status: 
Employee 0.49 0.50 0.37 0.48
Unemployed 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Disability pensioner 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.26
Pensioner 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46
Self-employed 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20
Student 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26
Other inactive 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.29
M arital status: 
Single 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48
Married 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50
Divorced 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
Widow/er 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32
APPENDIX B 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE THESIS
The descriptions indicate the base categories used in the regression models.
Age: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the respondent’s age 
in years: 17-29,30-39,40-49,50-62,63 and more. The base category is 40-49 years.
Age of head of household:, continuous variable, the age of head of household in years
Age of smallest child, a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the age 
of the smallest child in the households in years: 0-3 years, 4-9 years, 10-16 years.
Assets: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on whether the 
household has a second home, a holiday home, a land or a car
Debt: dummy, expressing whether the household had any debt to either a private person, a 
bank or something else. (The absolute amount of outstanding debt gave a worse model, 
probably due to more missing values and die potential problem of misreporting.)
Disability pensioner. 1992 - those receiving disability pension. 1998 — the survey questions are 
different, and refer to the date and status of becoming pensioner. Only those who became 
disability pensioners after 1988 were coded as currendy disability pensioners. The purpose 
was to try to approximately exclude those, who have turned into old-age pensioners from 
dieir earlier disability pensioner status by 1998.
A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent is disability pensioner, and 0 odierwise.
Disability pensioner in the household. A dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if there is a 
disability pensioner in the household, and 0 otherwise.
Educational level: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the 
respondent’s level of educational attainment: elementary education or below (i.e. up to the 
age of 14), vocational training, secondary education, higher education. The base category is 
elementary education or below.
Educational level of head of household: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 
depending on the head of household’s level of educational attainment: elementary 
education or below, vocational training, secondary education, higher education. The base 
category is elementary education or below.
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Educational level: a set of dummy variables, taking on die value of 1 depending on the level 
of educational attainment of the spouse of the head of household: education below 
secondary level, secondary education, higher education. The base category is education 
below secondary level.
Employee: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent works as an employee in 
March of the survey year, and 0 otherwise.
Ethnicity: Based on the judgement of the interviewer. A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the 
respondent is regarded to be Gypsy, in other words Romany, and 0 otherwise. [As noted 
already in chapter 1: This definition certainly does not discount those, who self­
consciously claim their Gypsy origin, but it also includes those, who have already became 
strongly assimilated into other communities. Every experience indicates, that the non­
gypsy communities are aware of the origins of even of the successfully assimilated gypsies/ 
(Kemeny etal. 1996, p. 3)]
Ethnicity of head of household: Based on the judgement of the interviewer. A dummy, taking 
the value of 1 if the head of household is regarded to be Gypsy, in other words Roma, and 
0 otherwise.
Fatalisnr. aggregate score of responses to the following questions:
• I accomplish my decisions.
• I have little power over the course of my life.
• Only to a minor extent I am able to ease most of my problems.
• I often feel lonely.
• Nowadays I can hardly find my way in matters of life.
Fully agree: 4, partly agree: 3, pardy disagree: 2, fully disagree: 1.
In the summation responses to the first question had been evaluated in a reverse way. The 
index is a continuous variable with scores from 6 to 23.
(The reliability of the summative index has been tested using Cronbach’s alpha. The alpha 
value is 0.78, which is over the 0.7 reliability threshold. This means that the inter-item 
correlations are high enough to be able to use a summary index. In other words, we can 
assume that the six items of the index are all functions of a latent, theoretical construct — 
fatalism.)
Female: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent is female, and 0 if male
Household amenities: set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on whether 
the household has the following items: HIFI, television, video, computer, washing 
machine, fridge, deep freezer, washing up machine, microwave, and house alarm
Housing ownership: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the 
housing ownership status of the individual: owner-occupier, tenant or other. The other 
category included for example those who use the flat illegally, who live in the flat in
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exchange for long term care of an elderly person, or those who occupy the housing as 
friends or relatives. The base category is owner-occupier.
Housing problems:, set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 if any of the following 
problems occur, dampness, fungi, darkness, air pollution, noise, dangerous 
neighbourhood, no separate entrance or other. If one problem occurs, then it is labelled as 
‘moderate’, if two, then ‘rather serious’, if three, then ‘serious’. The base category is ‘no 
housing problems*.
Income quintiles. a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on which 
quintile the respondent belongs to based on his/her total equalised net household income. 
Equivalence scale: OECD, which gives a weight of one to the first adult, 0.7 to each 
additional adults and 0.5 to each child in the household. Base category: 3rd quintile (On the 
details of the income components of total household income, see Appendix C.)
Little contact with relatives or friends: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent lives in 
a household which meets relatives or friends less often than once a month or they never 
meet them, either as inviting them in the household’s home or as visiting them in their 
own homes
Lives in Budapest: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent lives in the capital, and 
0 otherwise.
Living space per person (In): continuous variable. Natural logarithm of living space per person. 
The latter has been calculated as total living space of the housing in square meter as 
reported by the respondents, divided by the household size.
Marital status: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on the 
respondent’s marital status: married, divorced, widow/er, single. Base category is single.
Neighbourhood problems:, set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 if the 
neighbourhood has air pollution, it is noisy, there is both air pollution and noise, the area is 
untidy or dangerous or there is a housing quality problem. The latter may include any of 
the following: dampness, fungi, darkness, no separate entrance or other. The base category 
is ‘no neighbourhood problems’
No friends: a dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if the respondent says that he/she 
has no friend with whom he/she could discuss personal matters (the survey questions asks 
about the number of such friends), and 0 otherwise.
Number of active earners in the household: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value o f 1 
depending on how many active earners are in the household: 1, 2 or more. The base 
category is none.
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Number o f children: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 depending on how 
many children the respondent has: none, 1 ,2 ,3  or more. The base category is none.
Number of pensioners in the household: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 
depending on how many pensioners (other than disability pensioners) are in the 
household: 1,2 or more. The base category is none.
Number of unemployed in the household: a set of dummy variables, taking on the value of 1 
depending on how many unemployed are in the household: 1, 2 or more. The base 
category is none
Other inactive: All those who are not employed, pensioners or students. It thus includes all 
the inactive who are not recorded as students. A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the 
respondent is inactive and is not a student, and 0 otherwise.
Pensioner. Old-age, widowhood and other pensioners, excluding disability pensioners. 
Those pensioners who are employed were treated as part of the labour force, thus were 
excluded from this variable. A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent is pensioner, 
and 0 otherwise.
Real income, real income of net equivalised household income, in 1992 prices. The 
equivalence scale used is that of the OECD, which assigns a weight of 1 to die first adult, 
then 0.7 to each additional adults, and 0.5 to each child in the household. (On the details 
of the income components of total household income, see Appendix C.)
Religious: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent attends religious service or 
church at least once a mondi, and 0 odierwise.
Savings: continuous variable, the natural logarithm of total household savings, either cash, 
bank account, bonds, foreign currency or other forms. For comparability, the original 
categorical variable in 1992 has been converted into a continuous one by using mean 
values in each category.
Sef-employed: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent works as self-employed, and 
0 otherwise.
Share o f individuals income mthin household: continuous variable, based on the ratio o f annual 
personal and total annual household income (On the components of these two measures 
of aggregate income, see Appendix C.)
Student: A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent is a student, and 0 otherwise.
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Unemployed: ILO definition, those who are not working, are actively searching job and are 
available to work. Those who had worked in a family enterprise or business in the previous 
week are also excluded. A dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent is unemployed, 
and 0 otherwise.
Value of housing (In): continuous variable, showing the natural logarithm of self-reported 
market value of housing. (The survey question asked about the possible sale price. In cases 
where the sale price variable was missing it was replaced by the Value of housing7 variable, 
which was also self-reported in the survey.)
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APPENDIX C 
COMPONENTS OF AGGREGATE INCOME VARIABLES
Total personal incomeTotal household income 
-  received by the household as a whole
TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME
  Income from agricultural production and consumption
 Letting and leasing property
Other household income
Income from main job, 
incl. benefits in kind
Annual profit and dividend
Rare income
Occassional incomes
‘ Social insurance benefits
Social incomes
Other transfers
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TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME -  RECEIVED BY THE HOUSEHOLD AS A WHOLE
1992
(hljovosz)
1998
(h7jhhtot)
Income from agricultural production and Income from agricultural production and
consumption (hljmgosz) consumption (h7jagtot)
Income from sales of agricultural products Lifestock farming
(h 1 jmgela= h 1 gaelap +h 1 gaelfp+ h 1 gnelap+ (h7gaelap + h7gaelfp +h7gaelft,
+ hlgnelfp) +h7gafogp)
Saving from consumption of own agricultural Crop production
products (h7gnelap +h7gnelfp +h7gnelft
(hljmgtak= hlgaelfH hlgafogp +hlgnelft+ 
hlgnfogp)
+h7gnfogp)
Letting and leasing property (hljkiad) Letting and leasing property (h7jrent)
Flat (hljlakkl) Flat (h7jlakkl)
Room, bed (hljalbkl) Room, bed (h7jalbkl)
----- Cottage (hljnyakl) Cottage (h7jnyakl)
Machinery, equipment (hljgepkl) Machinery, equipment (h7jgepkl)
Land, agricultural property (hljfolkl) Land, agricultural property (h7jfolkl)
Other household income Other household income
Prize (hljnyerl) Prize (h7jnyerl)
Grant (hljsegl) Grant (h7jsegl)
Cash support from non-household member Child support grant (tartasdij) (h7jtdjkl)
(hljtamol) Cash support from non-household member
Compensation bonds (hljkarpl) (h7jtamol)
Present (H7jajanl)
- Interest income (h7j inter )
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TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME (eljoszan, e7joszan)
Annual profit and dividend (eljnyean, e 7jnyean)
Profit, dividend, and shares from enterprises 
(eljvpenz, e7jvpenz)
1992: Profit, dividend, and shares from other enterprises (e7jvsump)
Vallalkozdi j&vedelmek
Vallalkozas(ok)bol szarmazd nyereseg, 
osztalek, reszesedes
Other transfers (eljotran, e7jotran)
Income from private care contracts (eljprian, e7jprian) 
Income transfers (eljtaman, e7jtaman)
Life insurance and compensation bonds (eljinsan, e7jinsan) 
Insurance compensation (eljbizan, e7jbizan)
Transzfer jOvedelmek
Eletjaradek eltartasi szerzodesbol 
Penzbeni tamogatas (haztartason kivulrol) 
Eletjaradek biztositotol, karpotlasbol 
Biztositasbol szarmazo egyeb jovedelem
Rare income (eljritan, e7jritan)
Bonus, premium (eljpremp, e7jpremp) 
Daily travel allowance (eljnapip, e7jnapip) 
Patent, copywright (eljujitp, e7jujitp) 
Severance pay (el fevegp, e7fevegp)
Other rare income (eljegyp, e7jegyp)
Foalldshoz kapcsolddd vagy egy6b ritka jOvedelmek 
premium, 13.havi frzetes, nyeresegreszesedes 
napidij
ujitasi, talalmanyi dij 
vegkielegites
egyeb ritkan elofordulo jovedelem
Income from main job, incl. benefits in kind (eljmjan, e7jmjan) 
Income from main job (eljmaian, e7jmaian)
Overtime payment (eljtotan, e7jtotan)
Luncheon vouchers (eljlunan, e7jlunan)
In-kind benefits (car, petrol) (eljcaran, e7jcaran) 
1992: In-kind benefits (travel, flat, other)
(eljtrvan, eljrenan, eljcloan)
1998: In-kind benefits (travel, flat, other) (e7jbenan)
Alkalmazottak fomunkahelyi jOvedelme 
Fomunkahelyi ber, kereset 
Tulora
Etkezesi hozzajarulas
Gepkocsi hozzajarulas, benzinpenz
Utazas, alberlet es egyeb hozzajarulas
Utazas, alberlet es egyeb hozzajarulas
Social incomes (eljszcan, e7jszcan)
Social assistance to long-term unemployed (eljuean, e7juean) 
Training grants to unemployed (eljtraan, e7jtraan)
Student grants (eljgran, e7jgran)
Child benefit (eljchian, e7jchian)
Local authority assistance (eljassan, e7jassan)
Special (emergency) payment (eljspean, e7jspean)
1998: Child benefit (means-tested) (e7jcban)
1998: Old-aee means-tested benefit (e7ioldan)
Szocidlis jOvedelmek
Munkanelktiliek jovedelempotlo tamogatasa 
Atkepzesi tamogatas 
Osztondij, zsold 
Csaladi potlek 
Rendszeres szocidlis segely 
Rendkiviili es egyeb segely 
Gyermeknevelesi tamogatas (GYET) 
Idoskori iaradek
Occassional incomes (eljkulan, e7jkulan) 
part -time jobs (eljkmuan, e7jkmuan) 
occassional unskilled jobs (eljasman, e7jasman) 
occassional agricultural work (eljmgan, e7jmgan) 
1992: other occassional jobs 
(eljaszan, eljaeran, eljataan, eljafuan)
1998: other occassional jobs (e7jaegan) 
trading (eljkeran, e7jkeran) 
dealer’s fees (eljjutan, e7jjutan) 
tin<s /p i  ih n ran  p7 ihnran 'l
Rendszeres 6s alkalmi kiilOnmunka
masod-, mellekallas, reszfoglalkozasu vail, 
alkalmi segedmunka 
alkalmi mezogazdasagi munka 
alkalmi szakmunka, alkalmi takaritas, 
gyermekmegorzes, alkalmi fuvarozas 
egyeb alkalmi munka 
arusitas, kereskedelem 
jutalek, ugynoki munka, kozvetites
Hr»TT3va1n halanpriT
Social insurance benefits (eljsian, e7jsian)
Sick pay (eljsckan, e7jsckan)
Unemployment benefit (eljueman, e7jueman) 
Maternity allowance (eljgyean, e7jgyean) 
Maternity benefit (eljgysan, e7jgysan) 
Old-age pension (eljpenan, e7jpenan) 
Disability pension (eljdisan, e7jdisan)
1998: Orphan’s benefit (e7joran)
1998: Widow(er) pension (e7jwidan)
Other pension (eljopean, e7jopean)
Other transfers (eljellan, e7jellan)
Tdrsadalombiztositdsi jOvedelmek 
Tappenz
Munkanelkuli jaradek
GYED
GYES
Oregsegi nyugdij 
Rokkantsagi nyugdij 
Arvaellatas 
Ozvegyi nyugdij 
Egyeb nyugdij
Egyeb ellatas (anyasagi segely, baleseti ell.)
OTHER SUMMARY MEASURES OF INCOM E
I n c o m e  f r o m  e m p l o y m e n t  
(e7jemp)
E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  i n c o m e  ( e 7 j e n t )
(includes, income from main 
job and rare income o f the self- 
employed)
Social and private transfers
Social insurance benefits
Social incomes (e7jszcan)
Other transfers (e7jotran)
Income from main job, incl. 
benefits in kind
A n n u a l  p r o f i t  a n d  d i v i d e n d  
( e 7 j n y e a n )
Rare income
Occassional incomes
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APPENDIX D 
INCOME VARIABLES: MISSING DATA ANALYSIS AND IMPUTATION
The original dataset for 1992 did not use imputation for missing income variables. In 
contrast, the 1998 dataset did so. In order to achieve comparability, I have imputed income 
data for 1992. The method followed was the same as the one described by the data supplier 
research institute (TARKI). In addition to this, in order to filter potential mistakes in the 
imputation process itself for 1998,1 did not use the derived variables of the institute, but 
made my own programme, following the detailed original one. Further to this, as a 
principle, I did not use any derived variables provided in the datasets. The summary 
income measures are also added up from detailed components of income, following the 
Hungarian conventions.
Missing data analysis
Household level variables
About half of the household level income variables are related to agricultural production, 
and ask about revenues from sales and savings due to production for own use. Other 
variables investigate revenues from lending various types of property, but also include 
grants and transfers. The first general investigation discovered that the coding of zero and 
missing values was to a great extent inconsistent. This had no major effect on the data 
analysis itself, but determined the mediod of further missing value analysis. The inspection 
also revealed that diere is only a single category of missing data, no distinction is made 
between ‘no response’, denial of response or ‘don’t know5 response.
The major goal of further missing data analysis was to diagnose whether the missing data 
process is random. For this, the observations for each variable were divided into two 
groups, observations with missing data and those with valid values. Due to the above 
mentioned confusion of zero and missing values, all variables with zero or missing values 
were classified as ‘missing’. Statistical test was then performed to determine whether 
significant differences exist between the two groups on other variables of interest. If I 
found no significant difference between the means of valid observations and missing
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values, then the missing data probably occurred randomly. (For more on missing data 
analysis, see Hair 1998).
The variables for the test had to be selected in a way that they did not have causal 
relationship with the income variables, otherwise I would inevitably detect the presence of 
a missing data pattern. For example using setdement types as a base of comparison for 
groups of missing and non missing observations o f agricultural production income would 
show clear signs of bias, due to die higher occurrence of agricultural activities in farms and 
small villages. The choice of such independent variables is not simple. Gender, age and 
setdement type seem to be suitable, but not equally for all household income variables.
I used t-test for testing if the means are equal for each two groups of observations (with 
missing and non-missing data). For the sake of validity two types of variables were 
excluded from the test diose income variables which had small number of observations (2- 
4) in one of the groups, and those, where there was an expected causal relationship 
between the income and the other variable. As a first step, the means of the two gender 
groups were compared for each income variable in order to test if men and women are in 
the same proportions among diose who have declared to have that type of income and 
those who have n o t For the bulk of the variables the hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the two means was accepted at 95% confidence level, so there was no sign of a 
missing data pattern. In case of a few exceptions, it was possible to identify an apparent 
causality. These variables could have been excluded from the test provided I had more 
information at the start of the analysis. For example, women (more precisely, households 
where there is higher number of women) tend to keep animals and grow plants for own 
consumption more likely, which is probably a social phenomena rather than a non­
desirable non-random missing data process.
T-tests based on age and setdement type variables showed that the missing data process is 
random for most income variables. One group of variables show significant and 
unexpected ‘age bias’, namely those who tend to receive and give money transfers and in- 
kind presents are younger (the younger have higher ratios of valid responses). One possible 
explanation is that children and young couples are more likely to receive such gifts from 
their parents (the average age is 28 and 32, respectively), for example as a support for 
buying a flat. This seems to be plausible, since the amounts of these transfers are often very
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high. It is more difficult to explain why younger people (with average age of 36) tend to 
give more presents than odiers (42 years on average). Further investigation of the 
relationship between the head of households and these transfers reveals that records of 
such transfers are distorted. Much more people remember of giving presents and cash 
support for others than of receiving such help. This shows that the simple frequency 
analysis (which was the base of the t-test) may not be accurate. More detailed analysis 
referring to the amounts of such transfers shows that age groups between 35 and 55 are 
net receivers and those above 55 are net supporters. The same group of variables referring 
to transfers and presents appeared to show a non-random missing data for setdement 
types. It seems that those who live in towns and big cities tend to support their relatives 
more than those in villages. A detailed cross-tabulation revealed that the amount of 
transfers differs gready as well. This may be explained by the fact that average incomes are 
higher in cities, thus simply those who have more tend to give more.
Individual level variables
The first general investigation found a few cases with obvious miscoding in case o f child 
benefit. This benefit type allows crosschecks for die number of children in the family and 
the employee status of the individual, which makes it possible to identify data problems. 
Eleven observations of child benefit were modified, in two cases the amount of benefit 
was corrected (deleting one extra zero where it was an obvious typo), in nine cases the 
values were entirely deleted (for pensioners widi no children under 18; by adding the 
condition ‘pensioner5 I could minimise die possibility diat die number of children were 
actually entered incorrecdy). I found 15 cases when non-pensioners (e.g. soldiers or 
mothers on maternity leave) were receiving old-age pensions. Since there is no further 
information for deciding whedier the benefit variable or the employment status variable 
was miscoded, I could not correct this mistake. The recipients of unemployment benefits 
were not coded as unemployed in 66 cases. Similarly to the previous case, due to lack of 
adequate information the problem could not be corrected. Outliers for other types of 
income were not corrected, because I can assume that they show real cases.
The method applied for missing data analysis was similar to that of household level 
variables. First I separated two groups, dividing missing and valid responses, for each 
income variable. Then I tested the hypothesis if the means of these two groups are equal 
on independent variables. The specification of these variables had to exclude predictable
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causal relationship between these and the income variables. Therefore e.g. I did not use age 
variable, because most work-related incomes, and benefits have clear age pattern. Similarly, 
the occurrences of child and maternity benefits were not compared in the two gender 
groups. All major income variables tested by t-test on gender and settlement type variables 
showed no signs of non-random missing data pattern.
Imputation method
The replacement of certain missing data is a well-known way of dealing with missing data. 
If we used observations with complete data only, it would distort our results, since due to 
the nature of certain income variables they occur only in a minority of the total cases. 
Another simple remedy for missing data would be to delete problematic cases. This 
method is not justified in this case for two reasons. First, we found no evidence of the 
occurrence of a major non-random missing data process. Second, it would harm the 
representativeness of the sample.
TARKI has used a simple method of imputation, called mean substitution, which is one of 
the more widely used methods. Mean substitution replaces the missing values for a variable 
with the mean value of that variable based on all valid responses. TARKI used a more 
refined version of this, first they divided all cases of the variable into subgroups based 
upon three other variables, and then replaced the missing value with the mean value of that 
variable in that specific subgroups. In this way for example missing income from main job 
was not substituted by simply die mean of all incomes from main job, but by the specific 
mean, which belongs to that educational level and setdement type.
The statistical literature identifies three major disadvantages of this method. First, it 
understates the true variance in the data, thus make the variance estimates derived the 
standard variance formulas invalid. Second, the actual distribution of values is distorted. 
Third, this method depresses the observed correlation because all missing data will have a 
single constant value (Hair 1998). Some of these disadvantages, however, occur in the case 
o f other imputation methods, such as cold deck imputation or regression imputation. Hot 
deck imputation, also used in the British Household Panel Survey, is a better alternative to 
means imputation, since it lacks most of the unfavourable characteristics of the latter 
method. Hot deck imputation ‘can be broadly defined as a method where an imputed value
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is selected from an estimated distribution for each missing value, in contrast with mean 
imputation, where the mean of the distribution is substituted’ (Little and Rubin 1987, p. 
60). (For more on various methods, see Kalton 1983; Little and Rubin 1987; Rubin 1987; 
Groves and Couper 1998.)
Despite the obvious advantages of other methods I have decided to use the same method 
as TARKI did. The major reason for this is conceptual. The major focus of the current 
research is well-being and its comparison to income, for which it seems useful to use a 
well-known and already analysed basis. A major change in the imputation method could 
result in a significantly different income values and income distribution, which would divert 
the primary focus of the analysis towards explaining the income data themselves. Finally, 
the application of the most sophisticated techniques, such as multiple imputations (Rubin 
1987) would have been rather time consuming.
Process of actual imputation
The imputation technique was mean substitution. As described before, it means that 
missing values of annual total income were replaced by relevant group means of valid 
cases. The group characteristics were identified on the basis of two criteria: (1) predictive 
power in determining incomes, and (2) availability (small number of missing cases). Thus 
employment status, educational level, age, region and gender have been selected as group 
identifiers, and the mean of total income in die specific subgroups have been used to 
estimate missing values for individuals in similar subgroups. In this way, each individual 
with missing income in the specific subgroup got one identical income estimate. The 
subgroups used as the base of imputation have been selected with special consideration to 
sample size, in order to ensure representativeness. If the sample size of the subgroup 
proved to be too small, then I used fewer group characteristics in order to get adequate 
group size and a representative mean figure.
This process, despite its drawbacks, is suitable to make estimates for overall incomes. 
However, it would be problematic to use it for replacement of missing income 
components, since in most cases there is no adequate information to decide whether the 
missing case is a denial of response or the individual simply did not receive that particular 
type of income. (Such distinction is possible for total income in most cases, based on 
responses to other questions and the inconsistency between the answers.) As a result of the
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imputation method applied, income components may not add up to total income, and 
there is smaller number of ‘valid’ responses for income components than to total individual 
or household income.
Inconsistencies of total income due to missing components have been dealt with by 
deleting those total household income figures where at least one member had a 
‘problematic income’ where no imputation was done.
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